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The UN Millennium Project is an independent advisory body commissioned by the UN 
Secretary-General to propose the best strategies for meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs are the world’s targets for dramatically reducing extreme poverty in its 
many dimensions by 2015—income poverty, hunger, disease, exclusion, lack of infrastructure and 
shelter—while promoting gender equality, education, health, and environmental sustainability.
The UN Millennium Project is directed by Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs, Special Advisor to the 
Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals. The bulk of its analytical work has 
been carried out by 10 thematic task forces comprising more than 250 experts from around 
the world, including scientists, development practitioners, parliamentarians, policymakers, 
and representatives from civil society, UN agencies, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the private sector. The UN Millennium Project reports directly to UN 
Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan and United Nations Development Programme Administrator 
Mark Malloch Brown, in his capacity as Chair of the UN Development Group.
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Foreword
The world has an unprecedented opportunity to improve the lives of bil-
lions of people by adopting practical approaches to meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals. At the request of UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan, 
the UN Millennium Project has identiﬁed practical strategies to eradicate 
poverty by scaling up investments in infrastructure and human capital 
while promoting gender equality and environmental sustainability. These 
strategies are described in the UN Millennium Project’s report Investing in 
Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, 
which was coauthored by the coordinators of the UN Millennium Project 
task forces.
The task forces have identiﬁed the interventions and policy measures 
needed to achieve each of the Goals. In Trade for Development, the Task Force 
on Trade makes a strong case for a multilateral trading system that is more 
supportive of economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing coun-
tries. To this end, it puts forward a set of goals to be accomplished by the 
ongoing Doha Round as well as longer term objectives for the trading system 
to achieve by 2015 and 2025. It suggests that the High-Level Millennium 
Review of September 2005 be used to advance the trade for development 
agenda. 
This report emphasizes high-income countries’ responsibility to lead by 
example in pursuing more open markets and in supporting the Least Devel-
oped Countries to raise their export competitiveness. It proposes concrete and 
practical steps that governments and international agencies can undertake to 
bring trade to bear on development. 
The report has been prepared by a group of leading experts who contrib-
uted in their personal capacity and volunteered their time to this important 
task. I am very grateful for their thorough and skilled efforts, and I am sure 
iv Foreword
that the practical options for action in this report will make an important 
contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. I strongly 
recommend it to anyone who is interested in how to mobilize trade for 
development. 
Jeffrey D. Sachs
New York
January 17, 2005
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The report suggests ideal trade liberalization targets for both 2015 and 
2025, which heads of state could adopt in the context of the “2000 plus 5” 
high-level review of the Millennium Summit. The report emphasizes the 
importance of complementing the trade agenda with sufﬁcient support to poor 
countries for generating the sources of revenue needed to compensate for losses 
incurred as a result of lowering import duties, for building the human and 
physical infrastructure they need to beneﬁt from increased market opportuni-
ties, and for adjusting to erosions of existing trade preferences stemming from 
multilateral negotiations.
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xixMillennium Development Goals

In September 2000 the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted by all the 
presidents and prime ministers present at the Millennium Summit, and it was 
endorsed unanimously by the members of the United Nations General Assem-
bly. It grew out of a set of “international development goals” of 1996 and reaf-
ﬁrmed the commitment of UN members to achieving signiﬁcant, measurable 
improvements in people’s lives (see the list of Millennium Development Goals 
on pages xviii–xix).
Millennium Development Goal 8 is the topic for this task force. Funda-
mental to this Goal is contributing to and upholding an open, equitable, rules-
based, predictable, and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system. Uphold-
ing such a system is also important for achieving other Goals. The mandate of 
this task force is to explore how the trading system can be improved to support 
developing countries, with special attention to the needs of the poorest of them. 
This overview presents our main conclusions and recommendations.
Main conclusions
Trade openness can be a powerful driver of economic growth, which is indis-
pensable to reduce poverty and foster development. Trade, however, is not 
a silver bullet for achieving development. There is no way around the other 
institutional, macroeconomic, and microeconomic conditions that, along with 
well designed social policies, must also be met to attain development. Yet it is 
very likely that if developed countries open their markets signiﬁcantly more to 
developing countries and developing countries also become more open, pov-
erty would fall faster worldwide, including in most of the poorest countries, if 
the needed complementary policies are in place.
Achieving more open and fair markets for the promotion of development 
is the mission of the multilateral trading system. This system has evolved 
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progressively since the end of the Second World War and has delivered impres-
sive results for many countries, particularly those now fully industrialized. 
Throughout most of its existence, however, the trading system has mainly 
served the interests of developed countries. Sometimes by their own decision 
and other times by explicit exclusion dictated by richer countries, developing 
countries have not been inﬂuential in the design of the multilateral trading 
system. Moreover, most of the existing multilateral rules, through respective 
rounds, emulate to a great extent the policies, the practices, and most impor-
tant, the laws and regulations of a few developed countries.
The system is thus unbalanced against the interests of developing coun-
tries. Balancing the system will give developing countries greater economic 
growth potential, a major stake in developing multilateral trade rules and dis-
ciplines and in pursuing trade liberalization, and a more effective capacity to 
expand trade and defeat poverty.
That balancing goal was the raison d’être of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) Round of trade negotiations launched in November 2001, at 
least according to the rhetoric.
But this sense of purpose was short-lived. With key deadlines missed and 
progress practically nil on every issue contained in the DDA, the WTO Min-
isterial Conference of September 2003 collapsed amid acrimony. There is no 
single reason to explain this; however the failure of the US, the EU, and Japan 
to lead by example is a major one. 
WTO Members have since made a courageous effort to revive the Doha 
Round, but a lot more will be required. The 2004 Doha Work Programme 
framework, while necessary to prevent the collapse of the Round, is far from 
sufﬁcient to sustain it. 
The real work remains to be done, and a sense of urgency is required if the 
Round is to be completed by the end of 2006 or very early 2007 at the latest. If 
this narrow window of opportunity is missed, it is hard to see how the Round 
can be completed in time to contribute to achieving the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals by 2015. 
All WTO Members must identify the core priorities of a real “Development 
Round” and make concrete political and ﬁnancial commitment to achieving 
them. What must be done in the Doha Round and beyond? 
Agriculture—the biggest and costliest aberration
The biggest and most costly aberration of the trading system is to be found in 
agriculture. Farm producers in rich countries receive support in excess of $250 
billion, thanks to which their farmgate prices are almost one-third higher than 
world prices. Consumers in those countries pay for that protection through 
higher taxes and higher food prices. It’s their choice, but it must be stressed 
that by doing so they also impose a heavy burden on other agricultural pro-
ducers, particularly in developing countries. Agricultural protection in both 
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developed and developing countries is most assuredly a cause of poverty in 
poor countries. 
That rich countries should lead farm liberalization is beyond question. They 
should deliver substantial liberalization under all three pillars of the agricultural 
negotiations. They should shift their farm policies to income support—helping 
the poor and small farmers in rich countries adjust to more open farm markets. 
Export subsidies should be totally and deﬁnitively eliminated, as agreed in the 
DDA framework of August 2004. This will send a powerful signal to developing 
countries, which will follow suit with their own deeper market opening without 
the danger of trade and competition being greatly distorted by export subsidies. 
Negotiations on farm trade liberalization should also broaden their focus beyond 
elimination of export subsidies to stress reductions in tariffs—themselves a pow-
erful discipline on export subsidies—and reduction in domestic support. Market 
access negotiations must address both the unacceptably high peaks (often called 
tariff peaks) that remain in agriculture and tariff escalation, which continues to 
frustrate developing country efforts to move up the value chain.
The growth of the poorest countries depends crucially on a more dynamic 
farm sector—coming from increased domestic production for import substitu-
tion and/or exports. The fragility of these countries, however, suggests that, as 
a result of the Doha Round, they should reduce only their bound tariffs—since 
most of their applied tariffs are moderate—and also their applied tariff peaks, 
which cost their poor consumers dearly without bringing public revenue. Addi-
tional complications for the few poor countries that may be hurt by this mod-
est liberalization could be dealt with by a substantial increase in international 
aid—to provide the necessary means for a new wave of Green Revolutions and 
to ensure adequate food security.
Nonagricultural market access—developing countries should also 
liberalize
Although not as severe as in farm products, trade barriers in nonagricultural 
products continue to be signiﬁcant and particularly detrimental to develop-
ing countries. For example, developing countries’ exports to developed coun-
tries face tariffs that are, on average, four times higher than those faced by 
the exports of other developed countries. Developing countries’ exports suffer 
from tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and quotas imposed by rich countries on 
goods of great export potential. Although over the last few decades develop-
ing countries have undertaken an unprecedented level of trade liberalization, 
both on an autonomous basis and in the context of multilateral and regional 
negotiations, they still suffer, of course, from their own protection, which not 
only reduces their competitiveness in world markets, but also cancels enor-
mous opportunities of increased trade among themselves. 
While developed countries bear a special responsibility to liberalize in 
this Round, developing countries should also do so—in their own interests 
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and because they are important markets for each other and for the poorest 
countries. While still achieving less than full reciprocity, the poorest coun-
tries should nonetheless bind their tariffs at uniform and moderate rates in 
their own development interests. Adjustment costs should be economically and 
socially sustainable in developing countries, for example, by phasing in tariff 
reductions and providing international technical and ﬁnancial assistance. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) man-
dated the progressive phasing out of quotas by January 1, 2005. But phase-outs 
were heavily backloaded, with more than 50 percent of quotas—covering the 
most commercially valuable products—left to be removed by January 1, 2005. 
Backloading robbed developing countries of one of the major expected gains 
from the Uruguay Round and gave rise to legitimate doubts about the willing-
ness of the major importers to honor the agreement. It also undermined any 
chance of gradual and orderly adjustment in the sector; the abrupt removal of 
the remaining quotas on January 1, 2005, may create adjustment problems for 
importers and exporters alike, and is likely to unleash powerful protectionist 
forces. These must be effectively contained—for example, by restraining the 
proliferation of contingency protection measures. The correct answer lies not 
in pursuing protectionism by other means, but in providing adjustment sup-
port to the poorest countries and small suppliers highly dependent on this 
sector through trade and development measures. 
This has led some to call for an extension of quotas, but this would be a 
mistake. “Temporary” textile and clothing protection has been around for 40 
years; continued protection is likely only to prolong and further distort the 
adjustment process. Addicts always promise that they will quit tomorrow—the 
difﬁcult process of adjustment must be started now. Given the role that devel-
oped countries have played in creating the scale (if not the fact) of the adjust-
ment challenge, they must now be prepared to contribute to covering its costs. 
Assistance could help developing countries move into niche markets or up the 
value chain and strengthen their networks of suppliers and clients to meet just-
in-time production deadlines. Removal of trade barriers and domestic distor-
tions by developing countries themselves would also help increase competitive-
ness. Tariff preferences may ease adjustment for some countries in the short 
term, though restrictive rules of origin will need to be addressed. More help-
ful and less distortionary temporary breathing space could be provided by all 
developed countries extending duty-free and quota-free access to all products 
from the poorest developing countries no later than January 1, 2006.
Services—a major source of gains for developing countries
Liberalization of trade in services, especially of mode 4 (the temporary move-
ment of people to supply services), has been recognized as a major source of 
gains for developing countries, capable of bringing more beneﬁts to them than 
perhaps any other part of the Doha Agenda. Services liberalization promises 
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real development gains—in terms of the efﬁciency and growth potential of the 
economy as a whole, the export of goods and other services, and access to basic 
services to improve the lives of the poor. Done right, services negotiations offer 
developing countries an opportunity to act in their own economic interest and 
get paid for it. 
But services gains are not automatic, and producing an outcome that sup-
ports development can be a challenge, given the need for regulation to address 
complex issues of market structure, market failures, and noneconomic objec-
tives. Ensuring that services liberalization results in competition and increases 
access to services by the poor are key regulatory challenges—and will require 
increased assistance and regulatory creativity. But with appropriate care to the 
nature, pace, and sequencing of reform, adjustment—including that related to 
increased imports of labor-intensive services—can be managed. 
A serious “Development Round” must make progress on mode 4. Develop-
ing countries should seek to expand access for groups of interest to them (such 
as contractual service suppliers, and intracorporate transferees) and improve 
the transparency and usability of existing access. Bilateral or plurilateral agree-
ments could also be considered as an interim step. These cover a broader range 
of workers than mode 4 and provide scope to develop trust and complemen-
tary policies, (such as on brain drain, remittance transfer, return, and recogni-
tion). Over time, recruitment of workers under these schemes could be opened 
on a most favored nation (MFN) basis to any country that can implement 
the requirements. Agreements would be notiﬁed to the WTO, and interested 
WTO Members would have the opportunity to indicate their interest in joining 
or negotiating similar agreements. An MFN waiver would likely be necessary. 
Although a potentially useful interim step, bilateral or regional agreements are 
no substitute over the longer term for bound multilateral commitments under 
the WTO. WTO commitments remain the best and most effective way to 
deliver gains to developing countries, and commercially meaningful market 
access commitments on mode 4 are essential to fulﬁll the development dimen-
sion of the services, and Doha, negotiations.
Keeping markets open—not adding costs and uncertainties with new 
barriers
Hard-won gains in market access in agricultural and nonagricultural products 
are increasingly eroded by other policies that recreate trade barriers and/or cre-
ate transaction costs and uncertainty. 
Antidumping is used disproportionately against the exports of developing 
countries, with a severe chilling effect on their actual and potential trade—
though some developing countries are now also becoming major users of 
antidumping measures. The Doha Round could help in several ways. The de 
minimis threshold below which developing country exports are immune from 
antidumping could be raised—currently, as soon as imports from developing 
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countries emerge from being insigniﬁcant, they can be restricted by high anti-
dumping barriers. Additionally, national antidumping laws could be required 
to treat all affected domestic interests—import-competing industries, consum-
ers, and users—equally. 
Many developing countries are being denied effective market access by 
their inability to meet ever more—and ever higher—OECD standards or 
similar market-entry conditions. Exemptions are unlikely to help, serving only 
to brand developing country exports as inferior or unsafe, and providing no 
incentive to raise national standards for the beneﬁt of domestic consumers. 
Where standards are imposed by private buyers, there is even less scope for—or 
point in—seeking exemptions. Two things are essential if developing coun-
tries are not to be left behind: assistance to make effective use of the Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
disciplines to ensure that standards are not abused for protectionist purposes; 
and signiﬁcant assistance to construct the institutional frameworks and infra-
structure required to meet legitimate standards. Further, developing countries 
must be assisted to become more substantively involved in standard-setting 
processes and those standard-setting activities themselves need to be oriented 
toward issues of greater interest to developing countries. 
Preferences—to be replaced with equivalent development assistance
Rich countries have used preferences to divide developing countries and pro-
mote their narrower regional, sectoral, and political objectives, often estab-
lishing complicated regulations that exclude exports from otherwise eligible 
countries. The poorest countries have often received limited beneﬁts from 
preference schemes, including because preferences do nothing to address their 
multiple supply-side constraints. Beneﬁts are also often at the expense of other 
developing countries, and they are smaller than would be the case with either 
direct transfers or multilateral liberalization. But the price of preferences is 
continuing protection in rich countries. MFN liberalization—plus appropriate 
compensation for countries that may suffer adjustment problems—is likely to 
be a better path.
Although preference erosion is generally less than often thought, some 
countries may confront possible large losses and will require concrete assis-
tance. Given the history of preference programs, developed countries as a 
group should pay. They should replace preferences with equivalent develop-
ment assistance, which could be used by the recipient governments to fund 
adjustment costs. Operationalizing this deal should be an explicit part of the 
Doha Round. Any such assistance should be seen as part of a broader effort 
that is needed to help poor countries build and strengthen their ability to use 
trade beneﬁcially. However, speciﬁcally in the context of a Doha deal, there 
is a need to accompany global commitments to implement far-reaching trade 
reforms on an MFN basis with a temporary program to transfer additional 
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resources to developing countries, especially those that will experience prefer-
ence erosion losses.
Free trade agreements—imposing high transaction costs
Likewise, free trade agreements have a mixed record in achieving real liberal-
ization, especially on the hardest nuts (such as agricultural subsidies or sensi-
tive products). Beneﬁts may be limited (or achieved at the expense of oth-
ers) but costs can be high. Unlike at the WTO where developing countries 
can form effective coalitions, in free trade agreements (FTAs) they are at a 
disadvantage in resisting the inclusion of nontrade issues or erosion of their 
WTO rights (such as TRIPS+ on patents, especially pharmaceutical patents, 
and other WTO+ provisions). Multiple FTAs with differing rules of origin 
impose high transaction costs, particularly on small traders, and divert the 
limited negotiating resources of poor countries from the pursuit of multilateral 
liberalization. 
Singapore issues—trade facilitation promises gains
Three out of the four so-called Singapore issues (competition, investment, 
transparency in government procurement) have rightly been left off the Doha 
Round. None meets the essential tests of whether rules on regulatory issues 
should be included in the WTO: Are they trade related? Are they in line with 
broader development priorities? And what is the speciﬁc value of a WTO 
agreement? These issues are not priorities for poor countries and could divert 
scarce resources from other issues with higher development payoffs. Even 
where there are development beneﬁts, they may not be best pursued through a 
WTO agreement. 
Trade facilitation promises trade and development gains, but a WTO agree-
ment cannot be business as usual. It should not impose heavy obligations on 
developing countries and make light promises of assistance. The main value of 
a WTO agreement on trade facilitation would be as a mechanism for attract-
ing and channeling international assistance. From a development perspective, 
the best model is one where implementation deadlines could be customized in 
negotiations with individual countries (along the lines of GATS precommit-
ments), with technical and ﬁnancial assistance negotiated and customized as 
part of a package. A review process, involving expert organizations and other 
developing countries with similar experiences, could identify problems early, 
and negotiated extensions would be possible. Flexibility on dispute settlement 
could be provided by a “peace clause.”
Trade-related intellectual property rights—some areas of interest to 
developing countries
Should intellectual property rights have been included in the WTO? From 
an economic point of view, probably not, because they require a very delicate 
8 Overview
balance of market forces and public action—a balance unlikely to be the same 
for all countries. TRIPS obligations also tend to be “one size ﬁts all,” taking 
no account of levels of development and varying interests and priorities. While 
the agreement tries to mitigate this to some extent by providing for differing 
implementation periods, countries acceding to the WTO may not even have 
access to these normal ﬂexibilities. 
That said, the TRIPS Agreement is not without areas of actual or potential 
interest for developing countries (although the balance of costs and beneﬁts 
will vary among developing countries and according to the issue), nor is it 
without some ﬂexibility in its provisions. However, the ﬂexibility provided for 
implementation of TRIPS seems yet insufﬁcient on paper, and even more so 
in practice, and the assistance provided is clearly inadequate. There is a clear 
case for revisiting more of the rules to determine their impact on developing 
countries and any additional ﬂexibility required. In other cases, the agreement 
provides for ﬂexibility, but certain WTO Members—the US on drugs, the EU 
on geographical indications—are trying to narrow unacceptably the scope of 
that ﬂexibility.
Special and differential treatment—making it more effective and 
operational
While it is clear that developing countries beneﬁt from freer trade, it is equally 
clear that their capacity to do so is different from that of developed countries. 
Developing countries generally have a more limited ability to take advantage of 
new opportunities and to bear adjustment costs. Special and differential treat-
ment makes sense and should be made more effective and operational. 
There is no compelling case for exemption for rules on traditional trade 
policies. Additional freedom to use bad policies promises few development 
gains and risks harming other developing countries (such as subsidy wars). For 
rules on domestic regulations requiring actual investment of resources, a cost-
beneﬁt analysis based on four factors should guide what special and differential 
treatment to grant and to whom: the extent to which the rules are related to 
trade (market access), the extent to which they are in line with broader devel-
opment priorities, the costs of implementation, and the relative costs to others 
of nonimplementation. Assessments of costs and beneﬁts will vary by issue and 
the level of development of the country concerned. 
Where the costs are high and the trade and development beneﬁts mini-
mal, the issue should not be included in the WTO. Where the costs are high 
and development beneﬁts only a longer term priority, there is a strong case for 
extensive—but not eternal—ﬂexibility. Where development beneﬁts are greater 
or more immediate, a model that calibrates commitments with assistance and 
gives greater ﬂexibility to countries to determine appropriate implementation 
periods is appropriate. Where WTO rules promise real and short-term trade 
and development beneﬁts, concrete technical and ﬁnancial assistance should be 
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assured—say, through mandatory commitments subject to review and linked 
to implementation requirements of developing countries.
Coherence—adopting sound complementary policies and ramping up 
aid for trade
If trade liberalization is to contribute to economic growth, expanded trade, 
and poverty reduction, it must be coordinated with other policies at both the 
national and international levels. At the national level, policy coherence means 
the adoption of sound complementary policies by national governments to 
manage liberalization, as well as ensuring that trade policymaking is appropri-
ately informed by expertise across a range of policy areas. At the international 
level, coherence calls for a signiﬁcant ramping up of “aid for trade” by the 
development community (to negotiate, assess, and implement WTO agree-
ments and to design and implement adjustment policies) and for a clear and 
realistic view of the WTO’s role in technical assistance. This assistance for 
increasingly deeper capacity building must be additional to, and not at the 
expense of, development aid. Trade liberalization requires international nego-
tiations and international assistance, but its beneﬁts and challenges remain 
fundamentally a question of domestic economic and policy reform. 
Main recommendations
A real development round is achievable but will require some enlightened, 
albeit self-interested, leadership on the part of the major players in both devel-
oped and developing countries. Providing this leadership is not within the 
realm of trade negotiators’ capacities. Political leadership must be generated 
at a higher level, perhaps not even at the ministerial level but at the head of 
government level as part of a coherent policy approach—economic, political, 
and social—to meeting the development challenge. 
The year 2005 offers a rare opportunity to harness the broader momentum 
of the “2000 plus 5” high-level review of the Millennium Summit to seek a 
major political consensus among the heads of government of a group of 20 or 
so countries on the Doha Development Round and other topics crucial for 
achieving the Goals.
Heads of state can agree on the major strategic criteria to shape the mul-
tilateral trading system for the future. This grand vision would keep the eyes 
of negotiators preparing for the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, in Hong 
Kong (China) in December 2005, on the prize of a real development round 
and the contribution it could make to achieving the Goals. 
In this context it is recommended that leaders agree on the following ideals 
for the future path of the trading system: 
• In a conveniently distant long term (2025) the multilateral trading sys-
tem must deliver the total removal of barriers to all merchandise trade, 
a substantial and extensive liberalization of trade in services, and the 
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universal enforcement of the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimi-
nation in a way that supports attainment of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. This target is ambitious but not impossible, with politi-
cal will and appropriate support for adjustment. And there is a base to 
build on: Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies have 
already committed to free trade by 2010 for developed Members and 
2020 for developing Members. 
• The most useful WTO would be one focused solely on trade and 
relieved of other global economic governance tasks, which could be bet-
ter accomplished by other international instruments or entities.
Consistent with these criteria, more medium-term targets could be adopted. 
Greatly increased international technical and ﬁnancial support for reform and 
adjustment by developing countries will be needed to ensure the achievement 
of those targets; in the absence of such assistance, more ﬂexibility would be 
required. But given the potential beneﬁts, it is in all countries’ interests for 
substantial assistance to be forthcoming to underpin the following targets:
• By 2015, no bound farm tariff should exceed 5 percent for OECD coun-
tries, 10 percent for developing countries, and 15 percent for the poorest 
countries. All nontariff barriers, including tariff-rate quotas, should be 
removed by 2010.
• As soon as possible and no later than 2010, all export subsidies should 
be abolished, with comparable disciplines on similar instruments.
• Domestic support (such as price support, direct production subsidies) 
must be made both less trade-distorting (decoupled from production) 
and subject to an overall, signiﬁcantly lower limit. All countries should 
decouple all support payments to farmers by 2010 and cap all domestic 
support measures at 10 percent of the value of agricultural production (on 
a by-product basis) by 2010 and at 5 percent by 2015. The Green Box (of 
minimally trade-distorting subsidies) should be maintained for the poor-
est countries—with clariﬁcations or marginal additions such as support 
for diversiﬁcation, transportation subsidies for farm products, consump-
tion subsidies for domestic food aid, public assistance for establishing farm 
cooperatives, or institutions promoting marketing and quality control.
• Developed countries should bind all tariffs on nonagricultural mer-
chandise at zero by 2015, the target date for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. A mid-term target could be for no tariff higher 
than 5 percent by 2010. Ideally, developing countries should all be at 
zero tariffs by 2025. As soon as possible, these countries should bind all 
their tariffs in coherence with their applied rates. The poorest countries 
should also aim to bind all tariffs at a uniform and moderate rate.
• Duty-free and quota-free access for all exports from the poorest coun-
tries should be extended by all developed countries no later than Janu-
ary 1, 2006. 
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• The liberalization of mode 4 of the GATS (temporary movement of 
labor to provide services) should be adopted as a high-priority item on 
the international agenda, considering its potential beneﬁts for both 
developing and developed countries as well as the need to manage in 
a more orderly fashion the mounting migration pressures in the world. 
Developing countries’ liberalization to foreign direct investment must 
be matched by developed country liberalization to foreign labor. 
• The traditional approach to special and differential treatment must be 
revised away from the present, for the most part counterproductive, sys-
tem of exemptions from obligations and complex webs of discriminatory 
preferences. A trading system limited only to agreements that are in the 
trade and development interests of all Members to implement under the 
framework of binding multilateral trade rules should be accompanied 
by special and differential treatment that affords appropriately long and 
ﬂexible conditions to adjust to trade liberalization and real and substan-
tial aid for trade. Poor countries must be supported in generating the 
sources of revenue needed to compensate for losses incurred as a result 
of lowering import duties, in building the human and physical infra-
structure they need to beneﬁt from increased market opportunities, and 
in adjusting to erosions of existing trade preferences stemming from 
multilateral negotiations. 
• A temporary “aid for trade fund” commensurate with the size of the 
task, or signiﬁcantly ramped-up contributions through such existing 
channels such as the Integrated Framework, is needed to support coun-
tries in addressing adjustment costs associated with the implementation 
of a Doha reform agenda. Such funding must be additional to current 
aid ﬂows (and could be ﬁnanced out of the tariff revenue that is pres-
ently collected by OECD and higher income developing countries on 
imports that will be subject to Doha reduction commitments). A prior-
ity task for the development and trade communities could be the iden-
tiﬁcation of new and existing channels through which this additional 
funding could most efﬁciently be made available for relevant, targeted 
projects in developing countries.
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Introduction
In September 2000 the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted by 190 
presidents and prime ministers and passed unanimously by the members of 
the United Nations General Assembly. It grew out of a set of “international 
development goals” in 1996 and reafﬁrmed the commitment of UN members 
to achieving signiﬁcant, measurable improvements in people’s lives (see the list 
of Millennium Development Goals on pages xviii–xix).
Millennium Development Goal 8 is the topic for this task force. Funda-
mental to this Goal is contributing to and upholding an open, equitable, rules-
based, predictable, and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system. It is 
also an important instrument for achieving other Goals. The mandate of this 
task force is thus to explore how the trading system can be improved to support 
the development of developing countries, with special attention to the needs of 
the poorest developing countries. 
Why is trade expansion critical for the Goals? 
Openness to trade is associated with higher incomes and better economic 
performance. While there are differences of view about the magnitude and 
strength of this relationship, the general direction of effect is not in doubt: no 
closed or isolated economy has performed better than those integrated into 
the world economy (Irwin 2003) (box 1.1). Openness to trade gives ﬁrms and 
households access to world markets for goods, services, and knowledge—low-
ering prices, increasing the quality and variety of consumption goods, and 
fostering specialization of economic activity in areas where countries have a 
comparative advantage. Trade generates more investment and fosters higher 
productivity of domestic industries as a result of competition and access to 
knowledge. Trade is important for generating the positive externalities that are 
associated with learning through the diffusion and absorption of technology.
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For all countries, trade is an important source of wealth generation, and can 
lead to more rapid economic growth. It can generate the foreign exchange that 
countries need to import essential technologies (such as farming equipment or 
spare parts for manufacturing). It makes access to these technologies possible, 
and the absence of trade barriers lowers their cost. These technologies in turn 
boost the productivity and competitiveness of domestic producers, who also gain 
from access to larger, wealthier markets abroad. For companies in developing 
countries, access to other markets can be essential to generate the level of demand 
necessary to enable them to exploit economies of scale and generate sustained 
growth. The greater efﬁciency of local ﬁrms also beneﬁts consumers, through 
signiﬁcantly lower prices and greater availability of imported goods and services 
through imports (McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera 2001; Oxfam 2002).
Box 1.1
Why openness to 
trade matters
Source: Irwin 2003.
The share of investment in GDP is positively correlated with growth in per capita income, 
and trade is positively correlated with investment. Over the period from 1950 to 1998, 
within-country capital investment as a percent of GDP was 1.9 percentage points higher 
in a liberalized regime than in a nonliberalized regime. Tariffs and other trade barriers that 
raise the domestic price of capital goods mean that each investment dollar buys less 
capital, reducing the efﬁciency of investment spending. This is harmful to investment and 
therefore to growth as well: empirical evidence tends to suggest that the free importa-
tion of intermediate and capital goods is an effective way of promoting investments that 
increase growth.
In addition, trade contributes to productivity growth in at least two ways: it serves as 
a conduit for the transfer of foreign technologies (knowledge and know-how) that enhance 
productivity, and it increases competition in a way that stimulates industries to become 
more efﬁcient and improve productivity. 
The ﬁrst channel, where trade serves as a conduit for the transfer of foreign technolo-
gies, operates in several ways. One is through the importation of capital goods and equip-
ment. Imported capital goods that embody technological advances can greatly enhance 
an economy’s productivity. To the extent that trade barriers raise the price of imported 
capital goods, countries are hindering their ability to beneﬁt from technologies that could 
raise productivity. The second channel by which trade contributes to productivity is by 
forcing domestic industries to become more efﬁcient. Trade increases competition in the 
domestic market, diminishing the market power of ﬁrms and stimulating them to improve 
their efﬁciency; otherwise, they risk going out of business. 
Over the past decade, study after study has documented this phenomenon. Detailed 
analyses of India’s trade liberalization in 1991 and the Republic of Korea’s trade liberal-
ization in the 1980s reached essentially the same conclusion: trade not only disciplines 
domestic ﬁrms and forces them to behave more like a competitive industry, it also helps 
increase their productivity. And the higher an economy’s productivity, the higher that coun-
try’s standard of living.
Aggregate economic growth differences have been largely responsible for the differ-
ences in poverty alleviation across regions. While the relationship between growth and 
poverty alleviation is affected by the distribution of income, initiatives that boost eco-
nomic growth are likely to be helpful in the ﬁght against absolute poverty. Trade liberaliza-
tion is one such an initiative to boost economic growth.
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Policies that shelter the economy from the world market impede these spill-
over beneﬁts and dynamic gains (see box 1.1). Of course, such gains are not auto-
matic and depend upon appropriate complementary policies. Also important are 
“fundamentals” that determine the incentives for ﬁrms to invest in a speciﬁc 
country. The business environment, the quality of infrastructure, education and 
training, and the labor force, among other factors, will play an important role in 
determining the relative costs of production and the competitiveness of ﬁrms. 
Domestic policy settings are key determinants of the conditions for mar-
kets to develop. In many developing countries, private sector growth faces a 
range of impediments. Complex or poorly enforced regulations affecting the 
entry of new ﬁrms (for example, registering a ﬁrm in Angola takes 146 days 
and costs more than 8 times the average per capita income) and their opera-
tion (such as complex tax codes that discriminate against smaller ﬁrms) and 
barriers (high costs) to exit of ﬁrms inhibit private sector growth and entrench 
the informal economy. Trade liberalization may do little to stimulate growth 
in economies with limited competition or distorted capital and labor mar-
kets—increased openness to trade is positively correlated with income in all 
countries, but is associated with a lower standard of living in economies that 
heavily regulate new entry or impose high costs on restructuring (Bolaky and 
Freund 2004). 
The absence of laws—for instance, of bankruptcy laws to facilitate orderly 
exit—can also stiﬂe entrepreneurship and deter investment. The creation of 
an enabling environment for markets to develop requires the rule of law (both 
an appropriate set of laws, in particular for protecting property rights and 
resolving contractual disputes, and the fair and effective enforcement of those 
laws), as well as investment in the basic infrastructure that underpins the whole 
economy (energy, roads, water, and telecommunications, as well as health and 
education) (UNDP 2004b). Inserting developing countries into global pro-
duction and supply chains also requires improving the quality of products, 
upgrading the technological and skill content of export activity, expanding the 
base of domestic ﬁrms able to compete internationally, and developing links 
with global production and distribution networks (UNCTAD 2003c).
Increased trade is an important instrument—not a goal in itself. More 
trade will not necessarily result in expanded national income or poverty 
reduction—this is a function of the whole set of the economic, social, and 
political conditions that inﬂuence development. In moving toward a more 
open trade regime, adjustment costs also need to be taken into account. While 
more trade and specialization will help increase aggregate real income over 
time, some groups in society will lose in the short run, and others may confront 
a permanent reduction in expected income. Measures to safeguard the interests 
of poor households are particularly important in the design of policy reform. 
Furthermore, trade performance and the gains from trade enjoyed by a coun-
try also depend on what trading partners do. Foreign market access restrictions 
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may lower (raise) the prices of exports (imports) and have negative effects on the 
terms of trade, the incentives to investment, and the growth potential of develop-
ing countries. That is, international policy settings also matter. For developing 
countries to beneﬁt from their comparative advantage (low labor costs, resource 
endowments) and expand their trade, the restrictions and barriers to their exports 
of goods and services must be removed—along with anticompetitive practices 
and distortions in key sectors such as agriculture and services. 
Developing countries and trade
During the past 50 years growth in world trade has outpaced growth in world 
GDP—in the last 20 years by a factor of two—and exports now represent 
almost one-ﬁfth of global GDP (Oxfam 2002). Exports have grown faster than 
GDP in most developing regions, with the share of trade in GDP increasing 
between 1992 and 2002 by 7 percent for developing countries and 10 percent 
for low-income countries. Exports now account for more than one-quarter of 
GDP in developing countries, and the developing country share of global trade 
has increased from one-ﬁfth to one-quarter over the last decade. Part of this 
rise has been in manufactured goods, exports of which from developing coun-
tries rose at 12 percent a year between the mid-1980s and 2000, with exports 
of high-technology goods increasing at more than 20 percent a year over the 
same period (Oxfam 2002).
A similar picture emerges for foreign direct investment (FDI) over the 
same period, with very large increases in the ratio of stocks of FDI to GDP in 
Table 1.1
Inward and outward 
stocks of foreign 
direct investment 
as a percentage of 
GDP, selected years
 
Source: Adapted from 
UNCTAD 2003e, table B.6.
Region/economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Least Developed Countries
Inward 3.1 4.1 4.9 9.9 19.6 21.8 23.4
Outward 0.6 2.6 1.1 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.5
Developing countries
Inward 12.6 16.4 14.8 16.6 31.1 33.4 36.0
Outward 3.8 3.8 3.9 5.8 12.9 12.8 13.5
Developing countries, minus China
Inward 13.5 18.3 15.6 16.1 30.9 33.4 36.0
Outward .. 4.4 4.3 6.3 15.1 15.1 16.1
Developed countries
Inward 4.9 6.2 8.2 8.9 16.5 17.9 18.7
Outward 6.2 7.3 9.6 11.3 21.4 23.0 24.4
World
Inward 6.7 8.4 9.3 10.3 19.6 21.2 22.3
Outward 5.8 6.6 8.6 10.0 19.3 20.4 21.6
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both developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (table 1.1). Increases 
have occurred in all developing regions (Africa, Latin America and the Carib-
bean, Asia and the Paciﬁc), and are signiﬁcant even without China. Between 
1980 and 2002 inward stocks of FDI for developing countries increased from 
approximately $307 billion to some $2.3 trillion, and for LDCs from approxi-
mately $3.4 billion to $46 billion (UNCTAD 2003f). Developing countries 
are also a growing source of investment. Outward stocks more than tripled as a 
percentage of GDP between 1980 and 2002. For LDCs, the percentage, while 
much smaller, quadrupled over the same period. 
Underpinning this growth in trade and FDI has been signiﬁcant liberaliza-
tion in recent decades by both developed and developing countries. However, 
barriers in many countries remain high, especially for goods and services in 
which developing countries have a comparative advantage, such as agriculture 
and labor-intensive manufactures and services. The gains from removing these 
barriers would be substantial. 
Estimates of the gains from liberalization vary according to the assumptions 
used.1 For instance, the World Bank (2003a) has estimated gains from deep lib-
eralization of goods trade (services are not included) as $520 billion for the world 
in 2015 in 1997 dollars and $350 billion for low- and middle-income countries. 
It estimates that this should reduce the number of people living on $1 a day by 
61 million and those living on less than $2 a day by 144 million.2 Factoring in 
dynamic gains, this reform would boost GDP growth rates for developing coun-
tries by one-third—from 4.6 percent to 6.1 percent in 2015 (Anderson 2004). 
Other estimates suggest that the dynamic gains from trade liberalization will 
increase developing countries’ income by approximately 3 percent to 5 percent of 
their GDP by 2010–15, allowing for a period of adjustment (the static gains are 
smaller, ranging from 1 percent to 2.5 percent) (Cline 2004). 
It should be stressed that these are potential gains. As noted above, their 
realization is conditional on an environment that allows the associated move-
ments of labor and capital across sectors to occur, that encourages the needed 
investment in new sectors of activity, and that provides the vulnerable with 
some assurance that they will be assisted if necessary. Insofar as these condi-
tions are not met, complementary domestic reforms need to be implemented 
prior to and in conjunction with the global trade reforms. Analysis of the pro-
spective impacts of global reforms at the national level is therefore important. 
As illustrated in the LDC case studies that were undertaken for this report, 
global reforms, while potentially helping many of the poorest in society, may 
also impact negatively on poor households, depending on their circumstances 
and initial conditions. Policy needs to be designed to offset to the extent pos-
sible any major negative impacts a global reform may have on a substantial part 
of the more vulnerable in society. Some governments will have the capacity 
to redistribute some of the local gains from global reforms, while others may 
confront much greater constraints. The industrial countries have an important 
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role to play in designing a set of global reforms that will maximize the positive 
impact on poverty reduction—both in terms of their own reforms and the 
“policy space” that may be required for poor trading partners—and putting 
into place a parallel effort to provide poor countries with ﬁnancial assistance 
to address adjustment costs. 
The country case studies, as well as recent research assessing the likely global 
impacts of alternative Doha Round outcomes, also reveal that that the above-
cited potential beneﬁcial effects of a round on poverty are very much conditional 
on an ambitious outcome. Less ambitious scenarios are unlikely to generate a 
signiﬁcant impact. While this means that adjustment costs will be small, most 
likely negligible for poor countries, the same is true of beneﬁts (box 1.2).
Box 1.2
Impacts of 
a “limited” 
Doha Round
Source: Hoekman, Nicita, 
and Olarreaga 2004.
What would be a Doha Round outcome that seems plausible today? The July 2004 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations suggest that eliminating export subsidies on farm 
products could be agreed. Concerning tariffs, past rounds have varied in terms of reduc-
tions in protection, but often have aimed for average cuts of one-third or less in the aver-
age level of protection. However, it must be underlined that WTO negotiations focus on the 
level of tariffs commitments, not on applied rates of protection. This is crucial in the Doha 
Round context because bound tariffs on farm products are often very high—hence, cuts 
may affect bound tariffs while leaving applied tariffs largely unchanged.
As a result, a plausible Doha Round outcome could be as follows: all agricultural 
support and bound tariffs in agriculture and manufacturing would be cut by 40 percent, 
farm export subsidies would be eliminated, and trade facilitation would be improved (it 
is assumed that it would bring developing countries halfway toward an average index of 
facilitation [see chapter 9] developed by Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki 2003). It must be 
underlined that this outcome is very limited. A 40 percent cut in bound tariffs will lower 
the average applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rate in the world only from 10.8 
percent to 9.5 percent; it will have no implications for average tariffs in many low-income 
countries, and, as a result, it will have small effects on world prices of the products that 
are of greatest importance from a poverty perspective (the goods that poor households 
either consume or derive income from) such as food products or garments. Moreover, the 
focus of the current negotiations on farm export subsidies is misplaced because the key 
instrument for seriously improving market access remains tariff cuts (chapter 3).
Global welfare gains from such a limited Doha Round outcome may be in the range of 
$50 billion, of which 40 percent would accrue to developing countries. Low-income coun-
tries would obtain $2.3 billion, and the poorest countries $0.8 billion—or 1.7 percent of 
the potential global gains.
This result suggests two observations. First, it underlines the necessity, if one wants 
to get a development-friendly Doha Round, to obtain a much better outcome from the WTO 
negotiations than the one described here. As a matter of comparison, if all barriers were 
removed, estimated gains would be 10 times larger for the world as a whole. Second, devel-
oping countries could still get substantial beneﬁts from a limited Doha Round if they enforce 
domestic complementary policies (box 3.6). In other words, the more limited the outcome 
of the Doha Round, the more developing countries will have to rely on their own domestic 
policies. However, even a limited Doha Round offers a useful focal point to pursue domestic 
reforms and to mobilize the additional resources that are needed to implement them.
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The World Trade Organization
Given that multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) are currently under way, it seemed appropriate 
for this report to focus primarily on the WTO and the role that the trading 
system can and should play in supporting development. Given the positive 
association between trade openness, growth, and poverty reduction, the focus 
of the WTO on reducing barriers to trade makes it a useful instrument from a 
development perspective.
The WTO was born in 1995, as part of the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of 
negotiations held under the auspices of the WTO’s predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT emerged as part of 
the post–World War II international architecture to provide a framework for 
countries to manage their trade relations, including to help prevent a repeat of 
the disastrous experience of the Great Depression, and the discriminatory sys-
tem of managed trade and “beggar thy neighbor” exchange rate devaluations 
that helped to create it. The establishment of the WTO almost 50 years later 
reﬂected the increasing complexity of the trade agenda and the desire to create 
a permanent forum for the negotiation of trade and the effective settlement 
of trade disputes—and a set of trade policy-related disciplines that are ﬁrmly 
based on the principle of nondiscrimination.
The creation of the rules-based trading system reﬂected the post–World 
War II consensus that trade relations should be based on rules agreed by coun-
tries, and reinforced by institutions for cooperation, rather than on the exer-
cise of raw power. Good rules constrain the powerful and protect the weak; 
they make both better off. However, there are clearly some limits to the abil-
ity of sound rules and institutions to compensate for the inequalities between 
nations. In this sense, the WTO shares both the strengths and weaknesses of 
other parts of the postwar global architecture, including the United Nations. 
To remain effective and appropriate, rules must also evolve to reﬂect the chang-
ing global economy—and the changing membership of the trading system. 
Unlike its predecessor, the GATT, which was formally a provisional agree-
ment and functioned essentially as a contract between countries, the WTO is 
a full-ﬂedged international organization with 148 Members. A key feature of 
the WTO, perhaps inherited from the contractual nature of the GATT, is the 
extent to which it is member-driven. All trade rules and agreements are initi-
ated and negotiated by the Members; the WTO Secretariat has no right of 
initiative or power to interpret WTO agreements. All decisions in the WTO 
are taken by consensus—although the WTO Agreement technically provides 
for voting where consensus cannot be reached, on the basis of one Member, 
one vote, in practice only consensus is observed. 
The substantive rules of the WTO are listed in 23 multilateral trade agree-
ments, all of which are mandatory for all WTO Members. Most of these 
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agreements relate to trade in goods. Three framework agreements dealing 
with trade in goods, services, and intellectual property rights (respectively, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT; the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services—GATS; and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights—TRIPS) provide an overall structure. All the 
agreements are enforced through transparency, consultation, and dispute set-
tlement mechanisms.
The GATT covers trade in all goods, with the exception of agriculture and 
textiles, currently the subject of separate agreements. The exclusion of two key 
sectors of developing country export interest from the general rules for trade 
in goods has been the source of much bitterness. The exclusion matters—for 
instance, while the GATT in principle forbids the use of both quantitative 
restrictions (numerical limits or quotas) on imports and export subsidies, quo-
tas are still permitted in textiles trade, and export subsidies remain in use in 
agriculture. This anomaly has ended for textiles, which were due to be brought 
under GATT rules by January 1, 2005. However, whether agriculture should 
continue to be treated differently from trade in other goods remains a hotly 
contested issue among WTO Members.
Other agreements affecting trade in goods (and which take precedence 
over the GATT) include those on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, tech-
nical barriers to trade, industrial subsidies, contingent protection (antidump-
ing, safeguard, and antisubsidy actions), import licensing, trade-related invest-
ment measures, and a range of customs issues (such as preshipment inspection, 
customs valuation, and rules of origin). 
The GATS is a framework agreement for trade in services covering all 
services, barring certain types of air-trafﬁc rights and services supplied under 
the exercise of government authority. While there are some general disciplines, 
such as transparency and most favored nation (MFN) status, under the GATS, 
WTO Members can negotiate which service sectors they open to foreign sup-
pliers and the conditions under which they do so. This is in contrast to the 
GATT and other rulemaking multilateral trade agreements where market 
opening and other rules cover trade in all goods (bar agriculture and, until the 
end of 2004, textiles).
The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to protect six types of 
intellectual property, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Whereas 
the GATT and GATS mostly consist of general principles that constrain Mem-
bers, such as MFN status, TRIPS establishes speciﬁc standards. For instance, 
patent protection is to be provided for almost all inventions and is to be at least 
20 years in duration from the date of ﬁling. TRIPS also requires Members to 
ensure that enforcement procedures are available under their national laws, 
permitting effective action against any act of infringement of rights. 
Two plurilateral trade agreements, on government procurement and trade 
in civil aircraft, apply only to Members that have joined these agreements. 
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Broadly speaking, three basic principles underlie the trading system: trans-
parency, nondiscrimination, and reciprocity (although reservations apply to 
this last principle with regard to developing countries, as is discussed further 
below). These three principles are central to the beneﬁts countries hope to gain 
in becoming Members of the WTO (box 1.3).
Transparency
Transparency is a basic principle found in all WTO agreements. Generally, 
Members are required to make a wide range of information on their trade-related 
policies available to the public at large, through publication or similar means 
at the national level. In many instances, Members are also required to inform 
other WTO Members of their policies—in particular new or changed policies—
through notiﬁcation to the WTO. WTO Members may also seek information 
from each other regarding matters covered by WTO agreements at any time.
Box 1.3
Beneﬁts of the 
multilateral 
trading system 
for developing 
countries 
• Economically sound and legally fair multilateral rules protect the weaker players 
from the protectionism of the strong and help to create a more level playing ﬁeld 
for trade—say, for example, by banning export subsidies in industrial sectors (more 
easily or massively used by rich countries) or “voluntary” export restraints (more 
easily imposed on others by large economies). 
• The most favored nation (MFN) principle protects smaller players by preventing 
larger players from carving up world markets among them. MFN spreads the ben-
eﬁts of deals made between major players to all members of the trading system. 
It also prevents countries from using trade to punish or reward individual countries 
for political reasons.
• Sound rules give predictability to world trade, enabling necessary investments to 
be made by traders and investors.
• Sound multilateral rules reinforce domestic reform efforts and provide a means 
of locking in reforms and undermining pressures for policy reversal by powerful 
vested interests. As certain interests have more inﬂuence in politics than value in 
economics, the domestic political process will sometimes choose import protec-
tion even when it does not serve the national economic interest—hence the value 
of international obligations in the making of national trade policy.
• The trading system can facilitate the process of liberalization by providing a forum 
for mutual exchange of “concessions.” While many economic gains come from 
unilateral liberalization, exchanges of concessions can help to overcome political 
obstacles to reform by providing counterbalancing gains to losses suffered by par-
ticular groups.
• The transparency requirements of the trading system not only facilitate trade but 
help to promote good governance of trade policy by requiring countries to make 
information on trade-related policies publicly available—and hence contribute to 
global good governance.
• The trading system provides for the settlement of trade disputes in an orderly pro-
cess of negotiation and adjudication, rather than by sheer weight of economic or 
trade power alone.
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Nondiscrimination
The basic requirement of the GATT is that trade policies be nondiscriminatory. 
Nondiscrimination is reﬂected in two core rules. First, the MFN rule requires 
that Members not discriminate between like products originating in different 
trading partners. Rough shorthand for “treat all nations as well as you treat your 
most favored nation,” the rule requires that treatment granted to products from 
one country be granted to like products from all WTO Members. Second, the 
national treatment rule requires that once a good has entered into the territory 
of a country it is subject to the same treatment as like products produced domes-
tically (it is entitled to the same treatment as like national products). 
Nondiscrimination principles also extend to measures affecting trade in 
services under the GATS. MFN—in this case the requirement to treat like 
services and service suppliers from all other WTO Members as well as you 
treat those from your most favored country—is a general obligation, although 
countries had a one-off opportunity to claim exemptions from MFN at the 
time they joined the GATS. However, national treatment obligations (the 
requirement that a WTO Member extend to like services and service suppli-
ers from other WTO Members treatment no less favorable than that accorded 
to its own national services and service suppliers) are qualiﬁed; WTO Mem-
bers may maintain discriminatory measures provided they indicate those they 
are maintaining in their market-opening commitments. That is, each GATS 
member decides (negotiates) which service sectors will be subject to national 
treatment, and what measures that violate national treatment will be kept in 
place for that sector.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the engine of the WTO, reﬂecting a desire to limit the scope for 
free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule and the desire to obtain 
“payment” for trade liberalization in the form of better access to foreign mar-
kets. Reciprocity is not an economic necessity—a country gains overall from 
unilateral liberalization. But it is a political necessity: as different groups within 
the society win and lose, the existence of a forum for bargaining facilitates the 
political management of liberalization by enabling gains to national exporters 
to be used to offset losses to other groups. Reciprocity can thus help to overcome 
the power of vested interests resisting liberalization and domestic reform. 
Reciprocity is also at the heart of the notion that trade agreements must 
reﬂect a balance of rights and obligations, a package under which all parties 
gain. However, in view of their different capacities to implement and beneﬁt 
from trade agreements, concepts of nonreciprocity or special and differential 
treatment for developing countries have also become increasingly important 
principles of the system.3 The extent to which reciprocity or nonreciprocity—
and the ensuing balanced package—has operated in practice is discussed in 
the following section. 
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Developing countries in the WTO 
Developing countries in the GATT/WTO have sought to limit the reach of 
reciprocity by seeking special provisions in their favor known as “differential 
and more favorable treatment.” Such special and differential treatment, as it 
has come to be known, applies to all developing countries. As a general rule, 
developing countries in the WTO self-select—that is, they nominate their own 
status as developing. Within developing countries, LDCs generally beneﬁt 
from additional favorable treatment. LDC status is determined by the United 
Nations (appendix 1).
Special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions in the WTO span 
three main areas: market access, exemptions, and technical assistance. For 
market access, two kinds of provisions apply. First, developed countries can 
grant trade preferences to developing countries (that is, apply lower tariffs on 
goods exported from developing countries), which would otherwise be forbid-
den by the MFN rule. Second, other SDT provisions related to market access 
provide freedom for developing countries to make fewer or lesser market open-
ing commitments than developed countries in trade negotiations (nonreci-
procity). Other SDT provisions take the form of exemptions or deferrals from 
some WTO rules. For example, developing countries may have additional time 
to implement WTO Agreements (such as transition periods for implementa-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement), or may not be subject to certain provisions (for 
example, developing countries with a GNP of less than $1,000 per capita are 
exempt from the GATT prohibition on export subsidies, and thus are free to 
subsidize their merchandise exports if they wish). Finally, a number of SDT 
provisions relate to the provision of technical assistance by WTO Members to 
assist developing countries with the implementation of WTO agreements.
These three types of SDT are not equal, however. Only some—such as 
exemptions from certain provisions of WTO Agreements or extended time 
periods for implementation, and the scope to undertake fewer market opening 
commitments—are legally enforceable. Provisions relating to technical assis-
tance are “best endeavors”—that is, WTO Members are not legally obliged to 
provide such assistance, they are simply encouraged to make their best endeav-
ors to do so. Similarly, the granting of trade preferences to developing countries 
is permitted by the trading system but is not obligatory, and these preferences 
can be subject to additional conditions or can be unilaterally withdrawn by 
the granting country at any time. In sum, only exemptions and more limited 
market opening can really be thought of in WTO terms as a right; preferences 
and technical assistance are essentially conditional upon the goodwill of other 
WTO Members.
Even this limited special and differential treatment came at a price. First, 
exemption from WTO rules and market opening requirements meant that the 
trading system did not provide any impetus for developing countries to carry 
out their own liberalization, or any support for the development of sound trade 
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policies. Second, their lack of obligations under the system (nonreciprocity) 
undermined developing countries’ ability to inﬂuence the process and to make 
demands of others. The fact that, in terms of both their number and activism, 
most developing countries are latecomers to the multilateral trading system 
helps in part to explain why many present WTO rules predominantly reﬂect 
the interests of rich countries. The special treatment for agriculture and textiles 
is the clearest example of this—the permissive approach to subsidies in agri-
culture compared with other goods reﬂects the use of these subsidies by many 
developed countries. The same is true for import quotas in textiles (it is also a 
good example of how carve-outs from the rules do not help the development of 
sound trade policies in the developed countries concerned). More recently, the 
inclusion of far-reaching rules on the protection of intellectual property rights 
has strengthened perceptions that the WTO contract is unbalanced. 
If an important beneﬁt of the trading system is the governance of trade 
relations by the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle, then it is criti-
cal that those rules not be antithetical to the interests of developing coun-
tries. However, developing countries are increasingly questioning the extent to 
which the trade rules embodied in the WTO serve their development interests 
or take account of the particular challenges and constraints they face in inte-
grating into the global economy and pursuing their development strategies. 
Although the Uruguay Round saw the active participation of developing 
countries in the system for the ﬁrst time, many are now expressing disappoint-
ment with the outcome of that round, arguing that the expected beneﬁts have 
not materialized, while the obligations of implementation have exceeded both 
expectations and available resources. At the turn of the millennium, develop-
ing countries were vocal in their criticisms of their treatment in the WTO 
(box 1.4).
The Doha Development Agenda
Against this background, it is not surprising that many developing countries 
did not initially support the launch of a further round of negotiations. Imple-
mentation of the Uruguay Round was costly and unﬁnished, expected market 
access beneﬁts had not materialized, and there was a strong feeling that the 
rules were unbalanced. But much as these problems made developing coun-
tries wary of new negotiations, they also proved intractable in the absence of 
negotiations.
Backdrop to the new round
As mandated under the Uruguay Round “built-in agenda,” negotiations on 
agriculture and services commenced on January 1, 2000.4 These negotiations 
held some interest for developing countries, in particular to correct the imbal-
ances of the Uruguay Round: in agriculture, to try again to reduce developed 
country agricultural protection, and in services, to improve access for temporary 
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movement of people as service suppliers. However, it rapidly became apparent 
that these negotiations would make little progress in the absence of broader 
tradeoffs. 
Developing countries had also raised a long list of issues related to the imple-
mentation of Uruguay Round agreements. These related to both the need for 
greater assistance to implement the agreements and to dissatisfaction with the 
substance of the agreements themselves, which were argued to be both insuf-
ﬁciently supportive of development and overly restrictive in limiting the policy 
space available to developing countries (see box 1.4). This list included calls for 
changes to, or interpretations of, existing agreements to “rebalance” the Uru-
guay Round outcome. However, developed countries argued that many of these 
proposals were tantamount to renegotiation of the agreements—something 
which could only take place in the context of a broader round of negotiations. 
Developing country agreement to a new round thus emerged from the 
growing realization that a new round of negotiations was the only realistic route 
Box 1.4
Major 
shortcomings of 
the multilateral 
trading system 
for developing 
countries
• Market access gains from the Uruguay Round—especially in areas of real inter-
est to developing countries (such as agriculture and textiles)—never materialized. 
Where limited access was achieved, it was undermined by subsidies and contin-
gency protection actions such as antidumping measures and safeguards. 
• While market-opening commitments are binding and enforceable, special and dif-
ferential treatment provisions aimed at assisting developing countries (technical 
assistance, preferential access) tend to be “best endeavors,” or subject to unilat-
eral and discretionary implementation. 
• Rules reﬂect the priorities and needs of developed countries more than develop-
ing countries (for example, export subsidies are permitted for agriculture, but not 
industrial products). Further, rules—such as trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS)—can con-
strain the policy ﬂexibility of developing countries to use instruments arguably used 
by developed countries at comparable stages of their development. As the WTO 
agenda goes deeper into regulatory issues, the fear of imposing one-size-ﬁts-all 
rules on developing countries at pivotal stages of their development increases. 
• Insufﬁcient attention has been paid to the enormous demands on developing coun-
tries in implementing the outcome from the Uruguay Round. Agreements related 
to intellectual property, customs valuation, technical barriers to trade, and agricul-
tural food safety have been particular targets of criticism in this regard.
• The use of retaliation as the ﬁnal sanction for noncompliance in the dispute settle-
ment system is unfair to smaller developing countries whose capacity to inﬂict 
painful retaliation upon a noncomplying trading partner is extremely limited. 
• Developing countries are at a disadvantage in representing their interests and par-
ticipating effectively in the negotiations due to resource constraints. Many devel-
oping countries have small delegations; some are not represented in Geneva at 
all. The depth of technical expertise in capital might also be limited, with a few 
overstretched staff covering an increasing array of ever more complex negotiations, 
including at the regional level.
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for rebalancing the Uruguay Round outcome—agricultural market access and 
subsidy reform, changes to existing rules, making SDT more effective, and 
improved market access for temporary movement of natural persons to supply 
services could not be achieved outside of a new round. While eventually sup-
porting the launch of a new round, developing countries were determined to 
see their interests placed at the heart of the agenda.
This determination, and the growing activism and engagement of develop-
ing countries in the trading system since the Uruguay Round (with their “posi-
tive agenda”), led to the Doha Round of trade talks being termed the Doha 
Development Agenda. While the Doha Declaration signaled recognition of a 
problem by the broader WTO membership, there were no shared perceptions 
on how to solve that problem, or on what the precise “development” dimension 
of the Doha Development Agenda would be.
The original Doha mandate
The Doha Agenda agreed at the Ministerial Conference in 2001 spans market 
access, existing rules and proposals for new disciplines, enforcement, and SDT 
for developing countries, including technical assistance and capacity building. 
The market access–related policy agenda goes beyond tariffs and tariff quotas 
and spans trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture, so-called “contingent pro-
tection” (antidumping and safeguards), and the reduction of restrictions on 
trade in services. The Doha Agenda includes negotiating mandates on some 
issues and, for others, mandates continuing study with progress reports or rec-
ommendations to future ministerial conferences (box 1.5).
The wealth of references to developing country concerns in the Declara-
tion masked a lack of agreement on the real development priorities of the Doha 
Agenda. Developing countries had a range of speciﬁc priorities under the head-
ing “development,” varying according to their trade and development needs 
and interests. For some, the emphasis was on achieving real and signiﬁcant 
gains in market access—ﬁrst and foremost in agriculture, but also in textiles 
and temporary movement of natural persons to supply services. For others, the 
focus was on securing broad exemptions from any new commitments, as well 
as signiﬁcantly improved assistance to build their capacity to participate in 
both trade and trade negotiations. Most developing countries remained skepti-
cal about the development beneﬁts of the Singapore issues and, following the 
experience of the Uruguay Round, wary of launching negotiations in areas 
where the future scope of an agreement was unclear and the implementation 
costs potentially high.
These differences were mirrored in developed countries, some of which 
also saw the development dimension as resting chieﬂy with market access 
gains—but often with a greater emphasis on liberalization by developing coun-
tries than on a reduction of their own protection in sectors of developing coun-
try export interest. Others viewed the development dimension as being largely 
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Box 1.5
What’s in the 
original mandate 
of the Doha 
Agenda?
Source: WTO 2001b, 
2001c, 2001d.
Implementation-related issues and concerns—50 measures clarifying WTO Members’ obli-
gations in a range of agreements (agriculture, subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical 
barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, and rules of origin) were adopted in 
the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. Other outstanding imple-
mentation issues are an integral part of the Doha Work Programme, dealt with either 
under relevant speciﬁc negotiating mandates or as a matter of priority by the relevant 
WTO bodies, which must report to the Trade Negotiations Committee by the end of 2002 
on appropriate action.
Agriculture—without prejudging the outcome, mandates comprehensive negotiations 
aimed at substantial improvement in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing 
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic 
support. Special and differential treatment is to be an integral part of all elements of the 
negotiations and nontrade concerns are to be taken into account. Negotiating modalities 
are to be agreed by March 31, 2003.
Services—conﬁrms the negotiating guidelines already agreed by the Council for Trade in 
Services. Deadlines set for initial requests (June 30, 2002) and initial offers (March 31, 
2003).
Nonagricultural market access—negotiations shall aim to reduce or as appropriate elimi-
nate tariffs, including tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as nontariff bar-
riers, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries. Product coverage 
shall be comprehensive and without a priori exclusions. Negotiations shall take full account 
of the special needs and interests of developing country and Least Developed Country par-
ticipants, including through less-than-full reciprocity in reduction commitments. 
TRIPS—negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral system of notiﬁcation and 
registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits. Under the implementation 
agenda, the TRIPS Council will address the extension of higher geographical indication 
protection to other products, as well as the relationship between TRIPS and the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. A 
separate decision mandates the TRIPS Council to ﬁnd a solution to the difﬁculties faced 
by WTO Members with no or insufﬁcient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in using 
the compulsory licensing provisions of the agreement.
Singapore issues—named after the venue of the First WTO Ministerial Conference in 
1996, they are trade and investment, trade and competition, transparency in govern-
ment procurement, and trade facilitation. Negotiations are to take place after the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, on 
modalities of negotiations.
WTO rules—negotiations to clarify and improve disciplines on antidumping subsidies and 
countervailing measures (preserving the basic concepts, principles, and effectiveness of 
these agreements, their instruments, and objectives, taking into account the needs of 
developing and least developed participants); ﬁsheries subsidies, taking into account the 
importance of this sector to developing countries; and regional trade agreements, taking 
account of the developmental aspects of these agreements.
Dispute settlement understanding— improvements and clariﬁcations to be agreed by May 
2003.
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conﬁned to preferential market access for the poorest developing countries and 
increased technical assistance and capacity building for the implementation of 
WTO obligations. Expectations on all sides were high, but differing—on the 
extent of market access that would be offered and by whom, and on the level 
and purpose of trade-related technical assistance.
Box 1.5
What’s in the 
original mandate 
of the Doha 
Agenda?
(continued)
Trade and environment—negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on the relation-
ship between existing WTO rules and speciﬁc trade obligations in Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements (MEAs); procedures for information exchange between MEA secretariats 
and relevant WTO committees, and criteria for observership; and the reduction or, as 
appropriate, elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to environmental goods and ser-
vices. Work programs to explore the effect of environmental measures on market access 
(especially for developing countries and LDCs); TRIPS; and environmental labeling, with 
recommendations to the Fifth Ministerial Conference on future action, including the desir-
ability of negotiations. 
Electronic commerce—maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties on 
electronically delivered products until the Fifth Ministerial Conference. This refers to prod-
ucts that are both ordered and delivered online; products ordered online but delivered in 
physical form through regular channels attract the normal tariff.
Examination of issues relating to trade of small economies (recommendations for action 
to the Fifth Ministerial Conference)—trade, debt, and ﬁnance; and trade and technology 
transfer (both reporting on progress to the Fifth Ministerial Conference). 
Technical assistance and capacity building—core elements of the development dimen-
sion of the trading system. Support for mainstreaming of trade in national economic 
development plans and poverty reduction strategies. Priority for technical assistance to 
small, vulnerable, and transition economies and those not represented in Geneva. Need 
for coordination among bilateral donors. Director-General to consult with relevant agen-
cies, donors, and beneﬁciaries on ways of enhancing and rationalizing the Integrated 
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF) and the Joint Integrated 
Technical Assistance Program. Mandates development of a plan to ensure longer term 
funding of WTO technical assistance at an overall level no lower than that of the current 
year and commensurate with the activities outlined in the Doha Agenda. Reafﬁrms spe-
ciﬁc commitments to provide technical assistance in various parts of the Doha Agenda 
and instructs the Director-General to report on the implementation and adequacy of these 
commitments at the Fifth Ministerial Conference.
Least Developed Countries—commit to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market 
access for products originating from LDCs and to considering additional measures for 
progressive improvements in market access for LDCs. Work to facilitate and accelerate 
negotiations with acceding LDCs. Urged to signiﬁcantly increase contributions to the IF 
Trust Fund and WTO extrabudgetary trusts funds for LDCs. Explore enhancement of the 
IF. Director-General, in coordination with heads of other agencies, to report to the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference on all issues affecting LDCs.
Special and differential treatment—review all provisions with a view to strengthening them 
and making them more precise, effective, and operational.
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Throughout 2002–03, the story of the Doha Agenda was one of missed 
deadlines and mounting frustration. The March 31, 2003, deadline for the 
agreement on the modalities for the agriculture negotiations passed without 
agreement.5 No progress was possible until the European Union agreed inter-
nally on the latest reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which 
did not occur until June 2003. However, this reform proved underwhelming 
and provided little impetus for the talks (chapter 3). In July 2003, in an effort 
to break the stalemate, members requested the EU and U.S. to come up with 
a joint proposal on agriculture. As in the Uruguay Round, many members 
expected that the U.S. would push the EU in the direction of liberalization. 
However, this did not happen. Instead, the U.S. moved toward the EU posi-
tion. When their joint proposal emerged in August 2003, it surprised and 
dismayed many as a minimalist text that largely served to preserve the exist-
ing protection in both parties. The EU–U.S. deal not only failed to move the 
negotiations forward, but contributed to a growing climate of mistrust in the 
negotiations.
The absence of progress on agriculture, widely viewed as the key promise 
of the “development” round, obstructed progress on other issues. The dead-
line for agreement on negotiating modalities for nonagricultural products (the 
same date as for those for agriculture) was similarly missed. For many coun-
tries, the difference between the level of ambition in the U.S. and EU proposals 
for reductions in protection on agricultural and nonagricultural products was 
all too stark. Discussions on the review of special and differential treatment 
provisions and a range of outstanding implementation concerns also remained 
near a stalemate, with agreement looking possible on less than a third of the 
approximately 120 proposals tabled. Views on the Singapore issues likewise 
remained far apart. The web of deliberately interlinked deadlines established 
in the Doha Agenda was rapidly degenerating into gridlock.
Another critical deadline, December 2002 for TRIPS and access to medi-
cines, also passed without agreement. This issue—allowing developing coun-
tries with little or no manufacturing capacity in pharmaceuticals to make 
use of special procedures under TRIPS to import patented medicines under 
compulsory licenses—captured public attention and became one of the tests 
of whether the Doha Agenda was fulﬁlling its development promise. Agree-
ment was eventually reached on August 30, 2003, when the U.S. dropped its 
objection to a compromise text ﬁrst agreed by all other WTO Members nine 
months earlier, but by then it was too late to generate much goodwill or to 
lighten an atmosphere soured by months of increasingly acrimonious discus-
sions (chapter 10).
In the ﬁrst half of 2003 another issue also captured public attention and 
became viewed as a further development test for the trading system. In May 
a number of West African cotton-exporting countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali—drew attention to the impact on their cotton farmers of high 
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cotton subsidies in the U.S., and to a lesser extent, the EU and China. They 
proposed the abolition of these subsidies over three years and the payment of 
compensation to their farmers in the interim. This proposal attracted consid-
erable support, from both developing countries and the donor community in 
developed countries, although differences of view existed over whether cotton 
should be addressed separately or as part of the agriculture negotiations.
By the time of the Fifth Ministerial Conference, in September 2003 in 
Cancún, WTO Members had made little progress on the key elements of the 
Doha Agenda. Although the Fifth Ministerial was originally intended as a 
mid-term review, or stock-taking, of the state of play in the round, ministers 
were confronted with a series of fundamental decisions on the nature and scope 
of the negotiations.
The Cancún Ministerial
The Cancún Ministerial ended in failure at 6 PM on Sunday, September 15, 
2003, when the Chair of the Conference (Mexican Trade Minister Derbez) 
concluded that no agreement on the agenda was possible among WTO Mem-
bers and brought the proceedings to an end.6
At the heart of the collapse of the talks lay the failure to make substantial 
progress on agriculture. The EU–U.S. joint proposal, which was largely incor-
porated into the negotiating text for the meeting, was not viewed as a basis for 
negotiations by many developing countries, a group of which tabled their own 
alternative draft text as a basis for negotiation.
This group, the G-20, had been formed prior to Cancún, in response to 
deep frustration at the EU–U.S. proposal and the general lack of progress on 
agriculture.7 Under the leadership of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, 
the G-20 galvanized a range of developing countries around the need for reform 
of the agricultural policies of major developed countries. The G-20 negotiated 
strongly and effectively as a group on agriculture at Cancún, despite attempts 
by both the U.S. and the EU to exploit their internal differences on agriculture 
(such as differences over subsidies—India seeking to retain its own subsidies 
and Brazil opposing all subsidies—and market access) and other issues (such 
as the Singapore issues).
The emergence of the G-20 as a powerful negotiating force changed the 
dynamics of the agriculture negotiations and drew unprecedented public 
attention to the unequal treatment of agriculture in the trading system. The 
G-20—and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters with whom it shared 
many common members—pressed hard for greater movement on market 
access and subsidies from the EU, U.S., and Japan.8 However, these members 
gave little ground and countered that the G-20 countries were not prepared 
to open their own markets to agricultural imports. Intensive negotiations did 
not—and could not—bridge the considerable gap between the two sides, given 
the lack of willingness to put concessions of real value on the table.
30 Chapter 1
Two other groups were also active on agriculture. The G-33, a group of 33 
developing countries, demanded the right to designate a number of agricul-
tural “special products” to be exempted from any new tariff reduction com-
mitments.9 The G-33 also called for the establishment of a special safeguard 
mechanism on agriculture for all developing countries. The G-10, which rep-
resents mostly importers (and a few exporters), and includes Bulgaria, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Swit-
zerland, and Taiwan (China), was interested in the status quo or in a very slow 
evolution of reform.
As in the lead-up to the Ministerial Conference, failure of movement in 
agriculture stymied progress in nonagricultural market access (NAMA), where 
no agreement proved possible on the modalities for tariff-cutting negotiations. 
In addition to disagreements between developed and developing countries over 
the degree to which formulas should target high tariffs and the extent of ﬂex-
ibility to be granted to developing countries to make fewer and smaller reduc-
tions, another issue emerged to block progress. A large group of the poorest 
developing countries opposed any further tariff reductions on the grounds that 
this would undermine the value of their trade preferences in developed country 
markets.10
Many of these same poorest developing countries also united to form a 
stronger negotiating voice on issues beyond the erosion of preferences. The 
G-90 brought together the African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc (ACP) group 
of countries, the LDCs, and the African Union.11 Along with a few more 
advanced developing countries such as Malaysia, the G-90 was instrumental 
in blocking negotiations on the Singapore issues.
Cotton also proved to be a major issue at the Cancún Ministerial, with 
the Director-General taking personal charge of consultations (representa-
tives of WTO Members chaired the ﬁve formal negotiating groups on agri-
culture, NAMA, development, Singapore issues, and other issues). While the 
U.S. remained intransigent on the question of its cotton subsidies, many other 
WTO Members, in particular other developing (and some developed) country 
agricultural exporters, were sympathetic to the injustice, but argued that cot-
ton should be dealt with as part of the agriculture negotiations and not subject 
to a special deal. Expectations had been raised on cotton, but were bitterly 
disappointed: the Chair’s text on Saturday night (September 14) proposed nei-
ther the removal of the harmful subsidies nor payment of compensation, but 
instead encouraged assistance to help these countries diversify their economies 
away from cotton production. This enraged the African Group and, in what 
was felt to be its sheer insensitivity to the concerns of some very poor countries, 
further dismayed many other developing countries that were already deeply 
frustrated by the lack of progress in the negotiating group on development.
By Saturday night, the atmosphere had deteriorated signiﬁcantly. Mem-
bers increasingly reiterated well known and hard-line positions, escalating 
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the rhetoric and diminishing the scope for ﬂexibility, and with it the prospect 
of agreement. It was against this backdrop that consultations began on the 
Singapore issues on Sunday morning. The EU delivered a belated offer to 
remove investment and competition policy from the table, but the African 
Group refused to countenance negotiations on any of the four issues, while 
the Republic of Korea and Japan insisted that negotiations be launched on all 
four. The Chair concluded that there was no basis for consensus among the 
members and the conference ended among bitter recriminations. 
The 2004 Doha Work Programme framework
In closing the Cancún meeting, ministers tasked their ofﬁcials to continue 
working on outstanding issues with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose 
and taking fully into account all the views expressed in this conference. The 
General Council Chairman and the WTO Director-General were asked to 
convene a meeting of the General Council at senior ofﬁcials’ level no later than 
December 15, 2003, to take necessary action. 
While consultations on agriculture, NAMA, the Singapore issues, and 
cotton continued throughout October and November 2003, little progress was 
made. On December 15, WTO Members were able to agree only to allow the 
negotiating groups to reconvene in the new year, following the appointment 
of new chairs. 
However, in January 2004 the U.S. launched a new initiative to relaunch 
the round and ensure that 2004 was not a wasted year. In a letter to all 
WTO Members, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick proposed that 
WTO Members agree by mid-2004 on a framework for continuing the Doha 
Round. The letter signaled some U.S. ﬂexibility on agriculture, moving away 
from some of the elements of the EU–U.S. deal and proposed that, of the 
Singapore issues, only trade facilitation be included in the agenda (and perhaps 
transparency in government procurement if there was sufﬁcient support). 
Investment and competition, it suggested, should be taken off the table in the 
interests of encouraging African and other developing countries to agree to a 
framework for negotiations by mid-2004. This framework would establish a 
basis for the negotiations to continue, but would not include speciﬁc ﬁgures for 
negotiating modalities. That is, it would not include the actual percentages by 
which subsidies or tariffs on agricultural or nonagricultural products would be 
cut as a result of the negotiations.
Other members generally welcomed the U.S. initiative. Intensive 
consultations took place in Geneva and Member capitals throughout the ﬁrst 
half of 2004 with a view to agreeing on a framework package to keep the 
Doha Round alive. Key areas for consultation were the future of the Singapore 
issues—and in particular whether the G-90 would agree to the launch of 
negotiations on trade facilitation, NAMA, development issues, and, of course, 
agriculture. 
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On May 9, 2004, the European Commission, in a letter from Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy and Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, 
made its own proposal aimed at helping to reengage the negotiations. The 
two commissioners signaled that the EU was prepared to move on export 
subsidies in agriculture, subject to a satisfactory outcome on market access 
and domestic support. They acknowledged that, of the Singapore issues, only 
trade facilitation and perhaps transparency in government procurement would 
remain inside the Doha Development Agenda. A key element was the proposal 
that LDCs and other weak or vulnerable developing countries in a similar 
situation (essentially the G-90) be given the round “for free”—that is, that they 
should not have to open their markets beyond their existing commitments on 
agriculture and NAMA. As with the U.S. proposal, while views differed on the 
speciﬁc proposals, the initiative was generally welcomed by WTO Members as 
a contribution toward a mid-year agreement.
After long and arduous negotiations, a negotiating framework package was 
agreed by WTO Members in the early hours of August 1, 2004.12 The 2004 
Doha Work Programme (DWP) essentially puts the Doha Round back on a 
more focused footing, the key elements being the core market access agenda—
agriculture, services, and NAMA—plus trade facilitation (the only surviving 
Singapore issue) and development issues. The text also afﬁrms existing Doha 
Agenda negotiating mandates on intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
rules, and trade and the environment (see box 1.5). 
The agriculture text is widely viewed as the linchpin. While only laying 
down the basic pillars in the form of a “framework” for future talks, it 
nonetheless represents a signiﬁcant advance from the U.S.–EU text prior to 
Cancún and the months of deadlock that followed. The text was based on 
the results of intensive consultations, including at the ministerial level, of a 
grouping known as the Five Interested Parties (FIPs)—comprising the U.S., 
EU, Brazil, India, and Australia—a process that attracted sharp criticism 
from others (notably the G-10 and G-33) who were not represented in the 
grouping.
Cotton will be dealt with “ambitiously, expeditiously, and speciﬁcally” as 
an integral part of the agriculture negotiations rather than on a separate track. 
A special subcommittee will be established to “ensure appropriate prioritiza-
tion of the cotton issue” and the Director-General will work with relevant 
international organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions, on the 
development aspects.
The outcome on NAMA—“initial elements for future work on 
modalities”—consists of the Chair’s text from Cancún with an additional 
opening paragraph indicating areas where further negotiations are required. 
These areas include the treatment of developing countries, the issue of prefer-
ence erosion, and the formula for the negotiations. While the aims are kept 
ambitious, the speciﬁcs of key elements are left to be negotiated later. 
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The 2004 DWP reiterates calls for the strengthening of WTO provisions 
on special and differential treatment (SDT) in favor of developing countries and 
implementation issues. The Committee on Trade and Development in Special 
Session is instructed to complete its review of all outstanding proposals and 
report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 
2005. On implementation issues, the General Council should review progress 
and take any appropriate action no later than July 2005, on the basis of a report 
by the WTO Director-General to be submitted no later than May 2005.
Negotiations on SDT proved difﬁcult, largely due to differences among 
developing countries. Some more advanced developing countries (mostly Latin 
American and East Asian) objected to language that was seen as accepting the 
creation of a de facto new class of developing country WTO Member, covering 
small and vulnerable countries that are not LDCs, primarily in relation to mar-
ket access. It was ﬁnally agreed that the trade-related issues identiﬁed for the 
fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading 
system should also be addressed, without creating a subcategory of members, 
as part of a work program, as mandated in paragraph 35 of the Doha Minis-
terial Declaration (which refers to a work program under the auspices of the 
General Council to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies). 
Services remained relatively low-proﬁle throughout and the main outcome 
is a new deadline for revised offers of May 2005. 
Finally, negotiations on trade facilitation (improving the movement, 
release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit) were ofﬁcially 
launched, with reassurance for developing countries that commitments will 
be linked to capacity to implement and that support and assistance in imple-
menting future commitments will be provided. Of particular importance was 
the recognition of the principle that the extent and timing of entering into 
commitments would be related to the implementation capacities of develop-
ing countries and Least Developed Countries. Where the implementation of 
commitments would require infrastructure development, support and assis-
tance should be provided; where it is not, and the developing country or Least 
Developed Country lacks the necessary capacity, implementation will not be 
required. The other Singapore issues—trade and investment, trade and com-
petition policy, and transparency in government procurement—are completely 
dropped from the negotiating agenda, allowing developing countries to focus 
on core development-oriented areas without devoting scarce resources to new 
and complex subjects. 
Acknowledging that the original January 1, 2005, deadline for the end 
of the Doha Round will not be met, a Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference is 
scheduled for December 2005 in Hong Kong (China). No new deadline was 
set for completing the round. 
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant feature of the agreement is one not listed 
under any particular heading. That is, more than any previous round, the 
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Doha Round is being shaped by the actions and positions of developing coun-
tries. If developing countries have been a powerful force in shaping the agenda 
on issues of interest to them—witness the G-20’s unambiguous message that 
no deal is possible without a meaningful outcome on agriculture or the West 
African cotton producers success in placing their concerns on the agenda—
they have also been equally effective in using their power to refuse to negotiate 
on issues in which they felt they had little interest—the G-90 and the Singa-
pore issues. 
Who’s gaining little—or even losing
While the Doha Round is making visible the substantive trade interests of 
some developing countries and the legitimate aspirations of those countries to 
rebalance the WTO agreements to better reﬂect their interests, it is also reveal-
ing another reality—that the WTO has many Members who see themselves as 
gaining little from liberalization, or even as losing from liberalization due to 
preference erosion. 
The poorest WTO Members have not made the development gains experi-
enced by some other developing countries over the last 20-odd years. They have 
lower growth, face much more serious deﬁcits in economic infrastructure, and 
on the whole suffer more severe political and governance problems. They face a 
wide range of domestic constraints to participation in the global economy and 
are not major participants in trade. These countries generally also have very 
limited and highly product-speciﬁc market access interests, have seen their for-
eign currency earnings eroded by steadily declining commodity prices, and are 
often dependent on preferential access for their products in major developed 
country markets. They have few means to pursue their interests at the multilat-
eral level in terms of either leverage or resources. Their capacity to participate 
in both negotiating and implementing WTO agreements is severely limited by 
real resource and governance constraints. The major beneﬁt these countries are 
likely to receive from WTO membership in the short term is limited to support 
for domestic economic reform efforts. 
From the perspective of these poorest developing countries—which include 
but are not limited to the LDCs—the Doha Round offers relatively few imme-
diate beneﬁts, but carries the risk of additional, potentially burdensome obliga-
tions. This is a particular problem for countries that, while very poor, do not 
qualify as LDCs under the UN deﬁnition and therefore do not qualify for 
the most extensive special and differential treatment (which largely exempts 
LDCs from WTO obligations and offers them duty-free and quota-free access 
to major markets). These countries fall instead under the self-selected “devel-
oping country” category of the WTO, under which very different countries are 
subject to identical rules—Pakistan and Singapore, Botswana and Hong Kong 
(China) are all subject to the same WTO rights and obligations. The breadth 
of the developing country classiﬁcation in the WTO has resulted in a situation 
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in which more than a quarter of the countries with developing country status 
have higher annual gross national income than the poorest OECD country 
(Turkey). That this situation gave rise to difﬁcult discussions in the lead-up to 
the August 1 framework agreement is not surprising.
The concerns of the poorest developing countries are not restricted to the 
market opening or obligations they might be asked to undertake. Many of 
these countries currently beneﬁt from trade preferences in developed country 
markets, which has led them not only to oppose any further liberalization or 
assumption of WTO obligations on their part, but also to oppose liberalization 
by other WTO Members on the grounds that it would erode the value of their 
preferential access. Many of the poorest developing countries are now in the 
paradoxical position of arguing against reductions in rich country protection, 
in particular very high tariffs on products of major interest to developing coun-
try exporters, in order to preserve the value of their preferential access.
It is clear that if progress is to be made in the Doha Round, ways need to 
be found to address the concerns of the poorest developing countries—about 
the kinds of obligations they might be asked to assume, and about their ability 
to beneﬁt from the rules and access negotiated.
But it is also clear that, however conﬁgured, developing countries are now 
a major force for change in the WTO. There has been a shift in the tectonic 
plates and the trading system is confronting a complex new reality, opening the 
way for the achievement of a genuine development round. 
Where next: the road to Hong Kong (China)—and beyond
WTO Members have now agreed on the framework to guide the next phase 
of the negotiations. But there is a long way to go to translate this into a devel-
opment round. The 2004 DWP framework agreed on August 1 may have 
been necessary to prevent the collapse of the Doha Round, but it will not be 
sufﬁcient to keep it going without a considerable ramping-up of effort on the 
part of all Members. 
The real work is yet to be done. While the changeover of the European 
Commission and the U.S. election may mean that only limited progress is 
possible in the coming months, Members should position themselves to be 
ready to continue working in earnest early in 2005. This sense of urgency is 
necessary: the deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals is 2015 and, if the global trading system is going to make a meaningful 
contribution, there is a limited window of opportunity to conclude the Doha 
Round. For a variety of reasons—including expiry of U.S. fast track negotiating 
authority, timing of elections in major WTO Members (France in April 2007, 
the U.S. in 2008)—the Doha Round will need to be concluded by the end of 
2006 or very early 2007 at the latest if it is to contribute to the achievement 
of the Goals.13 To do that, concrete agreement on negotiating modalities on 
agriculture and NAMA, and real progress in negotiations on services, trade 
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facilitation, and development issues will be needed at the Hong Kong (China) 
Ministerial Conference in December 2005. 
To do that, Members will have to both identify the core priorities of a 
real development round and commit real political and ﬁnancial resources to 
achieving them. This report aims to assist in that process. 
Structure of this report
This report has four parts. 
Part 1 covers the market access agenda, focusing on each of the core Doha 
Round issues in this regard: agriculture (chapter 3), services (chapter 4), and 
nonagricultural market access (chapter 5). Each of these chapters assesses 
what needs to be done, and by whom, for liberalization to serve development, 
including in the adjustment costs. Each chapter concludes with recommenda-
tions on how and where we should be on these issues in order to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and how we might get there from 
here. 
Chapter 6 looks at how hard-won market access gains can be undermined 
by the use of contingency protection and offers some possible solutions. It also 
considers the role that ever-increasing and ever-higher product and production 
standards are playing in diminishing the expected market access gains of devel-
oping countries and what sorts of actions might help. Part 1 ends with a look 
at preferential market access, given the concerns that have been raised about 
the potential impact of MFN liberalization on preference-receiving countries 
(chapter 7). It asks whether preferential access has conferred the expected ben-
eﬁts and balances them against the associated costs, including the cost of pref-
erence erosion.
Part 2 considers a range of rules-related issues, focusing on two questions. 
What issues should, from a development perspective, be the subject of trade 
rules? And what sorts of trade rules on those issues make sense from a develop-
ment perspective? Chapter 8 sets out three tests for whether an issue should 
be included on the WTO agenda. Is the issue related to trade, speciﬁcally to 
market access? Is it in line with broader development priorities? And what is 
the speciﬁc value added of a WTO agreement? On the basis of these three tests, 
chapter 9 assesses both the exclusion of trade and investment, trade and com-
petition, and transparency in government procurement from the Doha Round 
and the inclusion of negotiations on trade facilitation. It then posits some ideas 
on the circumstances under which an agreement on trade facilitation might 
serve development. Chapter 10 applies the same logic to TRIPS, on two issues 
that have dominated the TRIPS negotiating agenda: access to medicines and 
geographical indications.
Chapter 11 addresses the broader question of the case for special and differ-
ential treatment in relation to WTO rules. It explores whether there is a devel-
opment case for different treatment for traditional trade policy instruments 
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and “regulatory” type rules. It concludes with some general thoughts on the 
way forward on special and differential treatment in the WTO. 
Part 3 takes up other systemic issues. Chapter 12 follows on from chapter 11 
on special and differential treatment by noting that, while the trading system 
can contribute to development, it alone cannot deliver development. It focuses 
on the need for policy coherence at the national level, including complemen-
tary policies to ensure that trade liberalization supports development, and at 
the international level, in the form of signiﬁcantly increased aid for trade. The 
chapter concludes with a practical example of policy coherence between trade 
and other policies in the form of trade and environment. Chapter 13 argues 
that the preferential free trade agreements have a mixed record in terms of the 
extent of real liberalization achieved, and that any beneﬁts conferred are often 
at the expense of other, excluded countries. It also considers whether the argu-
ments are any different for agreements between developing countries. Chapter 
14 looks at the evidence of developing country participation in the dispute 
settlement system and discusses some of the structural constraints they face in 
prosecuting their rights.
Part 4 concludes, drawing on the preceding analysis to offer some thoughts 
on the way ahead for the Doha Agenda as a concrete contribution toward 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (chapter 15). It restates the 
main conclusions and presents a set of key recommendations.
Box 1.6
Postscript—use 
of terms
Throughout this report, several different groups of countries are referred to: OECD coun-
tries, developed countries, developing countries, the poorest developing countries, and 
Least Developed Countries. 
Developed countries refers to those high-income countries that are considered to be 
developed countries in the WTO. This largely—but not entirely—corresponds with member-
ship of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Two OECD 
countries are considered to be developing countries in the WTO—Mexico and the Republic 
of Korea. The category of OECD countries is used in the section on agriculture because 
much of the research on agricultural protection has been conducted by the OECD. A list of 
OECD members is in appendix 3. 
Developing countries refers to those countries that have self-elected developing coun-
try status in the WTO. 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) refers to the United Nations List of LDCs (appendix 1). 
The poorest countries include the LDCs, but also a number of low-income WTO devel-
oping countries. They include countries with a GDP per capita of less than $1,000 (the cri-
terion used in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), as well as 
those falling under the World Bank category of low-income countries. However, no attempt 
is made to deﬁne these countries in a comprehensive manner (appendix 4).

1 Market access agenda

C
h
a
p
te
r 2
Why another Round?
In the euphoria following the completion of the Uruguay Round and the cre-
ation, after 50 years, of a global trade organization, projections were made of the 
enormous beneﬁts to follow. Implementing the Uruguay Round agreements, it 
was claimed, would result in worldwide welfare gains of $274.1 billion annually, 
of which $86 billion would accrue to developing countries and $188 billion to 
developed countries (OECD 1993). Nine long and exhausting years of negotia-
tions were about to result in unprecedented gains for the global economy.
Reality, however, has been on a smaller scale. Although the Uruguay Round 
put agriculture and textiles back on the table and created a framework for nego-
tiating services, market opening—and the associated large projected gains—
have not materialized. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in agriculture. The long-awaited Agree-
ment on Agriculture has failed to result in a major market opening, with total 
support to agriculture remaining at $318 billion in 2002 (OECD 2003c). Tar-
iffs for a range of commodities remain at well over 100 percent, with particu-
larly high tariffs often concentrated in products of export interest to develop-
ing countries. 
Beneﬁts have also failed to materialize in textiles. The majority of quotas 
were phased out only on January 1, 2005, and the anticipated freeing up of trade 
has been further limited by high tariffs, as well as safeguards and antidumping 
actions. Equally, while tariffs on merchandise trade have declined overall, very 
high tariffs remain in some sectors, particularly in those of interest to developing 
countries. The result: the average OECD most favored nation tariff on imports 
from developing countries is four times higher than on imports originating in 
the OECD (Laird 2002). Barriers in other developing countries are also a sig-
niﬁcant impediment, possibly accounting for up to 70 percent of the total tariffs 
levied on developing countries’ industrial exports (Hertel and Martin 2000).
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Another area of developing country comparative advantage—labor-
intensive services—also saw little liberalization in the Uruguay Round. Even 
by the relatively low standards of liberalization achieved under the GATS, the 
temporary movement of service suppliers (mode 4) stands out, with the fewest 
and most restrictive commitments. 
There is clearly much real work to be done in the Doha Round on market 
access. In services and industrial products, unilateral liberalization provides a 
strong foundation for the current multilateral negotiations; in sharp contrast, 
with a few notable exceptions such as New Zealand, no such unilateral liberal-
ization has been undertaken in agriculture. There are real gains to be made, and 
not just in terms of large ﬁgures for global welfare. The beneﬁts of liberalization 
accrue at the national level and, ﬁrst and foremost, to those who currently pay 
for protection: consumers and other sectors of the domestic economy. 
Who pays for protection?
The costs associated with protection are borne by the domestic economy. Pro-
tection raises costs of the protected goods and services above the world market 
price. The burden of this additional cost falls on two main groups—domestic 
consumers and other sectors of the economy for which the protected goods and 
services are key inputs.
Consumers—and often the poorest consumers—pay for protection 
While tariffs impose costs on foreign exporters, in terms of lost opportunities, 
and are paid directly by domestic importers, the real burden ultimately falls 
on the domestic consumers—be they enterprises or individuals. The cost of 
tariffs is generally passed on to the consumers, and the artiﬁcially high price 
of imported goods also allows domestic manufacturers of competing goods to 
maintain higher prices. Higher prices for basic goods reduce their availability 
to poor consumers—protection is often a regressive policy.
Poor people in rich countries can pay more than their share of the costs of 
protection. Tariffs are a tax, but unlike a sales tax are not transparent (tariffs, 
unlike sales taxes, do not appear on receipts); and unlike an income tax, they 
can sometimes be regressive, with a disproportionate impact on low-income 
consumers (box 2.1).
In the U.S., it is also estimated that poor consumers, who tend to spend a 
higher proportion of their income on food, also bear a heavier burden in terms 
of the higher food prices generated by protection. A single-parent family’s aver-
age annual budget for home meals is 60 percent of a two-parent family’s budget, 
although the latter’s average earnings are around two and a half times greater 
(Gresser 2002). Although agricultural tariffs are often viewed as revenues paid 
by foreigners and collected by governments, in reality they are closer to a sales 
tax imposed on food, with most of the beneﬁts redistributed to larger farmers 
(Diaz-Bonilla and others 2003).
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Box 2.1
Tariffs hit poor 
consumers 
hardest
Source: Gresser 2002.
In the U.S., tariffs—unlike the income tax—can fall most heavily on low-income earners 
because they can be highest on goods important to the poor (table 1). Remaining high 
tariffs tend to be on essential items—such as shoes and clothing, which make up only 
one-ﬁfteenth of U.S. merchandise imports, but bring in around half of the annual tariff 
revenue. In comparison with other expenses (education, transport, entertainment), these 
goods are relatively small expenses for middle-class or wealthy families but very large 
expenses for poor families with children (table 2). (The same could be said for high EU 
tariffs on farm products.)
Single-parent families spend around 55–60 percent less than two-parent families on 
transport, healthcare, education, insurance, and household furnishings—and 80 per-
cent less on telephones, computers, clocks, luggage, and jewelry. But their spending on 
necessities—food and clothing—is much closer to the average for all families. The single-
parent family’s clothing budget is two-thirds the two-parent family’s. In shoes alone the 
ﬁgures are $411 a year for a single parent family, and $480 for a two-parent family.
Tariffs are also usually lowest on luxuries and highest on the cheap goods poor families 
are most likely to buy. For instance, women’s silk underwear has a 2.4 percent tariff but 
polyester underwear a 16.2 percent tariff. A silk suit has a 1.9 percent tariff and a wool 
suit a 12 percent tariff, but a polyester suit has a 29 percent tariff. Snakeskin handbags 
have a 5.3 percent tariff but plastic-sided handbags an 18 percent tariff. Silver-handled 
forks have no tariff but cheap stainless steel forks a 15 percent tariff.
These high tariffs may not be effective in protecting jobs. Sneakers (trainers) costing 
$3 or less, those mostly bought by the poor, are subject to a 48 percent tariff (adding 
$1.06 to a standard $2.20 sneaker). Yet domestic employment in the sneaker sector in 
the U.S. is 3,000 persons (for all sneakers; it is unknown what proportion are making 
cheap sneakers). Most sneakers under $3 come from Indonesia or China. 
Table 1 Comparison between tariff tax rates and income tax rates
Family type
Average 
income
Income tax 
rate
Expenses on 
high tariff 
goods
Estimated 
costs of 
tariffs
Tariff tax 
rate
High-income $110,000 19.7% $7,916 $660 0.6%
Two-parent $66,913 6% $5,752 $470 0.7%
Single-parent $25,095 No liability $2,158 $307 1.2%
Working welfare leaver 
(expenses estimated)
$14,872 No liability $1,900 $279 1.9%
Source: Adapted from Gresser 2002. Figures for the two-parent family and single-parent family come from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002), table 1500. For the high-income family, ﬁgures are from table 
1201 in the same publication. Figures for the working welfare leaver are taken from LoPrest (2001).
Table 2 Main tariff expenses of a single parent family, 1999
(average earnings $25,095)
Expenses  
($)
Tariff rates 
(percent)
Cost of tariffs 
($)
Food (at home) 1,005 1–13 14
Clothes 1,440 5–30 212
Shoes 411 10–30 68
Linen 60 10 5
Other goods 67 0–11 8
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002; United States International Trade Commission; Gresser 2002.
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To the extent this story is repeated in other developed countries, it pres-
ents a powerful equity argument for reform. Developed countries bear a spe-
cial responsibility to deliver real market access for development in the Doha 
Round, and such evidence of the inequities of their protection not only at the 
global level for poor countries, but also at the domestic level for the poorer 
members of their own societies, may be important in combating pressure for 
extended protection from well organized producer lobbies. 
These arguments may also be important within developing countries, 
where there is some evidence that some of the same patterns may hold. In Viet 
Nam, for instance, bicycles are essential purchases for the poor, used for taking 
children to school and goods to market. But a 50 percent tariff renders the cost 
of bicycles prohibitive for many poor people; the cheapest bicycle is around 
twice the monthly income of people in rural communities (Thanh 2001). 
Equally, 25 percent or more tariffs on mosquito nets in Zambia and Senegal 
harm the ability of the poor to prevent malaria, which kills almost 1 million 
people a year in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bannister and Thugge 2001).
That said, there can be important differences between countries in terms of 
tariff structure and how the poor are affected by liberalization. This last point 
is important—where the poor are producers of the liberalized goods, as well 
as consumers, gains from liberalization can be adversely affected by adjust-
ment. For developing countries these factors are especially important as they 
have both larger numbers of poor (and very poor) people, and a more limited 
capacity to absorb adjustment costs. Tariffs may also be an important source 
of government revenue. In view of these differences, the adjustment impact of 
tariff liberalization on agricultural and nonagricultural goods in developing 
countries is speciﬁcally addressed in the following chapters.
Other sectors can also pay for protection 
The cost of protection in one sector is also borne by other sectors for which the 
protected products, be they goods or services, are inputs. Protection is often 
cast as a choice between domestic and foreign jobs, but in reality it can be more 
a choice between one set of domestic jobs and another (box 2.2). 
While the following chapters look at the market access agenda for agricul-
ture, services, and nonagricultural products separately, there are clearly strong 
linkages among them. (For example, agricultural and nonagricultural pro-
ducers and exporters are hurt by poor-quality services.) Equally, the size and 
nature of the adjustment challenge from liberalization in any one sector will be 
affected by the kinds of offsetting beneﬁts that might emerge in other sectors. 
(For example, poor urban laborers who may experience food price rises from 
agricultural liberalization could see the demand for their labor rise if labor-
intensive manufactures were similarly liberalized in export markets.) These 
linkages are discussed in more detail in the following chapters. 
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Box 2.2
Who pays for 
protection?
Source: Cato Institute 
2003; Washington Post 
Writers Group 2003; 
Barﬁeld 2003; Hufbauer 
and Goodrich 2003; 
Francois and Baughman 
2003; OECD 2003e; 
UNCTAD 2003c.
Support for the U.S. sugar industry means that the cost of sugar within the U.S. is up to 
three times the world price. In 1998 U.S. sweetener users paid an estimated extra $1.9 
billion for sugar due to protection, and protection is now being blamed for job losses in 
the U.S. confectionary industry. With sugar accounting for 92 percent of the raw materials 
for hard candy, the price of sugar can be a determining factor in location decisions—some 
ﬁrms have moved to Canada, where labor costs are comparable to the U.S. but sugar 
costs can be up to $10 million less a year. The mayor of Chicago, which has lost 11 
percent of its confectionary jobs since 1991, cited sugar protection as a key reason for 
companies relocating outside the U.S. 
A safeguard on U.S. steel, in the form of tariffs ranging from 8 percent to 30 percent, 
was imposed in March 2002—similar measures were imposed by the EU, a few days 
later. The Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, a group including manufacturers of 
vehicles and vehicle parts, construction equipment, tools, and dye works and appliances, 
estimated that 200,000 jobs were lost to higher steel prices during 2002, more than the 
number employed by the U.S. steel industry (187,500). Of these jobs 50,000 were lost in 
the manufacturing, machinery and equipment, and transportation equipment and parts 
sectors. While data were insufﬁcient to measure the exact number of job losses attribut-
able to the safeguard (as opposed to other factors such as increased demand and lower 
production), it was evident that, in the absence of tariffs, damage would have been signiﬁ-
cantly less. Others estimated the losses attributable to the safeguard at (conservatively) 
around 26,000 jobs over 12 months, contrasted with little pickup in employment in the 
steel-producing sector. Small businesses were hardest hit due to their limited ability to 
pass increased costs onto their clients.
In services the costs are arguably magniﬁed due to the role of some services in under-
pinning many economic activities. Infrastructure services—such as telecommunications, 
transport, ﬁnancial services—directly affect the ability of other sectors to participate in 
trade. A recent OECD survey of developing country services exports highlighted lack of 
access to reliable and inexpensive infrastructure as a key impediment facing developing 
country exporters. Poor quality and expensive telecommunications services undermined 
export potential in business services or back-ofﬁce processing. Small- and medium-size 
enterprises exporting professional services over the Internet were particularly penalized 
by unreliable telecommunications, which prevented timely service delivery, resulting in 
lost clients. Access to efﬁcient and reliable logistics services, transport, and communica-
tion infrastructure is essential for insertion into global supply chains.
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Agriculture is crucial for developing countries, particularly for the poorest 
ones. On average, it represents 40 percent of GDP, 35 percent of exports, and 
50–70 percent of total employment in the poorest developing countries; the 
proportions in the middle-income developing countries being 12 percent, 15 
percent, and 15–40 percent, respectively. Further, agriculture is particularly 
important for the poorest people in all developing countries: roughly 70 per-
cent of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas, with the proportion in 
the poorest countries being as high as 90 percent. Undoubtedly, reducing pov-
erty and attaining the other Millennium Development Goals necessitates, as 
an absolute priority, improving the economic situation of the farm sector and 
rural areas in developing countries.
If domestic action by developing country governments—including removal 
of anti-agriculture domestic biases, such as manufacturing protection and 
overvalued exchange rates—is important, action on the part of high-income 
countries is absolutely critical. Current farm policies that support prices and 
subsidize agricultural production in OECD countries distort trade and invest-
ment incentives by depressing world prices and preventing developing coun-
tries from exploiting their comparative advantage. They create huge distor-
tions, which can be captured by the following simple comparison: in 2002 the 
total amount of support to OECD farmers ($318 billion) was 5.5 times the 
total OECD ofﬁcial development assistance to developing countries ($58 bil-
lion) and about 100 times the share of OECD ofﬁcial development assistance 
granted to agricultural production in developing countries.
The current protection in OECD countries
In 1994 the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (UAA) brought agriculture 
into the legal framework of the multilateral trading system. But it did not 
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liberalize farm trade. The commitments that were made—the ban on quanti-
tative restrictions, the tarifﬁcation of border protection, the minimum market 
access based on tariff-rate quotas, the reduction of export and production sub-
sidies—did not noticeably lower the effective level of OECD farm protection 
since 1995 (although one could argue that, without the UAA, OECD protec-
tion would have risen rather than followed a ﬂat trend) (box 3.1).
This is not surprising. The tarifﬁcation process in 1993–94 was consciously 
handled by most WTO Members in such a way that it ampliﬁed the initial level 
Box 3.1
OECD agricultural 
protection
Sources: OECD 2003b, 
2003c, 2003f, 2004a.
• Total net transfers from consumers and taxpayers to farmers in OECD countries 
constituted 51 percent of the value of farm production in 1986–88. In 2003, after 
implementation of all the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture commitments, they still 
amounted to 48 percent of the value of farm production. In sum, half of the value of 
production at the farmgate—or roughly three-quarters of the value added—is still 
derived from transfers.
• The range of average support across OECD countries remains as wide now as 
it was 15 years ago: less than 5 percent of gross farm receipts in Australasia, 
20 percent in North America, 35 percent in the EU, and more than 60 percent in 
Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. There has been a notice-
able increase in support in recent OECD members (Mexico, Turkey, and the Central 
European countries). Over half the entire budget for the European Community is 
still absorbed by farm subsidies.
• As the number of active farmers continued to decline sharply during the 1990s, sup-
port per farmer has risen in many OECD countries—by 30 percent in the U.S. and 60 
percent in the EU, sending the wrong signal in terms of resource allocation. 
• OECD farmers get only a small portion of all the money poured into agriculture—
only 25–30 cents of every dollar or euro of support go to OECD farmers’ incomes. 
The remaining 70–75 cents end up in the pockets of landowners (whose ﬁelds are 
rented by farmers) and suppliers of other farm inputs or is wasted through inap-
propriate (subsidy-based) choices of crops. This enormous waste provides a strong 
rationale for reform from the perspective of OECD farmers themselves. 
• This rationale is even stronger for small farmers. The smallest 25 percent of European 
farms receive less than 4 percent of total European support (the same as in the U.S.), 
whereas the largest 25 percent of European farms receive 70 percent (80 percent in 
the U.S.) of the total. The fact that existing farm support mostly beneﬁts large farmers 
provides a strong rationale for reform from the perspective of OECD public opinion, 
which supports farm policies out of a desire to assist small family farms.
• OECD farmers often have above-average OECD incomes: Netherlands (250 per-
cent), Denmark (175 percent), Belgium (127 percent), Japan (120 percent), U.S. 
(110 percent), and Poland (105 percent). In sum, resources are transferred from 
poorer OECD households to richer ones. This is a powerful equity argument for 
policy reform from the OECD countries’ own perspective.
• Lastly, current OECD farm policies have in practice largely failed to protect the 
rural environment because they result in intensive use of fertilizers and encourage 
polluting production methods. Policies targeting well deﬁned environmental goals 
would be much more efﬁcient and effective.
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of protection to which the tariff cuts decided in the Uruguay Round would be 
applied so that these cuts had a very limited impact—so-called “dirty” tarifﬁ-
cation. Moreover, OECD WTO Members often limited the real value of their 
commitments by adopting “speciﬁc” tariffs (tariffs denominated as a ﬁxed sum 
per unit of product, such as €300 per ton of rice) rather than ad valorem 
tariffs (which are expressed as a percentage of the import price). For instance, 
the U.S. and the EU have imposed speciﬁc tariffs for one-third of their farm 
products, and these speciﬁc tariffs are devastatingly protectionist because they 
automatically increase the level of protection when world prices are low, that 
is, when protection is very much sought after by domestic farmers. Developing 
countries used another way to limit the real value of their commitments: they 
set their “bound” tariffs (which cannot be raised without compensating the 
affected trading partners) at a much higher level than their actually applied 
tariffs so that, if necessary, they could rapidly and massively increase their 
applied tariffs without any risk of having to offer compensation. Lastly, tariff-
rate quotas (restrictions combining a lower (in-quota) tariff rate for a speciﬁed 
volume of imports and a higher (over-quota) tariff rate for imports above this 
volume) have been used as a way to maintain existing preferences, not to open 
domestic markets more widely, or in a less discriminatory manner. These weak 
disciplines on tariffs, coupled with very limited restraints on export subsidies 
and domestic price support, prevented any real reform of farm trade.
OECD farm protection hurts developing countries, including those with 
“preferential” agreements
OECD farm policies severely limit access to major OECD farm markets. They 
generate large price volatility in world markets: while OECD farmers are shel-
tered from almost all possible risks because of price support and other subsidies, 
developing country markets bear the burden of ampliﬁed price volatility. They 
force farmers from developing countries to match OECD subsidized prices for 
the products concerned. They induce developing countries’ farmers to over-
invest in OECD least-subsidized products, such as coffee and cocoa, leading 
to excessive supply and depressed prices for these crops. Absent protection in 
developed countries, greater diversiﬁcation in developing countries would be 
feasible. Last, OECD policies have a perverse mimicking effect. Many govern-
ments of developing countries use OECD policies as a rationale for sheltering 
their own farmers from the depressed prices and ampliﬁed market volatility 
caused by trade-distorting OECD policies. While politically understandable, 
these policies impose additional costs on poor countries. 
Contrary to widespread belief, closed OECD markets are not solely a prob-
lem for major agricultural exporting countries such as Argentina, Brazil, or 
Thailand. They also affect the poorest developing countries, which are often 
dependent on a very small set of commodities, many of them subsidized and 
protected by OECD countries, such as sugar, cotton, and rice (box 3.2).
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Both the U.S. and the EU have adopted farm reforms since the 2001 Doha 
Ministerial. What follows shows that, unfortunately, these reforms are either 
going in the wrong direction (the U.S.) or are largely virtual (the EU). Both 
reforms are due to be revisited in 2006–07, as part of the normal legislative 
process in the U.S. and as a step in the enlargement process in the EU. These 
reexaminations will offer the last chance for these two large WTO Members 
not to block the Doha Round. But it is clear that, to be credible, signals of 
change need to be made quickly.
The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill: turning into Europeans?
Following its adoption by Congress, the U.S. Farm Security and Rural Invest-
ment Act (FSRIA) was signed in May 2002 by the president (who chose not 
to ﬁght the bill). It will last until 2006. Its main feature is to reinforce the 
link between subsidies and production decisions. This is a signiﬁcant back-
ward step compared with the previous Farm Bill, the 1996 Federal Agricul-
ture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR Act) which, in conformity with 
the UAA, eliminated all mechanisms linking subsidies to production deci-
sions (“decoupling” of subsidies), except for a speciﬁc type of deﬁciency pay-
ments (loan deﬁciency payments). Despite this important exception (in 2002 
loan deﬁciency payments represented almost 40 percent of total U.S. producer 
support as estimated by the OECD) the evolution of the FAIR Act toward 
economically sound and WTO-consistent decoupled subsidies was important 
because it signaled a serious commitment to a profound reform of U.S. farm 
policy. By moving backward, the FSRIA has raised serious doubts about this 
commitment.
Box 3.2
OECD farm 
protection and 
developing 
countries—a tale 
of three products
 
Source: OECD 2004a.
Sugar is one of the most policy-distorted of all commodities. Among the large OECD coun-
tries, the European Union is the worst offender with protection rates above 100 percent, 
meaning that producers receive more than double the world market price. EU support to 
sugar producers totaled €3.3 billion in 2003—that is, more than half the total OECD sup-
port for sugar, and 1.4 times the value of sugar exported by the eight developing countries 
for which sugar exports represent more than 20 percent of their total exports.
U.S. subsidies to cotton growers totaled $3 billion in 2001–02, meaning a protection 
rate of 95 percent. This represents half of the world subsidies to cotton, with China, the 
EU, and India being the other key offenders (their subsidies amount to 21 percent, 17 per-
cent, and 9 percent, respectively). U.S. subsidies are equivalent to four times the value of 
cotton produced by the four African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad) that 
argued the cotton issue at the Cancún Ministerial Conference because cotton is a critical 
cash crop for their many small-scale and near-subsistence farmers.
Rice support in Japan amounts to a staggering 700 percent of production at world 
prices. It amounted to almost $13 billion in 2003—roughly two-thirds of the OECD pro-
ducer support for this product, the bulk of the rest of OECD support being provided by 
the Republic of Korea ($6 billion)—denying huge export opportunities to poor countries in 
South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Viet Nam, and so on) or to the poorest regions (Thailand).
50 Part 1 Market access agenda
The FSRIA reinforces the link between subsidies and production decisions 
by reintroducing support (“target”) prices for calculating newly created counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs). Target prices are deﬁned for the years 2002–07 and 
for a much wider set of crops (cereals, cotton, milk, peanuts, rice, soybeans, and 
other oilseeds) than those covered by the FAIR Act. Although they are margin-
ally lower than those prevailing before 1996, these target prices provide higher 
support levels because world prices have declined since 1996. Based on these tar-
get prices, CCPs insulate U.S. farmers from world prices, providing higher sup-
port when world prices drop and smaller support when world prices increase.
What follows illustrates the concrete functioning of the FSRIA in a hypo-
thetical case for wheat in 2004–07 (prices are in rounded ﬁgures). For this 
period, the wheat target price is $144 a ton. If the world market price for wheat 
is, say, $100 a ton, any U.S. wheat producer is eligible for three layers of support: 
a loan deﬁciency payment deﬁned as the difference between the loan deﬁciency 
payment rate for wheat (ﬁxed at $101 a ton by the FSRIA) and the world price; 
a direct payment ﬁxed at $19 a ton for wheat by the FSRIA; and a CCP of $24 a 
ton, the CCP being calculated as the difference between the target price and the 
market price, less the loan deﬁciency payment and the direct payment.
These arcane calculations reﬂect differences between the bases for paying 
the three supports that are crucial in the WTO context. Loan deﬁciency pay-
ments are paid on the basis of production during the period in question. As 
they are clearly not decoupled subsidies, they pertain to the WTO Amber Box 
of trade-distorting subsidies. Direct payments are paid on the basis of histori-
cal production, that is, production having occurred during the reference period 
deﬁned by the FSRIA. They are considered to be decoupled subsidies—hence, 
they pertain to the WTO Green Box (the box of permitted subsidies). By con-
trast, the legal status of the CCPs was initially ambiguous. To the extent that 
they are paid on the basis of historical production, they are decoupled from 
current production. But, because they rely on target prices, they contain a link 
between production decisions and the size of the subsidy. This link is rein-
forced by the possibility, under the FSRIA, to “update” historical production 
by taking into account more recent production levels than those of the refer-
ence period. Updating opens the door to “strategic” behavior by U.S. farmers, 
that is, expanding acreage and yield-increasing inputs for further updating in 
the case of expected severe price declines in the future. Lastly, links with pro-
duction decisions are reinforced by the speciﬁc dairy provisions contained in 
the FSRIA, namely, a guaranteed intervention price for a speciﬁed milk quota. 
The ambiguity as to their legal status was dissipated by one of the provisions of 
the 2004 Doha Work Programme (DWP) framework.
In terms of policy instruments, the FSRIA is an important regression com-
pared with the FAIR Act. That its projected economic impact may be only 
marginally worse has two main explanations. The ﬁrst is that, when farm prices 
declined between 1998 and 2002, U.S. farmers lobbied for, and got, ad hoc 
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subsidies on top of those allowed under the FAIR Act. Adding this ad hoc 
assistance to the “regular” FAIR Act subsidies gives roughly the same amount of 
support as the total level of subsidies available under the FSRIA. In other words, 
the effective level of protection does not change much because the FSRIA locks 
in the actual level of support provided since 1998. Second, as the FAIR Act 
removed most of the supply controls, U.S. farmers have already expanded crop 
areas to their maximum proﬁtable limits under current prices, limiting the risk 
of an increased base for payments for the time being. Finally, because of the way 
CCPs are designed, the effective impact of the FSRIA depends on the level of 
world farm prices. As these prices have increased in 2003–04, actual U.S. sub-
sidies are substantially smaller than FSRIA appropriations.
However, the conclusion of a limited additional economic impact of the 
FSRIA over the FAIR Act requires an important caveat. It ignores the stronger 
systemic impact of the Act over the longer term. Undoubtedly, the FSRIA has 
refueled hopes for ongoing farm protection in the U.S., further eroding the pro-
liberalization U.S. export farm lobbies. This systemic effect is best illustrated 
by the shift of the largest U.S. farm association (the American Farm Bureau), 
which recently voted (by a narrow margin of 204 to 202) to support only 
future trade agreements “that prevent economic damage to import-sensitive 
commodities...while advancing U.S. agricultural trade and food security inter-
ests,” causing the chairman of the Indiana branch of the Farm Bureau to say 
that “we are turning into Europeans” (Financial Times, January 15, 2004). As 
a result, the FSRIA is fueling, all over the world, fears of increased price vola-
tility and uncertainty in the future, leading to reinforced pressures for more 
protectionist farm policies in other WTO Members.
The 2003 Luxembourg reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: 
“Matrix Reloaded” 
In June 2003 the European Council adopted the Luxembourg reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Adopted in the 1960s, the CAP was 
relentlessly expanded until the mid-1980s. Initially based on support for very 
high domestic prices, it transformed the EU from a net importer into a large 
net exporter of farm products. That is, it not only closed European markets to 
foreign competition, but it also dumped European farm products into foreign 
markets, through export subsidies, endangering the farm sectors of many devel-
oping countries. The unsustainably large costs of the CAP imposed the ﬁrst 
CAP reform (the 1992 McSharry reform). The UAA was used as an excuse for 
introducing this reform, a short-term political expediency that proved to be 
costly in the long run because it induced European farmers to believe that, since 
then, all their pains were due to “farm trade liberalization” (which, as shown 
above, has not yet occurred) rather than to the systemic ﬂaws of the CAP. Cop-
ing with the EU enlargement to Central European countries again revealed 
these systemic ﬂaws and entailed a second reform (the 1999 Berlin reform). 
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The 2003 Luxembourg reform is still incomplete. It needs additional regu-
lations at the European level, in particular for reforming the sugar market, 
which is one of the most protected in the EU yet is crucial for many developing 
countries (the July 2004 Commission proposal to reform the sugar market will 
be examined by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the 
months to come) (see box 3.2). Moreover, EU member states have some free-
dom in implementing key aspects of the 2003 reform, notably the exact dose 
of decoupling. While several large farm producers (Britain, Germany, Ireland) 
have decided to adopt maximum decoupling, other EU member states did not 
make such a clear choice, increasing the risks of perverse impacts of the reform, 
which will be described below.
However, despite the missing elements, enough information is available to 
suggest strongly that the 2003 CAP reform is very modest and may even gener-
ate new problems without having the capacity to solve the existing ones.
The 2003 reform introduces a new instrument—single farm payments—
which, as early as 2005 but no later than 2007, will replace a subset of the exist-
ing support measures, namely the subsidies based on the area planted (cereals, 
oilseeds) and on the herd size (beef, cows, sheep). As they are based on the 
average production in 2000–02 and do not require actual production of farm 
products, these single payments are considered as “decoupled” from produc-
tion decisions.
This decoupling has been the main reason for the hype about the 2003 
reform.1 It was presented as a decisive shift of the CAP toward a WTO-
consistent approach based on decoupled support, in sharp contrast with what 
happened with the U.S. FSRIA.
However, this hype is not justiﬁed. First, as underlined above, only area-
based and head-based subsidies will be decoupled. These subsidies account for 
a very limited share of producer support to EU farmers—between 21 percent 
and 27 percent in 2002—depending on the actual dose of decoupling adopted 
by the EU member states (in what follows, all ﬁgures refer to the EU-15). 
Second, for all but one (milk, see below) of the main EU crops and herds, 
the 2003 CAP reform maintains the current price support, which is by far the 
main source of EU producer support (58 percent in 2002).2 Given that for 
many products it is price support that determines the actual level of protec-
tion, the 2003 reform leaves the EU current level of protection unchanged. As 
a result, the 2003 reform can have only a modest impact on the markets of the 
current 15 EU member states. EU farm prices are estimated to change by 1 
percent or less for wheat and other cereals, oilseeds, poultry, and pork, and by 
2 percent or less for milk (FAPRI 2003; OECD 2004b).3 Such modest price 
changes can in turn bring only small changes in the quantities produced (less 
than 1 percent) and consumed in Europe, hence in EU imports from, and 
exports to, the rest of the world, and ultimately in world prices (FAPRI 2003; 
OECD 2004b).
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The 2003 reform substantially reduces support prices for only three prod-
ucts: butter, rice, and rye. Butter is by far the most important. The butter 
intervention price will be reduced by an additional 10 percent on top of the 15 
percent reduction agreed in the 1999 Berlin reform.4 As a result, the EU butter 
market price is projected to decrease by around 7 percent by 2008, with the 
world butter price increasing by less than 4 percent and EU exports of butter 
declining by 16 percent (OECD 2004b). However, the estimated changes of 
EU prices of other major dairy products (milk, cheese, skimmed milk powder) 
are modest (2 percent), as are changes in the corresponding world prices (less 
than 1 percent) (OECD 2004). These globally modest changes in the dairy 
sector are achieved at a very high price for EU taxpayers: the payments granted 
to EU dairy farmers to compensate them for the decrease in price support are 
estimated to amount to €4.2 billion—22 percent of the current producer sup-
port to milk producers in 2002. 
The two other products (rye and rice) are marginal—0.3 percent of EU 
farm production (in fact, the German rye producers anticipated a decline in rye 
support due to the huge EU stocks). The cut in the rice price support is inter-
esting for two reasons: it is driven by trade policy (it is necessary to honor the 
EU commitment under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative to provide 
access to the EU rice market to EBA beneﬁciaries); and it is a test case for sugar 
and bananas, the two other products in the same situation under the EBA 
initiative. The rice support price will be reduced by 50 percent in 2004—but, 
once again, these changes will be very costly for EU taxpayers since the single 
payments for rice will amount to the whole producer support in the sector. The 
EU market price is projected to decline by between 13 percent and 33 percent, 
and EU production by 12 percent, but the change in the world rice price is 
estimated to be very small (less than 2 percent) (FAPRI 2003; OECD 2004b). 
Imposed by the EBA initiative, the 2003 reform has a boomerang effect on 
the EU trade policy because the current EU protection for rice is mostly deter-
mined by price support. Lowering this support automatically reduces the level 
of protection on rice imports from countries that are not EBA beneﬁciaries. In 
order to eliminate this possibility, the EU has already announced its intention 
to negotiate import quotas with non-EBA rice exporters—and these are likely 
to be bitter and difﬁcult negotiations.
As noted above, the Commission’s July 2004 proposal for reforming 
the sugar market (another key product for developing countries) is not yet 
adopted—it is said that the ﬁnal decision is expected to be taken “within 12 
months” (that is, before July 2005). The core aspects of the Commission’s pro-
posal are a cut by one-third of the support price over three years, a reduction 
of the EU production quota by 16 percent over four years, and new decoupled 
support for sugar beet farmers to compensate income losses. The post-reform 
support price will basically align the EU price to the U.S. support price, and 
it will still be much higher than the current (and forecast) world price (€421 
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a ton compared with €160–€200 a ton), suggesting a very limited impact on 
foreign farmers. The production-quota reduction will be too small to change 
world prices (Brazilian producers could easily ﬁll the gap).
At this stage, the 2003 CAP reform thus suggests two main conclusions. 
First, it has almost no impact on the level of producer support (in percentage 
terms) to EU farmers, which (all other things being constant) is projected to 
decrease from 57 percent to 56 percent (OECD 2004b). By contrast, it allows 
a substantial shift of EU support from the Blue Box (subsidies exempted from 
reduction under the Uruguay Round because they are under production-limiting 
programs) to the Green Box (subsidies not deemed to be trade-distorting, hence 
acceptable) if they stay as currently deﬁned (a big if). For instance, the projected 
level of the remaining EU support in the Blue Box would be smaller than the 5 
percent threshold suggested in the August DWP framework. Similarly, the sum 
of the domestic subsidies deemed trade-distorting (calculated as the aggregate 
measure of support, or AMS) and Blue Box subsidies in 2008 would be half (in 
case of maximal decoupling) to two-thirds (in case of minimal decoupling) of 
the corresponding sum in 2003. In other words, the 2003 reform allows the EU 
to “play boxes” in WTO negotiations, by shifting some of them to the legally 
safest Green Box subsidies. But it has no effect on import barriers and export 
subsidies—the core issue for the EU trading partners.
Second, the 2003 reform’s estimated economic impact is modest, with the 
bulk of the net welfare gains ﬂowing almost entirely from the shift of the CAP 
burden from consumers to taxpayers and farmers in the dairy sector; dairy 
consumers will beneﬁt from lower butter prices, but taxpayers will pay more 
(the very expensive compensation program for dairy more than offsets the sav-
ings from lower dairy export subsidies), whereas dairy farmers will lose some 
rents associated with the existing milk quotas (assuming that they are effec-
tively the current beneﬁciaries of the rents, a debatable proposition). The fact 
that the net gains of the 2003 reform are so dominated by reform in the dairy 
sector can only be a source of serious concern because this sector is well known 
for its strong lobbying capacity (once again, as of September 2004, nothing 
deﬁnitive has been decided for the EU sugar regime).
The partial decoupling approach adopted by the 2003 reform not only fails 
to solve the existing CAP problem, but it may well generate additional problems. 
First, the single payments to be introduced are subject to “cross-compliance” 
criteria based on respect for statutory environmental, food safety, animal welfare, 
and animal and plant health standards (a nonexhaustive “priority” list of 18 such 
statutory standards has already been adopted). Farm land must also be kept in 
“good productive” condition, and there should be no signiﬁcant decrease in total 
permanent pasture area. Such cross-compliance clearly has the capacity to limit 
the new freedom of European farmers about production choices.
Second, the 2003 reform relies on systematic “overcompensation”—that is, 
it is paying farmers more than the value of the lost subsidies, as did the 1992 
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McSharry reform. This ﬂows from the wide difference in terms of transfer 
efﬁciency between area-based or head-based subsidies and single payments. 
Only 25–30 cents of every euro of area-based or head-based support goes to 
EU farmers’ incomes, as opposed to 50 cents in the case of single payments 
(OECD 2001b). In other words, matching the pre-2003 subsidies would actu-
ally have required single payments amounting to only half the current area-
based or head-based subsidies—and not the 95–110 percent granted in the 
2003 reform on rice and butter.5 
Third, the large EU farmers will be, once again, the main beneﬁciaries 
of the 2003 reform because they got most of the area-based and head-based 
subsidies during the reference period. And the poorest EU farmers will not get 
enough income support to leave production because they will get very limited 
single payments (see box 3.1). Further, by giving crop-free and herd-free money 
to large farmers, the 2003 reform has triggered fears among European farm-
ers, in particular the smaller farmers, that large farmers will use this money to 
invest in the areas where they currently produce. They have thus been able to 
impose limits on using single payments for investing in farm sectors such as 
fruits, vegetables, and potatoes. In sum, the 2003 reform has had the perverse 
impact of generating intra-EU production quotas—far from bringing simpliﬁ-
cation, as argued by its supporters. 
Intra-EU production quotas, combined with more quotas on EU imports 
(rice), make the 2003 reform more likely to open the door to a protectionist 
regime akin to the Multi-Fibre Agreement in clothing than to open EU farm 
markets to freer trade.6 That the DWP framework opens so many possibilities 
to “liberalize” through tariff-rate quotas can only magnify these worries.
This evolution is all the more plausible because it echoes similar EU ini-
tiatives, such as the new restrictions on grains imposed by the EU in 2002. 
It is also made more likely by the 10 new EU member states that have not 
been able—or keen—to use their accession negotiations as an opportunity 
to introduce deep CAP reforms. Instead of trying to gain as much of the pre-
2003 CAP as possible, they could have fought for amplifying “modulation”—
shifting more subsidies from the current wealthiest farmers (all of them being 
in the EU 15) to all the small farmers (being in the current or new EU member 
states) and to the large (but restructuring) farmers in the new EU member 
states. As a result, the new EU member states have lost an opportunity to build 
a bridge between the EU farmers and those from developing countries.7
Reasons for hope: ﬁrst cracks in the tectonic plates of OECD farm 
protection?
Given the dismal picture of the failure of the EU and U.S. to provide true 
farm reforms, are there any grounds for optimism with regard to the WTO 
negotiations? Indeed, the stability of OECD agricultural protection during the 
1990s reﬂects the political clout of OECD farmers. But things are changing 
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(Messerlin 2003). First, farmers nowadays represent only 2 percent to 4 per-
cent of the active population in all the large OECD countries, and they con-
stitute a relatively old, rapidly declining labor force. However, the remaining 
farm labor force has to date been in favor of protection, suggesting that OECD 
governments may adopt a freer trade farm policy only when the farm sector is 
miniscule. Moreover, while public awareness of the costs of OECD farm poli-
cies is growing, it remains low. For instance, in 2000 a Eurobarometer survey 
revealed that fewer than half of Europeans were aware of the existence of the 
CAP, despite the fact that it accounts for half of the OECD budget.
Second, farmers also have increasingly diverging interests. A growing share 
of farmers—in particular, small farmers—realize that they will lose little (see 
box 3.1), and might even gain, from a shift from the current farm policies to 
farm trade liberalization accompanied by sound domestic policies. The inter-
ests of small farmers in OECD countries and farmers in developing countries 
are increasingly converging: both groups will gain from a shift from the cur-
rent OECD farm policies to truly decoupled (income-support) schemes. Such 
schemes will shift the policy focus from large farmers (by far the main beneﬁ-
ciaries of the current subsidies) to poor (most of them being small) farmers, be 
they located in rich or poor countries. In sum, focusing on decoupling has the 
political advantage of being friendlier to small OECD farmers and is promis-
ing in terms of building the coalitions necessary for taking on the extraordi-
nary political forces that hold back agrifood liberalization in OECD countries, 
particularly in Europe. This coalition-building process will help tackle the cur-
rent situation in which consumers and taxpayers are no longer motivated to 
ﬁght for more liberalization in agrifood as they believe that it has already been 
liberalized under the UAA. 
Moreover, the increasing demand for processed food products is creat-
ing large consumers—the small and large agrifood ﬁrms—that can organize 
and unite the interests of all OECD consumers, providing for the ﬁrst time 
a powerful counterpoint to farm lobbies and rebalancing the political forces 
on farm protection. The technological evolution behind the shift to processed 
food is a challenge for OECD farmers as it tends to reduce their share of food 
revenue. 
The political forces on farm reform are already undergoing a shift due 
to two major factors. First, public support for current OECD farm policies 
has been eroded by the critical campaigns of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), which have become key agents in raising the media proﬁle of, and 
creating new constituencies for, farm reform in OECD countries. Several Euro-
pean consumers’ associations have also become more aggressive in demanding 
liberalization, particularly those that care about poor consumers, the main 
victims of the current agrifood protection (McKechnie 2003). NGOs such as 
Oxfam (2002) and World Vision have done much to move the debate out of 
trade policy circles and to raise broader public awareness of the costs of OECD 
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farm policies for developing countries. These campaigns have also done much 
to highlight the failure of existing protection to deliver environmental beneﬁts 
or to help small family farms.
Second, sanitary crises in OECD countries (such as mad cow and other 
instances of food contamination) have undermined public support for their 
own domestic farmers. While relatively few, these outbreaks have been trau-
matic for the populations involved, and they have contributed to increase pub-
lic questioning of what this large expenditure of tax revenue on agriculture is 
for—if it cannot guarantee safe, reliable food. These changes are yet precarious 
and should not be overstated. Despite the fact that sanitary crises have emerged 
from distinctly homegrown regulatory failures, they have also fed calls for the 
localization of food production and consumption, restricting world food trade 
to a few exotic commodities. Similarly, consumers’ and environmentalists’ 
concerns can lead to import restrictions, as best illustrated by the genetically 
modiﬁed organisms issue.
Finally, in the EU and the U.S., budget pressures may be helpful in the 
coming years, although history shows that one should not count too much 
on budgetary disciplines. In the U.S., pressure to reduce the record budget 
deﬁcit will force scrutiny of a range of domestic programs, from which farm 
spending may not be immune, as early as 2005, although increasing world 
prices are softening the impact of this constraint. In the EU case the 1999 
and 2003 CAP reforms have put a cap on the EU farm budget, with ﬁnancial 
rules ensuring the systematic respect of the cap; although here again, increas-
ing world prices are introducing temporary relief (particularly on EU export 
subsidies). However, the 10 new EU member states may trade some of their 
votes on other issues for changing these disciplines and getting more produc-
tion-related support. Moreover, the 15 pre-enlargement EU member states may 
want to lobby for more subsidies for rural development and other multifunc-
tionality items—there is no cap on such subsidies. Lastly, EU member states 
could decide to increase subsidies at the national level: under the 2003 reform, 
they can make additional payments up to a maximum of 10 percent of the total 
single payments to encourage speciﬁc sectors important for the environment, 
quality production, and marketing.
Driving forward the agrifood liberalization agenda will be easier if certain 
farmers decide to cooperate. An important ﬁrst step in this direction will be 
reached if OECD farmers get rid of their erroneous belief that their current 
problems are caused by liberalization when, in fact, they are generated by per-
sistent protection (as shown at the beginning of this chapter). Another illustra-
tion of such misconceptions is the idea that, as it is the largest food importer in 
the world, the EU must necessarily be an open market. This argument holds 
little weight because it reﬂects a host of factors that have little to do with the 
level of protection, such as the fact that Europe’s climate excludes production 
of the tropical products Europeans consume in large quantities.
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A second step will be reached if OECD farmers are convinced that there 
can be a “life after subsidies,” that is, that many will survive trade liberalization 
(Johnson 2000). For instance, what could be expected to happen in France—
a key European member state when it comes to agrifood liberalization—
following a 50 percent cut in European protection? There are three very dis-
tinct effects (Francois, van Meijl, and van Tongeren 2003): French farm output 
would decline by 15 percent in the long term in cereals and cattle (roughly 
12 percent of the total agrifood production); it would remain stable in milk 
and sugar (roughly 15 percent of the total agrifood production), though with 
eroded rents; and it would increase in pork and poultry by 6 percent, in horti-
culture by 8 percent, and, above all, in processed food by 18 percent (roughly 
63 percent of the total agrifood production). These estimates ﬂy in the face 
of public opinion. They are far from being cataclysmic. The changes would 
mostly require that a limited number of farmers redeﬁne their product mix 
toward products in which they are competitive, including shifting away from 
farm products toward processed food.
The last step consists of adjustment schemes to ease the transition to lib-
eralization. In fact, by recognizing the need for reform now, OECD farmers 
are in a position to negotiate appropriate adjustment schemes. These schemes 
are not new (box 3.3). OECD countries have two advantages for designing 
adjustment policies: they have a broader tax base and their farmers are older (in 
their mid-ﬁfties)—meaning that, since only the farmers currently in operation 
should be compensated for the existing situation, the average transition period 
to be considered is roughly 15 years, at most.
Yet all these powerful trends still raise a key question. Will the OECD 
farmers realize that, in this context, it is better for them to negotiate now—
when they still have some power for shaping the instruments and speed of 
liberalization—than in a decade or two—when their political weight will be 
even smaller, maybe to the point to be too small to inﬂuence future WTO 
negotiations? 
Beneﬁts from farm liberalization
For developing countries, farm reform is the main source of welfare gains from 
liberalizing trade in goods. The common outcomes of the available calcula-
tions of the gains from trade liberalization suggest two main observations, 
outlined below: that the biggest gains come from countries’ own liberalization, 
and that the poorest countries will tend to gain proportionally more than the 
other developing countries. 
The biggest gains come from countries’ own liberalization
The enormity of OECD protection should not obscure a crucial relation 
between the sources of the welfare gains and the beneﬁciaries. Developing 
countries’ welfare gains from farm liberalization will mostly come from their 
59Chapter 3 Agriculture
own liberalization, reﬂecting the basic point that protection hurts the consum-
ers of the protecting country. Similarly, most of the OECD gains from farm 
liberalization will come from their own liberalization.
The exact balance between the two sources of liberalization gains (those 
from own liberalization and those from trading partners’ liberalization) 
depends on the detailed hypotheses of the calculations. Higher estimates sug-
gest that 90 percent of the gains are coming from the own-group liberaliza-
tion (IMF 2003) while lower estimates are within the 50 percent to 60 per-
cent range (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003). But note that even the 
lower results suggest that a majority of gains come from liberalization of the 
country’s own group. In particular, some key developing countries in the post-
Cancún negotiations (for instance, Brazil and India) would gain much more 
from the liberalization of intra-developing country trade than from the open-
ing of OECD markets (though this partly mirrors the elimination of OECD 
export subsidies). The consequences of such a situation for the coming WTO 
negotiations are immense.
That said, available calculations also show that developing countries would 
make signiﬁcant gains from OECD farm liberalization. Similarly, OECD 
countries get noticeable welfare gains from developing countries’ farm liberal-
ization. In other words, developing countries have a strong interest in liberal-
izing OECD farm policies (and vice-versa).
These estimates underline the crucial responsibility of the OECD coun-
tries in leading farm trade liberalization. They also suggest two lessons for 
developing countries: ﬁrst, developing countries are right to keep the pressure 
Box 3.3
Adjustment 
schemes in 
OECD countries
Source: Beard and 
Swinbank 2001; Colman 
2002; Drake-Brockman 
and Anderson 2003; 
Edwards 2003; Orden, 
Paarlberg, and Roe 1999; 
Orden 2003; Swinbank 
and Tangermann 2001.
Until recently, OECD countries paid little attention to adjustment programs in agriculture. 
In the immediate postwar period, the focus was on industrialization, and rural depopula-
tion was seen as the main source of much-needed workers for industry. Adjustment pro-
grams such as the progressive reduction of producers of alcohol, known as bouilleurs de 
cru in France, were rare. After the 1960s, no attention was paid to the farmers who left 
the farm sector. It was assumed that the current OECD farm policies were slowing down 
rural depopulation as much as possible (although some argue that, indeed, they may have 
accelerated it).
As a result, the interest in substantial adjustment programs in agriculture among OECD 
countries has been short-lived (Sweden, 1989–92) or is too recent to provide interesting 
lessons (Australian dairy in 2000 and sugar in 2000 and 2002, U.S. peanuts under the 
2002 FSRIA). Paradoxically, the most determined shift away from a regulated farm policy 
(New Zealand, 1986) was not accompanied by a large-scale adjustment program. In the 
EU only plans for such programs exist (for instance, in the dairy sector).
Ideally, such programs should rely on four principles: decoupling payments from cur-
rent production decisions so that future payments are based on past entitlements; decou-
pling payments from land (farms) and coupling them to individuals (farmers); ﬁxing deﬁni-
tively the future level of payments; and limiting the duration of payments (10 to 20 years 
at most) and reducing them over time.
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on OECD countries to liberalize their agriculture; and second, they would be 
wrong to renounce their own liberalization. They also suggest that the only 
context in which it is possible to beneﬁt from such systemic effects is multilat-
eral negotiations—not unilateral or bilateral ones. Indeed, in stark contrast to 
services (and even, to a lesser extent, industrial goods), experience in agricul-
ture has been that very limited liberalization of market access and of subsidy 
regimes has been undertaken unilaterally, with the exception of New Zealand 
and Australia (leaving aside the short-lived cases of Sweden and Estonia). And 
the experience of the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Australia or 
the Central American countries or between the EU and Mercosur underlines 
how limited progress on agriculture outside of WTO negotiations is, and how 
difﬁcult implementation is in the rare cases of bilateral liberalization (NAFTA). 
One can hardly expect changes in this respect.
These estimates are also consistent with the fact that, during the last decade, 
intra–developing country trade has been more dynamic than developed-devel-
oping country trade in agricultural products. This is because tariffs have been 
reduced by developing countries (often in the context of World Bank or IMF 
programs) and despite the fact that average levels of overall protection in devel-
oping countries are still substantial—with average tariffs higher in poor devel-
oping countries (19.3 percent) than in middle-income developing countries 
(16.3 percent), and with developing countries’ ability to increase their applied 
tariffs very rapidly and massively because their bound tariffs are still very high 
(box 3.4). In other words, the growth in intra-developing country trade in agri-
culture despite the high level of actual and potential protection reﬂects the large 
growth in demand for a number of commodities in developing countries.
Box 3.4
Freer trade and 
market volatility
Source: Goletti 
1994; Dorosh and 
Shahabuddin 2002; 
Hoda and Gulati 2002.
Following the poor harvests in 1997 and 1998 in Bangladesh, hundreds of private trad-
ers imported several million tons of rice from India. This competitive trade stabilized rice 
prices in Bangladesh at import parity levels. This trade not only addressed the issue of 
food security for the poor, it also allowed the Bangladeshi government not to focus on rice 
price stabilization, a policy that has a weak economic case and that, in particular, has 
little effect on the poorest farmers. Private sector trade was the most efﬁcient stabiliza-
tion policy.
In sharp contrast, farm policies can rapidly destabilize prices. In 1999 and 2000 
Bangladesh experienced excellent rice harvests. India, which was enjoying continual good 
harvests, introduced export subsidies in early 2001. To protect its farmers from Indian 
subsidized rice, Bangladesh raised import tariffs on rice from 5 percent to 43 percent in 
August 2001—stopping rice imports, and keeping rice prices at a relatively high level.
Such illustrations about international trade can be extended to countries’ own domes-
tic trade. Many developing countries suffer from fragmented internal food markets for a 
host of reasons. Among them are ofﬁcial or hidden restrictions to trade between various 
regions or states, which prevent interregional trade ﬂows in a timely and efﬁcient manner, 
particularly in the case of large developing countries.
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Are the poorest countries among the beneﬁciaries?
Developing countries as a whole gain from liberalization, but is this also the 
case for the poorest countries? Would not most of the gains accrue to large 
middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Thailand, that have 
strong comparative advantages in agriculture and are already major players in 
world farm markets? The answer is no. The best information currently avail-
able strongly suggests that, in general, the poorest developing countries stand 
to gain too, and even that they will tend to gain proportionally more than the 
other developing countries.
A ﬁrst piece of evidence to support this answer is the relative importance 
of the poorest countries’ exports of products facing subsidies in at least one 
WTO Member. Contrary to widespread perception, preferential (duty-free) 
access to the European or U.S. markets, be it through the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences, EBA initiative, or African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
is not really helpful. The absence of restrictions at the borders does not pre-
vent behind-the-border measures—price support and other domestic produc-
tion subsidies—that keep OECD farmers producing and selling in their own 
OECD markets. The presence of heavily subsidized OECD producers in the 
market makes it very hard for exporters from the poorest countries to compete 
in those markets, despite their preferential tariffs.
Keeping this key point in mind, basic statistics tell a shocking story. The 
poorest countries (excluding China and India) are much more affected by farm 
protection than other countries: 29.3 percent of their farm exports are products 
that are subsidized by one or more WTO Members, compared with 6.4 per-
cent for middle-income developing countries, and 4 percent for the OECD 
countries, with China and India’s exposure rate being much lower at around 
5 percent (Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga 2004) (appendix 4, table A4.3). 
For countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Malawi, Mali, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 60 percent to 80 percent 
of their total exports are farm goods subsidized by OECD countries.
This regressive nature of existing OECD protection (it hurts the poorest 
countries more than other developing countries) is reinforced by the fact that, 
if protection varies greatly by product, those farm products that are most 
heavily protected by OECD countries are often key exports of developing 
countries. Contrary to popular opinion, the poorest countries are potential 
exporters of farm goods similar to highly protected OECD products, such as 
fruits, vegetables, rice, sugar, and meat. The average rate of support (tariffs 
and domestic support) of these farm products ranges from 5 percent to 150 
percent in the U.S., and from 30 percent to 330 percent in the EU (OECD 
2004a).
All these points are crucial because what counts is the overall protection 
(taking into account everything from tariffs to domestic subsidies), not just 
the protection granted by one instrument (tariffs). Preferential agreements 
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cannot deliver the elimination of behind-the-border measures; it is impossible 
to eliminate domestic subsidies paid to OECD farmers only for products com-
ing from a given region. The only forum where behind-the-border measures 
can be addressed is the WTO. With a WTO agreement, developing countries 
with preferential agreements will lose their tariff preferences (though, for many 
countries, the magnitude of such erosion of preferential access is likely to be 
relatively small, as discussed below) but many will gain from the removal of 
behind-the-border protection.
Because they face such high overall protection, it is not surprising that 
some of the largest beneﬁciaries of world farm liberalization would be regions 
dominated by the poorest countries. Indeed, the most detailed calculations 
currently available based on 28 individual developing countries (12 poorest 
and 16 middle-income developing countries) suggest a low probability of net 
losers among the poorest countries in the context of multilateral negotiations 
on farm liberalization: 3 if no liberalization occurs among developing coun-
tries, none if it occurs (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003) (table 3.1). 
The probability is even lower for middle-income developing countries. Look-
ing at changes in farm value added (an important criterion for farm-intensive 
countries) provides an even more optimistic view. These calculations provide 
three other lessons. First, the archetypal poorest countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
except South Africa) show welfare gains from liberalization by every OECD 
country. Their gains are highest when the EU liberalizes—a feature highlight-
ing the illusion of preferential agreements and their incapacity to address the 
problem of behind-the-border protection. Second, the four poorest countries 
showing welfare losses when only OECD countries liberalize (Bangladesh, 
China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka) face gains when every country liberalizes. 
Third, developing countries’ welfare gains are larger when the EU liberalizes 
than when the U.S. does. This is because EU protection is relatively higher, 
with a wider set of trade restrictions and spread over a larger number of farm 
products than is U.S. protection. Developing country targeting of the EU in 
the Doha negotiations echoes these broad features.
The possibility that some individual poorest countries could lose from 
farm reform needs to be considered for two economic reasons. First, their gains 
Table 3.1
Estimated number of 
individual countries 
possibly facing net 
losses from farm 
liberalization
 
Source: Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, 
and Robinson 2003.
Liberalization occurs in
U.S. alone EU alone
Japan 
alone
All 
developed 
countries
All 
countries
Estimated number based on losses from changes in welfare
Poorest countries (12) 4 2 0 3 0
Middle-income countries (16) 4 0 0 1 0
Estimated number based on losses from changes in farm value added
Poorest countries (12) 0 0 0 0 0
Middle-income countries (16) 0 0 0 0 0
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from a more efﬁcient allocation of domestic resources could be offset by a 
deterioration of their terms of trade (a decline of the prices of the products they 
export caused by the fact that many other countries simultaneously increase 
their exports of these products). Second, they may be net food importers and 
be sensitive to higher world prices for staples (this point is examined in detail 
in the next section).
However, the strength of these economic reasons is debatable. Under full 
employment, expansion of developing countries’ agriculture (following world 
price increases because of liberalization in rich countries) requires labor to move 
away from urban production, hence reducing the domestic gains that could 
have compensated for deteriorating terms of trade. This evolution is much 
less likely if one assumes (as seems more realistic) unemployment in rural and 
urban areas of the developing countries: in such a case, an increase in world 
farm prices would (if transmitted to domestic prices) lead to more production 
and employment in rural areas, which, in turn, would help to increase produc-
tion and employment in nonfarm sectors (there being no constraint on the 
available labor force), thus generating successive waves of income multipliers. 
Similarly, the fact that world prices of many food products have been depressed 
for decades (because of OECD agricultural protectionism) has contributed to 
some developing countries becoming net food importers (and artiﬁcially spe-
cializing in certain products). 
That said, the possibility of losses being incurred by the poorest countries 
is politically important enough for policymakers to take into account, both 
when designing negotiating modalities and when deﬁning the domestic poli-
cies aimed at enhancing developing countries’ capabilities to increase their farm 
supply and to beneﬁt from new market access. This is the focus of the following 
section. But it should be underlined that the developing countries facing such 
losses would not be better off were they to make no commitments themselves 
in the Doha Round. Assuming that a country is too small for its own policy 
choices to alter its export and import prices signiﬁcantly (a reasonable hypothe-
sis in the case of the poorest developing countries), it would still suffer the terms 
of trade loss from the trade reforms of the other countries—but without getting 
the economic efﬁciency gains from reforming its own policies in agriculture and 
in industry (where presumably it has most of its comparative advantages).
Addressing concerns about liberalization
Two main concerns are often voiced about farm liberalization. First, it could 
affect food security—that is, the capacity of a country to ensure that its whole 
population will have enough food on a stable basis, whether domestically pro-
duced or imported (this problem becomes an income issue for households 
whenever a country is open to trade). Second, it could have a particularly nega-
tive impact on the poor within countries—that is, on whether individuals will 
lack income to buy enough food to live decently.8 
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This section separately addresses both these issues—food security and the 
impact on the poor. However, the appropriate answers to these problems are 
similar: they consist in combining liberalization with appropriate domestic 
action—not in closing domestic markets to foreign exports. The crucial role 
of domestic policies is not surprising. Much of the impact of liberalization 
depends on the supply response in developing countries’ agriculture. This sup-
ply response in turn depends on a host of factors, most of which are determined 
by national conditions and policies, such as infrastructure investments, well 
functioning credit and other input markets, and the existence or absence of 
anti-agriculture and anti-export biases in the country in question. 
Farm liberalization and food security
A ﬁrst concern is that farm liberalization is seen by many as bringing with 
it the risk of generating food price increases high enough to hurt develop-
ing countries. But the currently available estimates of world price increases of 
commodities after liberalization do not exceed 5 percent to 10 percent. Full 
and instantaneous liberalization of OECD farm policies would boost the vol-
ume of global agricultural trade by more than 50 percent, but would cause real 
international food prices to rise by only 5 percent on average. Given that any 
farm trade liberalization is likely to require a decade for implementation (as for 
the commitments adopted during the previous GATT Rounds), the effects of 
such food import price increases would be indiscernible from other possible 
changes inﬂuencing trade, such as those related to demand changes and tech-
nical progress (both factors that can be strong enough to reverse the expected 
trade-related price rises) or exchange rate movements.
A second concern is that farm liberalization would also increase the price 
volatility of food products. But contrary to popular belief, trade is a powerful 
insurance policy against climate shocks and other sudden differences between 
countries. What did European cattle farmers do when confronted with a seri-
ous heat wave in the summer of 2003? They increased the trade of forage (to 
the point of closing some roads in order to facilitate convoys) between the 
European regions most and least hurt, allowing farmers in all the regions to get 
the necessary forage for their cattle. Similar illustrations can be found for trade 
between developing countries (see box 3.4). Eliminating existing farm policy 
distortions would reduce the variance of farm prices by stimulating production 
in the least protected countries, hence “thickening” the markets. 
Finally, food security concerns require a focus on a subset of developing 
countries that currently have a structurally precarious level of food security. 
A preliminary but essential step is to have a sense of the number of devel-
oping countries which could be concerned. The UAA established a list of 
net-food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs) and granted them some 
special rights. As this list was the outcome of (last-minute) negotiations, it is 
important to check whether it ﬁts a rigorous deﬁnition of food security risks 
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and does not simply reﬂect negotiating leverage. Such a rigorous deﬁnition 
shows that food security risks affect a large number of the poorest countries: 54 
of 68, with 39 of them running serious risks, while they affect only 12 middle-
income developing countries (Diaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and Robinson 2002; see 
appendix 4, table A4.3). The average level of food security risk (1 being the 
highest level of security risk, 12 the lowest) is 2.5 for the poorest countries, 
whereas it is 4.5 for China and India, 6.4 for the middle-income developing 
countries, and 10.6 for the OECD countries.9 
This result is important: it means that the issue of food security merges 
into the broader question of the situation of the poorest countries. It reinforces 
the suggestion made below that, while the poorest countries should be asked 
(and be willing) to bind their tariffs at a (much) lower level than their current 
bound tariffs, they should be required to reduce only their current applied high 
tariffs—such high tariffs are often called tariff “peaks.” 
The special safeguard debate. Food security concerns have also led to an 
impassioned debate on the necessity for a special safeguard for developing 
countries.
This debate was initially launched by some developing countries that asked 
for access to the UAA special safeguard (Article 5). The UAA made this provi-
sion available only to countries that tarifﬁed their border measures—that is, 
all the OECD countries, but only 20 developing countries (and only one of the 
poorest countries).10 The UAA special safeguard offers importing countries 
the possibility to limit a sudden surge in low-priced imports more easily than 
the usual GATT safeguard (GATT Article XIX).11 It is thus aimed at the secu-
rity of domestic farmers; it has little to do with the food security risks outlined 
above, which focus on consumers in developing countries not having enough 
food—in fact, surges in low-priced imports beneﬁt consumers.
Indeed, farm liberalization is seen by many as a situation where rich, heav-
ily equipped, and well trained OECD farmers will wipe out poor farmers in 
developing countries. Far from this, OECD farm liberalization is estimated 
to increase the food output of all the 40 individual developing countries or 
groups of countries (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Sherman 2003). Calculated as a 
percentage of the value added, the impact of world farm liberalization would 
be (again) greatest for the poorest countries—ranging between 3.1–3.4 percent 
for the Sub-Saharan countries, compared with 2.2–2.9 percent for the Latin 
American countries and less than 2 percent for the Asian countries. The value 
of agricultural exports of developing countries would be boosted by more than 
their agricultural imports would be dampened. All of the 40 developing coun-
tries or groups of developing countries would improve their trade balances, 
indicating that food self-sufﬁciency in the poorest countries would rise.
In sum, the wiping out of developing countries’ farmers by foreign farm-
ers, though technically possible, does not look very likely—and even less likely 
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if one includes the strong local dimension of food, which implies that most 
farmers produce for local markets, a dimension hard to fully integrate in the 
calculations.
Even so, would a special safeguard for developing countries be the best 
instrument to address these fears? The answer is no, for two reasons. First, in 
the context of WTO negotiations, granting a special safeguard to developing 
countries is likely to be “paid for” by keeping the special safeguard currently 
enjoyed by the OECD countries. Second, there is already a normal GATT 
safeguard (based on Article XIX), offering ample opportunities to react to 
strong import pressures.
Safeguards have also proven to be difﬁcult to control. The last 30 years of 
trade policy in developed and developing countries alike—including the last 
decade of using the Uruguay Round special safeguard—abundantly demon-
strate that safeguards are seldom used to protect the people for whom they were 
intended. More often, they fall into the hands of unrelated but powerful vested 
interests—large farmers instead of small farmers, traders instead of farmers, and 
so on. In this context, large countries have huge advantages. They will not hesi-
tate to impose safeguards, which will create the very price turbulences that devel-
oping countries fear. By contrast, small economies will often hesitate to displease 
their powerful trading partners by taking safeguards against them. They will 
generally end up imposing safeguards on the imports from their fellow develop-
ing countries, spreading turbulence and magnifying the initial problem. 
As explained below, the balance of the 2004 Doha Work Programme frame-
work underscores these concerns. It provides developing countries with a special 
safeguard, paid for by keeping the Uruguay Round special safeguard, which is 
mostly enjoyed by the rich countries. The combination of the existing Uruguay 
Round special safeguard and a possible Doha special safeguard for developing 
countries is likely to seriously undermine the value of any farm reform, and thus 
greatly diminish the overall gains expected from more liberal farm trade.
Alternatives to safeguards. There would have been—there still is, since the 2004 
DWP framework is a “work program”—a better way to address the fears just 
expressed, which may still be possible to explore in the coming negotiations. It 
would be for the Doha Agreement on Agriculture to allow the poorest coun-
tries that currently have low bound tariffs on certain farm goods to increase 
these tariffs during the Doha negotiations. These countries would receive the 
desired ﬂexibility to reposition themselves in the context of a liberalization 
process, while still keeping tariff reshufﬂing under the control of multilat-
eral negotiations. (Such an approach is equivalent to the use of GATT Article 
XXVIII without its costly compensatory mechanism.) Negotiators could 
decide to limit this one-off option to the poorest countries running food secu-
rity risks (as deﬁned by rigorous criteria, such as those mentioned above) or to 
the few food products that are key in the country’s diet.
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This approach should sufﬁce in the Doha Round context. As described 
below, the Doha negotiations should rely on a formula for tariff cuts based 
on progressivity (deeper cuts in high tariffs) with a possible cap on bound 
tariffs—that is, a maximum bound tariff. This maximum tariff is likely to be 
substantially higher than the tariff rates currently applied on farm imports by 
most developing countries. So, the foregoing alternative to a special safeguard 
for developing countries offers ﬂexibility to anxious developing countries.
Meanwhile, it has many important beneﬁts for the multilateral trading sys-
tem that a special safeguard will not provide. It ensures that the measures taken 
will consist of tariffs, not quotas. It sets ex ante the maximum possible tariff 
increases (the difference between the applied rate and the maximum bound 
tariff). It sets such increases on a tariff line basis (safeguards tend to cover 
many tariff lines). It helps the poorest countries start the crucial process of 
binding tariffs. It avoids the redundancy of making a special safeguard avail-
able to countries with very high bound tariffs. Last but not least, it will provide 
a key argument for developing countries to ask for the elimination of the Uru-
guay Round special safeguard currently enjoyed by the OECD countries.
A new special safeguard available to developing countries is thus not a 
desirable option for dealing with concerns about the potential for domestic 
producers to be wiped out by foreign competition. Nor is it the best option 
for dealing with food security concerns. First, it is difﬁcult to understand why 
such an instrument would need to be made available to middle-income coun-
tries, with most of them running no serious food security risks (see above), 
or to the poorest countries, which are not required to modify their current 
applied tariffs (other than the tariff peaks).
Second, and above all, there is a much more efﬁcient alternative for deal-
ing with these risks: emergency food stocks. From an economic perspective, 
such stocks differ from stocks used for stabilizing prices in that they should be 
bought and sold at market prices. Annex 2 (paragraph 3) of the UAA already 
includes emergency food stocks as a component of the Green Box, but devel-
oping countries running food risks should ﬁght for clariﬁcation of the UAA 
language (in addition to getting a more rigorous deﬁnition of when developing 
countries are running food security risks). 
The most important clariﬁcation concerns the possibility of treating public 
emergency purchases of food from existing domestic and foreign traders as 
equivalent to emergency public stockholding. This possibility is only brieﬂy 
evoked in the UAA’s Annex 2, but it could help to solve several problems (Lind 
2001). First, it would limit the huge maintenance costs entailed in keeping 
public stockholding (estimated to be within the range of 15 percent of the 
grain price in both India and the EU). Second, public foodstocks are hard to 
run efﬁciently, as best illustrated by India where the mammoth foodstocks 
(estimated at about 60 million tons) held by the Food Corporation of India 
(responsible for stocking and supplying the Public Distribution System) coexist 
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with several hundred million people lacking easy access to food (Hoda and 
Gulati 2002). 
More systematic public purchases from traders should also be encouraged. 
If done at the world level (the necessary capital is estimated at $400 million), 
their costs could be spread over many countries. Public purchases offer a trans-
parent alternative to international food aid, limiting the risk of using such aid 
as disguised export subsidies. They can be done at the right time, that is, when 
food is necessary, not when it is available in excess in developed countries (a 
key problem of food aid). Public purchases also allow a much more ﬂexible 
approach in terms of the food products to be stocked. All these advantages 
would be particularly beneﬁcial to the poorest countries, and are consistent 
with the Millennium Development Goals. 
In sum, improving food security should be dealt with not through restric-
tive trade policy (under the banner of a special safeguard) but through an 
open trade policy coupled with the possibilities of ex ante adjustment of bound 
tariffs and of ex post emergency food stocks, and with the elimination of the 
special safeguard provision already enjoyed by OECD countries.
Farm liberalization and the poor
Analyzing the impact of multilateral and domestic farm reforms on individual 
incomes requires a distinction between four main types of households within 
each developing country: net sellers of food (mostly farmers owning their 
land), landless rural workers, urban unskilled workers (often underemployed 
laborers), and urban skilled workers.
Net sellers of food would beneﬁt, undoubtedly and directly, from domestic 
food price increases following international food price rises. Farm households 
of this group represent a large share of the poor people in most developing 
countries, particularly in the poorest countries. For instance, they represent 60 
percent to 80 percent of total rural employment in South Asia (Rosegrant and 
Hazell 2000).
The three other groups of households are net food buyers—hence they 
are hurt by higher food prices. But whether they become ultimately poorer 
depends on what happens to their earnings—that is, to the demand for their 
speciﬁc labor. 
Most of the urban skilled workers are unlikely to see a rapid offsetting rise 
in the demand for their services following farm reforms. That would probably 
be the case for doctors, lawyers, or bureaucrats, but not for engineers who 
could beneﬁt from a boom in demand for rural infrastructure. However, one 
can reasonably assume that these net losers from farm reforms are also the 
more afﬂuent people in developing countries and that they will ﬁnd it relatively 
easy to pay a little extra for food.
Poor landless rural workers (20 percent to 40 percent of total rural employ-
ment in South Asia) would likely enjoy a rise in the demand for their unskilled 
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labor—be it demand for farm labor or for labor in rural enterprises that grow 
as farmers spend their enhanced income on manufactures and services. This, 
coupled with the fact that wage raises would more than offset the rise in food 
prices in rural areas, means that this group would beneﬁt indirectly from farm 
reforms.
That leaves the last of the four main types of households, underemployed 
urban poor, as the major vulnerable group. A proportion of these urban poor 
would not be worse off—those for whom trade reform generates a more-than-
offsetting increase in the demand for the (often informal) services that are 
relatively intensive in that group’s labor. For the rest of these households, 
which would lose from farm reforms, there are also some opportunities. Their 
losses may be offset if barriers to imports of semiskilled labor-intensive manu-
factures are reduced by their trading partners (chapter 5) and if semiskilled 
labor-intensive services from developing countries are becoming more trad-
able because of technical progress or reduced restrictions on movement of 
workers (chapter 4).
Taking these many economic forces into account suggests that losers 
among the poor would be far less numerous than is often believed. But this 
does not mean that there will be no losers from international and domestic 
farm reforms—adjustment policies to complement trade reforms will remain a 
necessary part of the package. Yet the design and ﬁnancing of appropriate com-
plementary policies can present real challenges for poor countries (box 3.5).
The need for domestic complementary policies: freer trade does not mean 
laissez-faire
Farm liberalization will require domestic adjustment in most developing (and 
developed) countries, hence the need for active domestic complementary poli-
cies. Foremost among the rural poor who may lose from trade reforms are 
those who are employed in or produce crops that are initially highly protected 
and who are unable to shift quickly from these crops to other agricultural or 
industrial activities. Examples include farmers producing maize in Mexico, 
wheat in Morocco, and bananas in several Caribbean countries.
If the mobility of the rural poor is limited, a reduction in farm protection 
alone is likely to hurt them as prices for their output fall. The costs for the 
rural poor may be particularly high in the short term. Over time, losses may be 
reduced and even eliminated, as farmers change their output mix and produce 
more of the crops whose prices do not fall. But this scenario is not necessarily 
a sufﬁcient answer: it does not solve the problem of how farmers could survive 
during the transition period.
These adjustment problems could be addressed in two ways. The ﬁrst is 
through progressive liberalization, that is, gradually phasing down tariffs in 
the vulnerable crops according to a pre-announced schedule. However, experi-
ence shows that this solution has limits. Unless a pre-announced schedule of 
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tariff reductions is actually implemented from the start, reforms with initial 
implementation lags and long transition periods (typically over ﬁve years) lack 
credibility and provide lobbyists with too much time to defeat them.
Second, liberalization must be combined with complementary policies 
aimed at easing the costs of adjustment for affected groups. Trade policy is 
not the best instrument for addressing issues raised by individual incomes. 
Better targeted policies are needed, focusing on the speciﬁc problems at hand. 
The necessary complementary policies will vary across countries but are likely 
to include a wide range of domestic structural policies (investments in land 
reform, education, technology, infrastructure) and income-transfer policies. 
Development of these policies requires analysis of the prevailing situation 
before reforms are pursued, and identiﬁcation of the sources of rigidity and of 
the balance between rural net sellers (including the importance of subsistence 
farming), rural net buyers, and the urban poor.
Box 3.5
Mismanaging 
adjustment to 
trade reform—
Zambia in the 
early 1990s
Source: McCulloch, Baulch, 
and Cherel-Robson 2000; 
Dinh, Adunga, and Myers 
2002; Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay, 2004.
The Zambian case of the early 1990s illustrates the importance of the careful design of 
trade reforms and appropriate complementary reforms. Until 1990 reliance on copper 
exports and high protection had led Zambia—a country that had a per capita income simi-
lar to that of the Republic of Korea in the mid-1960s—to a long-term decline. 
Starting in 1991 import licenses, quantitative restrictions, and most subsidies were 
abolished, and marketing boards were demonopolized. However the supply response was 
much more limited than had been hoped for. Following the abolition of the ofﬁcial monop-
sony in maize, two private ﬁrms dominated the activity and abandoned purchasing from 
farmers in remote areas—conﬁning many of the beneﬁts of greater availability of new 
and cheaper imported goods to urban and periurban areas. The ofﬁcial marketing boards 
had provided small farmers with inputs secured against future output, whereas the post-
liberalization private agents did not. Thus, small farmers in remote areas lost out, despite 
the rise in prices for commodities they produced.
Safety nets in Zambia were underfunded and unable to offer serious mitigation to the 
losers from trade liberalization. This reﬂects the general fact that developing country gov-
ernments have much less capacity to assist the losers of trade reforms, given their limited 
ﬁscal resources. In the Zambian case, it also reﬂected the adoption of a cash budget that 
restricted spending to domestic revenue performance. This led to great difﬁculties for min-
istries and agencies in planning and delivering programs, as resource availability became 
much more uncertain and volatile. Moreover, resources were redirected away from the 
poor, with a pernicious effect on the quality of public service delivery to them.
Finally, a signiﬁcant expansion in nontraditional exports, mostly horticulture and ﬂori-
culture, occurred in the mid-1990s. But only from 1996 onward did rural economic growth 
begin to have a signiﬁcant impact in reducing poverty and the employment losses caused 
by the privatization of parastatals offset by private sector employment expansion.
Targeting and sustainability are two challenges for general safety nets. Experience 
suggests that workfare programs can be most effective, provided they are well designed 
and administered, complemented by programs to provide food to those who cannot work 
and to children. Examples of the latter that have been successful in a number of countries 
are food-for-education schemes.
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If the problem is the relative immobility of farmers, complementary policies 
should directly target the farm sector. Shifting crops may require restructured 
land arrangements, adequate capital, education for the farmers and their fami-
lies, and research and development. Limits on all these inputs may make farm-
ers unable to take advantage of the opportunities created by farm reforms.
But if farmers are relatively mobile (able to undertake crop changes), their 
efforts to adjust may be held back by rigidities in the nonfarm sectors, be they 
industry or services. Complementary policies should then target these non-
farm sectors.
Services are particularly important. Inefﬁcient or costly services may prevent 
poor farmers from being able to take advantage of new export opportunities. 
For example, a crucial, though often neglected, sector in the context of trade 
farm reform is distribution. In many of the poorest countries, farm exports 
constitute a major share of total exports, but transportation and logistics ser-
vices in these countries are often limited and costly, placing a heavy burden on 
poor farmers attempting to access export markets. Rough handling of fruits and 
vegetables (including at airports and seaports), lack of storage, and inadequate 
packing and transport facilities result in considerable post-harvest losses, often 
estimated at 30–40 percent of the product sale value. Barriers to entry into dis-
tribution enable middlemen to artiﬁcially reduce the prices paid to poor farmers 
and increase those paid by consumers—that is, they can pocket much of what 
used to be collected as tariff revenue and do not pass on the savings from tariff 
cuts to consumers. The relative market power of farmers, food processors, and 
distributors is an issue for both developed and developing economies because 
distributors and food processors tend to concentrate more—and faster—than 
farmers. Rather than the levels of concentration, it is the imbalance between the 
different levels of concentration at the various stages of production that can be 
a source of problems. This situation can be addressed much more successfully 
by facilitating some kind of cooperation between farmers (for instance, through 
well designed regulations on cooperatives) rather than by imposing trade barri-
ers (generally captured by the most powerful actors, that is, the largest ones).
In the same vein, parastatal “marketing boards” often strongly restrict com-
petition for the products of poor farmers—curbing their incomes. Eliminating 
these boards and paying attention to the continuous supply during the transi-
tion period of the key ancillary services (transportation and credit) that these 
boards may have provided is crucial, particularly for the poorest farmers (see 
box 3.5). More generally, ensuring effective competition among private ﬁrms 
is very important. Granting exclusive state licenses to private ﬁrms (through 
import monopolies or exclusive distribution arrangements) should be avoided 
so that farmers do not have to pay excessive prices for their inputs or receive 
artiﬁcially depressed prices for their outputs.
Some of these complementary policies require the removal of restrictions—
say, on barriers to entry of additional suppliers in key service sectors—or 
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exclusive licenses, to promote gains from competition. Others require the com-
mitment of government resources—such as to undertake land reform, to pass 
regulations on cooperatives, or to fund increased education and appropriate 
technology, particularly in the regions that have not beneﬁted from the Green 
Revolutions of the 1970s (Hazell 2002). 
Many of the poorest countries may face real difﬁculties in ﬁnding the 
ﬁnancial resources for developing and adopting these appropriate complemen-
tary policies (see box 3.5). In such cases, the international community has a 
key role to play in ﬁnancing the adjustment policies. Institutions such as the 
World Bank can play a major role in supporting liberalization by providing the 
resources for adjustment and reform programs (the role of the international 
community in supporting complementary policies and safety nets is discussed 
further in chapter 12). Well organized international food aid will also continue 
to be important for the poorest countries.
In summary, the best approach for developing countries is to combine 
liberalization with complementary policies—supported and, where necessary, 
ﬁnanced by the international community—to ensure that the beneﬁts of liber-
alization are reaped and its costs, particularly for the most vulnerable groups, 
minimized. Case studies of Madagascar, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Cambodia 
suggest that appropriate complementary policies can greatly increase the gains 
to poor countries, even from a limited Doha Round (box 3.6). 
Negotiating issues—strategic view and tactical choices
If multilateral and domestic farm liberalization is both beneﬁcial and manage-
able for all developing countries, then what needs to be done in terms of trade 
negotiations, and how should it be done? In other words, what strategic view 
should be adopted, and what tactical choices in line with this view should be 
made during the Doha Round?
This section sketches the main strategic aspects (box 3.7), then identiﬁes 
the key tactics for the Doha negotiations under the three pillars of the 2004 
DWP framework: market access, export subsidies, and domestic support. 
While each is discussed separately, the linkages between them are crucial. For 
developing countries, it is crucial that the Doha negotiations should go beyond 
export subsidies and achieve a signiﬁcant reduction in tariffs—not only to 
provide market access opportunities, but to end the protection granted by rich 
countries’ domestic subsidies behind high tariff walls. Reducing border protec-
tion is the necessary pressure that will force rich countries to discipline domes-
tic subsidies, since it is becoming politically impossible to increase them. Were 
only export subsidies eliminated, the Doha Round would have simply put the 
world farm trade in the situation known by the trade in industrial goods in 
1947, before the birth of the GATT—high import barriers everywhere. Such a 
move could hardly be qualiﬁed as progress in farm trade liberalization, and it 
could be costly to many countries.
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Market access
The priority of the Doha negotiations should be a substantial reduction in 
existing bound tariffs, with a focus on the elimination of tariff peaks. Provi-
sions on market access in the 2004 DWP framework lack clarity and robust-
ness (box 3.8). Too many elements are yet to be deﬁned or negotiated, and 
some will be counterproductive—untying what others try to tie. What follows 
makes a case for a substantial reinforcement of some key provisions during the 
coming negotiations.
The ﬁrst key provision of the 2004 DWP framework is the choice of a 
tariff-cut formula. Relying on a formula is a wise decision, but there are many 
competing formulas (box 3.9). Unfortunately, the 2004 DWP framework has 
chosen the tiered formula, which is not the best choice. In this context, it 
is important to reafﬁrm the advantages of the Swiss formula which can be 
Box 3.6
Trade and 
complementary 
reforms in two 
of the poorest 
countries
 
Source: Nicita 2004a, b; 
Balat, Brambilla, and Porto 
2004; Soloaga 2004.
A very limited Doha Round outcome (as deﬁned in box 1.2) would increase prices of goods 
that are important to households in the poorest countries only by a small amount—1 
percent or less for Madagascar, 1 percent to 4 percent for Ethiopia. Only a proportion of 
this international price change would be passed through into domestic prices, reﬂecting 
internal transportation and distribution costs, among other factors (especially in econo-
mies lacking internal integration, such as Ethiopia). Given these small world and domestic 
price changes, the impact on exports of a limited Doha Round outcome would also be 
relatively small. So would be the overall effects on poverty—real incomes would increase 
by less than 0.5 percent in Madagascar and by 0.1 percent in Ethiopia. Such a small 
impact should not come as a surprise: it reﬂects the fact that the assumed Doha Round 
outcome is very limited, illustrating the crucial need for a more ambitious outcome. It 
also illustrates the importance of complementary actions by governments of low-income 
countries to increase the gains from trade.
For Madagascar, a poor country with a liberal trade policy (the average tariff is less than 
5 percent, the highest tariff band is 20 percent), complementary actions should revolve 
around improving productivity and enhancing the supply response to price changes. Such 
actions would amplify the beneﬁts of the very limited Doha Round outcome for poor house-
holds by a factor of 5—from 0.5 percent of real income to 2.5 percent. 
For Ethiopia, a poor country with relatively high trade barriers (the average weighted 
tariff is 15 percent), actions aiming to increase the supply response, productivity, and 
linkages to markets would triple the positive trade effects of a limited Doha Round out-
come. Much more important from a poverty perspective is the potential economic impact 
of domestic reforms that result in a decrease in subsistence and consequent increase 
in labor market participation. Such actions could have a signiﬁcant impact on poverty—
increasing real incomes of the poorest households by up to 6 percent.
The Doha Round would offer a potentially useful focal point to pursue such comple-
mentary reforms and to mobilize the additional resources that are needed to implement 
them. Moreover, because Ethiopia is a relatively protected economy, its own liberalization 
could have a signiﬁcant positive effect on the average real incomes, although the poorest 
in society might beneﬁt the least, with an increase of 3 percent, compared with 10 percent 
for households in the top third of the income distribution.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for Zambia and Cambodia.
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characterized as a “continuous” tiered formula (with a built-in maximum post-
liberalization tariff). This feature allows the Swiss formula to avoid all the 
problems raised by the discontinuities that are necessarily associated with the 
thresholds to be deﬁned in a tiered formula. Indeed, it would not be very sur-
prising if WTO negotiators face such huge difﬁculties in deﬁning the tariff 
bands, with the corresponding thresholds and the speciﬁc reduction coefﬁ-
cients, that they ultimately turn again to the Swiss formula.
The ﬁrst advantage of the Swiss formula is to offer immediate and cost-
less information on the post-liberalization tariff rates (and particularly on the 
maximum possible tariff) as soon as the reduction factor is agreed (see box 
3.9). In comparison, the tiered formula would require the negotiators to take at 
least six decisions to reach this point—two tariff bands and four speciﬁc reduc-
tion coefﬁcients. And it would also require considerable work in each capital 
city on how to implement these four reduction coefﬁcients, tariff line by tariff 
line. The capacity of the Swiss formula to deliver such complete information 
with so few decisions also exerts powerful constraints on rent-seeking interest 
groups. Moreover, the reduction factor does not need to be the same for all the 
countries. For instance, it could be lower for OECD countries than for devel-
oping countries, and it could be higher for the poorest countries than for the 
Box 3.7
A strategic view—
the “grand vision”
Adopting a strategic view about the world situation in farm reform by 2015–20 is a critical 
ﬁrst step. It should include:
• A commitment by all countries to reduce MFN bound tariffs dramatically. By 2015 
no bound farm tariff should exceed 5 percent for OECD countries, 10 percent for 
developing countries, and 15 percent for the poorest countries, and the dispersion 
in rates across tariff lines should be reduced.
• A binding commitment by all countries to fully decouple all support payments to 
farmers by 2015, and to cap all domestic support measures to 5 percent of the 
value of agricultural production (on a speciﬁc product basis).
• A binding commitment by all countries to abolish export subsidies by 2010, and to 
impose the same disciplines on export-subsidy substitutes, such as export credits, 
two-tier price schemes (as in the EU sugar regime, where high consumer prices in 
the EU market indirectly cross-subsidize EU exports to world markets), food aid, 
and exporting state trading enterprises.
• International institutions (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, and so on) should stand ready to provide adjust-
ment assistance to developing countries for food security reasons (emergency food 
stocks) and for ﬁnancing complementary policies (investments in domestic law, 
land reform, infrastructure, education, technology, and so on). The level of inter-
vention should be consistent with the Millennium Development Goals. Emergency 
stocks could take the form of an international ﬁnancial fund.
This strategic view does not imply the elimination of all subsidies. Complementary 
policies include genuine farm policies, and there is a valid rationale for nontrade-dis-
torting subsidies in many contexts. What should characterize them is that they should 
address well deﬁned problems and be decoupled as much as possible from production 
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two other country groups (generating proportionally greater cuts for OECD 
than for developing or the poorest countries).
Its second advantage is that it cuts tariff peaks by more than the smaller 
tariffs—hence maximizing the economic beneﬁts from trade liberalization. The 
Swiss formula is a powerful instrument to move protection automatically toward 
greater neutrality across goods at the lowest political domestic cost since the 
ranking of the domestic products in their level of protection remains unchanged, 
though the protection differentials between these products are narrowed. 
The Swiss formula requires speciﬁc tariffs to be transformed into ad 
valorem tariffs. This greatly improves transparency. Interestingly, this trans-
formation is explicitly included in the 2004 DWP framework on industrial 
goods (chapter 5), but not in Annex A for agriculture—a surprising difference, 
because speciﬁc tariffs are primarily used for farm products. The conversion 
from speciﬁc to ad valorem tariffs is a crucial beneﬁt for developing countries 
because it removes the implicit but strong bias of speciﬁc tariffs against devel-
oping countries’ exports: as products originating in developing countries often 
Box 3.8
The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme 
framework on 
market access
Source: WTO 2004d.
Tariff cuts
• Reduction of bound tariffs on the basis of a “tiered” formula (to be deﬁned) (see 
box 3.9).
• Progressivity: deeper cuts in higher tariffs.
• Possibility of a tariff cap.
Sensitive products
• Flexibility (to be deﬁned) for “sensitive” products through combining tariff-rate quo-
tas and tariff reductions.
• Some MFN expansion of the tariff-rate quotas will be required for all sensitive 
products.
Other elements
• Tariff escalation to be addressed through a formula to be agreed on.
• The Uruguay Round special safeguard remains under negotiation.
Special and differential treatment for developing countries
• LDCs are not required to undertake tariff reduction commitments.
• SDT for developing countries (other than LDCs) justiﬁed on the basis of food secu-
rity, livelihood security, and rural development needs (all undeﬁned).
• SDT provided through lesser tariff reductions and lesser expansion of tariff-rate 
quotas.
• Longer implementation period.
• Additional ﬂexibility for “special” products (all terms to be deﬁned).
• Flexibility (to be deﬁned) for newly acceded countries.
• Establishment of a “special safeguard mechanism” for the developing coun-
tries.
• Accelerated market access for tropical products and alternatives to narcotic 
products.
• Expeditious results for cotton.
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tend to have lower unit value exports (reﬂecting lower quality, less processing, 
and the like), on a per unit basis, the effective rate of protection implied by a 
given speciﬁc tariff is systematically higher on their products.
Box 3.9
The war of the 
formulas
Source: Francois and 
Martin 2002, 2003.
First is the “linear” formula, a simple proportional cut, with all tariffs reduced by the same 
proportion: T = ct. T is the post-liberalization tariff and t is the pre-liberalization tariff, and 
c is the constant proportion by which tariffs are to be reduced. The aim of the negotiations 
is to agree on c. From a negotiating point of view, this formula hardly offers an acceptable 
balance of concessions between countries with very different tariffs, particularly tariff 
peaks. From an economic point of view, this formula has the disadvantage of not cutting 
tariff peaks by more than small tariffs, whereas such tariff peaks impose most of the 
welfare costs of protection.
Under the Uruguay Round formula, countries choose the extent of their tariff cuts for 
individual products (tariff line by tariff line) but they have to reach an agreed average cut 
for all the tariffs involved (36 percent in the Uruguay Round) and a minimum cut on each 
tariff (15 percent in the Uruguay Round). From a negotiating point of view, this formula 
gives maximum ﬂexibility to countries. From an economic view, it minimizes liberalization 
since countries tend to adopt high tariff cuts on goods not domestically produced, but 
minimum tariff cuts on those domestically produced. Hence, domestic producers remain 
protected by minimum cuts—hence the absence of actual liberalization in the Uruguay 
Round, where minimum cuts were imposed on tariff peaks. In sum, the Uruguay Round 
formula minimizes the economic gains to be expected from liberalization.
The “tiered” formula, introduced in the WTO Harbinson text (February 2003), was sug-
gested as a compromise between the Uruguay formula (favored by the EU) and the Swiss 
formula (favored by the Cairns Group). It splits the whole range of tariff rates imposed 
by all the WTO Members into “bands,” with each band subject to speciﬁc reductions. For 
instance, the Harbinson text suggested three tariff bands (lower than 20 percent, from 
20 percent to 120 percent, greater than 120 percent) with speciﬁc average and minimal 
reduction rates for each band. The tiered formula, essentially the Uruguay Round formula 
with built-in progressivity, faces the same basic problems, though they are softened by 
the progressivity afforded by the bands. But it has two major problems: the deﬁnition of 
the thresholds is crucial (hence the source of tense negotiations that can lead to compli-
cated and perverse outcomes), and it deﬁnes no “maximum” tariff, a key point in such a 
highly protected sector. 
The “Swiss” formula comes from the negotiations on industrial goods in the Tokyo 
Round. It cuts the highest tariffs by more than the lowest tariffs according to the formula: 
T = (rt)/(r + t) where r is the “reduction factor.” By agreeing on r, negotiators deﬁne the 
highest post-liberalization tariff because, when t (pre-liberalization tariff) is very high, t/(r 
+ t) approaches 1 so that T (post-liberalization tariff) equals r (in other words, pre-liber-
alization megatariffs will be reduced to the lower, preestablished maximum level post-
liberalization). When t is very small, r/(r + t) approaches 1 so that T equals t (in other 
words, post-liberalization tariffs will be about the same as the low pre-liberalization tariff). 
Technically, the Swiss formula is generally considered as the best available. As a result, 
its beneﬁts are explained in the main text.
Last is the “blended” formula, which is a cocktail of the foregoing formulas. Countries 
could use the Uruguay Round formula for some tariff lines, the Swiss formula for other 
lines, and so on.
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All these features make the Swiss formula especially valuable for the poor-
est countries. The pivotal role of the reduction factor (which is the only param-
eter considered by negotiators) allows countries with minimal individual bar-
gaining power to make large coalitions on this central issue, instead of being 
dragged into detailed negotiations that they cannot follow closely enough. Its 
transparency makes countries deprived of large negotiating teams capable of 
assessing the concessions made by the trading partners. 
The Swiss formula happens to be friendlier to developing countries than to 
OECD countries for a more circumstantial reason: the farm tariffs currently 
applied by developing countries are often lower than those imposed by OECD 
countries (when one takes into account speciﬁc tariffs and seasonal tariffs). Table 
3.2 illustrates the case where the maximum tariff (the reduction factor) is assumed 
to be equal to 35 percent for all the WTO Members (once again, negotiations 
could agree on different reduction factors for the OECD, middle-income, and 
poorest developing countries, reinforcing the results of table 3.2). It shows that 
OECD countries would have to liberalize substantially under the Swiss formula, 
whereas countries such as Brazil or Malawi would simply have to reduce their 
average bound tariff, without changing their applied average tariff—though 
tariff peaks are likely to be reduced. Tariff negotiations could be futile when 
based on other formulas. These formula reductions leave very high tariffs for the 
OECD countries, even on average—such high tariffs will exert little pressure for 
eliminating or reducing OECD export and production subsidies.
The second key provision of the 2004 DWP framework on agriculture is 
the treatment of the tariff-rate quotas. Tariff-rate quotas are border restrictions 
that combine a lower (in-quota) tariff rate for a speciﬁed volume of imports 
and a higher (over-quota) tariff rate for imports above this volume. Elimi-
nating them is preferable to expanding them because they have many nega-
tive features: they generate quota rents that convert would-be free traders into 
supporters of the protective regime, they introduce scope for discriminating 
between countries, and they can reduce national welfare by much more than 
similarly protective import tariffs. Tariff-rate quotas were introduced by the 
UAA because it was clear that the then ongoing tarifﬁcation process would 
often lead to prohibitive tariffs. However, the adoption of a Swiss formula with 
a reasonable maximum tariff eliminates this rationale. 
The last key provision of the 2004 DWP framework is special and differ-
ential treatment for developing countries. As argued above, even the poorest 
countries have strong interests in nondiscriminatory (MFN) tariff cuts by 
OECD countries. At a ﬁrst glance, this seems paradoxical because most poor 
countries enjoy preferential (though often limited) tariffs in OECD markets. 
But MFN tariff cuts have much more powerful effects than preferential tariff 
reductions on the two other OECD instruments of protection—export and 
production subsidies. MFN tariff cuts will almost automatically generate 
equivalent cuts in export subsidies. This is because reducing MFN tariffs 
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leads to a reduction in domestic prices (an impact that preferential tariffs on 
generally very limited imports do not have), and this in turn causes produc-
tion costs to fall and removes the need for export subsidies (most of which are 
paid for in order to compensate for differences between high domestic costs 
and low world prices). Similarly, MFN tariff cuts will erode the protectionist 
impact of the production subsidies mostly granted by the OECD countries 
to their farmers. The higher the tariff rates, the smaller the domestic subsi-
dies need to be to provide a given level of protection.
But what about tariff cuts by developing countries? The 2004 DWP frame-
work clearly imposes looser commitments on developing countries, in almost 
all possible dimensions (tariff reductions, tariff-rate quota expansions, product 
coverage, longer implementation period, and so on). This approach introduces 
too many escape possibilities for developing countries and is counterproductive. 
Because tariffs are the main instrument of protection used by developing countries 
on imports from other developing countries, tariff cuts are the most straightfor-
ward tool for unleashing the gains to be expected from farm trade between devel-
oping countries. While OECD countries should bear the deepest cuts, it is not in 
developing countries’ own interests to maintain high agricultural protection.
But what about the poorest countries? The 2004 DWP framework states 
without ambiguity that LDCs are not required to undertake commitments 
on bound tariffs. This approach is also counterproductive. First, because the 
negotiations are on bound, not applied, tariffs, and as the applied farm tariffs 
of the poorest countries are often moderate, commitments to reduce bound 
Table 3.2
Comparisons of 
the impact of the 
various formulas for 
tariff reductions on 
selected farm sectors
Percent
a. Average tariff on 13 
product groups (see text).
b. Tariff cut on the 
average initial tariff.
c. Factor 30.
d. Average of the tariff 
cuts by product.
e. Assuming that the country 
would be an OECD country.
f. Assuming that the country 
would be a developing country.
g. Bound and applied tariffs 
for the products in question 
are very close for the EU. 
Source: For the formulas, 
proposals tabled in the 
WTO Special Session on 
Agriculture. For the initial 
tariffs, DRIFE 2003 (see text).
Initial 
tariffa Countries
Uruguay  
formulab
Swiss  
formulac
Harbinson formulab
OECDe
Developing 
countriesf
Minimum Average Averaged Globalb Minimum Average Minimum Average
473.7
Japan: 
bound 402.6 303.2 16.7 28.2 307.9 189.5 331.6 284.2
91.9
Japan: 
applied 78.1 58.8 14.9 22.6 59.7 36.8 70.8 58.8
55.3
EU: 
bound g 47.0 35.4 16.9 19.4 35.9 27.7 42.6 35.4
35.0
U.S.: 
bound 29.8 22.4 10.2 16.2 22.8 17.5 27.0 22.4
22.8
U.S.: 
applied 19.4 14.6 8.1 13.0 14.8 11.4 16.6 16.6
43.5
Brazil: 
bound 37.0 27.8 17.5 17.8 28.3 21.8 33.5 27.8
16.4
Brazil: 
applied 13.9 10.5 15.4 10.6 12.3 9.8 12.0 12.0
125.0
Malawi: 
bound 106.3 80.0 24.2 24.2 81.3 50.0 87.5 75.0
13.8
Malawi: 
applied 11.7 8.8 13.8 9.5 10.4 8.3 10.1 10.1
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tariffs will have a limited impact on applied tariffs (except in the case of applied 
tariff peaks). Reducing bound tariffs to a more moderate level would have then 
cost little to the poorest countries, while it would have put future liberalization 
on a ﬁrmer ground. Second, it is often argued that allowing the poorest coun-
tries to make no commitments is justiﬁed because they do not have the ﬁs-
cal capacity to support agriculture through less trade-distorting direct income 
supports. This argument ignores the fact that (applied) tariff peaks are usually 
so high that they provide no tariff revenue, so that more moderate tariffs are 
likely to increase tariff revenues. A much more sensible approach would have 
been to ask the poorest countries to adopt a uniform and moderate structure of 
bound tariffs—that is, leaving unchanged most of their current applied tariffs 
and reducing only their tariff peaks.
Export subsidies
Doha negotiators have inherited from the past 20 years a difﬁcult legacy of 
bitter disputes on export subsidies between countries convinced of their com-
parative advantages in farm exports (such as the U.S. during the Uruguay 
Round or Brazil today) and the EU. These disputes have been so intense that 
they have overshadowed the other aspects of farm negotiations—particularly 
tariff reductions. However, the elimination of export subsidies alone does not 
constitute a real trade liberalization—as said above, it would be similar to the 
pre-1947 situation in trade of industrial goods.
It is well known that eliminating export subsidies without reducing tar-
iffs and domestic support will be costly to countries that are net importers of 
farm products (because export subsidies depress world prices). These costs have 
been calculated: removing only OECD export subsidies would harm all the 
subgroups of developing countries, except Brazil and the rest of Latin America 
(IMF 2003). But, and this is crucial, the same calculations have also shown that 
these costs are transformed into net gains as soon as tariffs and domestic sup-
port are reduced or eliminated. There is thus a serious need to recast the export 
subsidies issue—and more broadly the export competition issue—which has 
been too much captured by negotiating rhetoric (box 3.10).12
First, export competition is very much country speciﬁc—in sharp contrast 
to the widely used tariffs. Export subsidies are almost exclusively a Western 
European phenomenon: ﬁve-sixths of all export subsidies in the mid-1990s 
were granted by the EU, and all but 2 percent of the rest were accounted for by 
Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. (eight non-OECD countries can provide 
export subsidies under the UAA provisions). Like-instruments (export cred-
its and food aid) are mostly used by the U.S., with the notable exception of 
widespread two-tier price schemes (such as the EU sugar regime, where high 
consumer prices on the EU market indirectly cross-subsidize EU exports to 
world markets). Finally, there are only a few important cases of state trading 
enterprises (mostly in Canada).
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Second, eliminating farm export subsidies is, of course, essential for all 
the developing countries that have comparative advantages and export capaci-
ties in farm products—hence their strong advocacy in this part of the negotia-
tions. But export subsidies should be a concern for all developing countries. 
Because they have helped convert traditional net importers of commodities 
(such as the EU) into net exporters, they have reduced incentives in all devel-
oping countries for investing in farm production. In particular, they have 
also led developing countries’ governments to neglect their domestic farm 
sector, and not to pursue the often successful Green Revolution efforts (FAO 
2003).
That said, the 2004 DWP framework provisions on export competition 
warrant four remarks. First, because the elimination of export subsidies could 
induce rich countries’ governments to use the like-instruments instead, it is 
important to discipline such substitutes as well, as speciﬁed by the framework. 
However, ideally, these disciplines should be nondiscriminatory, that is, not 
deﬁned by type of beneﬁciaries (for example, no less stringent provisions if 
export credits or food aid are granted to the poorest countries or net-food-
importing countries). This is because subsidies are by nature fungible, so privi-
leged beneﬁciaries could do business from their special status (for instance, 
resell food they received under special export credits or through food aid pro-
grams). Even with a nondiscriminatory regime, monitoring the subsidy com-
ponent of export credits and food aid would be a difﬁcult task, as illustrated 
by the OECD consensus on export subsidies in manufacturing (which mostly 
covered well deﬁned and easily traceable products).
Second, it is important to renew the exemption for developing countries 
(Article 9.4) regarding marketing costs, internal transport, and freight charges, 
as the 2004 DWP framework provides. These are not to be regarded as export 
subsidies and thus should not subject to reduction commitments. 
Box 3.10
The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme 
framework 
on export 
competition
 
Source: WTO 2004b.
Basic principles
• Parallel elimination of all forms of exports competition (export subsidies, subsidy 
elements of export credits and guarantees, trade-distorting practices by exporting 
state trading enterprises, food aid generating commercial displacement).
• Implementation modalities to be agreed.
• End date to be speciﬁed.
Special and differential treatment for developing countries
• Maintaining the UAA exemption for subsidies on certain inputs and downstream 
activities (such as marketing) (Article 9.4) for a reasonable period.
• Appropriate provisions for LDCs and net-food importing developing countries.
• Special consideration for state trading enterprises in developing countries aiming 
to preserve price stability.
• Higher de minimis threshold on export subsidies.
• Longer implementation period.
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Third, a higher de minimis threshold for export subsidies for developing 
countries makes some sense (although ideally it should have been limited to 
the poorest countries). This provision will protect the ﬁrst inroads of develop-
ing countries’ exporters from being immediately crushed by antisubsidy proce-
dures by developed and other developing countries. By contrast, it is difﬁcult 
to understand with some precision what is meant by the special consideration 
for state trading enterprises in developing countries aiming to preserve price 
stability. At a ﬁrst glance, it does not seem a good idea, given the experience 
with state trading enterprises and the existence of superior instruments to 
address food security concerns.
Fourth, it is worth noting that the 2004 DWP framework did not make 
any clear reference to Article 13 of the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (the 
so-called “Peace Clause”). This temporary ban on the right to impose counter-
vailing duties on imports of goods that have beneﬁted from domestic support 
and export subsidies in agriculture lapsed on December 31, 2003. The silence 
of the DWP framework is important. Developing countries with a stake in 
further liberalization in farm and food products should not agree to an exten-
sion of the Peace Clause under the Doha Round unless they have achieved 
their negotiating objective of enlarging market access for their exporters. The 
end of the Peace Clause is an essential instrument of pressure in this regard, 
and developing countries should not give up the possibility of being able to use 
disputes to raise public awareness of the need for reform of agricultural subsi-
dies and to create pressure for reform (as has successfully been pursued recently 
with regard to sugar and cotton). 
Domestic support
Domestic support (price support, direct production subsidies, and so on) is a 
domain where OECD countries have been able to get de facto “reverse spe-
cial and differential treatment” under the UAA: domestic support measures 
deemed to be trade-distorting were listed in an Amber Box, but their aggre-
gate monetary value (called the “Aggregate Measure of Support” or AMS) was 
merely subject to reduction commitments—not to outright prohibition as for 
industrial products.
This reverse special and differential treatment was reinforced by the fact 
that the Amber Box has three main exceptions: the Blue Box (payments under 
production-limiting programs), the threshold of de minimis levels of domestic 
support (subsidies considered too small to be trade-distorting), and certain 
measures to encourage agricultural and rural development in developing coun-
tries (measures under Article 6.2 of the UAA). At a ﬁrst glance, these three 
limits to the Amber Box disciplines seem to establish a fair balance between 
exceptions for OECD and those for developing countries. But in reality this is 
not the case. Some OECD countries have been able to allocate a large portion 
of their huge farm subsidies to the Blue Box, and they have been by far the 
82 Part 1 Market access agenda
main beneﬁciaries of the deﬁnition of the AMS in terms of the whole farm sec-
tor, rather than in terms of speciﬁc products. These lavish exceptions explain 
why most OECD countries have been able to maintain a very high level of 
domestic support—rendered less visibly expensive by high tariff walls. In sharp 
contrast, developing countries have only very marginally utilized Amber Box 
exceptions.
The 2004 DWP framework has provisions dealing with all these elements. 
One of them is relatively precise—the minimum cut of 20 percent (in the ﬁrst 
implementation year) of the overall domestic support (the sum of the Amber 
and Blue Boxes, plus the de minimis threshold) (box 3.11). What follows exam-
ines three key issues left by the trade negotiators.
First, the Boxes approach raises a fundamental question. Can “decou-
pling” be perfect, that is, eliminate all the links between subsidies granted for 
legitimate objectives and production decisions? The answer is no, and the 2004 
DWP framework tends to turn a blind eye to this problem. Every public or 
collective action may have some impact on production decisions, and govern-
ments looking to circumvent rules can use a plethora of potential instruments. 
For instance, subsidies for achieving noneconomic objectives, such as rural 
development or environmental protection, may still support farm production 
to some extent, and hence hurt trading partners’ producers. Making such sub-
sidies as minimally conditional upon production decisions as possible is a step 
in the right direction. But the near impossibility of fully decoupling subsidies 
from production decisions is what makes the discipline of increased competi-
tion from imports by cutting tariffs so essential.
Second, some developing countries’ farmers are indirectly beneﬁting from 
OECD domestic support. This is best illustrated by the EU sugar and banana 
regimes, with countries such as Mauritius (sugar) and the Caribbean states 
(bananas) enjoying quotas that allow them to sell their products on the EU 
market at the much higher European prices. Such a situation creates incentives 
for an “unholy alliance” between the farm interests of some OECD and devel-
oping countries (chapter 7). A fair and economically sound alternative to main-
taining preference margins would be to turn to the Green Box, on which the 
2004 DWP framework remains very vague. For instance, the Green Box could 
include the adjustment measures that OECD countries should take in order to 
compensate developing country farmers who indirectly beneﬁt from OECD 
domestic support. These measures could take the form of international ﬂows of 
direct income support, extending to developing countries’ farmers the adjust-
ment support granted to OECD farmers growing the same crops or livestock 
(see box 3.3 for the core principles for such adjustment support). Any such assis-
tance should be transitional and motivated explicitly by the need to facilitate the 
adjustments that are required to realize the gains from global policy reforms. 
Last but not least, should developing countries seek to expand the coverage 
of permitted support instruments to allow them more freedom to subsidize? 
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Indeed, many—including some of the poorest countries in the discussions 
on special and differential treatment—have argued that developing countries 
should counterbalance the current reverse special and differential treatment 
enjoyed by the OECD countries by demanding their own additional rights to 
subsidize.
This approach has ﬂaws. The UAA already gives developing countries a 
wide degree of freedom for subsidizing the development of their farm sector 
provided that these measures are “an integral part of development programs” 
(investment subsidies) or that “they are targeted at low-income or resource-
Box 3.11
The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme 
framework on 
domestic support
Source: WTO 2004d.
Overall reduction
• Deﬁnition of overall trade-distorting domestic support (ODS) as the ﬁnal bound 
total aggregate measure of support (FBTAMS) plus permitted de minimis level and 
plus the level of Blue Box payments.
• Reduction of the ODS on the basis of a “tiered” formula (to be deﬁned).
• Progressivity of the reductions: deeper cuts in higher levels of ODS.
• In the ﬁrst implementation year, a minimum cut of 20 percent in ODS.
• Special and differential treatment with longer implementation period and lower 
reduction coefﬁcients.
• No end target speciﬁed.
Final bound total aggregate measure of support (Amber Box)
• Reduction of the FBTAMS on the basis of a “tiered” formula (to be deﬁned).
• Progressivity of the reductions: deeper cuts in higher levels of FBTAMS.
• Product-speciﬁc AMS to be capped at their respective average levels according to 
a methodology to be agreed.
• FBTAMS reduction will result in reductions of some product-speciﬁc support.
De minimis level
• Subject to special and differential treatment.
• Exemption for developing countries allocating their de minimis support for subsis-
tence and resource-poor farmers.
Blue Box
• Renewal of Article 6.5, which would allow for direct payments under production-
limiting programs or for those not requiring production if these payments are based 
on ﬁxed and unchanging bases and yields (or heads) and if they are made on 85 
percent (or less) of a ﬁxed and unchanging base level of production.
• The above criteria, along with additional criteria, to be negotiated.
• All criteria should ensure that Blue Box payments are less trade-distorting than 
AMS measures.
• Blue Box support will not exceed 5 percent of a Member average total value of farm 
production during an (undeﬁned) historical period.
Green Box
• Green Box criteria to be reviewed and clariﬁed in order to ensure that Green Box mea-
sures have no, or almost minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.
• Improved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of new disciplines.
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poor producers” (input subsidies). There is thus no need for much wider free-
dom. But clariﬁcation of certain existing provisions might be considered—for 
instance, how to deﬁne low-income or resource-poor producers, poor remote 
areas, and  poor people? These clariﬁcations would aim to minimize the uncer-
tainty about whether such subsidies could be caught by antisubsidy proce-
dures from trading partners (chapter 6 suggests an additional way to improve 
legal certainty through the de minimis threshold). Other provisions could be 
marginally expanded. For instance, support for diversiﬁcation, transportation 
subsidies for farm products, consumption subsidies for domestic food aid, pub-
lic assistance for establishing farm cooperatives, or institutions promoting the 
marketing and quality control of food products could be made easier.13
All these expansions will require careful handling. “Targeting at the poor” 
has a mixed record, even when done with the best intentions. There is deﬁnitely 
a tradeoff between more meaningful concessions and a tighter deﬁnition of the 
recipients. Ideally, all these provisions should thus not only meet the basic 
Box 3.12
Key tactical 
choices for the 
Doha Agreement 
on Agriculture
Market access
• Reduction of bound tariffs on the basis of a Swiss formula, introducing three maxi-
mum tariffs (one for OECD countries, one for the developing countries, one for the 
poorest countries).
• Removal of all the nontariff barriers, including tariff-rate quotas, by 2010.
• A commitment by all countries to reduce the dispersion in tariff rates as much as 
possible, that is, substantially reduce tariff escalation.
Domestic support
• A commitment by all countries to decouple all support payments to farmers by 
2010 and to cap all the domestic support measures to 10 percent of the value of 
agricultural production (product by product).
• Maintain the existing Green Box with clariﬁcations or marginal additions (support 
for diversiﬁcation, transportation subsidies for farm products, consumption subsi-
dies for domestic food aid, public assistance for establishing farm cooperatives, 
or institutions promoting marketing and quality control of food products) for the 
poorest countries.
• OECD countries should compensate developing countries’ farmers for loss of pref-
erences under the Green Box.
• Reduce the scope and strengthen the disciplines of the Amber and Blue Boxes with 
a view to the progressive elimination of the Blue Box and further cuts in the AMS.
Export subsidies
• Elimination of all export subsidies by 2010. The smaller the tariff reduction com-
mitments by countries that use export subsidies, the stricter their commitments in 
terms of reduction of export subsidies should be.
• Comparable disciplines on similar instruments, such as export credits, two-tier 
price schemes, state trading enterprises, and food aid. 
• No reintroduction of the “Peace Clause”; it provides leverage for developing coun-
tries seeking greater market access.
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principle of the UAA Green Box (be minimally trade distorting), but they 
should be made speciﬁc to programs targeting poor consumers or farmers, and 
some of them should be made available only to the poorest countries.
Few of the poorest countries have the funds to ﬁnance additional subsidies. 
Fighting for unusable rights has heavy costs in trade negotiations. It wastes 
negotiating capital, leading to diminished ability to ﬁght for more urgent 
goals, such as tariff cuts. Indeed, the cautious approach taken here reﬂects a 
broader concern about whether subsidy rights are worth having in the context 
of limited government revenue, rather than a speciﬁc desire to limit public 
intervention.
The extra rights that the poorest countries could get to subsidize would 
probably come at the expense of ceding greater rights (for example, subsidies 
for animal welfare could easily become subsidies to livestock producers) to 
OECD countries, which are rich enough to use them—thus perpetuating or 
even amplifying the asymmetries that currently plague the system. 
Once again, the cautious approach advocated here has one ultimate advan-
tage. It is the best approach for dealing with the “reverse special and differen-
tial treatment” currently enjoyed by OECD countries (and the few developing 
countries with reserved rights in these matters); that is, for reducing the scope 
of acceptable subsidies for OECD countries by narrowing the scope of the Blue 
Box (ultimately by abolishing it) and by reducing the AMS.
Services
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While trade in goods—and particularly agriculture—commands most atten-
tion on the Doha Agenda, the potential gains from successful services liber-
alization may be much larger—by up to a factor of ﬁve under some estimates 
(Robinson, Wang, and Martin 1999). Beyond the numbers, services are funda-
mental for development, in terms of both the efﬁciency and growth potential 
of the economy as a whole, and access to basic services to improve the lives of 
the poor. Smooth transport, logistics, and distribution services are needed to 
reap the gains of increased exports and imports. Health, water distribution, 
and electricity are essential services that are still not available to many of the 
poorest. Services are central to the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals.
The service sector is wide and diverse, encompassing activities as dispa-
rate as accountancy, telecommunications, all kinds of transport, health, and 
tourism.1 In most developed countries, services account for around 70 percent 
of GDP; in other countries, the ﬁgure is still above 50 percent. Long consid-
ered nontradable, trade in services grew by about 6 percent a year on average 
between 1990 and 2003, keeping pace with the growth of merchandise trade 
over the same period. In 2003 global services exports increased signiﬁcantly, 
up by 12 percent to reach $1.8 trillion. Developing country services exports 
were valued at $377 billion in 2003, a 6 percent increase over the previous year, 
while Least Developed Country (LDC) exports were $7 billion, a 9 percent 
increase over the previous year (WTO 2004c).2 The majority of “trade” in 
services takes place through foreign direct investment (FDI) (box 4.1), and 
services may account for a substantial proportion of total FDI. 
The service sector is undergoing a profound transformation. Technologi-
cal developments, budgetary pressures, and regulatory changes have greatly 
expanded the range and scope of trade in services. They have introduced 
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competition into sectors formerly considered to be natural monopolies (tele-
communications, energy); created additional possibilities for cross-border trade 
(business and computer services); and increased private sector participation in 
services where, in many countries, the public sector had traditionally played a 
major role (health, education, environmental services). The growth in services 
trade is also underpinned by the widespread liberalization of FDI regimes over 
the past decade, a trend that accelerated in 2002 in the face of diminishing 
FDI inﬂows (UNCTAD 2003f).
In sharp contrast to agriculture, services negotiations in the Doha Round 
take place against a backdrop of widespread unilateral liberalization of ser-
vices trade and investment regimes by WTO Members. The two sectors thus 
face very different negotiating environments. While for agriculture, negotia-
tions are crucial in driving even minimal reform, services negotiations tend to 
play a complementary role, locking in reforms already undertaken. While this 
means that services negotiations can generate signiﬁcant gains simply by har-
vesting existing liberalization (which perhaps explains the relative inattention 
to services in the Doha Agenda), it also poses a real challenge—in a nutshell, 
why push strongly for commitments on market access when market opening 
is being undertaken unilaterally? In other words, if countries are liberalizing 
because they view it as being in their own economic interest, what are the 
incentives to translate this liberalization into GATS commitments (that is, to 
guarantee treatment at least this liberal on a permanent basis)?3
A Doha Agenda in services is attractive for three reasons. First, unilateral 
liberalization has not been spread equally across all services and modes of sup-
ply. Signiﬁcant barriers remain, particularly in areas of great interest to devel-
oping countries, such as the movement of natural persons to supply services 
under mode 4. Second, given that domestic politics and vested interests can 
Box 4.1
Ways of trading 
services
Trade in services, unlike trade in goods, is not limited to ﬂows across a border. The 
intangible nature of services and the need for proximity between producer and consumer 
means that services trade can take a variety of forms. The GATS refers to four “modes” 
by which services can be supplied:
• Mode 1 (cross-border trade): the service crosses the border (for example, an archi-
tect in Malaysia faxes a plan to a client in Thailand).
• Mode 2 (consumption abroad): the consumer moves to the territory of the service 
supplier, for example, to purchase tourism, education, or health services (a Thai 
goes to Malaysia for a holiday). 
• Mode 3 (commercial presence): foreign direct investment (FDI), where a service 
supplier establishes a branch or subsidiary in another country (for example, a 
Malaysian architecture ﬁrm establishes a subsidiary in Thailand). 
• Mode 4 (temporary movement of people as service suppliers): an individual ser-
vice supplier or company employee moves temporarily to another country to supply 
services (for example, a Malaysian architect goes to Thailand for six months to 
supervise the construction of the building she designed). 
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make reforms difﬁcult to sustain, GATS negotiations offer scope to lock in 
policy reforms by offsetting pressures for protection with pressure from those 
who gain from increased exports. Third, in the mercantilist world of trade 
negotiations, preparedness by developing countries to lock in services reforms 
in GATS commitments can generate leverage to push for the necessary tech-
nical and ﬁnancial assistance to implement regulatory reform or for commit-
ments from trading partners across other parts of the WTO agenda. Done 
right, services negotiations offer developing countries an opportunity to act in 
their own economic interest and get paid for it. 
Existing levels of protection in services trade and investment
Trade in services differs from trade in goods in two key respects. First, in gen-
eral, barriers to international trade in services are higher than those to trade 
in goods. They often take the form of regulatory measures, varying between 
and within sectors, some preventing market entry, others restricting the scope 
of operations within the market. For instance, in many countries, provision of 
professional services is restricted to nationals. But not all regulations on ser-
vices are necessarily barriers to trade—services tend to be regulated to achieve 
a range of public policy objectives.
Second, and potentially more important, market access barriers in services 
can also limit the entry of new domestic suppliers into the market, restrict-
ing both domestic and foreign competition. For instance, in many countries, 
provision of key services remains the province of monopolies (telecommunica-
tions, insurance, environmental services). And major services sectors, such as 
retailing, transport, and banking, can be regulated in such a way that they 
remain dominated by a few local providers.
Data on barriers in services are notoriously poor. However, available evi-
dence suggests that, on average, developing countries have more restrictive bar-
riers than developed countries, in particular in key infrastructure services—
ones that form the backbone of the economy—such as telecommunications and 
ﬁnancial services. The pattern is less clear in a number of other sectors, such as 
education, maritime, professional, and distribution services (OECD 2003e).
Unfortunately, GATS commitments provide limited insight into services 
barriers. This is because of the ﬂexibility in the GATS to commit to less than 
the status quo4 and the extent of unilateral liberalization undertaken since 
the Uruguay Round—in stark contrast to agriculture. In fact, many WTO 
Members have signiﬁcantly more open services markets than their GATS com-
mitments would suggest.
However, in terms of the GATS, the sectors where the highest number of 
WTO Members have made some form of commitment include tourism (126 
Members), ﬁnancial services (106 Members), business services (101 Members), 
communications (98 Members), transport (82 Members), construction (72 
Members), recreation (59 Members), environmental services (52 Members), 
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and distribution services (50 Members), with the fewest commitments made 
in health (45 Members) and education (44 Members). In general, developing 
countries have made commitments in fewer sectors than developed countries. 
Of the 99 WTO Members who have made commitments in 80 sectors or 
fewer from the more than 160 in the Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List, 98 
are developing countries (WTO 1999).5 The number of commitments for each 
sector does not tell the whole story since commitments can still be subject to 
restrictive conditions (for example, in telecommunications and ﬁnancial ser-
vices, especially in relation to market entry) (WTO 1999).
Commitments for each sector are undertaken by mode of supply. Most 
commitments have been made for mode 3 (foreign establishment, also known 
as commercial presence)—the dominant mode of supply in all service sec-
tors except transport and, to a lesser extent, telecommunications (World Bank 
2002). But these commitments do not necessarily grant open markets—
they include many limitations preserving the privileged status of traditional 
incumbents, particularly where the total number of suppliers in the market is 
restricted (WTO 1999).
Mode 1 (cross-border) commitments are generally much narrower and 
more limited than those for mode 3. During the Uruguay Round, many mode 
1 entries were left “unbound (meaning that no commitment has been taken by 
the country in question) due to lack of technical feasibility” for services that 
are now tradable. While in practice it can be hard to prevent supply by this 
mode, WTO Members place a range of restrictions on it, including nationality 
and residency requirements, authorization, and local authentication require-
ments (OECD 1999).
GATS mode 2 (consumption abroad) commitments show the fewest 
restrictions, probably because countries have limited interest in, or ability to, 
control the consumption of services abroad by their nationals.
Commitments on mode 4 (temporary movement of people to supply ser-
vices) are the fewest of any of the modes and the most restrictive. They tend 
to be horizontal (covering all sectors listed in the schedule, rather than being 
sector-speciﬁc—see appendix 5) and limited to the highly skilled (executives, 
managers, and specialists). Only 17 percent cover lower skilled personnel and 
only 10 countries have allowed some form of restricted entry to “other level” per-
sonnel (Chanda 1999). Around half of all mode 4 commitments relate explicitly 
to people being transferred within companies (intracorporate transferees)—that 
is, they are linked to foreign investment through mode 3. There are 38 exemp-
tions to most favored nation (MFN) treatment relevant to mode 4 (of which 32 
are preferential agreements).6 Barriers to mode 4 are discussed further below.
Beneﬁts of liberalization
Given the central role that services play as inputs into production, an efﬁ-
cient and diversiﬁed services sector is critical for development. Be it efﬁcient 
90 Part 1 Market access agenda
transport links, or business services to enable countries to participate in trade, 
or health and education to build human capital, services have a major inﬂuence 
upon economic development. Low quality, costly, or inefﬁcient services act as a 
brake on the entire economy: inefﬁciencies in roads, railways, power, and water 
alone cost an estimated $55 billion a year in losses in the early 1990s—an 
amount equal to 1 percent of the GDP of developing countries or twice the 
annual budget for ﬁnancing infrastructure in the developing world (UNDP 
2004b). Losses from inefﬁcient services have spillover effects and are not 
one-time—they hamper economic growth on an ongoing basis by lowering 
the proﬁtability of existing investment and discouraging further investment 
(Hodge 2002).
Service liberalization and economic performance
Reduction of barriers—in particular to foreign-owned ﬁrms or movements of 
labor—enhances competition, expands the scale and diversity of activity, low-
ers prices, and increases quality, all of which generate scope for further growth. 
For instance, a reduction in services trade barriers that increased cross-border 
trade and reduced inefﬁciencies from monopolies by 10 percent and price 
mark-ups from imperfect competition by a similar percentage could increase 
the income of developing countries by $900 billion (9.4 percent) by 2015 from 
1997 levels (World Bank 2002).
Openness in services can also inﬂuence long-run growth performance (ﬁg-
ure 4.1). After controlling for other determinants of growth, countries that fully 
reformed the ﬁnancial services sector grew, on average, about 1 percentage point 
faster than other countries. An even greater impetus to growth comes from fully 
reforming (liberalization plus regulatory reform) both the telecommunications 
and ﬁnancial services sectors; countries that fully liberalized both sectors grew, 
on average, about 1.5 percentage points faster than other countries.
Services liberalization provides three main sources of gains (box 4.2): it 
removes the bottlenecks in infrastructure services, it lowers prices in liberalized 
Figure 4.1
Greater liberalization 
in services is 
associated with 
faster growth
Growth rate, controlling 
for other variables
Source: Mattoo, Rathindran, 
and Subramanian 2001.
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services; and it improves the range and quality of services provided. Because 
much of services liberalization is through FDI, services imports bring in ﬂows 
of capital, know-how, and technology—all severely constraining factors in the 
development of poor countries. Moreover, the presence of foreign services ﬁrms 
often creates additional demand, including that for other services, in the domes-
tic economy. For instance, unit increases in the output of electricity, transport, 
public administration, and health in Bangladesh were found to create addi-
tional demand for other sectors ranging from 30 percent to 43 percent, while 
unit increases in housing, construction, and banking and insurance spurred 
increases in demand of up to 15–10 percent (Azad 1999). Gains from services 
liberalization also accrue from the fact that the removal of barriers allows entry by 
new domestic, as well as foreign, ﬁrms into the market. In telecommunications 
services, barriers to market entry by both domestic and foreign suppliers were 
found to raise prices by up to 70 percent (Warren 2000). 
Efﬁcient services are vital to the export of goods and other services
Services are used intensively in the production of all goods and services, making 
up around 10–20 percent of production costs in both industry and agriculture, 
Box 4.2
The three main 
sources from gains 
from services 
liberalization
 
Source: Luo and 
Findlay 2002; Boylaud 
and Nicoletti 2000; 
OECD 2000, 2001, 
2002b; Markusen 
and Rutherford 2002; 
Kalirajan and others 2000; 
Claessens, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Huizinga 2001; 
Mann 2000.
• Foreign competitors add to domestic production capacity and enhance efﬁciency. For-
eign competitors in the logistics sector add to capacity and provide access to the soft 
technology associated with new ways of organizing businesses, for both manufactur-
ers and retailers. Prospective and effective liberalization of telecommunications has 
a positive impact on sector efﬁciency (and on quality of services and prices) in OECD 
countries. The density of mobile phones grows more rapidly (and prices fall more 
rapidly) in liberalized markets. In mode 4, exposure to foreign expertise—say, through 
the presence of engineers or management consultants—can provide important knowl-
edge transmission and productivity gains with ﬂow-on beneﬁts for the development of 
domestic entrepreneurship and growth.
• Foreign competition contributes to reducing the price of services. In Chile, competition 
in telecommunications resulted in rapid price reductions (thanks to the modernization 
of infrastructure): between 1989 and 1994, prices for local telephone calls dropped 
by 36 percent, for long-distance calls by 38 percent, and for international calls by 50 
percent. By contrast, nonprudential restrictions on 294 foreign banks in 27 economies 
in the Asia-Paciﬁc, European, and American regions raised the price of different bank-
ing services by between 5 and 60 percent. 
• Foreign providers improve the range and quality of services. In ﬁnancial services, for-
eign participation strengthens the banking systems by introducing new risk manage-
ment technology. After controlling for all the standard ﬁnancial and macroeconomic 
factors, the entry of foreign banks was associated with greater efﬁciency of the bank-
ing system for 7,900 banks in 80 countries. In El Salvador, the sale of a majority stake 
in the country’s public telecommunications operator and the auction of a second cel-
lular license in conjunction with the introduction of competition reduced the delay for 
connection of a ﬁxed line from up to six years to a couple of days.
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and in some cases more—they are 20–25 percent of the readymade garments 
industry in Bangladesh (Azad 1999). The price and quality of services are criti-
cal in determining the cost of all other products and services in the economy. 
As tariffs come down and production chains go global, services are becoming 
an ever greater determinant of the competitiveness of goods and services pro-
ducers (Hodge 2002).
Much of what is required to trade—telecommunications, transport, banking, 
insurance, and distribution—is services. For agricultural exporters, integration 
of the agriculture sector within and between economies depends upon access to 
transportation services (Limão and Venables 2001). Inadequate transport and dis-
tribution links result in considerable post-harvest losses, wastage, and overcharg-
ing by middlemen—all problems particularly acute in relatively remote areas. 
Inefﬁciencies in internal transport systems have also contributed to the concen-
tration of China’s development in coastal areas: trucking rates to move a container 
550 kilometers inland are estimated to be about three times more than in Europe 
or the U.S., and railway charges are punitive (World Bank 2002).
Efﬁcient and cost-effective international maritime transport is also vital for 
many countries’ participation in world trade. Restrictions on the provision of 
port services can signiﬁcantly raise prices for maritime transport (Fink, Mat-
too, and Neagu 2001) and reduce port efﬁciency—high levels of mandatory 
port services for incoming ships are estimated to reduce port efﬁciency by 5 
percent (Clark, Dollar, and Micco 2002). 
Low-quality services that delay production or delivery effectively also 
exclude producers from time-sensitive global supply chains. A survey of devel-
oping country services exporters found that lack of access to cheap and reliable 
infrastructure services was a serious problem—for example, when exporters of 
business and professional services lost clients because unreliable telecommu-
nications prevented timely delivery (OECD 2003e). Transport and ﬁnancial 
services underpin the tourism sector, while data processing, customer service 
centers, and diagnostic health services all rely upon high quality telecommu-
nications. Services are also the key to small- and medium-size businesses being 
able to take advantage of the new trade opportunities made possible by the 
Internet. For instance, exporters of handicrafts or professional services might 
be able to access international markets through the Internet, but without tele-
communications and energy services they cannot access the Internet.
The quality and efﬁciency of all the basic services necessary for trade can 
be improved by trade itself: that is, by importing high quality and modern 
services—for example, traded business services provide the quality control 
and packaging services needed by Vietnamese exporters entering world tex-
tile markets (Kyvik Nordås 2004). Services imports can also build capacity in 
more direct ways: Malaysia formed twinning programs with universities from 
Australia, the UK, and the U.S. to provide its own population with increased 
access to higher education, but now markets itself as a destination for foreign 
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students seeking to take degrees accredited by those countries in a lower cost 
environment. In 2000 Malaysia attracted more than 26,000 foreign students 
from nearly 100 countries including Indonesia, China, and India. Similarly, 
developing country subsidiaries of major ﬁnancial services ﬁrms export to 
both the home country of the parent ﬁrm and third-country markets (OECD 
2003e) and the international outsourcing of services, a major growth area for 
developing country services exports, often takes place through local subsidiar-
ies of developed country companies (that is, outsourcing of exports can be 
built upon mode 3 imports) (OECD forthcoming). 
Developing countries have real export interests
The Doha Agenda is often presented as a tradeoff of developing country agri-
culture exports in exchange for developed country services exports. This is a 
mistake.
The gap between developed and developing countries in the share of services 
in total trade is rapidly closing. Developing countries have increased their exports 
of services nearly fourfold in the last decade (faster than goods exports), increas-
ing their share of the global marketplace from 14 percent in 1985–89 to 18 per-
cent in 1995–98 (World Bank 2002). As a result, while the share of services in 
trade in developed countries has stayed reasonably constant at around 20 percent 
of total trade for 1980–2000, the share in developing countries grew from under 
10 percent to just under 20 percent over the same period (OECD 2002c).
Many developing countries are highly specialized in services and have 
concrete—and growing—export interests to pursue in the Doha Round. While 
developed countries still dominate trade in services, 21 developing countries fea-
ture in the list of top 40 services exporters for 2003 (excluding intra-EU trade), 
with ﬁve (China, Hong Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
India) ranked in the top 10. Their percentage shares of world services trade remain 
relatively low, reﬂecting the concentration of services exports from a few devel-
oped countries.7 However, growth rates for nine developing countries—China, 
the Republic of Korea, Egypt, South Africa, Macao (China), Morocco, Chile, 
Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—were in double digits (table 4.1). 
Even for the poorest countries, services exports are not insigniﬁcant. 
In the 49 LDCs, the average contribution of services exports to GDP was 
around 6.5 percent in 2001, with some countries reaching peaks of more than 
50 percent (Vanuatu and the Maldives). Services were the main export for nine 
of the poorest developing countries in 2001 (table 4.2).
For these poorest countries, services exports are mostly tourism, while 
developing countries are exporting a broad range of services. Lower costs of 
skilled labor, along with cheaper and improved telecommunications, have 
made electronic supply a major factor in the growth of services exports from 
developing countries. As in goods, trade between developing countries is also 
expanding (box 4.3).
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Labor-intensive services: an opportunity for developing countries
Developing countries enjoy a clear comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
services, including—in a growing number of areas—at the higher skilled end 
of the chain. Service supply through temporary movement of natural persons 
(mode 4) is thus a key priority for the GATS negotiations. But increasingly, 
so is the supply of labor-intensive services by modes 1 and/or 2, in the form 
Table 4.1
Developing countries 
in the top 40 services 
exporters, 2003
Excluding intra-EU trade
— Not available.
a. WTO Secretariat estimate. 
Source: Adapted from 
WTO 2004b.
Rank Exporter
Value  
(billions of dollars)
Share  
(percentage)
Annual percentage 
change
4 China 46.4 3.5 18
5 Hong Kong (China) 44.6 3.3 4
8 Republic of Korea 31.3 2.3 16
9 Singapore 30.4 2.3 3
10 India 25.0 1.9 7
11 Taiwan (China) 23.0 1.7 7
16 Thailand 15.7 1.2 2
17 Malaysia 13.5 1.0 –9
18 Mexico 12.6 0.9 1
21 Egypt 10.8 0.8 19
22 Brazil 9.6 0.7 9
26 Indonesiaa 6.4 0.5 —
27 South Africa 6.4 0.5 40
29 Saudi Arabia 5.3 0.4 3
31 Macao (China) 5.2 0.4 17
32 Morocco 5.1 0.4 24
34 Chile 4.7 0.4 11
35 Argentina 3.8 0.3 32
36 Dominican Republic 3.4 0.3 13
38 Vietnam 3.2 0.2 —
40 Philippines 3.0 0.2 –2
Table 4.2
Ratio of exports 
of goods and 
commercial services 
to GDP for selected 
poorest countries, 
1995 and 2001
Percentage
— Not available.
Source: Adapted from WTO data.
Country
Goods Services
1995 2001 1995 2001
Cape Verde 3 6 12 20
Comoros 5 8 12 13
Eritrea 15 3 16 19
Ethiopia 7 7 5 6
Maldives 21 19 57 60
Samoa 5 — 27 —
São Tomé and Principe 10 7 13 28
Solomon Islands 54 20 11 18
Tanzania 13 8 11 7
Vanuatu 12 9 33 53
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of the international outsourcing of computer and business process services.8 
New telecommunications technologies have enabled companies in developed 
countries to take advantage of lower cost skilled labor by outsourcing a range 
of their business functions (customer help lines, data processing) to companies 
or subsidiaries based in developing countries. 
Both mode 4 and outsourcing promise real export gains for developing 
countries. In both cases, trade is already under way, and the challenge will be 
to translate this reality into GATS commitments and to use the negotiations 
to head off actual, or potential, obstacles to future growth. 
Mode 4 (temporary movement of people to supply services). One of the key gains 
from increased mode 4 trade for developing countries is the remittances (money) 
sent home by their nationals working abroad. While remittances are sent by a 
much larger group of migrants, of whom mode 4 is only one part, they are an 
important and growing source of development ﬁnance.9 The total value world-
wide of remittances more than doubled between 1988 and 1999, with ofﬁcially 
recorded workers remittances amounting to $72.3 billion in 2001 (World 
Bank 2003a)—although the total amount is likely higher as many remittances 
are sent through informal channels. Remittances are larger for low-income 
countries as a share of GDP and imports than for middle-income countries: 
Box 4.3
Developing 
country services 
exports
Source: OECD 2003e.
In port and shipping services, four of the top ﬁve global container terminals in terms of 
throughput are in developing countries; the Philippines accounts for 20 percent of seago-
ing staff.
In audiovisual services, India exports ﬁlms to 95 countries and sales grew from 
Rs 2 billion in 1998 to Rs 5.25 billion in 2001. Hong Kong (China) remains the world’s 
third largest ﬁlm producer, and Thailand is an emerging player, producing ﬁlm and televi-
sion and undertaking postproduction, including computer animation and effects, for other 
ﬁlms. Egypt and Brazil are major suppliers of audiovisual services, especially for televi-
sion, within their regions.
Of the top 150 construction companies in 2002 measured by revenue generated out-
side the home market, 51 were from developing countries, with China dominating.
In health services, Cuba, India, and South Africa are all destinations for foreign 
patients. China and India are establishing hospital and specialty clinics in a variety of 
foreign markets. Asian and Latin American retailers are also expanding in their regions, 
including into developed countries (Australia and the U.S.).
Barbados is becoming prominent in data processing; the Philippines, India, and China 
are actively exporting computer software services; and South Africa exports a full range of 
business and ﬁnancial services to the southern African region. Indian software and infor-
mation and communication technology (ICT) companies have established subsidiaries in 
both developed (U.S.) and developing country (Latin American) markets. 
In telecommunications, South African companies are major players in the African mar-
ket, exporting to Cameroon, Swaziland, Nigeria, Uganda, and Rwanda. Egyptian compa-
nies manage GSM networks in more than 20 countries in the Middle East and Africa. 
Telekom Malaysia exports to Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka.
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in the poorest countries, remittances are on average about 1.9 percent of GDP, 
but can be as much as 26.5 percent (Lesotho), and are two to three times larger 
than total FDI (Ratha 2003). Remittances are also more evenly spread than 
FDI ﬂows and more stable (unlike FDI, they are countercyclical, tending to 
increase in times of economic downturn). In most developing countries, remit-
tances are also a larger source of income than aid (Ratha 2003). 
The gains from further mode 4 liberalization are potentially great. Open-
ing of developed country labor markets to temporary entry by foreign work-
ers equal to 3 percent of the current workforce would generate welfare (real 
income) gains exceeding those that could be attained from full merchandise 
trade liberalization—an aggregate gain of $150 billion a year or 0.6 percent 
of initial world income (Winters 2003). For both developed and developing 
countries, the gains would come principally from the movement of low-skilled 
workers (Winters 2003).
At present, however, mode 4 is subject to a range of restrictions. Wage parity 
requirements are common: mode 4 workers are generally required to be paid the 
prevailing wage in the host country, and—under the same rationale of avoiding a 
competitive cost advantage to foreign workers—also to contribute to social secu-
rity systems. The latter requirement can be particularly unfair where the foreign 
worker will never be eligible to receive the beneﬁts of the schemes to which they 
contribute. As a result of these requirements, the competitive cost advantage of 
developing countries from lower labor costs shows up less in trade through the 
temporary movement of people (mode 4) than through outsourcing (modes 1/2). 
This is because where services are outsourced offshore, the prevailing local wages 
are paid and the cost advantages of developing country labor remain intact. 
Equally, while many schemes facilitate the mobility of the highly skilled, 
relatively few cover the moderately or lower skilled workers of interest to 
developing countries. While intracorporate transferees enjoy relatively easier 
conditions for mobility, groups that are more important to developing coun-
tries—such as contractual or independent service suppliers (those who are not 
attached to a foreign company established in the host country but have a con-
tract to provide a speciﬁc service to a host country client)—tend to be subject 
to quotas and limited to certain sectors and relatively short durations of stay. 
Most countries also subject entry of foreign workers to economic needs 
or labor market tests (under which foreign suppliers are admitted only if it 
is assessed that there is a “need” for their services in the domestic market). 
Such tests are often not transparent (few WTO Members have complied with 
the requirement to provide their criteria) and can be subject to arbitrary or 
unpredictable application (UNCTAD 2003b). Other difﬁculties arise from 
nontransparent, time-consuming, or burdensome visa or work permit require-
ments and procedures. Lack of recognition of qualiﬁcations, including the lim-
ited participation of developing countries in mutual recognition agreements, is 
a further constraint on mode 4 trade. 
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While the barriers are multiple, there may be scope for progress on mode 
4 in the Doha Round, in part because of changing pressures in developed 
countries. Of course, GATS mode 4 remains a sensitive issue of negotiations. 
But the reality is that temporary labor movement—in particular, but not only, 
related to services—is widespread and growing (box 4.4). While there are no 
reliable, systematic ﬁgures for mode 4, in certain sectors considerable mobility 
is already taking place.10 Two main factors can be identiﬁed.
First, OECD countries experiencing increasingly tight skills shortages see 
temporary mobility as one solution. For instance, in response to shortages in 
developed countries, large numbers of nurses move every year, with the majority 
coming from developing countries (Martineau, Decker, and Bundred 2002).11 
For some, this is part of a strategy of promoting labor exports; for others, it has 
given rise to concerns about “brain drain” (see “Addressing concerns about lib-
eralization” below). Developing countries have also been an important source 
of ICT (information and communication technology) workers, although the 
recent downturn in the sector has led to revision of projected shortages.12 
Further, as their populations age and their average levels of training and 
education rise, developed countries will face an increasing scarcity of less skilled 
labor. Given the fact that, at least in some occupations, there is no substitute 
for human labor, the demand for and beneﬁts of allowing labor mobility will 
Box 4.4
Trends in  the 
temporary 
movement of 
workers
 
Source: OECD 2004a.
In the U.S., more than 201,000 new H1B visas were granted during ﬁscal year 2001, 
in addition to 130,000 renewals. Following the ICT bust, only 103,600 new visas were 
granted in 2002. The quota is likely to revert to 65,000 for 2004. Temporary unskilled 
labor in the nonagricultural sector (H2B visas) increased by 50 percent over 2000, dou-
bling since 1999 to reach 72,400 in 2001.
In the UK recruitment conditions for the highly skilled were relaxed and work permits 
increased, in particular in new technologies, health, and education. In 2002, 85,600 new 
work permits were issued, continuing an upward trend. Switzerland increased its quota 
for skilled workers temporarily by nearly 30 percent in May 2001 to meet labor shortages 
(it had previously remained unchanged for 10 years). In Germany foreign employment 
grew strongly in the health sector in 2001. In France temporary work permits rose by 
28 percent between 2000 and 2001 and have more than doubled since 1998. These 
were mostly skilled workers in the services sector—computer specialists, teachers, and 
health personnel. Nearly 1,400 foreign engineers and computer managers received tem-
porary work permits in 2001 (up 40 percent on 2000) and an additional 2,640 specialists 
received a work permit for more than one year (up 63 percent on 2000).
In Australia temporary foreign skilled workers increased; around 43,000 work permits 
were issued in 2001 (up by more than 10 percent over 2000). In Japan the number of 
foreigners obtaining residence for employment reasons in 2001 was 142,000, up 9.3 per-
cent over 2000 and 39 percent over 1998. These are mostly entertainers, with highly 
skilled workers experiencing a slight decline. In Korea more than 28,200 skilled workers 
entered in 2001, a 60 percent increase over the previous year. Both Japan and Korea 
granted increasing entry to trainees in 2001—59,100 for Japan and 100,000 in Korea.
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increase over time (Winters 2003). The underlying demographics are compel-
ling: over the next decade, while developed countries face aging populations, 
around 700 million young people will join the labor market in developing 
countries.
Second, as business goes global and product cycles shorten, companies need 
to be able to move more people, and more types of people, to more countries but 
for shorter periods and at shorter notice. The numbers of people moving around 
the world within their companies are growing (table 4.3). Global project teams, 
teleworking, and dual-career couples are all contributing to changing the nature 
of overseas company assignments, with shorter, more frequent visits expand-
ing faster than longer term assignments (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). For 
multinational companies, recruitment of the highly skilled is also increasingly a 
global affair, fed by increasing student mobility and burgeoning FDI. 
Against this background, the share of temporary labor migration (short-
term permits, intracorporate transferees, internships, working holidays, sea-
sonal jobs) in total migration ﬂows is increasing. A number of developed coun-
tries are adapting labor migration laws to meet the needs of the labor market 
for highly skilled, skilled, and less skilled workers (the last in construction, 
elderly care, other business and household services, and agriculture) (see box 
4.4).13
In addition to these unilateral programs, labor mobility provisions are 
included in some regional trade agreements (RTAs). These range from free 
movement for all kinds of workers in deep integration agreements (such as the 
EU and that between Australia and New Zealand), to near-free movement for 
the highly skilled (CARICOM), to provision of certain forms of mobility for 
some categories of persons related to trade and investment (NAFTA). Some, 
like the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), do not grant any right of 
mobility but facilitate the entry of business visitors. Most RTAs focus on highly 
skilled workers. Some countries also maintain bilateral labor agreements, par-
ticularly covering lower skilled or seasonal workers (box 4.5).
Offshore outsourcing (modes 1 and 2)
New opportunities for skilled or semiskilled workers in developing countries 
are also being created by the international outsourcing of business process and 
Table 4.3
Intracompany 
transferees in selected 
countries, 1996–2001 
Thousands
 
— Not available.
a. Includes NAFTA entry. 
Source: OECD 2004a.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Canadaa — 2.1 2.8 2.5 3.0 3.3
France 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.2 2.3
Japan 2.8 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.9 3.5
United Kingdom 13.0 18.0 22.0 15.0 16.0 17.0
United States (L1 visa) 140.5 — 203.3 234.4 294.7 328.5
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ICT services.14 These are fast becoming major exports for a growing number 
of developing countries—shifting modes 1 and 2 from a secondary role until a 
few years ago to center stage in the Doha negotiations. Developments in ICT 
have enabled a growing range of services to be outsourced to other countries. 
What started out as data processing and low-end business support services has 
now moved into mid-range ICT jobs, medical care, and specialist analyst posi-
tions. ICT-enabled exports also tend to be associated with high levels of FDI, 
human capital formation, demonstration effects, and knowledge spillovers. 
Regulatory changes have also contributed to this phenomenon. For instance, 
companies required by new laws to separate research and analysis from consul-
tancy activities also turn to offshore provision for some activities.
Savings from outsourcing can be signiﬁcant—wages for software devel-
opers and data entry agents in India can be a tenth of those in the U.S. The 
attraction for companies is clear. For instance, General Electric saves about 
$350 million a year through outsourcing to India; GlaxoSmithKline expects 
to save around 35 percent a year on its ICT budget; and the U.S. banking 
industry has saved $2 billion per year in the last four years. Service quality 
does not suffer, and productivity can rise by 15–25 percent, as these jobs attract 
skilled, motivated workers in developing countries. Lower labor costs also 
Box 4.5
Regional and 
bilateral agreements 
to facilitate 
movements 
of workers
a. Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, China, 
Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Peru, the Philippines, Taiwan 
(China), and Thailand.
b. It does not include spouses 
and children; persons who 
wish to engage in paid employ-
ment or working holidays; 
and professional athletes, 
news correspondents, 
entertainers, musicians, 
artists, and persons engaged 
in similar occupations.
Source: Nielson 2003; OECD, 
IOM, World Bank 2004.
The APEC Business Travel Card is one of the few regional facilitation schemes including 
both developed and developing countries. Currently 14 APEC economies participate in 
the scheme.a While more countries are expected to join in the future, neither the U.S. nor 
Canada is planning to join. The Card is valid for three years and provides multiple short-
term business entries, with stays of two or three months on each arrival. Cardholders 
receive expedited airport processing and are not required to submit separate applications 
for business visitor visas. There is no limit on the number of cards, and almost 4,000 have 
been issued to date. Fees vary among the participating economies. The scheme is open 
to citizens of participating economies who are bona ﬁde businesspeople.b Participating 
economies commit to implement the scheme on a best endeavors basis and are free to 
maintain existing visa requirements for business visitors. All economies retain the right to 
refuse an individual without providing reasons or to refuse entry to APEC Business Travel 
Card holders at the border.
Some countries, mostly in Europe, have bilateral labor agreements. These tend to 
cover lower skilled or seasonal workers (in construction, tourism, or agriculture), with 
some covering nurses. Agreements usually include provisions related to return and worker 
protection. For instance, a scheme between Germany and some countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe allows employees of foreign companies to work in Germany providing 
services to German companies. The foreign company acts as a subcontractor to a Ger-
man ﬁrm, with the workers remaining under contract to their foreign employer. Duration 
is limited to two to three years. The foreign ﬁrm must ensure the exit of the workers, and 
part of the contract payment is withheld until the workers return home. Some enforcement 
responsibility is also placed on the local German company. Country-speciﬁc quotas are 
included that can be adapted to the labor market situation in Germany.
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enable companies to offer new services or to undertake tasks (such as pursuing 
overdue accounts) that were previously uneconomical. Considerable beneﬁts 
also accrue to the importing country as a whole (see box 4.8).
The beneﬁts for exporting developing countries are substantial. While most 
exports of business services still originate in OECD countries, developing coun-
tries are experiencing high growth rates (ﬁgure 4.2).15 India is the leader—its 
business process outsourcing sector grew by almost 60 percent a year after 2000, 
and the software development sector grew at 30 percent a year. But other devel-
oping countries are also seizing the outsourcing opportunity. While those with 
large pools of educated English speakers (the Philippines, South Africa) enjoy 
an advantage in certain markets, others (Costa Rica) provide services targeted at 
Spanish-speaking consumers in Europe and the U.S. Language is less important 
where services such as product development are outsourced—China is a favored 
location for hardware design and embedded software. Tunisia hosts three data 
processing companies, while both Barbados and Jamaica have developed ﬂour-
ishing back-ofﬁce industries, and smaller eastern Caribbean countries are col-
laborating to promote their back-ofﬁce capabilities (OECD 2003e). 
Linkages between modes of supply
The patterns and growth of developing country exports in labor-intensive services 
highlight the linkages between modes of supply, where trade through one mode 
of supply creates new opportunities for trade through others. For instance, the 
temporary movement of natural persons as service suppliers (mode 4) can make 
businesses in the host country aware of the pool of skilled labor in the worker’s 
home country and lead to outsourcing of work to (modes 1 and 2), or investment 
in (mode 3), that country. This has been the experience of India, whose ICT 
workers temporarily in the U.S. encouraged U.S. companies to see the opportu-
nities for outsourcing work to, or establishing in, India (Chanda 2003a). 
Many of the ﬁrms in developing countries undertaking work outsourced 
from developed countries are themselves subsidiaries of developed country 
Figure 4.2
Average growth rate 
of exports of business 
services for selected 
countries, 1995–2000
 
Source: IMF balance-of-
payments statistics, cited in 
Mattoo and Wunsch (2004).
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companies (such as IBM India Research Laboratory in New Delhi), an illus-
tration of developed country mode 3 exports leading to developing country 
exports under modes 1 and 2. These developing country subsidiaries of devel-
oped country companies may also bring workers from the developing coun-
try back into the parent company in the developed country as intracorporate 
transferees (mode 4). Further, as noted in the previous section, subsidiaries 
(mode 3 imports) in developing countries can expand services exports by those 
countries—Indian subsidiaries of U.S. companies now export services both 
back to the U.S. and to a range of other markets, contributing to the growth 
in India’s services exports. 
Equally, some Indian companies are now establishing their own subsidiar-
ies in the U.S. (mode 3) and bidding for contracts in the U.S. domestic mar-
ket. These developing country subsidiaries in developed countries (developing 
country mode 3 exports) are also bringing in workers from their home country 
as intracorporate transferees (mode 4). This has given rise to a new controversy. 
Intracorporate transferees have not traditionally been viewed as competing with 
local labor and so are exempt from some of the stricter requirements applying 
to other categories of mode 4 entrants (wage parity, labor market tests, or quo-
tas). However, some U.S. ﬁrms now complain that they are being underbid on 
contracts within the U.S. market by local branches of Indian companies using 
cheaper Indian workers brought in as intracorporate transferees. This has led 
to calls to make the conditions for intracorporate transferees (L1 visa) closer to 
those for other kinds of skilled workers (H1B visa), in particular to introduce 
wage parity requirements, labor market tests, or quotas.
The inclusion in trade in services of mobility of capital and labor raises 
new and complex choices and challenges for societies seeking to beneﬁt from 
the global market for services. These are addressed in the following section. 
Addressing concerns about liberalization 
There are substantial gains from liberalizing key services sectors, but these 
gains are not automatic. Producing an outcome that supports development is 
a much greater challenge in services than in goods, given the need for regu-
lation to address more complex issues of market structure, market failures, 
and noneconomic objectives. Sound domestic regulation—prudential regula-
tion in ﬁnancial services, consumer protection in professional services, and 
procompetitive regulation in a variety of network services—is critical to real-
izing the beneﬁts of liberalization. Credible regulatory frameworks are also 
important for attracting investors, especially in infrastructure services often 
characterized by large sunk investment costs (that is, those costs that pro-
duce a stream of beneﬁts over a long horizon but can never be recouped). In 
services, liberalization is emphatically not a synonym for deregulation; it is 
normally a process of both deregulation and re-regulation, that is, of regula-
tory reform.
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This is not easy, and a number of concerns have arisen with regard to 
services liberalization: ﬁrst, that services liberalization does not result in com-
petition; second, that liberalization will limit the access of the poor to basic 
services; third, that many developing country governments lack the regulatory 
capacity for effective and well conceived services liberalization; and fourth, that 
export of labor-intensive workers will lead to the “export” of local jobs and, in 
the case of mode 4, to a brain drain and unregulated permanent migration. 
Liberalization and competition
Ensuring that services liberalization results in a genuinely competitive market 
requires attention to the nature and sequencing of liberalization. Many coun-
tries have privatized without creating competition, effectively turning public 
monopolies into private ones by opening sectors to FDI without removing 
restrictions on new entry. Even if new entrants are permitted, competition will 
not be created if the conditions under which they enter discriminate heavily 
in favor of the incumbent. While privatization and liberalization can result in 
some beneﬁts (increasing available capital and technology transfer), the main 
gains come from competition.16
South Africa’s experience in telecommunications is salutary. South Africa 
privatized 30 percent of the public telecommunications provider (Telkom) and 
granted it a ﬁve-year monopoly on ﬁxed-line services. The monopoly period 
was supposed to facilitate the rollout of infrastructure to previously underser-
viced areas. Results were disappointing. Network growth picked up but rollout 
obligations were not met, and Telkom sought to renegotiate the targets. Pro-
ductivity gains were not passed to the consumer, leading to higher margins 
rather than lower prices. Labor productivity remained at one-quarter of lead-
ing international operators, with the lack of competition identiﬁed as a major 
contributing factor (World Bank 2002).
Competition requires a genuinely contestable market where new entrants 
are free to compete on price and quality. Many of the infrastructure services 
that are critical to development—transport, energy, telecommunications, 
ﬁnance—are industries in which network externalities are important. Regula-
tion to ensure that markets are contestable needs to focus not only on “tradi-
tional” types of entry barriers, but also on the ability to connect to the network 
at a reasonable price and to apply the relevant technologies (changes that can 
also have major implications for the design of appropriate regulation).
The sequencing of reform matters. Poor sequencing has been blamed for 
some of the unsatisfactory results in Latin America, where regulatory reform 
was concluded after ﬁrms were privatized (Pinheiro 2000). By contrast, simul-
taneous introduction of regulation to ensure competition and privatization 
contributed to successful telecommunications reform in 86 developing coun-
tries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. For all these countries, both privatiza-
tion and competition in telecommunications led to signiﬁcant improvements 
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in performance between 1985 and 1999: reform involving both policies pro-
duced 8 percent more mainlines and a 21 percent higher level of productivity 
compared with years of partial and no reform, but mainline penetration was 
lower if competition was introduced after privatization rather than at the same 
time (Fink, Mattoo, and Rathindran 2001).
Designing, sequencing, and enforcing reforms can be extremely complex. 
Regulatory thinking and economic analysis are still evolving rapidly, espe-
cially for network industries, and solutions that have proved successful in some 
countries or some sectors may not be readily transferable to others. Careful 
assessment of the implications of alternative types of regulation is required to 
determine which options might be most appropriate for developing countries. 
This situation has an important consequence for the Doha negotiations: it 
argues for a degree of caution in making binding commitments in areas where 
signiﬁcant regulatory experimentation is still under way, as well as caution in 
GATS rulemaking with regard to regulation (see appendix 5).
Liberalization and access to basic services by the poor
A key concern in liberalization is that poor households may lose their access 
to affordable services as new entrants “cream-skim” and focus only on the 
proﬁtable sectors of the market, leaving the former public monopoly to provide 
services to the poor, threatening the sustainability of the service supply and the 
viability of the former monopoly.
This concern raises a ﬁrst—factual—question. If state monopolies in utili-
ties can cross-subsidize to provide services to poor households, available evi-
dence suggests that they have often not done so, or not done so efﬁciently. 
Subsidized services often end up with the middle classes while the poor often 
remain without services (Simpson 2003). For instance, most of Panama’s poor 
live in rural areas, but the public water and sanitation utility operates almost 
exclusively in towns. While only 16 percent of its customers live below the 
poverty line, two-thirds are subsidized (Forster, Gómez-Lobo, and Halpern 
2000).
Similarly, while governments devote about a third of their budgets to 
health and education, they do not always spend it on the poor: in a number of 
developing countries the percentage of spending on the richest quintile greatly 
exceeds that on the poorest. For instance, in Nepal, 46 percent of education 
spending accrues to the richest ﬁfth and 11 percent to the poorest (World Bank 
2003b).
Second, liberalization can be a way of, or can contribute to, making ser-
vices available to the poor (box 4.6). 
Third, within liberalized markets, universal service provision can be ensured 
by a wide range of regulatory mechanisms. Some can target producers. Equal 
universal service obligations can be placed on all market participants and can 
include incentives for implementation. For instance, funds for universal service 
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can be pooled and allocated through competitive tender to the ﬁrm that offers 
to provide the necessary service or infrastructure at the least cost.
Alternatively, regulatory mechanisms ensuring universal service provision 
can target consumers. Nondiscriminatory levies can be placed on all service 
providers, with the proceeds used to directly subsidize poor households—say, 
through rebates or vouchers. Progressive tariffs can be applied in some sec-
tors (such as electricity), with low-income consumers paying a “social tariff” 
(with the government paying the remainder as an implicit subsidy). Consumer 
subsidies have the advantage of being more easily directly targeted at the most 
needy consumers and not discriminating between providers. However, they 
can involve administrative costs in identifying target groups and distributing 
funds, unless they can leverage existing administrative arrangements. Where 
the subsidy is not funded from industry levies or the proceeds of privatization, 
there may also be costs to the government in funding the subsidy. In either 
case, poor countries are likely to need international assistance to help meet the 
costs of subsidy programs. 
While a range of options exists for ensuring access to basic services by 
the poor, the most appropriate mechanisms to use will vary according to the 
conditions and capacities of the country concerned (box 4.7). Again, however, 
considerable experimentation is still under way in this area, and there are many 
instances in which privatization and liberalization of infrastructure services in 
developing countries have failed—sometimes dramatically (as in the case of 
water services in Bolivia). Getting the pricing right is no easy task, particularly 
where governments have traditionally held prices of key services below their 
economic costs—in developing countries at the beginning of the 1990s, rev-
enues for electricity on average recovered only 60 percent of costs; for water 
the ﬁgure was 30 percent. Under public ownership, these deﬁcits were often 
made up either by transfers from public ﬁnances or by the deterioration of 
assets through inadequate maintenance. Regardless of who owns the assets, in 
Box 4.6
Liberalization 
in the service 
of the poor—
GrameenPhone
 
Source: Lawson and 
Meyenn 2000, Burr 2002.
In Bangladesh, liberalization of mobile telephony enabled GrameenPhone, a joint venture 
between Grameen Telecom (a spinoff of the successful microcredit Grameen Bank) and 
Telenor (the Norwegian telecommunications company), to sell handsets and airtime to 
women who provide mobile pay phone services in their villages. The local branch of Gra-
meen Bank pays the price of the phone and connection in the form of a microloan and 
handles billing, phone maintenance, and investment ﬁnance. Each village pay phone cov-
ers around 2,500 people, and the repayment rate is 98 percent. In less than three years, 
telephone access was provided to 2.8 million villagers in 1,100 communities.
In this remarkable case, liberalization has done more than simply deliver access: it 
has empowered the poor as village women increased their capacity to negotiate with trad-
ers, resulting in lower input prices and higher output prices. What remains to be ﬁxed is 
the remaining monopoly on ﬁxed-line services, which imposes high interconnection and 
long-distance call costs.
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the end infrastructure services must be paid for either by users or by taxpayers 
(Harris 2003). Finding the right balance to ensure provision of services to the 
poor remains a major and complex challenge in services liberalization, the dif-
ﬁculty of which should not be underestimated. 
Fourth, government withdrawal from provision of services that can be 
more efﬁciently provided by the private sector has a large opportunity beneﬁt: 
it frees up its resources for core services of wide public interest, such as primary 
education. This beneﬁt is compounded if revenues from privatizations are also 
earmarked for basic services such as building new schools and recruiting teach-
ers in underserved areas. Liberalization can also generate revenue for govern-
ment services on an ongoing basis. Some developing countries are now active 
providers of health services to patients from other countries and can use the 
Box 4.7
Ensuring universal 
service under 
competition and 
privatization
 
Source: World Bank 
2002; Gómez-Lobo 
2001; Harris 2002.
Telecommunications
Chile adopted competitive provision of subsidized public access that helped to increase 
household ownership of a telephone from 16 percent in 1988 to 74 percent in 2000. 
In Peru the government imposed a universal service levy of 1 percent on gross operat-
ing revenues of telecommunications companies to ﬁnance a fund dedicated to providing 
universal access in remote areas. Funds were then allocated through a competitive bid-
ding process that encouraged operators to adopt the best technology and other cost-
saving practices at a minimum subsidy. 
To create competition in telecommunications sector liberalization, Brazil was divided 
into four regions with, in a ﬁrst phase, two carriers competing for the market in each of 
those regions. All carriers were subject to universal service and rollout obligations to be 
met by a set deadline. At the end of that deadline, all carriers would be allowed to oper-
ate in other regions. But they were allowed to do so earlier if they managed to meet the 
universal service obligations before companies operating in other regions, thus creating a 
powerful incentive for obligations to be fulﬁlled.
Water distribution
In Chile water privatization and liberalization was accompanied by means-tested subsidies 
targeted to individual consumers, with the objective that no household should pay more 
than 5 percent of its income for water and sewage. To encourage efﬁcient resource use 
and ensure that only the subsistence level was being subsidized, subsidies were capped 
at the subsistence level. Under that level, eligible households have 25–85 percent of 
their bill paid by the government, depending on need. Of the beneﬁts, 52 percent have 
gone to the three lowest income groups, with only 23 percent leakage to the ﬁve highest 
income groups.
Electricity
Guatemala integrated a rural electriﬁcation program into the concession contract of its 
new foreign private electricity operator. Households within a 200-meter radius of the exist-
ing network fell under a universal service obligation (connection without subsidy) while 
those outside attracted a $650 connection subsidy. The subsidies were set aside in a 
trust fund to prevent diversion to other uses, with revenue from the privatization of the 
distribution assets earmarked for the trust fund. Between May 1999 and May 2002, 
122,000 rural electricity connections were added. 
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revenue generated (or, for private clinics, the tax revenue generated) to subsi-
dize the public health system (Nielson forthcoming). 
Liberalization and regulatory capacity 
As the cases above indicate, there can be signiﬁcant regulatory challenges associ-
ated with services liberalization. Meeting these challenges requires sound and 
effective regulatory frameworks and institutions—which require resources and 
knowledge. While regulatory failure also occurs in OECD countries, many 
developing countries face particular challenges in services reform. These include 
a lack of experience with regulation and a limited capacity to assess either the 
various policy options or the impact of services reforms undertaken to date. 
Experience in Africa with ﬁnancial services liberalization suggests that one major 
shortcoming was the lack of adequate regulatory and supervision mechanisms to 
monitor the functioning of the ﬁnancial system (World Bank 2002). Regulatory 
reform can also be more difﬁcult where there are risks of industry capture, such 
as where the new regulator has to draw staff entirely from the former monopoly 
due to the small pool of persons with expert knowledge of the sector. There are 
also knowledge gaps about the functioning of services markets in developing 
countries and the kinds of policy frameworks and complementary policies that 
best support development. Further research and information exchange on con-
crete country experiences will be essential to getting policy settings right.17 
Liberalization in many developing countries will also require signiﬁcant 
investment in regulatory institutions and human capital. In many cases, inter-
national assistance will be required, to provide either technical advice and 
expertise or, more directly, resources for the development of institutions and 
frameworks. The GATS negotiations could provide an opportunity to link 
liberalization to regulatory capacity building and to marshal resources to this 
end. This is discussed further in “Priorities for liberalization” below. 
Even with assistance, the development of sound regulatory frameworks takes 
time, and developing countries should sequence and phase liberalization accord-
ingly. They should also make full use of the progressive liberalization envisaged 
under the GATS to keep their GATS commitments in line with their capacity to 
regulate—and experience of regulating—liberalized services markets. 
A ﬁnal issue is whether investment of resources in developing these regu-
latory institutions and frameworks is a development priority for the poorest 
countries. This concern is something of a vicious circle: countries that do not 
have adequate regulatory institutions may choose not to liberalize their services 
sectors, but then may ﬁnd their development constrained by lack of efﬁcient 
basic services. That is, the lack of efﬁcient services can constrain opportunities 
for growth-inducing activities that would help generate the resources to fund 
the necessary regulatory institutions to underpin the services liberalization 
that would increase the efﬁciency of those same services. This circularity is a 
powerful argument for increased international assistance.
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Liberalization and regulatory creativity 
Greatly increased assistance could usefully be targeted to identifying appro-
priate regulatory solutions for poor countries with limited resources. The 
poorest countries may face particular challenges in establishing regulatory 
frameworks, given their cost (for example, it is estimated that even a minimal 
telecommunications regulatory authority would cost Dominica $2 million a 
year, or 5 percent of its government budget). These countries also face chal-
lenges in balancing the need for regulation with the need to remain attractive 
to foreign investors, and they can be in an unequal bargaining position in such 
negotiations.
In other words, solutions implemented in OECD or even middle-income 
developing countries may not be easily introduced in poor countries. These 
countries may need serious “regulatory creativity,” that is, regulations designed 
to take speciﬁc account of their particular conditions and constraints. For 
instance, settling disputes about cost-based interconnection between tele-
communications operators can be carried out through competition authori-
ties or ad hoc regulatory agencies. But these solutions require years of regula-
tion-building and training to attain adequate practices. However, there may 
be scope to develop alternative approaches that are less resource intensive, 
as illustrated by the “ﬁnal offer arbitration” adopted by Guatemala in the 
mid-1990s (Spiller and Cardilli 1997). Under this procedure, the arbitra-
tor chooses only between the two ﬁnal offers presented by the parties, and 
the chosen offer becomes binding on both sides. Such a mechanism is fast 
(no endless lawsuits, since the process is limited by law to four months) and 
relatively inexpensive (due to the limited use of lawyers). More important, 
it induces the parties to make “reasonable” offers from the start, as it is in 
each party’s interest not to make an offer that would seem unreasonable to 
the arbitrator, but rather to make a marginally more favorable offer than the 
other party’s. 
Another solution could be to take a regional approach. In May 2000 St. 
Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Kitts and 
Nevis set up the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL). 
Established with World Bank support, it is the ﬁrst regional telecommunica-
tions authority in the world. Countries retain power over licensing and regu-
lation, with ECTEL providing technical expertise, advice, and support. The 
aim is to promote the development of harmonized and transparent regulation, 
allow for a greater degree of independence in regulatory advice, and enhance 
bargaining power with incumbents and new entrants (World Bank 2002).
There are many possible solutions and approaches yet to be explored. What 
is important is that developing countries have the scope to develop regulatory 
frameworks, appropriate to their circumstances, that will enable them to reap 
the beneﬁts of services liberalization, and that they receive sufﬁcient interna-
tional support and assistance to do so.
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Liberalization and adjustment in labor-related services
As for trade in goods, there are concerns about the adjustment costs following 
trade liberalization in services, particularly in labor-related services—even if, it 
is worth noting, there is some evidence that adjustment costs may be lower for 
trade in services than for manufacturing (OECD 2002c). As for other sectors 
(see agriculture), adjustment can be facilitated by the adoption of appropriate 
complementary policies. Attention to the nature, pace, and sequencing of lib-
eralization is essential, an understanding reﬂected in the progressive liberaliza-
tion envisaged under the GATS and the ﬂexible variable geometry of GATS 
commitments (appendix 5).
However, some are now questioning whether the adjustment problems 
raised by the import of labor-intensive services from developing countries (out-
sourcing and mode 4) are the same as those for trade in goods. As outsourcing 
has grown, so have concerns about the exports of jobs to developing countries. 
Currently only around 5 percent of U.S. ﬁrms with revenues from $100 mil-
lion to $4 billion have started to outsource (Mattoo and Wunsch 2004). But 
large growth is predicted, and political initiatives have been taken (in the U.S. 
Senate) or are being considered (in some U.S. states and in the United King-
dom) to prevent companies bidding for government procurement contracts 
from using offshore workers. 
Despite the increasingly rancorous debate, in-depth analysis has been lim-
ited to date and certainly does not prove the pessimist case—and the wild 
exaggerations of the export of jobs in trade in goods during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s suggest a certain caution in the current debate. Indeed, there is 
little in the evidence to date to suggest that adjustment to outsourcing will be 
very different from that required by liberalization in other sectors—that is, it 
will not be qualitatively different from that in labor-intensive manufacturing. 
All analyses to date agree that jobs will be lost and advocate measures to ease 
adjustment pressures—wage or company insurance schemes, as well as skill-
building, through resources for retraining, tax credits for human capital devel-
opment, and increased investment in math and science education and training. 
However, available analyses also suggest that losses need to be put in context 
and that there will be a number of offsetting gains (box 4.8).
At this stage, it is hard to assess the speciﬁc impact of mode 4 on local 
workers as most countries have introduced measures to limit mode 4 and to 
constrain any possible impacts on local workers (labor market tests, wage and 
social security parity requirements). Existing trade has also tended to be con-
centrated in shortage areas (nurses, ICT workers). Concerns about the impact 
of mode 4 are thus conditional upon signiﬁcant liberalization, in particular 
if this were to include more low-skilled workers (Winters 2003). As for trade 
in goods, these concerns suggest a need for sensitivity about the timing and 
extent of liberalization, and for available adjustment mechanisms (Chaudhuri, 
Mattoo, and Self 2004). Once again, it is hard to see, to date, why many of 
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Box 4.8
Outsourcing—four 
questions
Source: McKinsey Global 
Institute 2003; “India’s 
plan to beat the off-shoring 
backlash,” Financial Times, 
27 January 2004; Mann 
2003; Mattoo and Wunsch 
2004; OECD 2005. 
First, are projected job losses overstated? Estimates based on boom-era baselines would 
appear to be so. They are not borne out by employment data, which show that the highest 
job losses are still in manufacturing and management occupations. Job growth in white 
collar occupations deemed at risk from outsourcing is actually expanding (computer and 
mathematical occupations up by 6 percent and business and ﬁnancial occupations by 9 
percent during 1999–2003), and demand for U.S. services remains high—companies 
still do much at their headquarters, and the U.S. trade surplus for other private ser-
vices (which includes ﬁnancial, business, professional, and technical services) actually 
increased between 1997 and 2003. Moreover, there are intrinsic limits to the number 
and types of jobs that can be moved offshore, given that some services require proximity 
between the provider and consumer. 
Projected job losses also need to be seen in context. The much-cited projection from 
Forrester Research—that the U.S. will lose 3.3 million jobs by 2015—should be seen in 
the light of the constant destruction and creation of jobs in the U.S. labor market. Indeed, 
the average number of jobs destroyed every quarter in the private sector in the U.S. 
economy has ﬂuctuated between 7 and 9 million over the last 10 years (2.2–3 million on 
average per month). And the number of jobs created has exceeded the number of jobs 
destroyed during most quarters of the same period.
Second, are the issues different from the loss of manufacturing jobs from imports over 
the last 20 years? When manufacturing jobs moved to developing countries, new jobs 
were created. While trade-related job displacement is estimated at around 270,000 jobs 
per year between 1989 and 2000, over the past 10 years, the U.S. economy also gener-
ated 35 million new private sector jobs. With service sector jobs moving, the supply of 
jobs will not run out. New services jobs will continue to be created, for example in personal 
services associated with an aging population, and in new ﬁelds of technology.
Indeed, while low-wage, low-skill information and communication technology (ICT) jobs 
are likely to be lost (in some cases due to technology as much as outsourcing), higher 
paid, higher skilled ICT jobs will grow quickly in the U.S. Job growth to 2010 in occupations 
requiring ICT skills is still predicted to be more than three times the rate of job growth in 
the overall economy.
Third, what are the beneﬁts ﬂowing back to the country that sent the jobs? Estimates 
are that, for every dollar of outsourcing by U.S. companies to India, the U.S. gains 67 
cents in savings and direct returns, plus an additional 45 cents in new value from rede-
ploying U.S. labor ($1.12, or 79 percent of the total gains), while India gains 33 cents of 
the dollar in terms of increased employment and investment. In sum, movement of jobs 
is not a zero-sum game.
Further, developing countries to which jobs have moved also increase their demand 
for imported goods and services. Savings from outsourcing may be used for new busi-
ness investment or fed back into the economy through savings or consumption. Where 
outsourcing is undertaken by subsidiaries of U.S. ﬁrms located in India, proﬁts can also 
be repatriated and invested in the U.S. economy.
Fourth, what are the beneﬁts to consumers—a question that has received little atten-
tion perhaps because most outsourcing relates to business services? Consumers not only 
beneﬁt indirectly from lower cost business services where savings are passed on. They can 
also beneﬁt directly from the lower cost and increased availability of other services, such 
as diagnostic health services. The fact that MRI scans can be read by medical personnel in 
India at a fraction of the cost increases the access of many patients to this technology. 
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these issues would be more serious than those posed for less-skilled workers by 
imports of labor-intensive goods from developing countries.
Labor adjustment costs are also not limited to mode 4 in developed coun-
tries. In particular, mode 3 liberalization in developing countries—while gen-
erally raising employment—can entail labor adjustment, particularly in cases 
where former state monopolies have played a politically convenient role in 
absorbing surplus labor.18 For instance, privatization of electricity distribution 
in Argentina led to a 40 percent reduction in the workforce after privatization 
(Alexander and Estache 1999). For all modes of supply, costs associated with 
liberalization—including retraining and safety nets—need to be set against 
the gains to the domestic economy as a whole from cheaper, more efﬁcient 
services. 
In this sense, it is ironic that outsourcing (modes 1 and 2) was originally 
welcomed as a means of avoiding some of the risks and difﬁculties involved in 
bringing foreign workers into the country (mode 4). As noted above, restric-
tions on mode 4 meant that outsourcing was the best way to reap the cost 
advantage from developing country labor. Of course, mode 3 is also impor-
tant, as companies establish branches and subsidiaries in other countries, to 
take advantage of local labor skills and costs. The bottom line is that, in a 
more global economy, production, jobs, and workers are increasingly able to 
move—through modes 1 and 2, 3, or 4. The question is how those opportuni-
ties can be harnessed and the adjustment costs managed. 
Liberalization, mode 4, brain drain, and permanent migration
A speciﬁc concern for mode 4 is the prospect that the temporary movement of 
workers can become permanent. Countries of origin can fear the permanent 
loss of their (sometimes scarce) skilled workers, while destination countries can 
fear loss of control over regular migration. 
Some developing countries are concerned that the loss of skilled people, 
even temporarily, reduces total output, and hence the tax base. Depending on 
the extent of the skilled workers’ absences, it could also reduce an economy’s 
entrepreneurship, ability to absorb new technologies, and various positive spill-
overs from skilled to other workers and society in general. But these losses are 
not inevitable, and are much less likely with mode 4 than permanent migra-
tion. For example, skilled workers from developing countries are likely to be 
more productive and have higher earnings in advanced economies, and the 
earnings that they bring home may more than fully offset their loss locally. 
This is particularly true if the developing country had not been able to make 
optimal use of its skilled labor initially. 
Further, while temporary migrants temporarily withdraw the ﬂow of their 
skills from the local economy, they do not withdraw their citizenship or their 
offspring. Thus general spillovers and the intergenerational beneﬁts of educa-
tion are likely to persist. Temporary workers abroad are likely to provide ideas, 
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technology, markets, or networks for those who remain, increasing the latter’s 
productivity and market opportunities. This is particularly likely where schemes 
permit workers to move regularly between home and host country. Another pos-
sibility is that mode 4 mobility increases the returns to education. If the result-
ing increase in the supply of skilled workers exceeds the actual loss through tem-
porary movement, the domestic economy in the developing country becomes a 
net gainer of skills (Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters 2002).19 
That said, brain drain can be a real concern when even the temporary loss 
of skilled personnel cannot be borne, such as when countries facing health cri-
ses lose scarce health workers. Several initiatives aim to address this. In 2002 
the Commonwealth countries approved an International Code of Practice on 
Ethical Recruitment applying to all major importers of doctors and nurses, and 
the UK nursing association has developed a similar code. Home countries have 
also introduced community service requirements and improved pay and condi-
tions in an effort to ensure that temporary movement by their health workers 
does not turn into permanent migration.
While it is a reality that temporary movement can be a ﬁrst step to perma-
nent residence, it is not a simple one because many factors inﬂuence whether 
temporary movement leads to permanent migration. In some countries, tem-
porary entry can legally lead to permanent stay, with temporary entry used as 
a means of preselecting permanent migrants, and even here, evidence varies on 
the extent to which temporary movement becomes permanent.20 Illegal over-
staying is a different issue that arises with all forms of temporary movement, 
including tourists and students. Regular schemes for the temporary move-
ment of workers could actually help to discourage illegal movement (OECD 
2002d).
Governments of both sending and receiving countries are also develop-
ing incentives or sanctions to ensure return. For example, temporary worker 
schemes can involve sanction mechanisms to prevent overstaying, such as 
withholding part of the pay of contractual service suppliers until they (or, for 
a ﬁrm, their workers) leave the country, requiring ﬁrms or individuals to place 
a bond that is forfeited in the case of nondeparture (Hatcher 2003), or ﬁning 
the domestic sponsoring company for workers who do not leave and withdraw-
ing their right to sponsor future workers. Migration ofﬁcials also undertake 
monitoring, including site visits.
Bilateral labor agreements use the prospect of re-employment the follow-
ing year as an incentive for return for both workers (who receive a slightly 
higher wage next time) and employers (who, knowing they can rehire the same 
workers next year, have an incentive not to allow illegal overstaying).21 Home 
countries also operate initiatives to encourage the return of highly qualiﬁed 
nationals, including speciﬁc incentives (tax exemptions, ﬁnancial assistance 
with removal costs or business seed capital, citizenship rights for spouses and 
children); the creation of more attractive opportunities in the home country, 
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including by encouraging domestic investment in research and development; 
or reintegration assistance for returnees.
Priorities for liberalization
The GATS is a relatively development-friendly agreement, affording a high 
degree of ﬂexibility to WTO Members to determine what kind of market 
opening they will undertake and in what sectors (appendix 5). The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme (DWP) text thus does not specify particular types of market 
opening that members should undertake, but sets out general principles in 
line with the GATS negotiating mandate (box 4.9). However, the attention 
to mode 4 underlines that an outcome on this issue will be essential in the 
negotiations. Against this background, what should the priorities for develop-
ing countries be?
Commitments under mode 4
Mode 4 liberalization faces three main challenges. First, GATS commitments 
are guaranteed minimum treatment, while migration regulators in all countries 
seek to maintain maximum ﬂexibility to respond to changing labor market 
and other circumstances. Second, GATS commitments are on an MFN basis, 
while some countries prefer to maintain special migration arrangements with 
particular countries, especially for low-skilled workers. Third, issues related to 
labor mobility go beyond trade, and there is a real need to identify how each 
can promote the other. This is no easy task: there is a real gap in understanding 
between the trade and migration communities on mode 4; migration ofﬁcials 
often do not see the importance of mode 4, while trade negotiators lack an 
Box 4.9
The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme 
text on services
Source: WTO 2004b.
Offers: Members who have not submitted offers must do so as soon as possible, and 
revised offers should be made by May 2005. Members should strive to ensure a high qual-
ity of offers, particularly in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing 
countries, with special attention to Least Developed Countries.
Liberalization: Members should aim to achieve progressively higher levels of liberalization 
with no a priori exclusion of any service sector or mode of supply and should give special 
attention to sectors and modes of export interest to developing countries. Members note 
the interest of developing countries, as well as other members, in mode 4. 
Rules: Members must intensify their efforts to conclude rules negotiations in accordance 
with the respective mandates and deadlines.
Technical assistance: Targeted technical assistance should be provided to enable devel-
oping countries to participate effectively in the negotiations.
Review: For the purposes of the sixth ministerial meeting, members should review prog-
ress in the negotiations and make a report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, including 
possible recommendations.
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understanding of current migration regimes. Further, migration remains an 
area of unilateral government action, subject to few if any international treaties 
and without a strong culture of negotiation.
These tensions are not easily resolved and a degree of pragmatism might 
be required. Insistence upon binding all current schemes could result in the 
creation of more restrictive conditions in the short term. There is no virtue in 
radical schemes that stand no chance of success: not only will they fail, but 
they could also undermine progress in other areas of negotiation. As with other 
areas of services trade, liberalization on the ground might be more important 
than whether the full extent of this openness is reﬂected in GATS commitments 
at this stage. Crucially, progress on mode 4 will require the early and active 
engagement of migration and labor market regulators; all the issues arising 
from labor mobility cannot be addressed under the GATS, and complemen-
tary policies will need to be developed, and trust built. The GATS negotiations 
are nonetheless an important opportunity to bring labor and migration regula-
tors to the table and to create a sense of urgency about facilitating mobility.
For all these reasons, it makes strategic and political sense to think of mode 
4 liberalization in terms of goals for the longer term and key objectives for this 
Round (box 4.10). 
Longer term goals
In the longer term, WTO Members should agree that foreign employees of 
domestic companies, as well as foreign employees of foreign established (mode 
3) companies, are included under the scope of mode 4. The lack of consensus 
on this point at present (see appendix 5) creates an anomaly whereby foreign-
ers working on contract and those working as employees for the same domes-
tic ﬁrm can be treated differently under trade rules. In addition to limiting 
the potential gains from mode 4 mobility, it is not clear that this distinction 
is enforceable in all jurisdictions. For instance, some WTO Members deem 
almost all types of foreign temporary workers to be employees for the purposes 
of bringing them under domestic labor law. As a practical matter, the distinction 
between employees and contract workers may also be hard for migration ofﬁ-
cials to enforce. Agreement by all WTO Members to include foreign employees 
of domestic companies in mode 4 would open the door for real global gains 
on labor mobility by enabling agreements to be reached on expanded quotas 
of foreign workers. While quotas are not ideal, they are transparent and nego-
tiable. By contrast, economic needs or labor market tests would be abolished. 
The scope of mode 4 should also be broadened beyond service suppliers to 
include workers related to agriculture and manufacturing. The current distinc-
tion is artiﬁcial and in line neither with migration regimes (which generally 
do not distinguish between sectors of employment) nor with the commercial 
reality of ﬁrms providing both goods and services. This is not necessarily unre-
alistic: a number of regional trade agreements contain provisions related to the 
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temporary movement of investors and businesspeople from other sectors (such 
as manufacturing) as well as service suppliers.
An important complementary effort to help build the basis for multilateral 
action over the longer term may be to explore the scope for further bilateral or 
even possibly plurilateral labor agreements in the short to medium term. These 
agreements are more likely to include the sorts of workers not covered by the 
GATS deﬁnition (agricultural workers) or current commitments (low-skilled 
workers in hospitality or construction or health workers). They also provide 
scope for regulatory experimentation to develop the necessary complementary 
policies to address issues related to mobility but not properly the subject of the 
GATS. These include, for example, assistance programs to combat brain drain 
and compensate for loss of investment in education, mechanisms for improved 
remittance transfer, incentives and cooperative mechanisms to ensure return, 
Box 4.10
The way ahead 
on mode 4
In the Doha Round, WTO Members should seek to:
• Expand the range of commitments for ﬁrms as contractual service suppliers (sub-
contractors), including the expansion of opportunities for lower skilled labor. 
• Improve access for intracorporate transferees, including for categories beyond 
managers, executives, and specialists, and remove preemployment requirements.
• Improve the clarity and usability of commitments by developing common deﬁnitions 
of key categories; improve the transparency of economic needs tests; specify dura-
tions of stay in commitments and extend the period for contractual service suppli-
ers; and encourage adoption of a GATS visa or improvement to existing relevant 
visa regimes.
• Improve transparency through single windows or specialized enquiry points in 
migration authorities, notiﬁcations of all information necessary to give practical 
effect to commitments, and additional commitments on prior consultation on rel-
evant regulations. 
• Separate short-run social programs (health) and long-run social protection for tem-
porary foreign workers and refund contributions upon departure. 
• Use GATS Article VI.6 to gain information on the procedures for recognition of their 
professionals in key trading partners and to push for improvements.
In the longer term (beyond the Doha Round), WTO Members should:
• Agree that GATS mode 4 covers foreign employees of domestic as well as foreign 
established ﬁrms.
• Abolish economic needs tests.
• Expand mode 4 beyond service suppliers to include temporary workers related to 
agriculture and manufacturing. 
As an interim step, WTO Members could enter into bilateral or plurilateral agreements. 
These could cover a broader range of workers and provide scope to develop complemen-
tary policies, such as those related to brain drain, remittance transfers, return, and rec-
ognition. Over time, recruitment of workers under these schemes could be opened on an 
MFN basis to any country that could meet the requirements and implement the other side 
of the agreement. Agreements would be notiﬁed to the WTO, and interested WTO Mem-
bers would have the opportunity to indicate their interest in joining or negotiating similar 
agreements. An MFN waiver would likely be necessary.
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and incentives and mechanisms to promote recognition of qualiﬁcations in 
particular areas. They may also enable equitable solutions to be found for the 
movement of shortage workers. For example, agreements covering nurses could 
involve the host country contributing to the cost of training nurses in the home 
country, with a certain percentage of nursing graduates receiving ﬁxed-term 
visas to work in the host country.22 
The most successful schemes to date (such as the APEC Business Travel 
Cards) have combined national sovereignty with cooperation and capacity 
building. Over time, a more multilateral approach could be encouraged—
for instance, by encouraging the extension of successful agreements to more 
countries and by opening recruitment of workers under these schemes on an 
MFN basis to any country that could meet the requirements and implement 
the other side of the agreement. In a sense, this approach mirrors that taken 
to recognition of qualiﬁcations under the GATS—acknowledging that it will 
most likely happen bilaterally or plurilaterally at this stage, but requiring the 
opportunity to be given to all other WTO Members to prove they can meet 
the same nondiscriminatory standards. As for recognition agreements, these 
agreements could be notiﬁed to the WTO to promote transparency and give 
interested WTO Members the opportunity to indicate their interest in nego-
tiating similar agreements. An MFN waiver for agreements covering certain 
types of workers would be necessary. 
This approach would both help spur domestic reform and promote the devel-
opment of strategic policies related to mobility in both developed and develop-
ing countries. It also permits a broader approach to be taken than that permit-
ted by the scope of the GATS to ensure that mobility beneﬁts development. 
Key objectives for the Doha Round
These priorities for liberalization suggest several key objectives for the Doha 
Round.
Improving the scope of commitments. 
• Contractual service suppliers. Negotiating effort should be directed 
toward improving access for contractual service suppliers not tied to 
investment. These include not simply individuals, but also compa-
nies (subcontracting). Subcontracting could offer substantial eco-
nomic beneﬁts to developing country exporters because it offers access 
for small- and medium-size enterprises that may not be able to invest 
abroad as well as the greatest chance of extending mode 4 to lower 
skilled workers. With well deﬁned parties on both sides of the transac-
tion—incorporated ﬁrms—enforcement of conditions for mobility is 
much easier than for individual workers. Subcontracting thus responds 
to developed countries’ concerns about ensuring the return of tempo-
rary workers. For greatest beneﬁt, developing countries should seek 
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removal of requirements for prior employment with the subcontracting 
ﬁrm. These requirements are intended to ensure that the workers are 
genuinely attached to a well deﬁned undertaking to which they can 
return and which can guarantee their return after the completion of 
the project. However, preemployment can be a burden for ﬁrms set up 
largely for the purpose of exporting, as it involves periods of low or zero 
productivity at home. On the downside, subcontracting is not appropri-
ate for many service transactions, and being restricted to incorporated 
ﬁrms, limits the potential set of services providers. Further, the subcon-
tracting ﬁrm has to be approved by the host authorities. 
• Intracorporate transferees. Developing countries might also have inter-
ests in improving conditions for intracorporate transferees—and not 
simply to create a broader alliance for mode 4 (important though that 
is). Some developing countries are already establishing subsidiaries in 
developed countries and using intracompany transfer schemes. Scope 
exists for others to make greater use of this, including joint ventures in 
the context of mode 3 liberalization. Further, many nationals of devel-
oping countries are employed by multinational companies, and their 
home countries reap some beneﬁts from better intracorporate mobility 
(technology transfer, remittances, building awareness of the skills in the 
home country of the workers). Beneﬁts for developing countries would 
increase were the scope of intracompany transferees to be broadened 
beyond managers, executives, and specialists, to trainees and a wider 
range of skill groups. Preemployment requirements for intracorporate 
transferees should be removed because they restrict the ability of com-
panies to recruit talent globally. 
Improving the usability and clarity of commitments.
• Common deﬁnitions. Without clear deﬁnitions of occupations and related 
skills levels, regulatory authorities have huge discretion in deciding what 
constitutes a specialist (and, presumably, to change the deﬁnition accord-
ing to political or labor market pressures). More uniform deﬁnitions and 
coverage of service personnel categories would help. The existing ILO 
classiﬁcation of occupations could be a good place to start, as could the 
deﬁnitions used in RTAs, which share some common elements (OECD 
2001b). Moves toward common deﬁnitions would also make it easier to 
extend commitments to include middle and lower level professionals. 
• Specify and extend periods of stay. Periods of stay should be speciﬁed in 
commitments and extended in duration, in particular for contractual 
service suppliers (who are often limited to 3–6 months, restricting the 
type of contracts for which they can bid). 
• GATS visa. WTO Members without adequate temporary entry schemes 
could be encouraged to adopt a GATS visa, along the lines of that 
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proposed by India.23 In other cases, it might be more efﬁcient to iden-
tify the existing temporary entry schemes under which most mode 4 
entrants fall and to focus on improving those schemes. More countries 
could join or create facilitation schemes, along the lines of the APEC 
Business Travel Card, which, while more modest in scope, offer some 
beneﬁts and help to build trust between regulators. 
• Economic needs or labor market tests. Developing countries should seek 
removal of labor market tests or—at a minimum—regular notiﬁcations 
on their operation (decisions taken, time frames), along with adherence 
to the existing requirement to specify their criteria in schedules. 
• Transparency. Single windows or specialized enquiry points in migra-
tion authorities should be established to answer queries about mode 4 
access and collect feedback on difﬁculties encountered with the sys-
tem.24 WTO Members should also notify all information necessary to 
give practical effect to commitments (such as relevant visas) in a user-
friendly standard format. Developing countries should also seek addi-
tional commitments from their trading partners to afford them prior 
consultation and the opportunity for comment on regulations relevant 
to mode 4 commitments. 
These measures would have the additional beneﬁt of encouraging dialogue 
between trade and migration authorities. Notiﬁcations could assist mutual 
understanding of mode 4 and help to ensure that practical effect is given to 
commitments. Over time, they could contribute to increased convergence 
between mode 4 and migration categories and terminology. Prior consultation 
would promote awareness of the possible trade impact of migration regulations 
and help to mainstream mode 4 into migration policy.
Other concerns.
• Social security contributions. The inequity of workers contributing to 
schemes from which they do not beneﬁt can be addressed by separating 
short-run social programs (health) and long-run social protection for 
temporary foreign workers. Host governments can legitimately insist on 
contributions to ensure that service providers are fully insured for work-
related accident and health matters. Contributions to long-run social 
protection could be refunded upon departure. Alternatively, employers 
or users of overseas contractors could fund the workers’ social secu-
rity contributions at their home rates (although this may be politically 
controversial as it could accord a further cost advantage to temporary 
foreign workers). 
• Recognition. Given the importance of the regulatory objectives at stake, 
and the need for incentives to embark on long and complex recogni-
tion negotiations, recognition agreements cannot be made to happen. 
A more feasible path in the short term is to use the existing GATS 
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obligation (Article VI.6) that, where they make commitments on pro-
fessional services, Members provide for adequate procedures to verify 
the competence of professionals from any other WTO Member. On 
the basis of this obligation, developing countries should use the nego-
tiations to gain information on the procedures for recognition of their 
professionals in key trading partners and to push for improvements. 
Locking in market access for outsourcing
This trade is currently largely market-driven and free of restrictions, and this 
desirable state of affairs should be locked in through the GATS. Two problems 
arise in this regard. First, the range of services covered by outsourcing is poorly 
covered in the GATS classiﬁcation and second, there is no agreement among 
WTO Members about whether electronic supply should be covered by mode 1 
or 2. Neither of these problems is likely to be solved in the short term. 
In the interim, developing countries should seek to agree with trading part-
ners on the widest possible deﬁnitions of categories of relevant services (such as 
data processing services), perhaps using formulas along the lines of “and any 
closely related services that may be developed.” Another approach could be to 
seek commitments from trading partners that all future services that might be 
developed under current classiﬁcation headings would automatically be included 
in the scope of a commitment (Mattoo and Wunsch 2004).25 However, this 
ambitious approach is likely to be met with requests for similar treatment by 
developing countries in other sectors. To address the problem of modes, devel-
oping countries should seek commitments in both modes 1 and 2 in this Round 
(the latter are already reasonably liberal) (Mattoo and Wunsch 2004). 
Given that some WTO Members are introducing measures to prevent out-
sourcing in government procurement, developing countries might also want to 
consider their position on future coverage of government procurement in the 
GATS (appendix 6). 
Commitments under mode 3
Developing countries have a lot to gain from making mode 3 commitments. 
Infrastructure services (telecommunications, ﬁnancial, energy, and transport) 
should be the priority—they promise the greatest downstream beneﬁts for the 
domestic economy; they function as inputs for other services whose successful 
liberalization may depend on the prior liberalization of the input services 
(Hodge 2002); and they tend to be subject to relatively high barriers in devel-
oping countries. Mode 3 imports can form the basis for exports in professional, 
ﬁnancial, and education services (including mode 4 exports). They also offer 
opportunities for other developing countries, which are increasingly providers 
of FDI, in particular at the regional level.
While promising the most gains, liberalization of infrastructure ser-
vices can pose regulatory challenges. Developing countries should condition 
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liberalization on the existence of appropriate safety nets and regulatory inter-
vention to ensure that reforms will be beneﬁcial. Precommitments (commit-
ments to liberalize at a certain future date) could link market opening to the 
provision of assistance for the development of adequate regulatory frameworks, 
along with the institutions and trained personnel required to implement them. 
Developing countries would undertake an assessment of their regulatory needs 
and the resources required, and time frames for liberalization would be estab-
lished on this basis—rather than arbitrarily in negotiation (Mattoo 2003). 
Developed countries would have an incentive to provide the required assis-
tance in order to beneﬁt from the expected market access. This explicit link 
between commitments and building of the regulatory capacity is a practical 
example of operational special and differential treatment used to encourage 
and support liberalization. 
Focus on the rules negotiations
The GATS is an unﬁnished agreement, with rules in important areas—govern-
ment procurement, domestic regulation, safeguards, and subsidies—still being 
developed (appendix 6). While complex, and not necessarily likely to be ﬁnal-
ized in the short term, the rules will determine the future shape of the agree-
ment. Market access negotiations will come and go—the GATS mandates pro-
gressive liberalization through successive rounds of negotiations—but the rules 
framework, once agreed, is almost permanent (changing rules in the WTO is 
very difﬁcult). Rules could have important impacts on countries’ choices in 
domestic reform, as well as in ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of market 
access. Participation in the rules negotiations can also assist developing coun-
tries in learning about their own system for regulating services and in thinking 
about the sorts of instruments they use in terms of GATS disciplines. 
Understanding and identifying their interests in the rules negotiations 
should perhaps be the priority for the poorest developing countries in the cur-
rent Round. Even if these countries were to be largely excluded from additional 
obligations at this stage, they still have a longer term interest in shaping the 
agreement and a shorter term interest in using the rules to address problems 
encountered by their exporters in the markets of other WTO Members on 
whom such obligations fall. In both the short and the long term, the nature of 
the rules will matter for the poorest developing countries. 
By contrast, participation in the complex GATS market access negotia-
tions is a major resource challenge for these countries and may not represent 
the best investment of scarce negotiating resources at this stage. Many of the 
market access interests of the poorest developing countries may be covered by 
requests from other better resourced (including other developing) countries, 
so free-riding is an option.26 GATS commitments also need to be entered 
into carefully, and governmental coordination and regulatory resources in the 
poorest developing countries may be insufﬁcient to ensure a well informed 
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negotiating position. Limited governmental resources may also imply a need 
for scope for regulatory creativity. 
But the fact that negotiating GATS commitments may not be a prior-
ity does not mean that services liberalization is not important for the poorest 
developing countries. As part of an overall process of domestic reform, lib-
eralization can provide the poorest developing countries with access to basic 
services (telecommunications, energy), leaving scarce government resources to 
focus on other priorities (basic education). Liberalization efforts should con-
tinue, regardless of the GATS commitments. 27
Benchmarks and reviews
One option is to establish benchmarks and formulas to increase the level of 
bound commitments. The simplest benchmark would be to deﬁne a percentage 
of services sectors to be covered by bound commitments or the number of sectors 
subject to full market opening. However, use of such benchmarks could under-
mine efforts to encourage countries to base liberalization decisions on a sound 
assessment of their priority sectors and regulatory readiness. It may encourage 
liberalization of sectors that are politically easiest, rather than those promising 
the greatest beneﬁts. A quantitative benchmark may also be more burdensome 
for developing countries (which have generally made fewer commitments), with-
out guaranteeing additional commitments in areas of interest to them. 
A different approach might be to encourage Members to bind the status 
quo wherever possible, in particular in areas where the current market condi-
tions represent well established reforms. The main aim would be to encourage 
Members to reduce the margin between their actual level of market open-
ing and their GATS commitments. This would increase the predictability 
and transparency of policy, as well as the credibility of GATS commitments. 
Equally, where countries have undertaken more ambitious liberalization in the 
context of RTAs, they should be encouraged to multilateralize these commit-
ments to the extent possible to narrow the gap between preferential and MFN 
access.
Further, a review could be undertaken prior to the conclusion of the nego-
tiations to assess the extent to which the obligation in Article IV to make com-
mitments in sectors and modes of interest to developing countries has been 
met. This process could build upon the report due to be made to the Sixth 
Ministerial Conference (see box 4.9). 
Environmental services
Paragraph 31 of the Doha Work Programme mandates negotiations on 
the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of barriers to environmental ser-
vices (see box 1.5). There are certainly gains for developing countries from 
liberalization of these services. Globally, 2.4 billion people lack access to basic 
sanitation and 1.2 billion to safe drinking water. More than 90 percent of 
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sewage overall in developing countries is discharged directly into rivers, lakes, 
and coastal waters without any treatment and about half of the urban popula-
tion lacks adequate waste disposal. When they do exist, sewage systems and 
garbage collection services may cover only rich residential areas. Air pollution, 
which causes premature deaths and chronic illness, has also been a steadily 
growing problem in developing countries (Zarilli 2003). Increased trade and 
investment in environmental services could provide countries with greater 
access to these services, beneﬁting the poor and the environment. Further, 
the presence of foreign suppliers (mode 3 trade) creates opportunities for tech-
nology transfer, both in terms of environmental management education and 
training and skills transfers and in terms of making available a larger choice of 
environmental technologies, which can promote a greater focus on preventive 
solutions (OECD 2001c).
However, there are also a number of reasons for caution, particularly with 
regard to making fast track commitments binding under the GATS. 
First, while the potential beneﬁts of liberalization of environmental services 
may be large, they depend crucially on the quality of the underlying regulatory 
framework. Having the right frameworks in place requires resources that may 
not be easily available in developing countries. This is all the more true because 
liberalizing environmental services will generally require the government to 
move from being the provider to being the regulator. This poses many chal-
lenges, including how to ensure appropriate competition or other disciplines on 
suppliers in view of the market structure (some environmental services, such 
as water distribution, may be natural monopolies and competition is largely 
for, rather than within, the market); increased access by the poor; ﬂexibility to 
change arrangements as circumstances change; adjustment measures for ﬁrms 
that previously provided the services in poor areas; and adequate transparency 
and consumer input into service provision. An additional and most important 
requirement is that regulations on environmental services ensure that suppliers 
respect sustainable resource use, including through appropriate arrangements 
for public control over water resources, and that high standards of water qual-
ity are maintained. This can be a challenge, as strong regulatory oversight 
equipped to conduct sophisticated testing can be required (although it should 
be recalled that regulatory failures in this regard also occur in cases of gov-
ernment provision, due to conﬂicts of interest where the government is both 
provider and regulator). 
Given these challenges, it is not surprising that considerable regulatory 
experimentation is still under way and that many countries have taken a grad-
ual approach to liberalization of environmental services (the private sector 
currently supplies water services to about 5 percent of the world’s population, 
3 percent in developing countries). Making binding the GATS commitments 
on environmental services too early would limit the scope for governments to 
change course and reverse failed policies. 
122 Part 1 Market access agenda
Second, there are a number of legal questions regarding the coverage of 
certain forms of trade in environmental services under the GATS. The GATS 
excludes services “in the exercise of governmental authority,” deﬁned as 
services supplied “neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one 
or more service suppliers.” This deﬁnition is seen as being rather imprecise, 
and a number of WTO Members have further speciﬁed in their schedules the 
types of services they see as falling under the scope of their commitment.28 At 
present, government procurement of services is also excluded from the scope 
of commitments. However, there is no agreement among WTO Members on 
the status of the types of public-private partnerships commonly involved in 
liberalization of environmental services, such as build-operate-transfer con-
tracts29 and concessions, and the form that these arrangements take can also 
vary considerably among Members. There is also confusion about what cer-
tain types of market access commitments may mean for some environmental 
services. 
Third, as for environmental goods, there is no agreement on what exactly is 
covered by “environmental services.” The existing GATS classiﬁcation is seen 
as narrow and out of date, and several WTO Members have suggested alter-
native deﬁnitions. Some of these propose an approach that identiﬁes “core” 
environmental services and a “cluster” or “checklist” of other services that are 
not environmental, but that are nevertheless important to the provision of 
environmental services, for instance because they have environmental end uses 
(such as engineering or research and development). Lists for analytical purposes 
have been developed by the OECD and Eurostat30 and by UNCTAD.31
Box 4.11
Other key points 
on services
• To preserve the liberal conditions for outsourcing, developing countries should seek 
commitments under both modes 1 and 2, and explore ways to give the broadest pos-
sible deﬁnitions of the relevant services so that rapidly developing new services are 
covered.
• Developing countries should make commitments in mode 3, in particular for infrastruc-
ture services, and should use precommitments to condition mode 3 market open-
ing on the provision of adequate assistance to establish the necessary regulatory 
framework.
• All Members should accord priority to the rules negotiations, which will determine the 
future shape of the agreement.
• For the poorest developing countries, the rules negotiations should be the highest 
negotiating priority, with liberalization pursued unilaterally and not necessarily trans-
lated into GATS commitments at this stage.
• As a benchmark, Members should aim to reduce the margin between WTO Members’ 
actual level of market opening and their GATS commitments. A review of the negotia-
tions should be held to assess the extent to which Article IV has been honored. 
• Given the complexities and uncertainties that surround them, it is inadvisable for envi-
ronmental services to be singled out for fast-track GATS commitments.
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In sum, given the above complexities and uncertainties—and the impor-
tance of other infrastructure services—it is inadvisable for environmental ser-
vices to be singled out for fast-track GATS commitments. Each WTO Mem-
ber should assess for itself whether liberalization of these services serves its 
development interests more than liberalization of other services and what sort 
of regulatory ﬂexibility it requires. 
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Nonagricultural merchandise trade
As wtih services, but again in sharp contrast to agriculture, signiﬁcant uni-
lateral liberalization of merchandise trade has been undertaken over the last 
two decades. Developing countries have reduced their applied tariffs either 
autonomously or as part of IMF or World Bank structural adjustment pro-
grams. However, they have been less active in multilateral and reciprocal liber-
alization: much of their unilateral liberalization is not reﬂected in lower tariffs 
bound under the WTO.
The opportunity thus exists to make real progress in the Doha negotiations 
simply by increasing tariff bindings in the WTO, including at levels at or close 
to applied rates.1 The value of binding tariffs is clear: it provides a guarantee to 
traders that the tariff will not be raised above a given, transparent level—or at 
least that compensation would be payable were that level to be breached. Given 
the relative ease of raising tariffs (as compared, for example, with changing the 
conditions applying to foreign-established companies under GATS mode 3), 
the certainty provided by bindings has real commercial value.
Further, while substantial liberalization has been undertaken, signiﬁcant 
protection also persists, particularly on products of export interest to develop-
ing countries. The ability of developing countries to move up the export value 
chain is hampered by the fact that tariffs on some products increase with the 
level of processing. This protection is not only a feature of developed country 
markets: developing countries also maintain high barriers against each other’s 
exports, and against the exports of LDCs, for whom they are important poten-
tial markets.
The key questions in the negotiations on nonagricultural market access to 
date have been who should liberalize, in which sectors, and by how much? These 
may seem odd questions, given that tariff protection is demonstrably a cost to 
the domestic economy of the protecting country, with reductions beneﬁting 
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domestic consumers—and the poorest among them most (chapter 2). How-
ever, in the mercantilist world of trade negotiations, countries seek to be “paid” 
for reducing and binding tariffs, to trade these “concessions” for outcomes in 
other parts of the agenda. In the context of the Doha Round, binding tariff 
reductions on nonagricultural market access is likely to be an important part of 
the price for further agricultural liberalization. That is, in addition to being in 
WTO Members’ own self-interest, reducing and binding tariffs on nonagricul-
tural market access are likely to play a key role in the overall Doha deal.
While beneﬁcial in the longer term, tariff reductions can impose adjust-
ment costs on developing countries, including in terms of lost government 
revenue, with the poorest developing countries facing particular problems in 
bearing these costs. As for other sectors, liberalization will need to be under-
pinned by appropriate complementary policies and supported by international 
assistance.
Current levels of protection
The Uruguay Round witnessed some moves toward bound tariffs by develop-
ing countries. The share of developing country imports subject to tariff bind-
ings rose from 13 percent to 61 percent (Blackhurst, Francois, and Enders 
1996), mainly because of commitments by Latin American countries to bind 
100 percent of their tariff lines and commitments by some Asian countries to 
bind signiﬁcant proportions of their tariff lines. (Indonesia bound more than 
90 percent of its tariff lines; India, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, the 
Republic of Korea, and Thailand between 70 percent and 89 percent.) How-
ever, other developing countries (such as Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe) bound 
fewer than 15 percent of their tariff lines. There remains thus a sharp contrast 
with the major developed countries: the EU and U.S. have bound virtually all 
of their tariff lines; Japan has left around 7 percent of lines unbound in wood, 
pulp, paper, and furniture and almost 13 percent unbound in ﬁsh and ﬁsh 
products (Francois and Martin 2002).
However, the number of bound tariff lines is not a perfect measure of the 
effective level of liberalization of the domestic economy. In a number of cases, 
bindings have been imposed on goods not produced by the country—hence with 
a limited impact on domestic producers. Or they have not been taken on tariff 
lines with high trade volumes. Many developing countries (Cameroon, Chad, 
Gabon, India, Macao (China), Malaysia, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Zimbabwe) have actually left more than 60 percent 
of trade unbound for most product categories (Francois and Martin 2002). 
Additionally, there remain—often considerable—gaps between the bound 
and applied rates, creating uncertainty for traders and trading partners (table 
5.1). The gap is particularly high in LDCs, where the difference between 
applied and bound rates expressed as a percentage of applied rates is around 
290 percent. The ﬁgure is also high for low- and middle-income countries 
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(around 175 percent), in particular those in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(275 percent). Given that many tariff lines are not even bound in develop-
ing countries, these ﬁgures can underestimate the actual level of uncertainty 
generated in the market. For developed countries, the gap is small in absolute 
terms (4.7 percent), but is also high (more than 120 percent) as a percentage of 
applied rates (OECD 2004c). 
Tariff peaks
Tariff averages give a very incomplete story. Developed countries often have 
relatively low average tariffs, but this hides the fact that they keep very high 
tariffs (often called tariff peaks) on certain products, particularly on those of 
key export interest to developing countries. For example, simple average bound 
tariffs on textiles and clothing, leather, rubber, footwear and travel goods, 
transport equipment, and ﬁsh and ﬁsh products are higher than those on other 
industrial products (Bacchetta and Bora 2001). In terms of applied tariffs, 
textiles and clothing have the highest or second-highest applied tariff aver-
ages of all nonagricultural goods in most countries and the highest instance of 
international tariff peaks (tariffs over 15 percent) (WTO 2003d). 
Within the Quad (Canada, EU, Japan, U.S.) tariff peaks (tariffs of more 
than 15 percent) are found on 6 percent to 14 percent of total tariff lines (IMF 
and World Bank 2002), though these ﬁgures include agricultural products, 
and there are important differences in the proportions of peaks in nonagricul-
tural products among Quad countries. While the majority of tariff peaks in 
the U.S. (85.7 percent of all peaks) and Canada (88.4 percent of all peaks) are 
found in industrials, this is not the case for Japan (23.6 percent of all peaks) 
or the EU (8.5 percent of all peaks), where peaks are heavily concentrated in 
agriculture (ﬁgures adapted from Olarreaga and Ng 2002).
The concentration of these tariff peaks in areas of export interest to devel-
oping countries means that the average OECD tariff on imports from develop-
ing countries is four times higher than that on imports originating from within 
the OECD (Laird 2002). In more concrete terms, this means that Bangladesh’s 
Table 5.1
Simple average tariffs
Percent
Source: OECD 2004c.
Reporting group Bound rate Applied rate
Absolute 
difference
Difference as 
proportion of 
applied rate
Developed countries   8.5   3.8   4.7 124.1
Low- and middle-income countries 30.7 11.1 19.6 176.4
East Asia and Paciﬁc 28.8 13.5 15.3 113.6
Europe 10.2   7.0   3.2   45.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 39.1 10.4 28.7 275.2
Middle East and North Africa 34.0 21.3 12.7   59.6
South Asia 33.7 18.8 14.9   79.5
Least Developed Countries 51.5 13.2 38.4 291.0
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$2.4 billion a year in exports to the U.S. attract duties amounting to $331 mil-
lion—around the same amount of duties ($330 million) collected on French 
exports to the U.S., valued at $30 billion a year. Likewise, Cambodia’s exports 
to the U.S. face $152 million in duties, while Norway’s face just $24 million, 
even though Norway’s exports are ﬁve times higher (Gresser 2002). Export-
ers of cotton T-shirts from China to the U.S. face tariff and nontariff barriers 
amounting to more than 350 percent of their net returns—20 times the rate 
applying to exports from industrial countries. 
But the story is not all one way. Despite steady progress in bringing down 
tariffs over the last 15 years, protection on nonagricultural goods in middle- 
and low-income countries is still just under three times that imposed by rich 
countries—on average 11.1 percent (see table 5.1).2 The LDCs maintain even 
higher average tariffs on manufacturing imports—13.2 percent. Tariff peaks 
are also common in developing country tariff schedules—Bangladesh, Costa 
Rica, Egypt, India, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe 
(among others) have tariffs above 100 percent for some products. These peaks 
adversely affect trade among developing countries: by some estimates, barriers 
in other developing countries could actually account for more than 70 percent 
of the tariffs levied on developing country industrial exports (Hertel and Mar-
tin 2000). 
Further, developing countries and LDCs impose higher tariffs on each 
other’s imports than those imposed by developed countries (table 5.2). On a 
regional basis, tariffs are particularly high in South Asian countries, the Mid-
dle East and North Africa, and—to a lesser extent—in Latin America in the 
Caribbean. Exports from low- and middle-income countries and LDCs face on 
average the highest tariffs in all markets, with those from South Asia and East 
Asia and the Paciﬁc facing the highest protection. It should be noted that these 
are most favored nation (MFN) rates, and preferential access to products from 
LDCs granted by developed countries are not accounted for in these ﬁgures. 
Generally, there is a tendency for LDCs’ exports to face higher tariffs in devel-
oping country markets than in developed country markets (UNCTAD 2004b). 
It should also be noted that low trade values, themselves a result of restrictive 
trade policies, also generate low weights in trade-weighted tariff ﬁgures.
Tariff escalation
The tariff structures of both developed and developing countries also show sig-
niﬁcant tariff escalation (the more processed the product, the higher the tariff), 
resulting in more restricted market access for more processed products embody-
ing greater value added. The average post–Uruguay Round tariff for all indus-
trial products is six times higher for ﬁnished products (at 4.8 percent), than for 
raw materials, for which the average tariff for all industrial products is 0.8 per-
cent (bearing in mind that these are average ﬁgures for all industrial products 
and that tariffs for individual products can be much higher) (OECD 2001a). 
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Tariff escalation is most prevalent in textiles and clothing, leather and 
leather products, rubber products, wood, pulp, paper, furniture, and metals—
all important developing country exports. For instance, the MFN tariff for 
prepared or preserved ﬁsh is around twice that for ﬁsh ﬁllets or other ﬁsh meat 
in the EU (18.4 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively) and Japan (9.2 percent 
and 4.4 percent, respectively), with even greater differences—albeit on lower 
tariffs—in the U.S. (5.2 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively) and Canada 
(which applies a 5.4 percent tariff to prepared or preserved ﬁsh but allows ﬁsh 
ﬁllets and other ﬁsh meat to enter duty-free).3 
A similar pattern holds for agriculture, where processed foods exported by 
developing countries are particular victims of tariff escalation. For instance, 
fully processed manufactured food products face tariffs twice as large as prod-
ucts in the ﬁrst stage of processing in the EU and Japan, with ﬁnal goods con-
fronting an average MFN tariff of 24 percent and 65 percent, respectively. In 
Canada the ratio is even higher: at 42 percent, tariffs on fully processed food 
products are 12 times higher than for ﬁrst-stage processed products (Hoekman, 
Ng, and Olarreaga 2002). Likewise, Chilean fresh tomatoes enter the U.S. with 
a 2.8 percent tariff rate, while dried and packaged tomatoes attract a tariff of 8.9 
percent, and salsa and ketchup are subject to an 11.6 percent tariff rate.
The consequences for developing countries trying to move up the value 
chain are clear. For instance, the EU tariff on cocoa beans is 0.5 percent, while 
the tariff on cocoa paste (semiprocessed) is 9.6 percent and the tariff on choco-
late can be up to 25 percent. That is part of the story of why 90 percent of the 
world’s cocoa beans are grown in developing countries, while these countries 
Table 5.2
Trade-weighted 
averages of most 
favored nation applied 
rates on industrial 
products, 2002
Percent
Source: OECD 2004c.
Country source of imports
Low- and middle-income countries
Reporting 
group
Developed 
countries
Least 
Developed 
Countries All
East Asia 
and the 
Paciﬁc Europe
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa
South 
Asia
Developed 
countries 2.2 9.8 3.7 3.5 3.1 4.0 1.9 6.4
Least 
Developed 
Countries 10.8 8.8 14.0 17.5 7.5 8.6 8.7 18.7
Low- and 
middle-income 
countries 11.0 7.6 8.9 10.5 6.4 10.4 6.4 11.4
East Asia and 
the Paciﬁc 9.6 5.4 7.5 8.9 6.2 5.1 6.7 9.0
Europe 7.1 6.5 5.2 6.6 5.2 4.4 1.0 6.9
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 12.8 10.0 11.1 12.8 7.6 11.5 2.8 13.0
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 20.9 18.9 20.6 25.9 24.1 21.0 14.7 19.9
South Asia 24.3 22.0 20.9 19.7 26.7 16.7 17.4 17.8
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account for only 44 percent of cocoa liquor, 29 percent of cocoa powder, and 4 
percent of global production of chocolate—and Germany is the world’s largest 
exporter of processed cocoa (IMF and World Bank 2002; International Cocoa 
Organization cited in UNCTAD 2003c).4
Textiles and clothing
The most pernicious protection has, however, been reserved for the sector in 
which developing countries arguably enjoy the greatest comparative advan-
tage: clothing and, to a lesser extent, textiles. (Some textiles are highly capital-
intensive, hence developed countries may have a comparative advantage in 
their production.) Trade in textiles and clothing accounts for around 8 percent 
of overall world trade in manufactured goods (around $370 billion in world 
exports), but it is enormously important to developing countries. It represents 
more than a quarter of total merchandise exports for 10 developing countries 
and more than 50 percent for 6 countries: for Bangladesh and Cambodia trade 
in textiles and clothing is more than 80 percent of their merchandise exports; 
for Pakistan it is more than 70 percent; for India and China the ﬁgure is around 
20–30 percent (IMF and World Bank 2002).
While the use of quantitative restrictions (quotas) is generally prohibited 
by the GATT/WTO, trade in textiles and clothing has been subject to quotas 
for more than 50 years, under various derogations from GATT rules. The last 
of these were the successive versions of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), 
which essentially embodied a system of bilateral quotas negotiated between 
textile importing and exporting countries. By 1994 the MFA consisted of 4 
developed country importing members (Canada, EU, Norway, and U.S.) and 
30 developing countries, and covered 1,325 bilateral quotas.5
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was 
designed to progressively phase out these MFA quotas and integrate the sector 
into the GATT (bring it under GATT rules) by January 1, 2005.6 The ATC 
was seen as one of the main gains for developing countries from the Uruguay 
Round, a key part of the “grand bargain” under which developed countries 
would liberalize in agriculture and textiles, in exchange for services liberaliza-
tion and intellectual property protection by developing countries. However, as 
with agriculture, the promised gains in textiles have been slow to materialize, 
though gains should greatly accelerate by January 1, 2005 (box 5.1). 
Implementation of the ATC will greatly advance the liberalization of 
global trade in textiles and clothing. However, it will not solve all problems: 
the ATC removes quotas, but not tariffs. The average tariff on textiles and 
clothing in developed countries is 12 percent (9 percent in the EU, Canada, 
U.S., and Japan only), compared with an average of 3.8 percent (4.4 percent for 
the Quad countries) for all nonagricultural products. Tariff peaks (of up to 30 
percent or 40 percent) and escalation (tariffs on clothing remain higher than 
those on textiles) remain common. Developing countries also maintain tariff 
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peaks, burdening an important form of intra–developing country trade in the 
context of global production chains—around half of textiles exports and 20 
percent of clothing exports go to other developing countries (IMF and World 
Bank 2002). Use of antidumping and safeguard actions have also severely 
affected trade (chapter 6).
The losses from such a persistent and high protection are large. The com-
bined income effect for developing countries of tariffs and quotas on their 
textiles and clothing exports is estimated at around $24 billion a year, and the 
export revenue loss at $40 billion (IMF and World Bank 2002). Tariff and 
quota restrictions combined may also result in as many as 27 million jobs for-
gone in developing countries. On average, each job saved in developed coun-
tries by protection is estimated to cost 35 jobs in developing countries (IMF 
Box 5.1
The Uruguay 
Round Agreement 
on Textiles 
and Clothing
 
Sources: IMF and World 
Bank 2002; Malaga and 
Mohanty 2003; Oxfam 
International 2004a; 
World Bank 2003a; 
Kyvik Nordås 2004. 
The ATC establishes three stages for the phase-out of MFA quotas: 1995–97; 1998–2001; 
and 2002–04, under which importing countries are to integrate 16 percent, 17 percent, 
and 18 percent of 1990 import volumes, respectively. While this schedule is heavily back-
loaded (leaving 49 percent of imports to be integrated on January 1, 2005), the ATC was 
nonetheless expected to greatly expand trade during its implementation.
This has not happened because the list of products used in the ATC covered those 
subject to restriction in any agreement in any one country. As this list was the basis for 
reductions, it artiﬁcially inﬂated the starting point for liberalization. Out of the original 
1,325 quotas, only 219 had been eliminated by 2002, with 1,106 (83 percent) left to be 
removed in January 2005. Norway abolished its quotas early, but the numbers of remain-
ing quotas still to be abolished by Canada, the EU, and the U.S. are high. On January 1, 
2005, the U.S. must abolish 701 quotas (out of an original 758 quotas), the EU must 
abolish 167 quotas (out of an original 218 quotas), and Canada must remove 239 quotas 
(out of an original 295 quotas). 
Even the limited number of quotas removed were, by and large, not commercially 
meaningful—in clothing, the main interest of developing countries, only 6–7 percent of 
quotas were removed. Canada, the EU, and the U.S. on average integrated 31 percent low-
value products and less than 3 percent high-value products. While this fulﬁlls the target 
established in the ATC of 33 percent of imports by volume, it leaves around 80 percent of 
import value still to be freed from quotas.
Given the extent of this backloading, and thus the size of the adjustment required by 
January 1, 2005, there are reasonable doubts about whether the commitments in the ATC 
will be honored. Calls for continuing protection are also emerging from those likely to lose 
from quota removal. Implementation of the ATC is also likely to bring increased pressure in 
importing countries for the maintenance of high tariffs on textiles and clothing and for the 
increased use of contingent protection, such as antidumping and safeguard measures.
Experience with the ATC has inﬂuenced the caution with which some developing coun-
tries approach the Doha negotiations. It has engendered distrust for the ﬁne print, and 
underlined the need for implementation deadlines to be considered carefully—leading 
some to argue that it was a mistake not to make the deadlines for TRIPS (2000 for devel-
oping countries) and the ATC (2005) the same, as considerable potential leverage was 
lost. Failure to honor the ATC would be a serious mistake and would greatly prejudice the 
chances of progress in the Doha Round.
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and World Bank 2002). The poor suffer most on both counts: in developing 
countries textiles jobs are mostly ﬁlled by poor (low-skilled) workers, while in 
rich countries the cost of this protection is borne disproportionately by poor 
consumers (chapter 2).
Beneﬁts of liberalization
The above analysis shows that, contrary to common perception, substantial 
barriers to trade in nonagricultural products are still imposed by developed 
and developing countries alike. There is scope for further liberalization by 
all WTO Members—a 40 percent cut in applied tariffs on manufactures by 
all countries would result in an expansion of global trade of about $380 bil-
lion by 2005 (Hertel and Martin 2000). Trade would create opportunities 
not only for developed countries but also for developing countries, for which 
manufactured exports are increasingly important (developing country exports 
of manufactures grew by 12 percent a year between the mid-1980s and 2000) 
(Oxfam 2002). In particular, removing high tariffs on textiles and clothing 
could beneﬁt people in poverty in both developed and developing countries 
(Oxfam International 2004a) and seems a necessary complement to remov-
ing farm protection—giving to developing countries with limited comparative 
advantages in agriculture alternative opportunities for growth.
Notwithstanding this, many people involved in trade negotiations tend to 
view tariff cuts as concessions, rather than acts of self-interest, and discussion 
has all too often focused on which countries should not have to liberalize.
Developed countries
Developed countries clearly bear a special responsibility to eliminate or consid-
erably lower their tariffs, particularly in areas of export interest to developing 
countries. Developed countries remain major markets for developing countries, 
accounting for 75–80 percent of the total trade of those countries. Likewise, 
the U.S., EU, and Japan alone account for 60 percent of total LDC exports 
(table 5.3). Against this backdrop, the fourfold difference between the average 
OECD tariff on imports from developing countries and that on imports origi-
nating from within the OECD clearly illustrates the scale of action required 
if the beneﬁts of freer trade are to be truly global. Tariff peaks and escalation 
are clearly antidevelopment and are prime candidates for early removal, with 
particular attention to tariff peaks on clothing, as a complement to full imple-
mentation of the ATC. With developing countries now active participants in 
the negotiations, developed countries must be prepared to address the long-
standing discrimination against products of their export interest.
Developing countries
Some have argued that, because most (but certainly not all) remaining high 
tariffs are in developing countries, developed countries will be the primary 
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beneﬁciaries of nonagricultural market access liberalization—further unbal-
ancing the Doha Round—and they conclude that developing countries should 
not participate in nonagricultural market access liberalization. This view 
ignores three points.
First and foremost, the economic reality is that tariff reductions primarily 
beneﬁt the country undertaking them. The costs of protection are paid by the 
domestic economy—by its households, which pay more for goods and services 
they consume, and by its ﬁrms, which pay more for the protected goods they use 
(consume) as inputs. Protection creates a bias against exports by raising the costs 
of inputs; that is, protection on imports reduces the competitiveness of exports. 
It distorts the allocation of resources in the domestic economy, encouraging 
investment in the most protected—not the most potentially efﬁcient—sectors. 
In sum, it creates an unfriendly environment for implementing development 
and poverty reduction strategies. Liberalization works in the converse direction, 
and while estimates of welfare gains vary according to the assumptions used, 
there is general consensus that these gains are signiﬁcant and that developing 
countries capture the largest gains relative to their GDP (OECD 2004c). Most 
of these gains could be achieved with unilateral liberalization. Multilateral 
negotiations are simply a mechanism for countering the political pressure of 
domestic interests enjoying protection by creating equal and opposing pressure 
from exporters who will gain from increased access to other markets.
Second, tariff reductions promise real gains not only to the liberalizing 
country itself, but also to other developing countries. As in the case of farm 
Table 5.3
Merchandise exports 
and imports of Least 
Developed Countries 
by selected country 
grouping, 2003 
 
— Not available.
a. Excludes trade with Lesotho.
Source: UNSD Comtrade 
Database, cited in WTO (2004a).
Imports from Least 
Developed Countries 
($ millions) Share of total (%)
Importers 2002 2003 2002 2003
All reporters (world) 37,794 44,914 100.0 100.0
EU 15 13,057 14,186 34.5 31.6
United States 9,591 11,525 25.4 25.7
China 3,502 6,268 9.3 14.0
Thailand — 2,346 — 5.2
Japan 1,591 1,584 4.2 3.5
India 1,312 — 3.5 —
Korea, Rep. 990 — 2.6 —
Taiwan (China) 870 999 2.3 2.2
Canada 403 771 1.1 1.7
Singapore 547 508 1.4 1.1
Saudi Arabia 445 — 1.2 —
Malaysia 438 361 1.2 0.8
Indonesia 221 293 0.6 0.7
South Africaa 252 238 0.7 0.5
Hong Kong (China) 237 225 0.6 0.5
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liberalization, nearly all analyses of the beneﬁts of removing restraints to trade 
show that most of the gains to developing countries—some 60–80 percent—
result from trade reforms in developing countries themselves. Trade among 
developing countries is growing faster than developed-developing country 
trade and now constitutes 20–25 percent of the total trade.
Liberalization by the more advanced developing countries is not only in 
their own interest, but would beneﬁt the poorest developing countries as well. 
The U.S. and EU remain the major markets for LDC exports, accounting for 
approximately 57 percent of LDC exports—and together North America and 
Western Europe account for 96 percent of LDC clothing exports. However, 
only two other developed countries ﬁgure in the top 10 export markets (Japan 
is the ﬁfth-largest market and Canada the ninth). China is now the third-
largest market, accounting for 14 percent of LDC exports, and other develop-
ing economies in East Asia are also important markets for LDCs. In declining 
order of importance, they are Thailand, India, the Republic of Korea, Tai-
wan (China), Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa, and 
Hong Kong (China) (see table 5.3).7 In 2002 developing countries accounted 
for 34 percent of LDC exports (UNCTAD 2004b). There is a large regional 
variation, however; the share of African LDC exports going to other African 
countries remains around 7–10 percent, while the share of Asian LDC exports 
going to developing Asia was around 41 percent in 2002 (UNCTAD 2004b).
Third, experience has amply shown that nonreciprocal participation in 
negotiations results in unequal outcomes. Clearly, the current pattern of tariff 
peaks in areas of interest to developing countries is related to the lack of devel-
oping country presence in GATT Rounds until the mid-1990s. Liberalization 
by middle-income developing countries would also maximize strategic linkages 
and leverage; these developing countries could link their own liberalization of 
industrials to OECD performance in reducing tariff peaks, including on agri-
culture, and in reducing agricultural support. Leverage could also be important 
in terms of ensuring the full implementation of the ATC by importing countries 
and constraining their use of antidumping and safeguards after 2005. While not 
necessarily the ﬁrst-best strategy in economic terms, a linkage approach may help 
to build support for further reforms in developing countries and to assuage fears 
that governments may be “giving away” one of the few instruments they have to 
counteract to some extent the effects of protectionist policies in the OECD.
The poorest developing countries
What of the poorest developing countries—should they be exempt from tariff 
bindings and cuts altogether? This is not the good idea it seems at a ﬁrst glance. 
The above arguments for developing countries are true for the poorest develop-
ing countries. Were the poorest developing countries not to participate in the 
tariff cutting process, they would lose an opportunity to remove policies that 
constrain their own economic development.
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Tariff cuts can pose particular problems for the poorest developing coun-
tries, however, given their signiﬁcantly more limited capacity to bear adjust-
ment costs. This is discussed more fully in the following section, but two 
approaches might help. First, the poorest developing countries should focus 
their tariff cuts on their very high tariffs, those which create the most costly 
domestic distortions without generating tariff revenues (high tariffs actually 
inhibit imports, while moderate tariffs generate tariff revenue). Second, they 
should bind all their tariffs at a moderate level—hence moving toward a more 
uniform tariff structure that will still be a source of public revenues while 
minimizing the largest economic distortions (box 5.2).
In sum, in the Doha Round the poorest countries should cut their tariff 
peaks (to align them as much as possible with their other tariff rates) and 
reduce the huge gap between their bound and applied tariffs (see table 5.1). In 
other words, the poorest countries will not touch their applied nonpeak tariffs. 
This is a much less demanding effort than that required by current negotia-
tions on regional agreements, which generally insist upon reciprocity from the 
poorest countries. Although much less demanding, this effort will still bring 
most of the economic gains to be expected from liberalization.
Managing adjustment
However, trade-related gains are not without adjustment costs. These costs 
may be larger in developing countries, where unemployment rates may be 
Box 5.2
Development 
beneﬁts of 
uniform tariffs
Sources: Tarr 2002; 
Messerlin 2003.
First, uniform tariffs force domestic ﬁrms to compete on a level playing ﬁeld in the domes-
tic market. No domestic ﬁrm will be able to beneﬁt from higher domestic prices permitted 
by higher trade barriers. As a result, no domestic ﬁrm will unfairly attract the resources 
badly needed by other domestic ﬁrms, which may be more efﬁcient but are less protected. 
Similarly, uniform tariffs do not distort the investment decisions of foreign ﬁrms, as these 
decisions will be made according to a country’s comparative advantages, and not its tariff 
regime. By ensuring a continuous reallocation of resources in accordance with the evolv-
ing comparative advantages of the country, uniform tariffs serve long-term growth. 
Second, uniform tariffs narrow the gap (often very high in the poorest developing coun-
tries) between bound and applied tariffs, a signiﬁcant source of uncertainty (and ensuing 
chill effects) in trade, including between developing countries. Uniform tariffs also help to 
force the conversion of remaining speciﬁc tariffs (tariffs set at a certain percentage per 
unit of quantity) into ad valorem equivalents. Speciﬁc tariffs tend to discriminate against 
developing countries that tend to have lower unit value exports, and their protectionist 
effect is further exacerbated when prices are low.
Third, uniform tariffs offer a range of governance beneﬁts. They make it easier for 
governments to take on vested interests; they reduce the tax-evasion and anti-export 
biases usually generated by highly differentiated tariffs; and they eliminate the causes of 
fraud and smuggling, which are inevitably triggered by such differentiated tariffs. Further, 
they can serve as a ﬁrst step toward the creation of a modern and manageable regime of 
domestic indirect taxation based on a uniform rate (such as a uniform value-added tax).
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higher and where safety nets and risk markets are weaker (Stiglitz and Charl-
ton 2004). But allowing developing countries to retain protection indeﬁnitely 
is not the solution; adjustment may be costly in the short term, but protection 
is even more costly over the longer term. Developing countries are better off 
moving to a policy of lower bound tariffs combined with appropriate com-
plementary policies—in macroeconomic, social, and labor market policy—
including allowing resources to move easily between sectors. That said, they 
will require both more time to make the required adjustments and more inter-
national assistance to do so (chapter 12).
Adjustment challenges for some of the poorest developing countries posed 
by the erosion of their preferential access into developed country markets 
caused by multilateral liberalization are discussed in chapter 7. 
Loss of government revenue 
A major developing country concern is the loss of government revenue follow-
ing tariff reductions. This is not surprising: developing countries have a much 
greater reliance on tariffs as a source of revenue than developed countries—tar-
iffs account for an average of 18 percent of government revenue in developing 
countries, but only 2 percent in developed countries. For LDCs in Africa the 
ﬁgure is even higher—34 percent on average in 1999–2001, but more than 
50 percent in some countries (UNECA 2003). However, many developing 
countries are making a shift away from reliance on tariffs as a source of tax 
revenue—down by 20 percentage points in Tunisia, 17 in Jordan, 16 in Paki-
stan, and 14 in Mauritius and the Democratic Republic of Congo over 1994–
2001.
Tax reform is seen as key to avoiding major government revenue short-
falls following tariff liberalization. However, introduction of taxes on alterna-
tive sources—income, sales, and value added tax—and developing the means 
to collect them are not easy. Agricultural economies can face difﬁculties in 
assessing and collecting income taxes; low urbanization also makes tax col-
lection harder. Inefﬁcient, underfunded, and corrupt tax administrations may 
struggle with assessing and collecting broad-based tax liabilities, and large 
informal sectors, high numbers of small establishments, small shares of wages 
in national income, and small shares of consumer spending in large modern 
establishments can all complicate the use of income and, to a lesser extent, 
value added tax (OECD 2004c; Tanzi and Zee 2000).
That said, tariffs remain a relatively inefﬁcient way to raise revenue, and 
while the costs of appropriate compensatory taxes are temporary, the gains they 
induce through an improved allocation of resources are permanent.8 Indeed, 
revenue neutrality should not be the aim because tariff reform brings welfare 
gains, net of any loss in tariff revenues (OECD 2004c). While revenue neutral-
ity is not the aim, the need to avoid large and abrupt reductions in revenue is 
clearly a powerful argument both for phased tariff reductions to allow time for 
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alternative tax sources to be developed and for substantial international techni-
cal and ﬁnancial assistance to assist in their implementation. 
There are also several mitigating factors when tariffs are reduced. A tariff 
decrease does not necessarily lead to reduced revenue. The actual outcome 
will depend on the response of import demand to changes in price due to the 
tariff cut. Indeed, sometimes revenue can increase as very high tariffs do not 
generate revenue, but either encourage smuggling or wipe out imports entirely. 
Empirical evidence from major trade liberalization programs suggests that rev-
enue implications are not always signiﬁcant, in part due to accelerated import 
growth (Bacchetta and Jansen 2003). Trade facilitation improvements in col-
lecting existing (particularly more uniform) duties can also boost revenue in 
the face of tariff cuts. 
Finally, the structure of the initial tariff structure of the country concerned 
will also affect the impact on government revenue. Where bound rates are sig-
niﬁcantly above applied rates, cuts in bound rates could well have no effect on 
revenue. There is also scope to increase trade without reducing tariff revenue 
by focusing initial cuts on high tariff rates on price-elastic goods (increasing 
trade and welfare), while leveling tariff rates on price-inelastic goods. This 
would also have the beneﬁt of creating a more uniform tariff proﬁle. Countries 
with high tariffs and not much difference between the bound and applied rates 
are likely to experience deeper revenue loss—but they also experience greater 
trade creation and welfare gains. Equally, the choice of method for tariff reduc-
tion can affect the extent of revenue loss.
Adjustment to implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing
Implementation of the ATC raises a different issue—adjustment to the removal 
of a signiﬁcant number of quantitative restrictions. The progressivity built into 
the ATC should have allowed for an orderly adjustment to the removal of quo-
tas over a 10 year period. But systematic backloading by developed countries 
has made the adjustment challenge confronting all countries as of January 1, 
2005, much more difﬁcult. Massive restructuring is expected, particularly in 
the clothing sector.9 
While the size of existing distortions in the clothing and textile trade make 
the impact of quota removal difﬁcult to predict, the main beneﬁciaries are 
expected to be developing country producers with scale economies, low labor 
costs, vertical integration, and underutilized capacity—such as China and 
India (OECD 2005) (box 5.3). Given that around 560 million people live in 
poverty in these two countries alone, the potential impact on poverty reduc-
tion could be signiﬁcant (Oxfam International 2004a).10 But adjustment is 
predicted to be hardest for developing countries without these comparative 
advantages, and whose industries have been largely supported by quotas—for 
example, where investment has been attracted that otherwise would not have 
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been and where the segmenting effect of quotas has left the industry with little 
experience of real competition (box 5.4). 
However, two other factors should be taken into account in assessing 
the relative competitiveness of countries after the ATC. First, the increasing 
importance of vertical specialization in the textiles and clothing trade means 
that parts, components, and semiﬁnished goods cross borders several times.11 
This has greatly increased the effect of tariffs and thus the impact of prefer-
ences. Second, new trends in retailing, especially in the fashion clothing sector, 
have increased the importance of time to market in competitiveness. Some 
models estimate that the effect of a shared border with a major market can 
be strong for clothing, potentially multiplying trade ﬂows by a factor of nine, 
other things being equal. In other words, countries close to major markets 
(Mexico, and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and North Africa) 
may be better able to withstand competition from India and China than is 
commonly assumed. Hence the impact for preference-receiving countries, or 
those close to markets, may be less negative than the above estimates predict 
(Kyvik Nordås 2004).
The scale of adjustment has led some groups to call for extensions of quo-
tas. That would be a mistake. “Temporary” textile and clothing protection 
Box 5.3
Estimates of the 
impact of quota 
removal in textiles 
and clothing
 
Sources: Kyvik Nordås 
2004; Francois and 
others 1997.
Some estimate that quota removal could increase export volume in textiles anywhere from 
17.5 percent (for static gains only) to 72.5 percent (if dynamic gains are factored in). For 
clothing, estimates range from 7 percent to 190 percent. However, dynamic gains are hard 
to assess, and the most optimistic estimates should be treated with great caution. Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) models also suggest that removal of quotas will increase the 
import share of clothing in the U.S. and Canada market by as much as one-third, from 33.8 
percent to 45 percent, and in the EU, from 48.5 percent to 51 percent.
In the EU China will make the largest gains from removal of quotas on textiles (from 10 
percent to 12 percent of market share), followed by India (9 percent to 11 percent). Other 
OECD countries and Sub-Saharan Africa will lose market share. In clothing both India and 
China will increase their market share (China from 18 percent to 29 percent; India from 6 
percent to 9 percent), while Africa and richer Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan (China) will lose. 
In the U.S. and Canada elimination of textile quotas will see China increase its market 
share by just under 50 percent (from 11 percent to 18 percent), while the other top 10 export-
ers remain the same, though their respective rankings change. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will 
increase their market share, but from a low base, and the combined market share of small 
exporters increases. Those losing market share will be African countries with preferential 
access and Latin American countries. For clothing, China and India will take 65 percent of the 
export market (China’s share increases from 16 percent to 50 percent; India’s from 4 percent 
to 15 percent). All others will lose market share, with the largest losses incurred by African 
countries and Mexico (whose share declines from 10 percent to 3 percent). 
However, it should be noted that these models focus on price and do not take account 
of increased wages and decreased cost competitiveness as demand increases, changes 
in technology, or the effect of proximity to markets. 
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has been around for 40 years; continued protection is only likely to prolong 
and further distort the adjustment process—addicts always promise that they 
will quit tomorrow.12 The difﬁcult process of adjustment must be started now. 
Given the role that developed countries have played in creating the scale (if 
not the fact) of this challenge, they must now be prepared to contribute to its 
costs—a point at the core of the priorities for liberalization designed below. 
How might developing countries concretely position themselves for the 
post-ATC world? (Developed countries will also need to undertake their own 
signiﬁcant and long-delayed adjustment but are better placed to bear the related 
costs, so their case will not be analyzed in what follows). Several strategies are 
being tried to maintain competitiveness in the post-ATC world:
• Moving into niche markets or up the value chain. Cambodia is looking 
to market its adherence to labor standards (see box 5.4), while Colom-
bia has improved the quality of its labor and management to move out 
of assembly (where labor costs are key and competition is ﬁerce) into 
higher value-added activities and full-package production. Developing 
countries could also integrate specialist local skills (embroidery, lace, 
stitching) into the production chain, though this will require invest-
ment in training (ITC case studies, cited in UNCTAD 2003d). Fund-
ing from the international community will be indispensable if these 
developing country initiatives are to be intensiﬁed and expanded to the 
necessary scale. 
Box 5.4
Quotas and 
Least Developed 
Countries—the 
case of Cambodia
Source: Cattaneo 2004.
Cambodia’s textile industry employs 200,000 people and accounts for 80 percent of mer-
chandise exports. Around 70 percent of its textile exports go to the U.S., with no preferen-
tial tariff treatment (although Cambodia, along with Nepal, is lobbying the U.S. Congress 
to extend to non-African LDCs the preferential treatment offered to African LDCs under 
the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act). While in principle eligible for preferences in 
its second major export market, the EU, three-quarters of Cambodia’s textiles exports are 
excluded by strict rules of origin. 
Around 50 percent of companies in the sector receive foreign investment from China 
and Hong Kong (China). This investment might relocate back to China, where production 
costs are 10–20 percent lower, once quotas are removed, though investors might wish to 
diversify their export bases—especially given threats to Chinese exports from safeguards 
and antidumping.
Competitiveness gains could come from reducing the administrative and ﬁnancial bur-
dens on exporters, both formal (export taxes) and informal (corruption). Improving the 
efﬁciency of export formalities and procedures, as well as improving basic infrastructure, 
would also facilitate trade and reduce costs. Creating a favorable environment for invest-
ment is also crucial. International assistance should be targeted at these areas. 
Cambodia is also trying to develop niche marketing on the basis of its respect for core 
labor standards. Some companies (such as Nike) have proven to be sensitive to consumer 
concerns on labor issues, and buyer standards are increasingly incorporating these ele-
ments. Standards also involve implementation costs, however.
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• Strengthening networks of suppliers and clients to meet “ just-in-time” pro-
duction deadlines. Bangladesh is developing alliances between textiles 
mills and garment manufacturers to jointly develop fabric design, facili-
tate participation in overseas trade fairs, and coordinate production 
plans to cut delivery time. Some of these networks with downstream 
suppliers also involve close relationships with textile mills in China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (ITC studies cited in UNC-
TAD 2003d). Improving transport and communications links is also 
central to this process and is another area where international assistance 
could support domestic reform.
• Removing trade barriers and domestic distortions. Barriers and distortions 
raise prices for exporters and reduce their competitiveness. Bangladesh 
has reduced barriers on imports of capital goods and other inputs to 
reduce costs for apparel producers. In addition to easing the burden of 
tariff and taxes, it has freed the exchange rate and is addressing corrup-
tion and administrative inefﬁciency. Colombia has also undertaken sim-
ilar, and more extensive, reforms (OECD forthcoming). India has also 
recently substantially reduced tariffs on synthetic ﬁbers (Kyvik Nordås 
2004), and it is estimated that its welfare gains from quota elimination 
could be tripled if combined with domestic reforms (Kathuria, Martin, 
and Bhardwaj 2001). 
Preferential trade agreements are also being used to cushion adjustment 
pressures. For developing countries, these are a way of ensuring ongoing access 
to major markets, while developed countries seek to promote coproduction 
between domestic textile producers and developing country apparel producers. 
These are not necessarily a desirable solution, however, as their effect is to keep 
other developing country suppliers (not just India and China) out of the mar-
ket (and even in the case of India and China, it must be recalled that textiles 
and clothing employ a signiﬁcant proportion of the urban and rural poor). 
Further, preference schemes often require the use of textile inputs from the 
importing (developed) country, thereby undermining both potential export 
markets for other developing country textile producers and efforts to establish 
a broader production base within the preference-receiving country (chapter 
7). In addition, use of uncompetitive inputs can increase dependency on the 
preference-granting country’s market at the expense of diversiﬁcation of export 
markets. Lastly, preferences create incentives for countries to oppose MFN 
tariff reductions.
However, given the size of the adjustment challenge, tariff preferences under 
existing preference schemes could be an important factor, in the short term, in 
buying additional time for smaller producers faced with increased competition 
from India and China (neither of which qualiﬁes for preferences on textiles). 
However, for them to be really effective in helping textiles adjustment, their 
requirements for use of developed country inputs and their restrictive rules 
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of origin (which set stringent conditions for when a product can be said to be 
“from” an eligible country) will need to be removed (chapter 7). 
It has also been suggested that duty-free and quota-free treatment for tex-
tiles and clothing exports should be extended until 2010 to other poor country 
producers that are not LDCs but are heavily dependent on those exports (that 
is, that earn more than 50 percent of their current export revenue from the 
sector) to help them cope with the shock of adjustment (Oxfam International 
2004a). Five countries are involved: the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Mauritius, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.13 However, if such solutions are to be 
considered, more helpful and (more crucially) less distorting breathing space 
might be afforded to the poorest countries were all developed countries to 
extend duty-free and quota-free access to all products from the poorest devel-
oping countries from January 1, 2006. (While this date is after the implemen-
tation of the ATC, realistically, an agreement to extend this market access 
could be reached only at the WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled for the 
end of 2005 in Hong Kong, China.) 
While such additional access would acknowledge the size of the adjust-
ment problem in textiles and clothing and the role of developed countries in 
creating it, considering the problems inherent in preferential access (chapter 
7)—not least that it creates incentives for recipients to oppose MFN liberal-
ization that would beneﬁt a broader group of countries—it must be seen as a 
second-best solution and in no way a substitute for signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and 
technical adjustment assistance. In addition, such preferential access would 
need to be considered very much as a form of adjustment assistance—that is, 
assistance that is by its very nature temporary and subject to reduction over 
time (in this instance through MFN tariff reductions). 
Equally important will be adjustment programs to help countries get out 
of the industry. For those developing countries where production will drop and 
jobs will be lost, international ﬁnancial assistance for adjustment, safety nets, 
and retraining workers will be essential. 
Priorities for liberalization
To warrant being called a development round, the Doha Round must remove 
high tariffs on developing country exports. The primary responsibility falls on 
developed countries to end discrimination against developing country exports 
and to offer meaningful market access for all products, removing tariff peaks 
and escalation. An ambitious but achievable target should be set at the highest 
political level to ensure that the Doha Round delivers for development. To this 
end, developed countries should bind all tariffs on nonagricultural merchan-
dise exports at zero by 2015, the due date for the achievement of the Millen-
nium Development Goals. 
But a development round should also encourage good trade policies in 
developing countries that import from and export to each other in rapidly 
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growing volumes and varieties. Again, a target should be set, but one that 
acknowledges the greater adjustment challenges faced by developing countries. 
Developing countries should reduce their tariffs on all nonagricultural mer-
chandise to zero by 2025.
In their own development interests, the poorest developing countries 
should aim to bind all their tariffs at a uniform and moderate rate—higher 
than most of their current applied tariff rates, but much lower than their cur-
rent applied tariff peaks.
How do we get there from here?
The 2004 Doha Work Programme (DWP) nonagricultural market access text 
provides some, but limited guidance, on how liberalization of nonagricultural 
products is likely to be approached in this round. Nonagricultural market 
access was the last issue to be resolved, partially because discussions on it did 
not really start in earnest until the outcome on agriculture was clear. Unlike for 
agriculture, there is no ﬁnal agreed text on nonagricultural market access; the 
July text is essentially the Derbez text from Cancún, with an additional para-
graph at the start, outlining developing concerns and areas to be the subject of 
further discussions. 
The 2004 DWP text “contains the initial elements for future work on 
modalities” noting that “additional negotiations are required to reach agreement 
on the speciﬁcs of some of these elements.” The areas for further negotiation are 
the formula for reductions; how the formula should be applied to unbound 
tariffs; ﬂexibilities for developing countries; the question of developing country 
participation in sectoral initiatives; and preference erosion (box 5.5). 
There are of course, many different ways to achieve the targets set in the 
July text. Whatever approach is taken, several elements will be important from 
a development point of view:
• All tariffs should be bound. In many cases this will require developing coun-
tries to adopt bindings for the ﬁrst time. Full binding—even if at rates 
above applied rates—would constitute an important move toward full 
participation in the trading system. This would also mean that develop-
ing countries have a lot to offer in terms of gaining credit for binding past 
unilateral liberalization—essentially the difference between the applied 
rate in the base year and the much higher ceiling bindings or the complete 
absence of bindings. Granting some ﬂexibility to developing countries in 
binding their tariffs would smooth the process. But then there should be a 
tradeoff between the wedge remaining between the bound tariff rates and 
the applied tariff rates and the number of tariff lines involved: the larger 
the wedge, the smaller the number of tariff lines concerned.
• Higher tariffs should be cut by more than lower tariffs. The July text 
rightly advocates the use of a formula approach, though the possibility 
of using other modalities is kept open. While there are many possible 
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formulas, the Swiss formula has the advantage of ﬁtting this progres-
sivity in cuts, while allowing for different reduction rates for develop-
ing and developed countries (see box 3.9). This progressivity prevents 
developed countries from being able to shield from meaningful cuts 
the sectors of greatest interest to developing countries currently subject 
to tariff peaks. It would also help prevent textile tariffs from rising in 
response to increased protectionist pressure in the wake of the removal 
of quotas. Lowering tariffs and removing quotas simultaneously may 
Box 5.5
The 2004 
Doha Work 
Programme text 
on nonagricultural 
market access
Note: Areas where 
agreement is yet to be 
reached are indicated 
by square brackets. 
Source: WTO 2004b.
Formula. Members agree that a formula approach is key to reducing tariffs and reducing 
or eliminating tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation. The special needs of devel-
oping countries and LDCs will be taken fully into account, including through less-than-full 
reciprocity. Elements of the formula include:
• A nonlinear formula applied line by line, with no a priori product exclusions.
• Reductions to be based on bound rates; for unbound rates the basis for reduc-
tions shall be [two] times the MFN applied rate in the base year. The base year is 
2001.
• Credit will be given for autonomous liberalization, provided that tariff lines have 
been bound in the WTO.
• All non–ad valorem tariffs shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the 
basis of a methodology to be determined and bound in ad valorem terms.
Participants with less than [35] percent of tariff lines bound would be exempt from the 
formula, but would be expected to bind [100] percent of tariff lines at an average level 
that does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after 
implementation of current concessions. 
Developing countries will have longer implementation periods, plus they can apply less 
than formula cuts to up to [10] percent of tariff lines, provided that the cuts are no less 
than half the formula cuts and that these tariff lines do not exceed [10] percent of the 
total value of a member’s imports; or they can keep, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, 
or not apply formula cuts for up to [5] percent of tariff lines provided they do not exceed 
[5] percent of total value of a member’s imports. This cannot be used to exclude entire 
chapters from the Harmonized System of tariff classiﬁcation.
LDCs are not expected to apply the formula or participate in sectoral approaches. They 
are expected to substantially increase their level of bindings. Duty-free and quota-free 
access for LDCs is to be extended by all developed countries on an autonomous basis by 
a date to be decided.
Newly acceded countries shall have recourse to special provisions to take account of their 
extensive reductions and current phased implementation.
Sectoral initiatives. Discussions are to be pursued with a view to deﬁning product cover-
age, participation, and adequate provisions for ﬂexibility for developing countries. 
Supplementary modalities. The possibilities for zero-for-zero initiatives, sectoral harmoni-
zation, and request offer should be kept open. 
Low duties. Developed countries and others that so decide are to consider their elimination.
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also ease the adjustment pressures faced by many developing country 
exporters of textile and clothing, though it could create additional dif-
ﬁculties for those currently receiving preferences, and additional assis-
tance will clearly be needed (chapter 7).
• Dispersions in tariffs should be reduced to the maximum extent possible. 
Cutting higher tariffs by more than lower tariffs would reduce disper-
sion (increase tariff uniformity), promoting greater domestic efﬁciency 
(see box 5.2) and eroding tariff escalation.
• Reductions should be phased in to facilitate adjustment. For example, in 
order to reach the ultimate goal of zero tariffs by 2015–25, developed 
countries could be required to reduce tariffs to a maximum of 10 per-
cent by the end of the round, and 5 percent by 2010. For developing 
countries the targets could be 25 percent at the end of the round, 20 
percent by 2010, 15 percent by 2015, and 10 percent by 2020, mov-
ing to zero percent by 2025. However, such targets need to be set with 
care—hence the key role of the tariff-cutting formula (setting targets 
at maximum average tariffs allows countries more room to determine 
for themselves which tariffs to cut, but may not result in sufﬁcient cuts 
on tariff peaks in developed countries, given that their average tariff is 
already relatively low). 
• Developing countries should have additional ﬂexibility. Bearing in mind 
that these disciplines are new to many developing countries, these coun-
tries should have longer to phase in reductions, and possibly more ﬂex-
ibility to determine which products to cut to meet a target. Consider-
ation could be given to using different approaches for setting targets 
in developing and developed countries—by using ceiling or average 
rate targets, by taking into account the issue of potential government 
revenue losses in developing countries, and so on. However, while 
developing countries need ﬂexibility, given the desirability of achieving 
greater uniformity of protection and reducing tariffs to zero by 2025, 
any exceptions from formula reductions should be kept to a minimum. 
Monitoring and quantiﬁcation of the implications of proposed excep-
tions is a key task for national policymakers.
• As a transitional measure to assist with adjustment to the end of textile 
quotas, all developed countries should grant duty-free and quota-free mar-
ket access to all exports from the poorest developing countries by January 1, 
2006. Developing countries would be encouraged, but not obliged, to 
provide duty-free and quota-free access for all exports from the poorest 
developing countries. This access would not substitute for ﬁnancial and 
technical assistance for adjustment (chapter 12) and would be strictly 
transitional to avoid the risk, inherent in preferential access, of creating 
a constituency opposed to the further MFN liberalization that would 
beneﬁt a wider group of countries (chapter 7). 
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• All non–ad valorem tariffs should be converted to ad valorem tariffs, and 
nuisance tariffs should be eliminated. Speciﬁc tariffs have a very undesir-
able feature: the lower the world prices, the more protectionist such 
tariffs are. This feature is particularly harmful for the developing coun-
tries at the early development stages that tend to produce low-priced 
products. Tariffs of less than 3 percent should be eliminated at the end 
of the round because they tend to be a mere nuisance: the protection 
value of such tariffs is normally outweighed by the administrative costs 
incurred in collecting them and by exchange rate ﬂuctuations. 
Initiatives for sectoral liberalization are not a priority and should be treated 
with caution. While developing countries have key interests in sectors such as 
textiles and clothing, such initiatives often tend to favor products of export 
interest to developed countries. Participation in any such initiatives should 
be strictly voluntary, and they should not be conditional on participation by 
a critical mass of world trade in the products concerned. It is unclear, in any 
event, how much scope remains for such initiatives after the Information Tech-
nology Agreement and whether there are similar products on which agreement 
is likely to be reached.14 That said, one proposal is already on the table: envi-
ronmental goods.
Environmental goods
The July text states that WTO Members will continue to work closely with 
the Committee on Trade and Environment, with a view to addressing environ-
mental goods per paragraph 31 of the Doha Agenda (see box 1.6). Progress has 
been limited to date.
A threshold problem has been the lack of agreement over what would con-
stitute an environmental good. For example, should products be deﬁned by their 
end-use and, if so, what should be done with products with multiple end-uses, 
only some of which are “environmental?” Should the way in which a good is pro-
duced determine its status as an environmental good? Distinguishing between 
products in this way would have major implications for the WTO system, where 
process and production methods (PPMs) have never been used as the basis for 
claiming that two products were not “like.” Lastly, there is the fundamental 
problem that the idea of “environmentally friendly” varies among countries. 
Discussions on potential criteria and deﬁnitions of environmental goods 
have been inﬂuenced by lists of environmental goods that were developed even 
before the Doha Round negotiations started. The list drawn up by the Asia-
Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum emerged from an ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt by that forum to include environmental goods in an 
early voluntary sectoral liberalization initiative. The other list, developed by 
the OECD, was created simply for the purpose of a trade analysis. In addition, 
Japan and Qatar have submitted their own lists of environmental goods. How-
ever, several developing countries have argued that the WTO must identify its 
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own list of environmental goods, one that reﬂects the (export) interests of the 
organization’s entire membership.
There is also no agreement on how liberalization of environmental goods 
should be approached. The Doha Agenda mandate refers to negotiations on 
“the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers 
to environmental goods and services.” This instruction could, of course, be 
satisﬁed if, at the end of the market access discussions, some progress had been 
made in reducing tariffs on all nonagricultural goods, and if environmental 
goods (however deﬁned) faced tariffs that were no higher than those applied 
to other goods. Many readers of paragraph 31(iii) assume, however, that the 
mandate was intended to make barriers to trade in environmental goods lower 
than the average for other goods, and perhaps to eliminate them completely. 
Assuming that was the intention, it would seem to have the undesirable 
consequence of diverting valuable negotiating energy and resources into an 
unending process of determining whether a particular good qualiﬁes as suit-
ably “environmental” or not—with potentially a 5–10 percent difference in 
the tariffs applied at stake. Further, the political economy of preferences—wit-
ness the current resistance to the possible erosion of other forms of prefer-
ences (chapter 7)—is driven by the distortions in the pattern of investment 
and trade, and thus the rents, they create. It is thus likely that, in any future 
trade round, suppliers of environmental goods will be joined by environmental 
interest groups in arguing for the maintenance of the status quo, undermining 
the achievement of the elimination of tariffs on all goods (Steenblik 2004).
Box 5.6
Liberalizing 
nonagricultural 
market access—
key elements
• All tariffs on manufactures by developed countries should go to zero by 2015, the 
target date for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
• Developing countries should bind all their tariffs in the Doha Round and reduce them 
to zero by 2025. 
• The poorest developing countries should reduce their high tariffs in order to remove 
the most costly domestic distortions and anti-export biases and to move toward a 
more uniform tariff schedule. They should bind all tariffs at a maximum rate.
• All developed countries should extend duty-free and quota-free access to all products 
of the poorest developing countries by January 1, 2005. Developing countries would 
be encouraged, but not obliged, to do so.
• Whatever approach it taken, it is important that higher tariffs are cut more than lower 
tariffs; reductions are staged to avoid adjustment shocks; some ﬂexibility is extended 
to developing countries; dispersion in tariffs should be reduced to the extent possible; 
minimal tariffs are eliminated; and all non–ad valorem tariffs are converted into ad 
valorem tariffs. 
• Increased international assistance should be given to help developing countries address 
adjustment costs, including loss of government revenue, from tariff liberalization.
• Full and faithful implementation of the ATC should be accompanied by removal of tariff 
peaks in textiles and clothing and substantial assistance to help developing countries 
manage the adjustment costs.
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Keeping markets open
Hard-won gains in market access in agricultural and nonagricultural products 
can be eroded where other policies re-create trade barriers or create transac-
tions costs and uncertainty regarding the conditions of that access. This chap-
ter looks at two very different kinds of instruments that can prevent developing 
countries from being able to take advantage of negotiated market access.
The ﬁrst, contingent protection, refers to limits on market access by 
the imposition, under certain circumstances, of traditional instruments of 
protection—tariffs, import quotas, or other nontariff barriers, such as mini-
mum prices. The second, norms and standards applied to products, are not 
necessarily trade policies at all, but part of the normal domestic regulatory 
structure of importing countries. Such standards can be designed to ensure 
the quality or safety of products, or aimed at achieving environmental objec-
tives. Concerns have arisen about the potential for abusing these standards for 
protectionist effect. Even where there is no protectionist intent, compliance 
costs related to increasingly high standards in OECD markets can pose major 
challenges for developing country exporters. 
Notwithstanding their differences, in both cases, there is considerable 
scope for such measures to have a disproportionate impact upon developing 
countries. And in both cases, WTO rules have been developed with a view 
to narrowing the scope for abuse, but serious concerns have arisen about the 
effectiveness of those rules, particularly for developing countries. 
Contingent protection
Contingent protection, including antidumping, antisubsidies, and safeguards 
can all prevent developing countries from taking advantage of negotiated mar-
ket access.
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Antidumping
As of today, the most frequently used instrument of contingent protection is 
antidumping. Antidumping permits a WTO Member to impose special import 
duties when a ﬁrm, following an investigation, is found to have sold a product 
in the importing market at a price below the one it charges for the same prod-
uct in its home market. Under GATT Article VI, antidumping duties may 
only be imposed if this price difference is found to be causing material injury 
to the domestic industry producing like products.
While this technical deﬁnition may sound relatively anodyne, the real-
ity of antidumping is quite different. Antidumping has rightly been dubbed 
“ordinary protection with a good public relations program,” the rhetoric of 
foreign unfairness providing an effective vehicle for building a political case 
for protection (Finger and Zlate 2003). However, the existence of antidumping 
induces rent-seeking behavior on the part of import-competing ﬁrms, and cre-
ates substantial uncertainty regarding the conditions of market access facing 
exporters.
Antidumping allows particular exporters of certain products to be singled 
out (duties are not applied on a most favored nation basis) and is initiated 
and carried out unilaterally by the importing country (no compensation or 
renegotiation of commitments is required). Further, the mere initiation of 
an antidumping investigation itself tends to have a signiﬁcant chilling effect 
on imports. This is because exporters bear signiﬁcant legal and administra-
tive costs and importers face the uncertainty of having to pay backdated 
antidumping duties once an investigation is completed. This effect is com-
pounded by the fact that petitions for antidumping measures by domestic 
industry are not subject to prohibitions on double jeopardy—that is, if one 
petition against an exporter fails, minor respeciﬁcation generates a valid new 
petition, and a new investigation. Last but not least, antidumping measures 
often ultimately serve to encourage the conclusion of market-sharing or price-
ﬁxing agreements among import-competing ﬁrms, and between those ﬁrms 
and affected exporters.
Who uses antidumping? Who are the targets? There has been an explosion in the 
total number of antidumping investigations initiated by WTO Members in 
the last decade. Used almost exclusively by the U.S., EU, Canada, and Aus-
tralia until the 1980s, antidumping spread to other countries in the 1990s. 
Since the end of the Uruguay Round, use by developing countries has greatly 
increased. Between 1995 and 2002 developing countries initiated 1,144 anti-
dumping cases, or just under 60 percent of all antidumping initiations. Over 
the same period, developed countries initiated 819 cases, or around 40 per-
cent of all initiations (a small number of cases were also initiated by transition 
economies) (table 6.1).
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Most cases have been initiated by the U.S. (279 cases), India (273 cases) 
and the EU (255 cases). Other major users are Argentina (176 cases), South 
Africa (157 cases), Australia (142 cases), Canada (106 cases), and Brazil (98 
cases).1 However, consideration of the number of antidumping cases initiated 
per dollar of imports reveals a slightly different picture. On this basis, Brazil’s 
intensity of use is 5 times the U.S. intensity, Australia’s 7 times, South Africa’s 
20 times, India’s 21 times, and Argentina’s 25 times the U.S. ﬁgure (Finger 
and Zlate 2003).
The targeted countries are predominantly developing countries, especially 
small ones, regardless of who the initiator is. About 70 percent of developing 
country investigations are against other developing and transition economies, 
and more than 75 percent of industrial country initiatives are against develop-
ing and transition economies (see table 6.1). Again, the picture is different if the 
level of trade is taken into account. Here, the bias against imports from develop-
ing countries becomes evident: per dollar of imports, developing countries are 
six times more likely to be targeted by industrial countries and three times more 
likely by other developing countries than other countries (table 6.2). 
Developing countries, especially small ones, are not only targeted more 
frequently in investigations, they are also more likely to be confronted with 
higher duties than those imposed on exports from developed countries. In 
part, the incidence of antidumping reﬂects differences in capacity across coun-
tries to defend their interests. Such capacity constraints may be physical (a lack 
Table 6.1
Numbers and 
percentages 
of antidumping 
initiations by initiating 
economy group, 
1995–2002 (June)
Note: Industrial economies 
include Australia, Canada, 15 
European Union members, 
Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and U.S. 
Transition economies are those 
deﬁned by World Bank (1996): 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Macedonia (FYR), 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbeki-
stan, and Yugoslavia. Developing 
economies include all economies 
except industrial economies and 
transition economies. China is 
included in the totals for develop-
ing economies. China excludes 
Hong Kong (China), Macao 
(China), and Taiwan (China). 
Source: WTO Antidumping 
Committee, cited in Finger 
and Zlate (2003).
Initiated against →
Industrial 
economies
Developing 
economies 
(including 
China) China
Transition 
economies
All 
economiesBy ↓
Number of antidumping initiations
Industrial economies 198 494 104 127 819
Developing economies 357 649 172 138 1,144
Transition economies 4 6 2 6 16
All economies 559 1,149 278 271 1,979
Percentage of antidumping initiations
Industrial economies 24 60 13 16 100
Developing economies 31 57 15 12 100
Transition economies 25 38 13 37 100
All economies 28 58 14 14 100
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of expertise) or reﬂect incentive constraints (expected returns to the level of 
work and organization required are too low). 
What can be done to discipline antidumping? The observed bias against develop-
ing countries underscores the importance and urgency of disciplining the use 
of antidumping. The challenge is how to do so most effectively, given that the 
ﬁrst-best solution—a ban on antidumping use—is unlikely to be feasible in 
the foreseeable future. Three options are discussed here: the ﬁrst being feasible 
and providing substantial welfare gains, particularly to the poorest developing 
country exporters (and other countries’ consumers); the second being feasible, 
but more doubtful in terms of welfare gains; and the third bringing substantial 
welfare gains, but highly unlikely to prove feasible at this stage.
The ﬁrst option would be to draw on the WTO Agreement on Antidump-
ing, which includes a variety of provisions that aim to reduce the probability 
that developing country exporters will confront threats. For instance, Article 
5.8 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that allegedly dumped imports 
from developing countries should represent more than 3 percent of the total 
imports of the product in order to be subject to antidumping measures. This 
so-called de minimis threshold is particularly perverse for developing countries’ 
exporters: as soon as it is passed, import-competing ﬁrms lodge antidumping 
complaints that generally lead to protectionist measures. In sum, as soon as 
imports from developing countries emerge from being insigniﬁcant, they are 
smashed by high antidumping barriers. The ﬁrst option, therefore, for reduc-
ing the protectionist bias of antidumping procedures is to increase the de mini-
mis threshold in order to allow some more reasonable room for developing 
countries. And the threshold for exports from the poorest countries could be 
higher than that for exports from developing countries.
The second option would be to rely on Article 15 of the Antidumping 
Agreement, which states, “[I]t is recognized that special regard must be given 
Table 6.2
Intensity of 
antidumping 
initiations across 
different groups 
of economies, 
1995–2002 (June)
Note: Number of antidumping 
initiations against the country 
group per dollar of imports from 
the group, scaled to ﬁgure for 
initiations against/imports from 
all economies. For example, 
industrial economies, per 
dollar of imports, had 2.57 
times more antidumping 
initiations against China than 
against all countries. Economy 
classiﬁcations as in table 6.1.
Source: Finger and Zlate 2003.
Initiated against →
Industrial 
economies
Developing 
economies 
(including 
China) China
Transition 
economies
All 
economiesBy ↓
Industrial economies 36 210 257 411 100
Developing economies 51 155 511 560 100
Transition economies 35 366 325 197 100
All above economies 43 192 316 371 100
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by developed country Members to the special situation of developing country 
Members when considering the application of antidumping measures under 
this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this 
Agreement shall be explored before applying antidumping duties where they 
would affect the essential interests of developing country Members.” However, 
this approach has several weaknesses. In particular, “constructive remedies” 
need only to be “explored,” and—even if found—might include instruments 
of dubious value, such as informal pressure on exporting countries to reduce 
their exports.2
The third option would be to require a change in national antidumping 
laws to consider not just the interests of import-competing industries, but also 
the interests of consumers and users of the products claimed to be dumped and 
causing injury to competing domestic ﬁrms. In short, all affected domestic inter-
ests—import-competing industries, consumers, and users—would be treated as 
equal (Finger and Zlate 2003). Such a “public interest”–type of rebalancing the 
antidumping law could do much to mitigate asymmetries in administrative and 
organizational capacity and expertise, and also help overcome foreign-policy-type 
constraints that could reduce the willingness of developing country governments 
to take cases to the WTO. If users of imports had to be heard—and the effects 
of possible protection on the proﬁtability and health of their businesses were to 
be considered and balanced against the interests of import-competing ﬁrms—
much of the imbalance in capacity to engage in antidumping litigations would 
be removed. Moreover, with fewer cases presumably having a protectionist out-
come, there would be less need to resort to the WTO as an enforcement device. 
However, it should be recognized that the antidumping regulations already imple-
menting this option (such as those in the EU) illustrate how easily it could be cir-
cumvented. For instance, it is routinely mentioned in EU cases that the interests 
of the European consumers is to keep alive EU ﬁrms—hence the public interest 
clause is used for justifying the adoption of antidumping barriers.
Antisubsidy and safeguards
Antidumping is the most used but not the only contingent protection instru-
ment. GATT Articles XVI and VI allow WTO countries importing subsi-
dized goods to “countervail” the subsidies granted by imposing antisubsidy (or 
countervailing) duties. The above arguments related to antidumping are also 
relevant to antisubsidy measures. In particular, expanding de minimis thresh-
olds would provide a simple, better answer to the request by many poor coun-
tries for more freedom in the use of export subsidies. Export subsidies by most 
poor countries are unlikely to affect a signiﬁcant proportion of the imports of 
their trading partners, meaning that their use would be constrained by domes-
tic considerations (the recognition that export subsidies are unlikely to be an 
efﬁcient trade instrument for the country using them), not by WTO rules (see 
chapter 11 on special and differential treatment).
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GATT Article XIX permits WTO Members to take “safeguard” (pro-
tective) measures when they face “unforeseen import surges.” Until the mid-
1990s, safeguards have been rarely implemented because their use was subject 
to much stricter conditions than those prevailing for antidumping procedures. 
The Uruguay Round modiﬁed this situation, and safeguard measures may 
become an increasingly serious threat to existing liberalization (Kommerz 
Kollegium 2004). One of the best illustrations is the safeguards in steel taken 
by the U.S. and the EU in 2002: these were the equivalent of 30–50 antidump-
ing actions because they covered a much broader range of steel products and 
exporters, and they introduced many distortionary trade barriers. 
Standards
While debates on trade and standards often focus on concerns about a poten-
tial “race to the bottom,” a far more immediate problem is the “race to the top” 
that has actually occurred. In response to rising consumer concerns about food 
safety and health, as well environmental and social issues, OECD countries are 
adopting ever more—and ever more stringent—standards. It is now estimated 
that almost 90 percent of internationally traded goods are subject to measures 
for the protection of human health and the environment (UNCTAD 2003c). 
The ability to meet such standards at minimum cost is an important deter-
minant of competitiveness. But for many exporters in developing countries, 
meeting these standards is a major challenge, one that often prevents promised 
market access from being utilized. 
Standards relate both to the product itself, deﬁning the quality, safety, 
and authenticity that goods should possess (“product standards”—such as 
minimum nutrition content, maximum pesticide residue content, performance 
requirements for machinery) and to the conditions under which goods are pro-
duced, packaged, or reﬁned (“process standards”—such as inputs into crop 
or livestock production, technical processes for ﬁshing, forestry management, 
labor standards for workers). They can take the form of voluntary or industry 
standards, or government regulations (technical regulations). Products that 
do not comply with technical regulations are often excluded from the market 
entirely; those that do not meet voluntary standards may be permitted entry, 
but can face problems in gaining consumer acceptance (World Bank 2003c). 
There is no doubt that standards are fundamentally important to correct 
domestic market failures (say, with regard to the provision of health, safety, and 
quality) and to pursue public policy objectives (such as protecting the environ-
ment or workers). Standards can also facilitate trade—without the codiﬁcation 
of an agreed standard for the dimensions of A4 paper, trade in paper products, 
printers, photocopies, and fax machines would be signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult 
(Rotherham 2003). 
While the right of countries to use standards to safeguard health, safety, 
and other public policy objectives is not in doubt, there are important concerns 
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about the impact of rising standards on developing country trade, in terms of 
both the nature of the standards themselves and the costs of compliance. 
Whose standards?
All countries should have the right to set their own regulations, but not without 
challenge, especially if the costs will fall primarily on other countries (DFID 
2002). Standards that deviate from international norms raise the costs of market 
entry. The costs of meeting the proliferation of differing national standards act as 
a major brake on the ability of developing country companies, in particular small 
and medium-size enterprises, to enter into the export trade. This has been a focus 
of concern, particularly for their impact on countries in Africa that have been 
dependent on two primary commodities for around half their export earnings 
(World Bank 2003c). For these countries, the difference between international 
and higher standards in export markets is millions of dollars in lost trade (box 
6.1). It is not surprising that product standards are highlighted as one of two 
important concerns by African leaders in the “NEPAD Market Access Initiative” 
document (2002) (the other is OECD farm subsidies). 
There can be good reasons for standards to differ among countries in view 
of the differing conditions they face—earthquake zones require different stan-
dards for building products—and, generally, demand for higher standards of 
quality and safety tends to rise with income. Moreover, different societies may 
take a different view of the acceptable level of risk (DFID 2002). However, the 
proliferation of standards has also given rise to concerns that they are being 
used as discriminatory barriers to trade, providing for excessively stringent 
Box 6.1
The cost of 
standards for 
Africa’s trade—
some examples
 
Source: Otsuki, Sewadeh, 
and Wilson 2001; Otsuki 
and Wilson 2001; World 
Bank 2003c; Wilson 2003.
Costs can ﬂow from multiple standards and noncompliance. The ﬁrst source of costs can 
be illustrated by the proposed imposition of EU standards for alfatoxin B1 above interna-
tional standards, which was estimated to reduce EU health risks by only about 1.4 deaths 
per billion people a year, but cut African exports of nuts and grains by more than 60 per-
cent, or $670 million a year. In all, the cost of not adopting a uniform international standard 
on alfatoxin B1 is estimated at $38.8 billion in lower global cereals and nuts trade. 
In the same vein, the use of international standards for pesticide residue in bananas 
rather than divergent national standards could increase African banana exports by about 
$410 million a year. However, if the international standard were to be set at the level used by 
the EU, rather than the CODEX standard, there would be a $5.3 billion loss in world banana 
exports. For beef, adoption of science-based international standards for minimum residue 
of veterinary drugs could boost South Africa’s beef exports by $160 million a year. 
Compliance with international standards could increase African exports by $1 billion 
a year. The World Bank recently surveyed 700 ﬁrms in 17 developing countries, including 
Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda on standards and technical barri-
ers to trade. For these ﬁve countries, 70 percent of ﬁrms (except in Kenya where the ﬁgure 
was around 50 percent) indicated that compliance with technical regulations is important 
to increase export sales.
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levels of protection that favor particular producers or interest groups. Concerns 
about the manipulation of standards by protectionist lobbies are heightened by 
the tendency of some standards to be moving targets, becoming more stringent 
as soon as exporters achieve compliance. 
But even where international standards are used, they may not ade-
quately reﬂect the concerns and circumstances of developing countries. Many 
developing country standards bodies lack the resources, including skilled 
human resources, to either send representatives to international meetings or to 
conduct the necessary research to have an impact on the debate. International 
standards tend to be developed in areas of OECD interest and at levels that 
reﬂect their standards and regulatory capacity, while developing countries suf-
fer from a lack of systematic research into standards for their products. 
Further, the trend in developed countries toward more extensive regula-
tions on quality and process attributes, rather than just on product character-
istics, poses a problem for developing countries. In effect, it tends to divide the 
world market into high value products sold on the basis of real or perceived 
attributes identiﬁed with location and production method and lower value 
“commodities” that have little differentiation. The market for high value prod-
ucts has grown at a faster rate than for undifferentiated and raw commodities. 
If developing countries are conﬁned to the production of these lower value 
products, then their terms of trade will continue to deteriorate and they will 
become marginalized in world trade (Josling 2003).
The impact of process standards is controversial, as demonstrated by the 
case of South African citrus exports to the EU subject to standards relating to 
environmental requirements in the production process (level of pesticides used) 
and work practices (washing facilities and potable toilets for every 600 meters 
in the orchard). In one view, these standards have effectively overridden lower 
domestic environmental and workplace standards for exporters and have helped 
to decrease pesticide use and improve working conditions (IISD/ICTSD 2004). 
However, others claim that South African citrus producers saw these standards 
as interference in a matter that should be dealt with between them, their work-
ers, the unions, and the government. Producers are said to feel that that they are 
being forced to comply with standards out of line with domestic norms and not 
related to the quality of fruit they produce (World Bank 2003c).
In this case the standards at issue were not imposed by government regu-
lation, but by industry. This reﬂects a general trend whereby standards are 
increasingly developed by the private sector, or by large-scale international 
buyers. This is especially the case in sectors of interest to developing countries, 
such as food and timber products and textiles. Concerns in the food sector 
have been sharpened by the consolidation of the global retail distribution sec-
tor (UNCTAD 2003d). However, as retailers tend to buy “local” in the farm 
and food business, their inﬂuence may also be seen as positive—helping to 
upgrade the quality of local food, hence making it easier to export.
154 Part 1 Market access agenda
A key problem is the lack of information on private sector standards and 
buyers’ requirements. For example, the Colombian ﬂower-growing sector has 
encountered export restrictions resulting from the proliferation of private envi-
ronmental labels. Labels are not based on common minimum parameters so 
the consumer does not receive comparable information, and it is impossible 
for exporters to satisfy all the different requirements. Labels can also be poorly 
supervised and not subject to internationally accepted standards of transpar-
ency, impartiality, and objectivity (Rojas Arroyo 2003).
What are the costs of complying with standards?
Even where standards are fair, compliance costs vary across countries due to differ-
ences in, for example, institutional, ﬁnancial, and technological capacity, human 
capital, consumer preferences, and local conditions (World Bank 2003c). Many 
standards place a larger ﬁnancial burden on companies in developing countries 
than on their counterparts in the developed world (Rotherham 2003). 
Many of the costs of meeting standards are related to establishing the neces-
sary institutional infrastructure. First, countries need to have a standards body 
to set standards, coordinate information and comments on standards in export 
markets, and participate in international standard-setting bodies. In develop-
ing countries, relevant national authorities often lack resources and clear lines 
of responsibility, and communication and coordination among them is poor. 
Standards and industry bodies lack information about standards in export mar-
kets and have limited capacity to assess the potential impact of, or coordinate 
comments on, proposed standards. Information on standards in export markets 
is especially lacking among small and medium-size enterprises and in rural areas 
where most producers are located. Poor telecommunications infrastructure is a 
major contributing factor—lack of information and communication technology 
means that information is slow to reach producers and traders who need it most. 
There are also often few effective channels for the private sector to feed in infor-
mation about what standards would be desirable, including in terms of aligning 
national standards more closely with major export markets.
Second, countries need to have conformity assessment facilities to test 
compliance with standards. The standards and monitoring required in the 
local market might be much lower and not easily ramped up to the level of 
international standards, and substantial investments in sophisticated technol-
ogy may be required. For some countries, facilities with the required level of 
technical sophistication are too costly to establish, and the local market for 
their services is too small. Even where local compliance and veriﬁcation pro-
cedures exist, they may not be accredited internationally. Where exporters are 
obliged to pay for testing overseas, it raises their production costs and decreases 
the competitiveness of their products. 
Third, these testing facilities need to be accredited by relevant authori-
ties in export markets for their certiﬁcation of compliance to be accepted. 
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Separate accreditations can be required for each export market, although 
some moves are being made toward mutual recognition of accreditations.3 In 
some cases, governments require certiﬁcation to be undertaken by their own 
domestic agents and do not grant accreditation to foreign certiﬁers. Some pri-
vate sector standards have their own bodies, accreditation to which can be 
costly—accreditation to the Organic Accreditation Service of the International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements costs $14,000 a year (IISD/
ICTSD 2004). 
Adjusting production facilities to comply with standard requirements can 
generate signiﬁcant costs to producers. Investment in capital equipment can be 
particularly burdensome for small and medium-size enterprises, whose main 
cost advantage lies in low capital inputs and high labor inputs and whose access 
to credit might be limited (Rotherham 2003) (box 6.2).4 In Bangladesh, shrimp 
processors spend around $2.2 million a year to meet international standards, 
and the government spends an additional $225,000 on monitoring and certify-
ing compliance. Even then, processors may not be able to guarantee compliance 
Box 6.2
The costs of 
standards
Source: OECD 2002b; 
World Bank 2003c.
The costs of certiﬁcation under the ecolabeling program set up by the Flower Campaign 
(a group of German NGOs and consumer organizations) have been estimated at a rela-
tively low $2,500 a year. However, exporters must also pay $1 per label for each crate 
of exported ﬂowers, which could raise costs by as much as $20,000 a year for some 
producers. The producer generally assumes these costs, as few ecolabels command a 
signiﬁcant price premium.
In Uganda it is estimated that construction of processing facilities and purchase of 
equipment necessary to upgrade a honey processing center to conform to ISO food safety 
standards would be up to $300 million. Likewise, average coffee production costs are 
said to increase by about 200 percent when compliance costs for good quality coffee are 
factored in. 
The need to segregate organic and nonorganic produce along the production and distri-
bution chain for certiﬁcation may mean that small producers can no longer take advantage 
of economies of scale offered by marketing boards and cooperatives unless these organi-
zations make expensive changes to ensure that goods are segregated.
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC, a partnership between the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature International and Unilever) provides certiﬁcation regarding responsible and sus-
tainable ﬁsheries management but has been controversial, in part because of the costs to 
developing countries. For example, an MSC certiﬁcation of the Philippine blue crab ﬁshery 
in the Sulu Sea was deemed prohibitively expensive due to the genetic tests of the blue 
crab stock required. 
An EU ban on azo dyes resulted in substantial compliance costs for Indian exporters. 
The cost of azo-free substitutes was estimated at 2.5 times that of azo dyes, a prohibitive 
difference for the small and medium-size enterprise textile producers that make up 60 
percent of the Indian textile industry. Further, it cost the Indian government about 1 billion 
rupees to establish the testing facilities necessary to comply with the new standards. 
Some developing country exporters argued that the ban on azo dyes only came into effect 
once European manufacturers had developed patented substitutes. 
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with all standards, as they have little control over the production process, 50 
percent of which is in the hands of small producers who may be unaware of the 
standards, unable to implement them, or unable to afford the necessary moni-
toring systems to prove that they meet them. The fact that a certain scale of pro-
duction can be needed to make compliance systems affordable poses problems 
for small producers. For example, certiﬁcation costs for organic wine produc-
tion in Chile are 5 percent of operating costs for vineyards of 50 hectares, but 
25 percent for vineyards of 10 hectares (IISD/ICTSD 2004). 
High compliance costs can act as a powerful deterrent for companies, espe-
cially small and medium-size enterprises, against engaging in exports.5 While 
this is a problem for small producers in both rich and poor countries, small 
producers are more prevalent in developing countries and less likely to have 
access to support services. The inability to enforce compliance with national 
standards is also a problem. For local ﬁrms in developing countries, lack of 
compliance with domestic standards means that they lag even further behind 
foreign standards and can lack experience in ﬁnding efﬁcient ways to adapt to 
new quality requirements. Some developed country exporters, while legally 
obliged to meet their domestic standards, may also take advantage of weak 
enforcement capacity in developing countries to export substandard products 
(DFID 2002). 
What can be done?
The basic dilemma could be sketched as follows. On the one hand, developed 
countries are adopting increasingly stringent standards that developing coun-
tries have to try to meet in order to gain market access, but for which they 
often lack the infrastructure and production conditions, and which may be 
inappropriate for their domestic markets because, as a matter of priorities, they 
are too high or costly for local conditions. Investment in sophisticated techni-
cal and administrative infrastructure needed to meet high standards in export 
markets could crowd out more urgently needed investment in social services or 
public utilities, especially in resource-constrained countries. 
On the other hand, seeking exemptions from these standards is unlikely 
to help, serving only to brand exports from developing countries as inferior 
or unsafe (and providing no incentive to raise standards in developing coun-
tries for the beneﬁt of domestic consumers). Where standards are imposed by 
private buyers, there is even less scope for—or point in—seeking exemptions. 
And there can be development beneﬁts. The need to implement foreign stan-
dards for export markets can raise overall standards, with ﬂow-on beneﬁts for 
the local market. Investing in the capacity to meet higher standards in export 
markets may result in increased resource efﬁciency, higher occupational safety, 
improved health conditions and consumer protection, and less environmen-
tal pollution (Jha 2003; Henson and Wilson 2002). Certain standards, such 
as those for organic produce, may even create export niches for developing 
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countries, though these opportunities should not be overstated in the absence 
of a domestic market for “green” products (IISD/ICTSD 2004). 
Two things are thus essential if developing countries are not to be left 
behind by rising standards. First, there is a need to ensure that standards are 
not abused for protectionist purposes and do not contain additional impedi-
ments to the exports of developing countries. Second, signiﬁcant assistance 
must be provided to developing countries to construct the institutional frame-
works and infrastructure to meet standards. 
Preventing the protectionist abuse of standards 
The WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) aim to address two main concerns: the 
scope for otherwise legitimate trade barriers standards to be used as a shelter 
for protection (precaution used as protection); and the lack of information on 
the regulations to be complied with in export markets. While regulatory and 
technical barriers related to trade in goods are covered by the TBT Agreement, 
standards related to animal, plant material, and human health are covered by 
the SPS Agreement. 
Under the TBT Agreement, no country is prevented from taking measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health, or the 
protection of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at 
the levels it considers appropriate. However, the agreement requires that tech-
nical standards not create unnecessary barriers to trade (box 6.3). 
Similarly, the SPS Agreement has two aims: to maintain the sovereign right 
of any government to provide the level of health protection it deems appropri-
ate, and to ensure that these rights are not misused for protectionist purposes 
and do not result in unnecessary barriers to international trade (box 6.4). 
In principle, these agreements should deliver real gains to developing coun-
tries by ensuring that their exporters only expend scarce resources conforming 
to legitimate measures (Jensen 2002). However, there have been limits to these 
gains.
First, the strongest disciplines in these agreements apply only to a subset 
of standards in the marketplace. Within the realm of government standards, 
only mandatory standards are subject to the strictest disciplines—voluntary 
standards are subject to the weaker Code of Good Practice. Private or nongov-
ernmental standards bodies are encouraged to accede to the Code, but adop-
tion is voluntary.
The gap matters: from the perspective of a developing country exporter, there 
is little difference between a government regulation and the standards imposed 
by private sector buyers, yet the extent to which they are disciplined by trade rules 
is hugely different. Considerable problems with private sector or NGO standards 
have been reported—for example, ecolabeling organizations have a poor record 
of soliciting input from foreigners on draft standards (IISD/ICTSD 2004). 
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Recognition of these difﬁculties has led to the development of a Code of Good 
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards by the ISEAL alliance, 
for international standard-setting and conformity assessment organizations to 
promote practices such as consultation with stakeholders (OECD 2003a). 
Equally, the extent to which the disciplines requiring the provision of techni-
cal assistance apply to voluntary standards introduced by private sector groups is 
unclear (see box 6.3). While WTO Members can be held accountable to provide 
assistance to combat the trade effects of standards they introduce, it is less clear 
Box 6.3
The Agreement 
on Technical 
Barriers to Trade
Source: WTO 1998; 
Rotherham 2003. 
The agreement distinguishes between mandatory technical regulations, to which most 
obligations apply, and voluntary standards, which are subject only to the Code of Good 
Practice (see below). It applies to national governments and subnational governmental or 
nongovernmental bodies. Key principles include:
Avoidance of unnecessary obstacles to trade. Technical regulations and conformity assess-
ment procedures must not be prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or the effect 
of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Technical regulations must be 
not more trade restrictive than necessary to fulﬁll a legitimate objective, taking account 
of the risks that nonfulﬁllment of the objective would create. Legitimate objectives include 
national security requirements, prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human 
health or safety, and protection of animal and plant life or health or the environment. 
Nondiscrimination and national treatment. Apply to both technical regulations and confor-
mity assessment procedures. 
Harmonization. Members must use existing international standards for their regulations 
unless their use would be ineffective or inappropriate to fulﬁll the legitimate policy objec-
tive. International standards are rebuttably presumed not to create unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade. Similar provisions apply to conformity assessment procedures. 
Members are also encouraged to participate in the work of international bodies. 
Equivalence of technical regulations/mutual recognition of conformity assessment proce-
dures. Members are encouraged to recognize others’ technical regulations as equivalent 
and are required to consider recognition of conformity assessment procedures. 
Transparency. Members must provide advance notiﬁcation and opportunity for comment 
on regulations that are not based on international standards and that may have a sig-
niﬁcant effect on the trade of other members. Each member must establish a national 
enquiry point. A Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee allows Members to consult 
on any matters relating to the agreement. 
Special and differential treatment. Developing countries have additional ﬂexibility in apply-
ing the Agreement, and developed countries must pay special attention to the trade inter-
ests of developing countries when applying their own technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures. 
Technical assistance. Members shall, on request, grant technical assistance to develop-
ing countries on mutually agreed terms and conditions. 
The Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards 
applies to voluntary standards developed by government, nongovernmental, and regional 
standardizing bodies. 
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that they are obliged to do so for voluntary standards. But the private sector 
bodies responsible for voluntary standards generally have neither the resources 
nor the capacity to provide assistance (Rotherham 2003). Further, while the 
notiﬁcation system for mandatory technical regulations has generated a com-
prehensive list of notiﬁcations on products of export interest to developing coun-
tries, there is no parallel obligation for notiﬁcation of voluntary standards and 
buyers’ requirements, and no information clearinghouse services exist as yet (Jha 
2003)—though some are proposed (see below). In addition, the treatment of 
non-product-related process standards under these rules also remains unclear.6 
Second, even where the rules do apply, developing countries may be unable 
to take advantage of them due to resource and capacity constraints.
Countries seeking to exercise their rights and responsibilities under the 
Agreement need a functioning standards regime—the requirements of which 
are a heavier burden for developing than developed countries (Finger and Schuler 
2000). As noted above, developing countries often lack the necessary institu-
tional framework (agencies with rules, enforcement capability, communication 
Box 6.4
The Agreement 
on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Measures
Note: The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 
run jointly by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization 
and the World Health 
Organization, develops 
standards on food-related 
issues. The International 
Ofﬁce of Epizootics is 
responsible for animal 
diseases, while the 
International Plant 
Protection Convention, 
administered by the 
FAO, covers plant 
pests and diseases.
Source: Josling 2003; 
Jensen 2002.
The Agreement has three basic principles.
First, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures should be based as far as possible 
on objective and accurate scientiﬁc data. The use of scientiﬁc risk assessment enables 
regionalization—where a region within an exporting country is declared free of a disease 
or pest even when the country as a whole does not achieve that status.
Second, national regulations should be based on international standards, where they 
exist, as agreed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Ofﬁce of Epizo-
otics, and the International Plant Protection Convention. The importance and legitimacy 
conferred on these international standards encourages harmonization. However, coun-
tries can still choose higher standards, but these must be based on scientiﬁc evidence 
and consistent with the acceptable level of risk chosen by that country. As a practical 
matter, if international standards are not appropriate, importers are also encouraged to 
recognize the equivalence of standards and certiﬁcation procedures in the exporter coun-
try if they provide the same level of protection. 
Third, the transparency of SPS regulations and adequate information for exporters 
is to be accomplished through enquiry points, notiﬁcation of any new or changed SPS 
measures that affect trade in time to facilitate compliance, and the establishment of the 
WTO SPS Committee.
The general functioning of the SPS Agreement is basically the same for developed 
and developing countries; the main differences are in implementation and provision of 
assistance. Major special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries 
include the provision of technical assistance to help them meet SPS standards; care in 
preparing and applying SPS measures when their interests are involved; longer phase-ins, 
where possible, for SPS measures affecting their products; the possibility of time-limited 
exemptions from obligations under the agreement; and encouragement and facilitation of 
their participation in standard-setting organizations. 
Implementation of the agreement was delayed for developing countries by two years 
(until 1997) and for LDCs by ﬁve years (until 2000).
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mechanisms, and transparency), infrastructure (labs for testing, surveillance 
and research facilities, and hygiene controls in production and processing 
facilities), and human resources (technical and scientiﬁc expertise and experi-
ence). In the absence of these, the full beneﬁts of the agreements—in particu-
lar harmonization and the establishment of equivalence, plus regionalization 
under SPS—have not been realized for developing countries. Experience with 
SPS suggests that negotiations on equivalence have often in effect amounted 
to requests for the adoption of the developed country standard rather than 
an attempt to recognize alternative ways of accomplishing the same level of 
protection (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2003, Josling 2003). Experience with 
the TBT Agreement has been more limited, with few efforts made, but to date 
WTO Members have had little success in negotiating equivalence on technical 
regulations (Rotherham 2003). 
Additionally, while the agreements make international standards more 
important, resource constraints limit the participation of developing countries 
in the development of those standards. In the case of SPS, membership of the 
three international bodies (the Codex Alimentarius Commission, International 
Ofﬁce of Epizootics, and International Plant Protection Convention) is corre-
lated with income (Jensen 2002), and even members may lack the resources to 
participate effectively in the standards-making process. As noted above, inter-
national standards tend to be developed in areas of developed country interest, 
and at levels that reﬂect their standards and regulatory capacity.7 
Finally, the poorest developing countries struggle to fulﬁll notiﬁcation 
responsibilities and, perhaps more important, to monitor the notiﬁcations of oth-
ers and initiate challenges. In the case of the SPS Agreement, by March 2002, 
only 56 percent of low-income countries had established a national Notiﬁcation 
Authority, and only 64 percent an Enquiry Point, compared with 89.3 percent 
and 92.9 percent respectively for upper-middle-income countries, and 100 per-
cent on both counts for high-income OECD countries. While 30 developing 
countries have either raised or supported an SPS challenge within the WTO 
SPS Committee, these have been dominated by only a few countries (Argentina, 
Thailand, Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), with most African countries and 
LDCs practically absent (Jensen 2002). Further, few developing countries have 
made formal complaints through the dispute settlement system on SPS matters 
(Jensen 2002).8 Participation by developing countries in these bodies remains 
clearly inadequate, given their trade interests in the issues at stake.
Neither the TBT agreement nor the SPS agreement is mandated for renego-
tiation as part of the Doha Agenda. That said, the signiﬁcant problems that devel-
oping countries have encountered with implementation of these agreements has 
generated a number of proposals in the implementation discussions. It is clear that 
the same infrastructure and resource constraints that prevent developing countries 
from being able to meet standards in the market also prevent them from being 
able to take advantage of the TBT and SPS Agreements. Nonimplementation of 
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these agreements will not solve the problems developing countries face in the mar-
ketplace but could only increase them, by removing a tool for keeping standards 
as fair and transparent as possible. Any assistance provided reaps multiple beneﬁts: 
improving domestic standards infrastructure; improving the development-friend-
liness of international standards and the capacity of developing countries to meet 
them; and increasing their ability to use the TBT and SPS agreements to chal-
lenge standards that unfairly keep them out of the market.
All these aspects might induce developing countries to consider seriously 
the option of “importing” standards (in part or in totality) from a developed 
country, including the standard and certiﬁcation bodies (be these bodies pri-
vate or public) that could establish subsidiaries in the developing country in 
question (Messerlin and Zarrouck 2000). In the case where public bodies from 
the developed country are involved, such an “import” of institutions should 
be seen as a component of the technical assistance of the developed country 
chosen by the developing country (see below). 
Assistance for developing countries
Assistance to developing countries to date has clearly been inadequate and a 
substantial increase is clearly needed—but what should it be aimed at and what 
is already being done?9
What sort of assistance would help?10
• International standard-setting bodies could prepare a user-friendly 
inventory of standards of interest to developing countries and accelerate 
consideration of issues of speciﬁc interest to developing countries. Inter-
national standard bodies could also be asked to review their working 
methods to minimize constraints on developing country participation. 
For example, the International Ofﬁce of Epizootics (OIE) funds some 
developing country participation, has lowered its fees for LDCs, and has 
also introduced written submissions. 
• International standard-setting bodies could also help to increase the 
capacity of developing countries to participate fully in the SPS and TBT 
Committees, for instance by providing assistance with preparation of 
challenges to notiﬁcations. Technical agencies could also identify situa-
tions where equivalent levels of protection could be provided by differ-
ent means and assist developing countries to prepare documentation for 
negotiating equivalence agreements. Similar assistance could be granted 
to prepare negotiations on regionalization in SPS, as well as assistance 
in providing monitoring and certiﬁcation schemes. 
• Developing country national and regional capacity to conduct risk 
analysis and other scientiﬁc and policy research could be strengthened 
by encouraging conformity assessment facilities in developed countries 
to develop twinning relationships with their counterparts in develop-
ing countries. Equally, public laboratories in OECD countries could be 
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encouraged to set up branches in developing countries. This could help 
to build local capacity by training staff, provide technology transfer on 
meeting international standards, and help to create international trust 
in the local standards conformity capacity. 
• A regional approach could be taken, including building on existing links 
in regional trade agreements. For instance, international technical and 
ﬁnancial assistance could support the development of joint certiﬁcation 
schemes and common research facilities, pooling resources to create 
a scientiﬁc base. Existing schemes for information-sharing could be 
expanded. A United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) project in the context of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union is working toward harmonizing standards within the 
region and helping testing laboratories upgrade technical competence to 
levels required for accreditation.
• A regional approach could also be taken in international standard-
setting bodies and the SPS Committee, rotating responsibilities at a 
regional level for representation. Designated scientiﬁc support groups 
for particular SPS issues could help to reduce the resource and ﬁnancial 
burden on individual countries. In this instance, a sensible alternative 
to a regional approach would be cooperation or coordination among 
developing countries sharing similar concerns. 
• Support for greater involvement by small and medium-size enterprises 
could be expanded by encouraging backward and forward linkages 
between local small and medium-size enterprises and large export ﬁrms. 
For example, South Africa uses an incentive scheme called  the “Com-
petitiveness Fund” under its Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
which offers grant fund assistance and comprehensive support of con-
formity assessment activities to small and medium-size enterprises. DTI 
also hosts a “Sector Partnership Fund,” which supports ﬁve or more 
ﬁrms and organizations in the development and execution of collabora-
tive projects. Local or regional certiﬁcation systems could be custom-
ized to better meet the needs of small and medium-size enterprises by 
providing group certiﬁcation schemes.
• Assistance could also be provided to help small and medium-size 
enterprises form industry associations. For instance, in 1995 UNIDO 
helped to establish the Eastern and Southern African Leathers Industry 
Association, which helped to increase awareness of European chemi-
cals restrictions among small leather goods producers and to coordinate 
technical assistance projects (Rotherham 2003). 
• Assistance could also be devoted to helping developing countries pro-
mote standards at the national level. For example, studies could assist 
developing countries in examining how compliance with standards 
could help to improve economic efﬁciency and export competitiveness. 
163Chapter 6 Keeping markets open
The experience of those developing countries that have moved to becom-
ing standard setters would be useful. Countries could also be encour-
aged to develop high impact awareness campaigns on the importance 
of standards and to create incentives for private sector compliance with 
national laws.
In addition to assistance, domestic reform can contribute to the ability 
of developing countries to comply with international standards. For example, 
given the importance of information and communication technology (ICT) 
in the dissemination of standards information, developing countries could be 
encouraged to explore telecommunications liberalization as a means of increas-
ing domestic access to ICT. Equally, priority should be accorded to improved 
infrastructure for transport of goods and other shared facilities that may 
reduce the cost of supply chain management and increase the delivery quality 
of export products. Here again, services trade liberalization, as well as trade 
facilitation initiatives, may play an important role. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can play a major role in helping develop-
ing countries to meet standards. Multinational companies operating in devel-
oping countries often dominate exports because they are more aware of, and 
have greater resources to implement, international standards. FDI can help in 
Box 6.5
Some examples of 
where assistance 
has made a 
difference
 
Source: UNIDO 2003; 
World Bank 2003c. 
In 1999, following a contamination, the EU imposed an import ban on ﬁsh from the Lake 
Victoria region, resulting in a 50 percent drop in ﬁsh exports from Tanzania and Uganda 
and a 30 percent drop in employment in the ﬁsh sector. The ban cost around $36.9 mil-
lion, and around 35,000 people lost their jobs. With funds from UNDP, WHO, FAO, UNIDO, 
and a range of bilateral donors, a program was established to improve the management 
and oversight of the ﬁsh industry, including inspection; install locally laboratories able to 
test to international standards; train 950 persons in 17 companies on standards; and 
improve the control of standards and quality at all levels.
Investments in technology were also necessary: additional costs in equipment ranged 
from $12,000–$13,500 for a representative ﬁsh ﬁrm in Uganda to $2,500–$5,000 for 
training of personnel on ﬁsh processing and handling. Initial cost of certiﬁcation for each 
individual ﬁrm was $15,000, while hired testing and certiﬁcation services ranged from 
$2,000 to $4,000. These costs were borne by the ﬁrms themselves, apart from the train-
ing provided by UNIDO, USAID, and the World Bank. 
The EU ban was lifted in 2000, and exports resumed. The investments have paid off; 
Ugandan ﬁsh exports increased from 14,075 tons before the ban to 28,119 tons after-
ward, partly due to the compliance enabling the upgrading of the status of the ﬁsh.
In Sri Lanka UNIDO assistance helped introduce new industrial metrology and upgrade 
chemical and textile testing laboratories to international accreditation. Standards and 
conformity assessment bodies were transformed into business-oriented organizations. 
Textile lab income increased by 70 percent and local capacity for ISO 14000 was cre-
ated. As a result of the improved facilities and international accreditation, 14 Sri Lankan 
companies have started exporting food, and many international buyers are now accepting 
the Sri Lanka laboratory certiﬁcation. The existence of adequate testing facilities has also 
enabled niche products, such as organic tea to be explored. 
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overcoming supply-side constraints that hinder competitiveness, bringing in 
ﬁnancing and technology transfer to improve product quality and production 
practices. For example, the ﬁrst dyestuffs manufacturer in China to become 
ISO 14001 certiﬁed (a certiﬁcation for continuous environmental manage-
ment improvements) was a joint venture between a domestic ﬁrm and BASF 
(IISD/ICTSD 2004). Working with developed country retailers can help small 
producers in developing countries adapt to higher international standards. 
Action in OECD countries could be an important complement. Resources 
could usefully be devoted to education campaigns for consumers in developed 
countries to increase awareness of the impact of ever-higher standards on devel-
oping countries. Such campaigns could increase the political scope of regula-
tory agencies in developed countries to pursue policies that provide a better 
balance between risk and the need to provide developing countries with trade 
opportunities in the interests of their economic development. 
Box 6.6
Activities 
of selected 
international 
organizations 
on standards 
and trade
a. See www.unctad.org for 
summaries of “Ways to 
Enhance the Production 
and Export Capacities 
of Developing Countries 
of Agriculture and Food 
Products, including 
Niche Products, such as 
Environmentally Preferable 
Products” (July 2001); “En-
vironmental Requirements 
and International Trade” 
(October 2002); “Deﬁni-
tions and Dimensions 
of Environmental Goods 
and Services in Trade 
and Development” (July 
2003); and “Market Entry 
Conditions Affecting Com-
petitiveness and Exports 
of Goods and Services 
of Developing Countries: 
Large Distribution Net-
works Taking into Account 
the Special Needs of 
LDCs” (November 2003). 
b. These include studies 
on standards and trade 
in South Asia, Eastern 
and Southern Africa, and 
Central America funded by 
the Canadian International 
Development Research 
Centre and two UK-funded 
projects on trade and 
environment—one on 
research and policymaking 
capacity and another on 
improved policymaking 
and negotiation. 
In 2001 the World Bank, WTO, World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the International Ofﬁce of Epizootics (OIE) established the Stan-
dards and Trade Development Facility. The Facility has three primary objectives: provision 
of small grants for pilot projects that build capacity in SPS-related standards in developing 
countries; assistance to governments and private sector in meeting international stan-
dards; and strengthened interagency coordination and donor collaboration in the deliv-
ery of technical assistance in standards. The WTO has also put in place procedures to 
monitor the provision of assistance by WTO Members, and the Secretariat has solicited 
requests for assistance from developing countries. 
UNCTAD’s work in standards aims at building consensus, promoting policy dialogues, 
strengthening the capacity of developing countries in research, and responding to emerg-
ing requirements. Three main types of activities are undertaken: expert meetings bring-
ing together experts from government, private sector, academics, and NGOsa; technical 
cooperation and capacity building projectsb; and policy-oriented research. 
UNCTAD, with other organizations, has also been exploring the possibility of creating 
a Consultative Task Force (CTF) on Environmental Requirements and International Trade. 
Funded by the Netherlands, it is envisaged that this would be a multistakeholder forum 
of government, private sector, and NGO representatives from developed and developing 
countries.
The CTF would look at ways to improve collection and dissemination of information. It 
would study the contours of an international clearinghouse mechanism for voluntary envi-
ronmental and health requirements and synergies with comparable existing public and 
private databases on voluntary standards. It would review best practices in the develop-
ment and implementation of regulations and standards. And it would discuss adjustment 
policies and measures in developing countries. 
Established in 2003 the FAO–UNTCAD–International Federation of Organic Movements 
(IFOAM) International Task Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture 
is an open-ended dialogue between public agencies and private sector institutions and 
companies involved in trade and regulatory activities in organic agriculture. It aims to 
facilitate international trade by exploring opportunities for harmonization, equivalence, 
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Where countries have been successful in meeting standards, it has required 
increased FDI and donor assistance backed by political will and direct govern-
ment support. The impact of technical assistance on standards has also depended 
upon the general effectiveness of the regulatory framework, including the rule 
of law and transparent and consistent administrative procedures. It is clear that 
prompt, comprehensive, and targeted assistance can help (box 6.5).
While more remains to be done, international organizations have stepped 
up their efforts to assist developing countries in meeting the challenges of stan-
dards, including increasingly working together (box 6.6).
Box 6.6
Activities 
of selected 
international 
organizations 
on standards 
and trade
(continued)
Source: Josling 2003; 
Vossenaar 2003; 
UNIDO 2003.
and mutual recognition of organic agriculture standards, regulations, and conformity 
assessment systems and discusses measures to facilitate access to organic markets by 
developing countries and smallholders. 
UNIDO undertakes extensive capacity-building projects related to TBT and SPS, some 
in cooperation with other international organizations. It focuses on technology diffusion 
and capacity building for market access, including development of productive capacity 
in selected export sectors; upgrading technical, physical, and institutional infrastructure 
for standards and conformity assessment; and analysis, advice, and technical solutions 
to TBT and SPS problems. UNIDO is undertaking surveys to assess TBTs faced by enter-
prises, in particular small and medium-size enterprises, in developing countries (such as 
Bahrain) and is exploring the establishment of an early warning mechanism to work in 
parallel with existing enquiry points and information dissemination systems to make small 
and medium-size enterprises in developing countries aware of new standards. 
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Preferential market access
While the previous chapters have addressed the core market access of the 
WTO—most favored nation (MFN) liberalization—this chapter addresses 
market access granted outside of the WTO; that is, preferential access for 
developing countries (normally access at a lower tariff rate) to the markets 
of donor developed countries. While not formally part of the WTO, prefer-
ential access has become a key issue on the Doha Agenda, largely because of 
an increasing dissatisfaction on the part of some countries that are excluded 
from preferences at the favored treatment being accorded to other countries, 
and because of fears about the impact of MFN liberalization on the preference 
margins currently received by some developing countries and the Least Devel-
oped Countries. Fears about preference erosion have become a powerful argu-
ment in some quarters against ambitious liberalization—by developed coun-
tries—in the Doha Round. But is this correct? Have preferences conferred 
signiﬁcant beneﬁts, and what are the consequences of eroding them? 
Trade preferences have become a feature of the trade landscape; ﬁrst, with 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, and 
more recently, with a range of initiatives aimed at providing preferential access 
for LDCs to the markets of certain developed countries. 
As discrimination among WTO Members in the application of tariffs 
would normally be prohibited, WTO rules include a special Enabling Clause, 
which permits (but does not require), GSP schemes, reciprocal agreements 
among developing countries, and special treatment for LDCs, among other 
measures.1 (Agreements not falling under this clause must be the subject of a 
waiver agreed by all WTO Members.) 
Preferential access for developing countries is not negotiated under the 
WTO and differs from WTO market access in several key respects. First, it 
is nonreciprocal: the recipient country is not expected to grant any access in 
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return.2 Second, it is applied to some countries and not others on the basis 
of criteria determined by the importing country alone. Third, preference 
schemes are unilateral: they can be withdrawn or changed at any time, without 
recourse. In sum, unlike negotiated WTO market access, preferences are not a 
legal right—they rely on the goodwill of the importing Member.
Preference schemes are usually viewed as a positive contribution to the 
development of the poorest countries by helping to offset competitive disad-
vantages that impede or lower the incentives to invest in new activities. They 
have also been used as a substitute for development assistance, in that they offer 
higher prices for traditional commodities in the protected importing market. 
If preferences were to result in the ﬁrst outcome by helping to establish a viable 
new export industry, they would certainly be “developmental.” However, inso-
far as they simply transfer rents to beneﬁciary countries for their traditional 
exports, they are not—it would be more appropriate to provide development 
assistance directly, without distorting trade. Further, unless any new produc-
tion stimulated by preferences also strengthens the development of national 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities through learning by doing, the 
sustainability of the development processes might be questionable. Experience 
with the Caribbean Basin Initiative has suggested that the fragmented type of 
industrialization process that follows from the nature of the preferences may 
actually slow down the type of technological capacity-building and learning 
necessary for economic sustainability (Mortimore 1999).
Unfortunately, overall experience suggests that preferences do little 
good, and may even do harm, in that—insofar as they have had a signiﬁcant 
impact—they have mostly been of the rent transfer type and have not done 
much to foster diversiﬁcation.
Has preferential access conferred the expected beneﬁts?
The ﬁrst major attempt to use trade preferences for development is GSP schemes. 
Fifteen such schemes were in operation in 2001 (IMF and World Bank 2002). 
While intended to be “generalized” (covering all products), nondiscriminatory 
(covering all developing countries), and nonreciprocal, in reality, country and 
product coverage varies considerably, and “nontrade” conditionality may be 
used as a substitute for traditional trade reciprocity.
Experience with GSP schemes has been disappointing. During the ﬁrst 
11 years (1968–78) less than 11 percent of eligible imports received GSP 
treatment. By 1988 this ﬁgure had increased only to 27 percent (Oyejide 
2002). Further, the beneﬁts have been heavily concentrated among a few 
recipients. In 1999 the top 15 GSP exporters to the Quad countries (Canada, 
EU, Japan, U.S.) accounted for 88 percent of all qualifying imports. And 
these were not always the poorest countries: in descending order, the main 
recipients were China, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, India, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Taiwan (China), South Africa, 
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Chile, Argentina, the Russian Federation, and Mexico (Laird, Safadi, and 
Turrini 2003).
In general, utilization rates of preference schemes tend to be low. For 
instance, with limited exceptions (alcohols, sugar, ﬂowers, and jewelry), only 
around one-third of eligible products—and only 65 percent of eligible apparel 
exports from the Caribbean and Central America, despite a preference margin 
of 14 percent—are estimated to enter the U.S. under all preference programs 
(World Bank 2003a). For all Quad countries, rates of preference utilization 
are low and declining—by 2001 only an estimated 38.9 percent of eligible 
imports entered under reduced tariffs (table 7.1). In all, only 68.5 percent of 
total imports from LDCs eligible to enter Quad markets at a preferential duty 
actually do so; the rest pay MFN duties (UNCTAD 2004b). 
In addition to the GSP, new initiatives have aimed to reduce or eliminate 
tariffs on products from certain groups of low-income countries. The EU’s 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative (2001) and the U.S. African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (2000) offer deep preferences to recipient coun-
tries that can satisfy strict eligibility constraints. For instance, EBA eliminates 
tariffs on all tariff lines, but only for LDCs and with long transition periods 
for three critical products—bananas (2006), rice (2009), and sugar (2009). 
Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland also offer duty-free and 
quota-free access for all products from LDCs (Canada excludes certain agri-
cultural products). 
Overall, the impact of these schemes has not yet been very signiﬁcant, with 
the exception of African apparel exports to the U.S. under AGOA (World Bank 
2003a).3 The impact of the EBA has been relatively limited, largely because the 
vast majority of EU imports from LDCs (99.5 percent in 2001) were already 
eligible for preferences under other schemes—notably, the Lomé-Cotonou 
Conventions that cover ACP (African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc) countries (see 
appendix 2). However, non-ACP countries are underusing the EBA—in 2001, 
50 percent of their exports to the EU did not receive preferential access and 
paid the MFN tariff (Brenton 2003). 
Table 7.1
Quad country imports 
from Generalized 
System of Preferences 
beneﬁciaries (billions 
of dollars) and ratio 
of use of available 
preference (percent), 
1994–2001
Year
Total 
imports
Dutiable 
imports
Eligible for 
preference
Receiving 
preference
Rate of use of 
preferences 
(percent)
1994 448 283 162 83 51.1
1995 539 331 195 108 55.1
1996 585 351 178 100 56.0
1997 575 346 200 100 50.1
1998 543 311 183 74 40.6
1999 548 290 166 68 40.7
2000 623 308 171 72 42.0
2001 588 296 184 71 38.9
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There are several reasons why utilization rates of preference schemes tend 
to be low: complex regulations and rules of origin, exclusion of key exports 
from the recipients, uncertainty and conditionality of the preferences, non-
production of relevant goods, or administrative failure (Stevens and Kennan 
2004). Further, many LDC exports remain unable to meet relevant standards 
(see chapter 6); no preference schemes currently include any capacity-building 
programs to assist in this regard (UNCTAD 2004b). Countries must have a 
minimum base of production and supply capacity in order to be able to take 
advantage of preferences—supply-side constraints could also be an impor-
tant contributing factor to the low utilization rates of a number of preference 
schemes. Indeed, the low level of industrialization and diversiﬁcation in many 
ACP countries has contributed to the low utilization (although comparisons 
with other preference schemes, such as the U.S. AGOA, suggest rules of origin 
may be an important barrier) (Page and Kleen 2004). The choice of product 
coverage under preference schemes will also affect the extent to which supply-
side constraints are binding (that is, where schemes exclude or offer less favor-
able treatment to the very products that preference-recipient countries are best 
placed to produce—see below). 
Preferences are undermined by complex regulations and rules of origin
Countries beneﬁting from preferential access are subject to administrative 
requirements, and rules of origin are often complex. The result: countries are 
often forced to pay the MFN tariff because they cannot satisfy the require-
ments. The speciﬁcity, design, and application of rules of origin can make it 
particularly difﬁcult for LDC exporters to beneﬁt from preference schemes 
(UNCTAD 2001). For instance, underutilization of the EBA has been attrib-
uted in part to its rules of origin, which are stricter than those for ACP prefer-
ences (Brenton 2003). 
Strict rules of origin requiring local sourcing (or at best regional cumu-
lation) are often defended on the grounds that they help to encourage the 
development of integrated production structures in the recipient country.4 It 
is questionable whether integrated production structures are a sensible aim in 
the context of increasingly global production networks. In any case, there is 
little evidence to date that this actually happens. Further, this objective would 
surely be better served by the development of rules of origin in consultation 
with the recipient country, rather than unilaterally by the donor, as is currently 
the case.
Restrictive rules of origin are particularly hard on small countries with lim-
ited capacity to source locally. Regional cumulation can help, but it still limits 
sourcing choices, and there does not appear to be any development rationale 
for choice of countries for which cumulation is permitted—Sri Lanka is penal-
ized for using inputs from Indonesia, but not from India (Oxfam International 
2004a). Use of cheaper inputs from excluded countries can limit the eligibility 
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of the ﬁnal product for preferential treatment, but not using them can either 
raise costs and reduce competitiveness or render production unfeasible. 
This is a particular problem in textiles and apparel, which are key exports 
for LDCs. Many clothing exports from Bangladesh and Cambodia do not 
qualify for preferences under the EBA because of fabric sourcing require-
ments—and the competitiveness of fabric from external suppliers can be more 
important than the preference margin (UNCTAD 2004b). Likewise, the 
requirement to use U.S. fabric or yarn in manufacturing apparel limits the 
exports of some countries under AGOA, due to the higher cost of U.S. fabric 
and inefﬁcient transport logistics in Sub-Saharan Africa—whereas the very 
poor countries that are exempt from this requirement (such as Lesotho) have 
beneﬁted signiﬁcantly (Garay and Cornejo 2002). It is estimated that the basic 
AGOA rules of origin would reduce the potential beneﬁts of the agreement by 
up to a factor of ﬁve (Mattoo, Roy, and Subramanian 2002)—although the 
relaxation of the standard rules of origin for qualifying AGOA countries has 
meant that beneﬁciaries have been able to signiﬁcantly expand their garment 
exports to the U.S. In sum, restrictive rules of origin have a perverse effect: 
the smaller and poorer a country is, the less likely it is to be able to establish a 
textile industry that would qualify for preferential access to developed country 
markets (Oxfam International 2004a). 
Complex rules of origin also impose high costs simply in terms of pro-
viding the necessary documentation. These costs can be compounded where, 
for example, products are required to be shipped directly to the preference-
granting country or, if they transit another location, written proof must be 
provided that the products stayed under the control of customs at all times 
and did not enter the domestic market or undergo any operations other than 
loading or unloading. Transit is very common for products from LDCs, and 
acquiring this documentation can be costly and difﬁcult.
Preference schemes continue to restrict certain products of major export 
interest
Many preference schemes exclude or continue to restrict products of major 
export interest to recipient countries, often products in which these countries 
have a genuine comparative advantage. Often the most sensitive products with 
the highest tariffs also have the lowest preference margins or are subject to 
some type of quantitative limitation or safeguard. Further, preference margins 
do not address escalation since tariffs tend to remain higher on more processed 
products.
Product exclusion has been a major source of criticism of the GSP. In the 
EU, “sensitive” products receive only a 3.5 percentage point reduction in the 
MFN rate, except for clothing, which receives a 20 percent reduction (though 
in most cases this amounts to only 3.5 percentage points). Sensitive products 
include many of those of interest to developing countries—most chemicals, 
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almost all agricultural and food products, and all textiles, apparel, and leather 
goods. There seems to be less of a problem with product exclusion for LDC 
trade, where the products with the highest margin between the MFN rate and 
LDC preferential duty appear to correspond quite well to major LDC exports. 
For example, apparel and processed ﬁsh have some of the highest preference 
margins in a number of markets (WTO 2003d). A number of new schemes 
reduce tariffs for all LDC exports to zero, though exceptions tend to remain 
in areas of key interest, such as farm products (dairy, eggs, and poultry are 
excluded in Canada; bananas, rice, and sugar are subject to extended phase-
outs in the EU) or textiles and apparel (excluded in the U.S., with the excep-
tion of AGOA) (WTO 2003d). These exclusions matter: up to 70 percent of 
the potential positive trade effects for LDCs from the EU’s EBA could come 
from free access for sugar, rice, and beef (UNCTAD 2003c). 
Preferences are also often subject to special safeguards. Under the U.S. 
GSP, a country’s eligibility for a given product may be removed if its annual 
exports of that product reach a certain level or if there is signiﬁcant damage to 
domestic industry. Likewise, the EU GSP allows preferences to be suspended 
if imports cause, or threaten to cause, harm to a community producer. The 
EU’s EBA scheme also contains a mechanism for the temporary suspension of 
preferences in the event of massive increases in imports from LDCs, as well as a 
special safeguard for bananas, rice, and sugar. Whenever LDC imports of these 
products exceed or are likely to exceed the previous year’s level by more than 25 
percent, the Commission will automatically examine whether the conditions 
for applying a safeguard are met (Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga 2002). Prefer-
ence schemes also contain in-built mechanisms for graduation, which can lead 
to ﬁne-tuned discrimination between eligible developing countries. 
Since countries whose exports increase can be removed from preference 
schemes, including because of lobbying by import-competing groups in the 
donor country, some preference-receiving countries try to curb their export 
performance in order not to lose the preferential access altogether. Hence one 
of the many perverse incentives of preferences: countries that actually beneﬁt 
from preferences are more likely to lose them (Özden and Reinhardt 2003).
Preferences are uncertain and subject to conditions
Preferences are uncertain, subject to unilateral change or withdrawal by the 
donors and to nontrade conditionality. They can be used as bargaining chips 
against developing countries across a range of areas—directly related to the 
WTO (dispute cases), related to trade issues in general (intellectual property 
rights), or unrelated political issues—and can be withdrawn at any time without 
recourse (Özden 2003).5 Further, they are often of short duration and subject to 
periodic renewal. For instance, to prove eligibility for U.S. AGOA preferences, 
countries must document not only GSP criteria and satisfy rules of origin, but 
also criteria related to child labor and respect for internationally recognized 
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workers’ rights (IMF and World Bank 2002). U.S. GSP eligibility has also been 
used to promote increased protection of intellectual property rights in some 
developing countries (World Bank 2003a). Similarly, the EU’s GSP scheme 
contains conditions related to, for example, compliance with international anti-
money laundering agreements and measures to ﬁght the drug trade, as well as 
conditions related to environmental and labor standards. A major advantage of 
the EU’s new EBA scheme is that it is granted for an unlimited period and is 
not subject to periodic review (though it is subject to temporary suspension in 
the event of signiﬁcant import increases, as noted above). 
Has preferential access caused harm?
Returning to the distinction between “development preferences,” motivated 
by assisting recipients to overcome competitive disadvantages that constrain 
investment in new activities, and “rent preferences,” motivated by a desire to 
transfer resources to traditional suppliers of commodities, the evidence suggests 
that exports under “rent preferences” account for the lion’s share of current 
beneﬁts of those recipients that have exploited preferential access opportunities 
(Page and Kleen 2004). This in turn suggests that the beneﬁts from a global 
development perspective have been limited. Moreover, preferential access car-
ries some signiﬁcant downsides: it distorts developing countries’ trade and cre-
ates vested interests and the potential for unholy alliances.
Preferences divert trade from other developing countries
A key problem is the impact of the preferences granted to one developing coun-
try on the trade of other developing countries. Preferences can give rise to 
serious trade diversion. While this is also the case with preferential trade agree-
ments, it is likely to be more of a problem with preferences because the set of 
goods that developing countries produce will overlap much more with other 
developing countries that are not recipients than with the output of donor 
developed countries (Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and Winters 2003).
Trade diversion can be particularly pernicious where the preference mar-
gin is sufﬁcient to divert trade from a relatively efﬁcient developing country 
producer toward one that may never be competitive in the product concerned 
in the absence of this preference margin. Rather than encouraging diversiﬁca-
tion (a frequent argument among supporters of preferences), preferences tend 
to encourage specialization, including inappropriate specialization in uncom-
petitive sectors which, without the preferences, would have disappeared in the 
recipient country. This danger is particularly great in the case of preferences 
given in areas of very high protection, such as agriculture.
Equally poor—but non-ACP or non-LDC or non-African—developing 
countries are disadvantaged by preferences granted to ACP countries, to the 
countries covered by the EU’s EBA initiative, or to those covered by the U.S. 
AGOA initiative. This was made abundantly clear in the 1990s during the 
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dispute-settlement case that was brought to the WTO concerning the EU’s 
banana import regime. For every dollar of beneﬁt that the banana policy 
brought to producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-ACP devel-
oping country producers by almost exactly $1—and in the process harmed 
EU consumers by more than $13 (Borrell 2004). It is difﬁcult to imagine a 
more inefﬁcient way of transferring income to the poorest countries, since EU 
citizens could have, through direct payments, been 13 times more effective in 
helping ACP banana producers and not hurt non-ACP banana producers at 
all. Such wasteful trade diversion is avoided under nondiscriminatory MFN 
liberalization under the WTO.
Preferences create vested interests against multilateral liberalization
Fears of preference erosion and a desire to maintain preference margins clearly 
impede moves by many developing country preference recipients toward mul-
tilateral liberalization in areas that should be of key concern to them—such as 
agricultural support policies. There is a danger that a desire to keep preferences 
will allow the donor countries—the EU in particular—to bolster support from 
developing country recipients in an effort to keep protection high (such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy, see chapter 3) while not really sharing much, if 
any, of the resulting rents with preference recipients.
While the highest preference margins are not granted to farm products, 
the high level of protection in agriculture implies that even modest preference 
margins can create artiﬁcial markets for particular exporters. Estimates of pref-
erence margins for LDCs into four markets—Australia, Canada, the EU, and 
the U.S.—for those agricultural products where the difference between the 
donors’ MFN rate and the preferential rate granted to the LDCs was greatest 
show that margins vary widely. Not surprisingly, those in the less protected 
OECD countries are relatively low: 5 percent in the case of Australia, and 11 
percent to 19.6 percent, with most around 12.5 percent, in the case of Canada. 
Those in the most protectionist OECD countries are much higher: 18 percent 
to 25 percent in the case of the U.S., and 24 percent to 74.9 percent in the case 
of the EU (see appendix 7) (WTO 2003a). The key problem is that, where 
this has encouraged inappropriate specialization, the erosion or removal of the 
preference may cause painful adjustment problems to the recipients of prefer-
ences (see below). 
Preferences may undermine trade reform in developing countries
Finally, the fact that preferences are by deﬁnition not reciprocal makes life easy 
for politicians. But that contributes nothing to the removal of the wasteful 
trade-restrictive policies of recipient countries. Given that exporters are nor-
mally a strong voice for liberalization at the domestic level, the capture of this 
group in the cause of preferential access can retard the process of liberalization. 
In fact, countries tend to undertake more trade reform (they reap the efﬁciency 
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gains of removing protectionist policies) after withdrawal of GSP (Özden and 
Reinhardt 2003). By contrast, market access negotiations under WTO are 
characterized by reciprocity: you receive greater access to your trading partner’s 
market (on an MFN basis) on the condition that your trading partner receives 
a similar degree of improvement in access to your market. 
More generally, and perhaps most important, preferences divide develop-
ing countries on the issue of securing tariff reductions in OECD markets on an 
MFN basis. They do this in two ways: by reducing the number of developing 
countries arguing against protection and by creating a subset of developing 
countries that have an interest in supporting OECD protectionist policies in 
order to continue to receive the high domestic prices in those markets. The case 
of the ACP waiver deal that was negotiated in Doha—which pitted developing 
country exporters against ACP preference beneﬁciaries—is a clear illustration 
of how preferences can create conﬂicts among developing countries and allow 
donors to divide and rule. In that case, Thailand and the Philippines joined 
the consensus to grant a waiver for the EU’s preferences for ACP countries only 
after the EU agreed to consultations on the impact of these preferences on their 
exports of canned tuna (under the waiver, ACP countries would continue to be 
exempt from the 24 percent tariff applied to all other imports of canned tuna). 
The EU ultimately agreed to establish an MFN tariff quota on canned tuna of 
25,000 tons at a 12 percent tariff, but it did so in the face of opposition in ACP 
countries. Preferences limit the ability of developing countries to maximize 
their leverage in the WTO by negotiating as a bloc and undermine the forma-
tion of alliances to open protected OECD markets.
This point is crucial, and yet it is often not appreciated. Perhaps if these 
preferences had not been offered in the ﬁrst place, developing countries would 
have negotiated much more vigorously in previous GATT rounds for lower 
tariffs on agricultural and other imports into the EU. That in turn would 
have placed greater pressure on Japan and other OECD countries to reduce 
their agricultural protectionism also. The end result would have been higher 
international prices for agricultural products that, for developing country pro-
ducers as a group, may have been more than sufﬁcient to offset the lower prices 
received in the EU market for a favored subset of those producers.
Preference erosion
Although many preference programs have had only limited beneﬁts for recipi-
ents, the scope for preference erosion resulting from a Doha Round set of global 
reforms could be considerable for some countries. In part this will depend on 
the notional preference margins. But the real costs of preference erosion will 
depend on a much wider range of factors. These include the extent of trade 
actually taking place (determined by other factors, such as regulations and 
other nontariff barriers, as well as supply-side capacity), the extent of prefer-
ence utilization (which, as shown above, can be limited), and the extent to 
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which any rents actually accrue to producers in the poorest countries. Indeed, 
even if preferences have value—that is, they apply to highly protected sectors 
in donor countries and thus generate rents—in practice these rents will not 
accrue completely to the recipient developing countries.6 Instead, a share of the 
rents, and perhaps most of the rents, will be captured by importers (distribu-
tors, retailers, distribution subsidiaries of producers) (Tangermann 2002). 
Moreover, insofar as a developing country sells only part of its exports into 
a protected market to which it has preferential access, it receives a lower price 
for the rest of its exports than would be the case under free trade (because 
of the price-depressing effect of that OECD protection on the free interna-
tional market). It is therefore conceivable that the weighted average price for its 
exports is lower than it would be under free trade, notwithstanding the beneﬁt 
of preferential access for some of its exports. 
The costs of preference erosion also need to be set against gains from MFN 
liberalization—both for the recipient country and other developing and Least 
Developed Countries. Available evidence suggests that preference erosion is 
unlikely to be a major issue for many countries once the compensatory effect 
of broad-based multilateral liberalization is taken into account (World Bank 
2003a). Under a variety of scenarios, developing countries would receive tens 
of billions in welfare gains from an across-the-board reduction in MFN rates. 
For instance, a 50 percent reduction in agricultural and industrial tariffs would 
potentially yield welfare gains of $28 billion for developing countries, more 
than nine times the loss associated with the complete removal of GSP schemes 
(Lippoldt and Kowalski 2003). 
The more detailed assessments of this potential problem suggest that 
because only a few commodities account for the lion’s share of preference-
generated beneﬁts (rents) (table 7.2), and that the number of countries that 
have an export structure that is highly dependent on such commodities is small, 
preference erosion is a signiﬁcant economic issue for only a limited number of 
countries. Moreover, most of these countries are not the poorest countries, but 
middle-income economies (box 7.1).
The impact of abolishing GSP schemes is likely to be relatively small over-
all, with limited impact on the poorest developing countries, because they are 
not the main recipients. Reducing MFN duties to existing GSP rates (leaving 
other preferences untouched) would result in export losses in all beneﬁciary 
regions, but the losses are not large (0.4 percent and 1.6 percent of trade in 
the base period). Globally, the loss is estimated at $3.3 billion, with most ($2 
billion) borne by the Asian newly industrialized economies and China (as the 
largest beneﬁciaries of existing schemes). For these countries this represents 
only 0.2 percent of real income. Effects are also concentrated in textiles and 
apparel and processed agriculture. These sectors do not receive the biggest 
preferences, but beneﬁciary countries tend to specialize in sensitive sectors with 
high MFN protection (Laird, Safadi, and Turrini 2003). 
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Erosion of all preferences, both GSP and the deeper, more recent prefer-
ences such as EBA and AGOA as a result of MFN Doha reforms, would have 
a substantial impact on some countries, especially those with high concen-
trations of exports in heavily protected commodities. However, the number 
of countries that are in this situation is small (IMF 2004; Alexandraki and 
Lankes 2004). The problem is heavily concentrated in small island economies 
dependent on sugar, banana, and—to a lesser extent—garment exports (see 
table 7.2). These are the commodities for which protection and thus preference 
margins are high. Preference-dependent or -sensitive countries include Mauri-
tius, Malawi, Mauritania, Cambodia, Maldives, Haiti, Cape Verde, Sao Tome, 
Tanzania, and the Comoros (Stevens and Kennan 2004). The limited number 
and small size of most of the economies concerned imply that measures to help 
mitigate the impact of preference erosion can be closely targeted at the coun-
tries at risk (Alexandraki and Lankes 2004). The only large country expected 
to suffer from preference erosion is Bangladesh, which has beneﬁted signiﬁ-
cantly from the textile quota restrictions imposed on other large competitive 
developing countries such as China—restrictions due to be removed at the end 
of 2004 under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. 
Table 7.2
Contribution of major 
export products to 
preference margin
a. As a percent of the trade-
weighted average world market 
price of the country’s exports.
b. Average for 76 middle-
income developing countries, 
weighted by margin.
c. Eighteen countries with 
average preference margins 
greater than 5 percent.
Source: Alexandraki 
and Lankes 2004.
Proportion of margin accounted for by preferences for:
Total 
preference 
margina Sugar Bananas
Textiles and 
clothing
Other  
products
Middle-income countriesb 4.9 42 19 12 27
Largest beneﬁciariesc 15.6 51 24 8 17
Mauritius 39.9 84 0 13 3
St. Lucia 32.9 0 94 2 4
Belize 29.3 47 23 0 30
St. Kitts and Nevis 28.7 94 0 0 6
Guyana 24.2 95 0 1 4
Fiji 24.1 96 0 1 2
Dominica 15.9 0 97 0 3
Seychelles 12.2 0 0 0 100
Jamaica 9.7 67 8 7 18
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 9.4 0 89 0 11
Albania 8.9 0 0 48 52
Swaziland 8.2 97 0 1 2
Serbia and Montenegro 7.6 28 7 10 56
Honduras 6.7 56 9 19 15
Tunisia 5.9 0 1 79 20
Côte d’Ivoire 5.7 8 51 2 38
Morocco 5.7 0 4 64 33
Dominican Republic 5.5 23 16 27 34
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Those LDCs and small middle-income economies that will confront 
possible large losses from preference erosion will require concrete assistance. 
Given that they have been obtaining transfers from the importing countries, 
an appropriate response would be for these countries to convert these transfers 
into equivalent development assistance, which could be used by the recipi-
ent governments to fund adjustment costs. This ﬁrst-best solution may face 
the opposition of the preferences beneﬁciaries in the developing countries in 
Box 7.1
Measuring 
preference erosion
Note: Only preference 
erosion vis-à-vis Canada, 
the EU, Japan, and the 
U.S. is considered. Current 
preference margins are 
calculated using tariff 
data per two-digit tariff 
line for each preference 
scheme. Direction of trade 
data is then applied to 
obtain a trade-weighted 
preference margin.
Source: Subramanian 
2003; Alexandraki 
and Lankes 2004.
Simulations of the likely impact of a 40 percent reduction in MFN tariffs by Quad countries 
suggest that only a few countries will face signiﬁcant losses. 
The magnitude of the potential shock for middle-income countries is small in aggre-
gate, ranging between 0.5 percent and 1.2 percent of total exports of those middle-
income countries that are most preference-dependent. 
Six countries (Mauritius, St. Lucia, Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guyana, and Fiji) would 
incur signiﬁcant adjustment shocks, ranging from 11.5 percent for Mauritius to 7.8 per-
cent for Fiji. 
For the LDCs the overall impact is again likely to be limited, at some 1.7 percent of 
total trade. But here also there are some countries that will lose more: Malawi stands to 
lose 6.6 percent, and other countries confronting potentially signiﬁcant losses include 
Mauritania, Cambodia, and Bangladesh. 
Potential export losses 
(percent)
Other developing countries Least Developed Countries
Mauritius 11.5 Malawi 6.6
St. Lucia 9.8 Mauritania 4.8
Belize 9.1 Cambodia 4.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 8.9 Bangladesh 3.9
Guyana 7.9 Maldives 3.5
Fiji 7.8 Haiti 3.3
Dominica 5.5 Cape Verde 3.3
Seychelles 4.2 São Tomé and Principe 2.7
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 3.4
Tanzania 2.4
Comoros 2.0
Jamaica 3.3
Albania 3.3
Nicaragua 3.2
Swaziland 3.0
Serbia and Montenegro 2.9
Tunisia 2.2
Côte d’Ivoire 2.2
Morocco 2.1
Dominican Republic 2.1
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question. For instance, farmers having beneﬁted from EU banana or sugar 
regimes may insist on being compensated for the losses of their rents. The 
simplest way to handle this issue would be to make these farmers an integral 
part of the shift of OECD farm policies away from product-support to pure 
income-support (see chapter 3).
Given the history of preference programs, developed countries as a group 
should pay: they instituted and preserved the system of discretionary prefer-
ences, and they also have the largest interests in the trading system (Page and 
Kleen 2004). How to operationalize this shift from preferences to aid is some-
thing that should be considered explicitly as part of a Doha deal. A number of 
issues would have to be resolved: ensuring that ﬁnancing commitments were 
(and were seen to be) credible; guaranteeing that the associated aid would be 
additional to existing ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA); and ensuring 
that the aid was used to effectively address the adjustment burden in recipient 
economies (Hoekman 2004) (chapter 12). It would also need to be determined 
how the funds would be administered, and speciﬁcally, whether to give the 
WTO the mandate to manage them. Whatever is done in terms of manage-
ment of a funding entity, it is important that this be a temporary mechanism 
that is meant to deal with the adjustment costs associated with preference ero-
sion. Insofar as developed countries desire to support the countries concerned 
on a longer term basis, the appropriate vehicle is ODA.7
Another possibly complementary approach is the idea of “supply-side pref-
erences” to assist affected LDCs (UNCTAD 2004b). While this proposal 
requires further ﬂeshing out, the basic idea is for further measures in devel-
oped countries to promote the transfer of technology to LDCs and to promote 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in LDCs. For instance, measures 
to promote FDI could include ﬁnancial support in the form of equity and 
loans, the provision of ﬁscal incentives and insurance, or the dissemination of 
information services and match-making services. Measures to mitigate risks in 
LDCs could also be considered,8 as could measures to encourage maximum 
forward and backward linkages with local companies. Here there is a need to 
ensure that the focus is on market failures and that the programs are designed 
so as to minimize the prospects of capture by interest groups.9
Conclusion
Rich countries have used preferences to divide developing countries and pro-
mote their narrower regional, sectoral, and political objectives, often estab-
lishing complicated regulations whose effect is to exclude exports from oth-
erwise eligible countries. The poorest countries have seldom received more 
than limited beneﬁts from preferences, in part due to the shortcomings of the 
schemes and in part because preferences are only an opportunity for market 
access—they do not address the multiple supply-side constraints that limit the 
participation of the poorest countries in world trade. Beneﬁts are also often at 
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the expense of other developing countries, and are smaller than would be the 
case with either direct transfers or multilateral liberalization. Ultimately, the 
price of defending preferences is continuing protection in rich countries. Given 
this, MFN liberalization—plus appropriate compensation for those countries 
that may suffer adjustment problems—is likely to be a better path.

2 Rules-related issues
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What should be the 
scope of WTO rules?
There is more to the Doha Agenda than market access—the “rules of the 
game” are also the subject of intense debate. At the heart of this debate is the 
question of what sort of trade rules make sense for development. Answering 
this question requires considering not simply how existing trade rules can best 
be adapted, including through special and differential treatment, to address 
the needs of developing countries, especially the poorest ones at the core of the 
Millennium Development Goals. It also requires considering the more funda-
mental question of what, from a development perspective, should properly be 
the scope of trade rules in the ﬁrst place. That is, are there issues that simply 
do not belong on the WTO agenda?
This question has become more pressing with proposals to include on 
the WTO agenda issues such as the Singapore issues, which relate ever more 
closely to “behind the border” or domestic regulatory issues. Such proposals 
are unsurprising, as the reduction of traditional trade barriers has increased the 
visibility of differences in national regulatory regimes. But while trade liberal-
ization may have thrown these differences into sharper relief, it does not follow 
that trade rules are the best means of addressing the issues arising from these 
differences. Three tests can usefully be applied to determine whether rules on 
regulatory issues should be included in the WTO. First, is the issue related to 
trade, speciﬁcally to market access? Second, is it in line with broader develop-
ment priorities? Third, what is the speciﬁc value added of a WTO agreement? 
These three criteria are of course related and should be considered in light of 
each other.1
Is there a link to market access?
The threshold question is whether a particular regulatory policy is being used 
or can be used to restrict market access. This is the traditional WTO criterion 
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for inclusion of an issue on the agenda: whether a policy is trade-related, that 
is, whether it impedes market access or distorts competition on a third market. 
Regulatory measures can be a substitute for explicit barriers (such as product 
standards) and, as seen in chapter 6, multilateral rules on preventing protec-
tionist abuse of such measures can be warranted in order to ensure market 
access. WTO rules in this context may also lead to reciprocal beneﬁts similar 
to traditional trade liberalization: greater contestability of domestic markets 
and improved market access abroad. Where the link to market access is not 
clear-cut, serious doubts can be raised regarding the appropriateness of includ-
ing the policy areas in the WTO. 
Are there domestic beneﬁts to negotiating rules on regulation?
A key question is whether proposed regulatory rules make sense from a 
national perspective in terms of addressing development policy priorities, even 
if there are no market access considerations. Some domestic regulatory issues 
that have been proposed for inclusion on the WTO agenda are not priorities 
for low-income countries and risk diverting scarce administrative and politi-
cal resources from those that have higher development payoffs. Where agree-
ments on regulation require signiﬁcant investment of real resources by poor 
countries, a strategy of “just say no” may make sense if a cost-beneﬁt analysis 
suggests that the net beneﬁts are less than would be feasible if resources were 
invested elsewhere. It must be recognized that scarce policymaking resources 
in many low-income countries imply that there are opportunity costs associ-
ated with an expansion of the negotiating agenda. 
Determining national priorities on regulatory issues requires country-
speciﬁc evaluation of policy and institutional options. Assessing the relative 
development contribution of reform in a particular policy area will thus require 
proactive engagement by national stakeholders and extensive policy research.
Is there speciﬁc value in a WTO agreement?
A major function of international agreements is to overcome domestic con-
straints that prevent the adoption of welfare-improving policies. They can 
tackle domestic vested interests that are blocking reforms in the general interest 
to preserve their narrow group interests. International agreements may also be 
useful in cases where the beneﬁts of reform are maximized when others reform 
as well—as in the case of customs procedures. Finally, they may be necessary 
to deal with situations where a country’s policies generate negative spillovers or 
where problems go beyond the ability or scope of national authorities to handle 
(such as where the same information is required in different formats by export-
ing and importing countries, thereby raising transaction costs for ﬁrms).
That there are beneﬁts to collective action does not necessarily mean 
that the WTO is the right forum. Other international organizations or fora 
could take the lead. Here the extent to which the issue meets the ﬁrst criterion 
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(trade-related) is essential. While certain policies may be desirable for any 
sound, modern economy, they may not necessarily be appropriate subject mat-
ter for—or be appropriately promoted by—trade rules. The dispute settlement 
system, with its promise of more effective enforcement, may be a powerful 
attraction, but just because a certain policy is desirable does not mean that it is 
best fostered by international rules backed by formal dispute settlement. The 
WTO’s remit is trade; it is not the world economic organization, and it cannot 
carry the load of ensuring that countries have all the policies they need in a 
globalized economy. In many cases, other forms of international cooperation, 
such as voluntary agreements, information exchanges, and peer reviews, may 
be more appropriate. Even where action may be appropriately undertaken in 
the WTO, mechanisms and linkages are crucial to ensure the close involve-
ment of other organizations with technical expertise in the issues at stake.
It is also inherently difﬁcult to design generic rules that apply to all when 
it comes to behind-the-border policies. Given the general presumption that 
regulatory regimes should reﬂect local conditions, substantive harmonization 
may well be inappropriate. What is needed in the behind-the-border regulatory 
areas is to design agreements that are ﬂexible and encourage experimentation, 
learning, and competition. The easiest way to ensure “regulatory creativity” is 
not to include issues too early in the WTO. Indeed, countries with only lim-
ited experience of implementing certain policies at the national level may not 
be ready to sign onto binding multilateral rules governing their application. 
Alternatively, ﬂexibility can be maintained by limiting agreements on regula-
tory subjects to due process and transparency-type requirements. 
Even if negotiators get the economics right, there is a danger that good 
policies will be resisted because dealing with these types of issues in the con-
text of negotiation may lead countries to perceive reforms as costly conces-
sions to foreign interests, as opposed to being in the national interest. Further, 
the dynamics that drive the WTO require countries to bring “concessions” 
to the table if they are to induce partners to liberalize politically sensitive sec-
tors. Such linkage strategies may require consideration of negotiations in a 
particular area because of expected payoffs in other areas. In this case two 
considerations are paramount. First is that any negotiation be in the national 
development interest (as underlined above) and involve policy commitments 
that are seen to be desirable. Agreements that involve a welfare loss should not 
be accepted. Second is to avoid “paying twice” for the same reforms by trading 
partners. The linkage question boils down to how to design a socially beneﬁ-
cial grand bargain scenario—what can and should be offered in the context of 
WTO talks in order to obtain a desirable outcome? 
These tests form the backdrop to the major questions addressed in this 
part of the report: What issues should, from a development perspective, be the 
subject of trade rules? And what sorts of trade rules on those issues make sense 
from a development perspective?
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The Singapore issues
At the Doha Ministerial Conference it was decided that negotiations would be 
launched in Cancún on competition law, trade and investment, transparency 
in government procurement, and trade facilitation—if an explicit consensus 
was reached on the modalities for these talks.
That this deal was open to different interpretations emerged strongly at the 
Cancún Ministerial Conference. While the EU insisted that the talks on all 
four issues were mandated to begin, most developing countries argued that—
particularly in the absence of adequate progress on issues of interest to them, 
notably agriculture—there was no consensus for negotiations on the Singa-
pore issues. The EU offered to drop two of the issues, but the African Group 
insisted that all four be taken off the table, while Japan and the Republic of 
Korea insisted that all four be kept. 
After Cancún it was apparent to almost all but the most die-hard sup-
porters that three of the Singapore issues (competition, trade and investment, 
and transparency in government procurement) were effectively off the table. 
Debate in the lead-up to the 2004 Doha Work Program (DWP) text thus 
largely focused on whether negotiations would be launched on trade facilita-
tion. Developing countries, in particular the G-90, remained concerned that 
such negotiations could impose heavy implementation costs and overload their 
limited negotiating capacity. Intensive consultations were undertaken with 
developing countries stressing that any such negotiations should be limited in 
scope (bearing in mind the experience with TRIPS, which began with agree-
ment to negotiate on trade in counterfeit goods and ended with harmonization 
of patent protection) and that special and differential treatment (SDT) and 
provision of assistance should be integral parts of any negotiations.
The 2004 DWP text states that members agree to launch negotiations on 
trade facilitation “by explicit consensus,” but that the other Singapore issues 
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“will not form part of the Work Programme [set out in the DDA] and therefore 
no work toward negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the 
WTO during the Doha Round” (although there may be some ongoing argu-
ment about what precisely this means and whether the WTO Working Groups 
on these issues can continue). 
First, this chapter assesses the exclusion of trade and investment, trade and 
competition policy, and transparency in government procurement from the 
WTO agenda against the general criteria set out in the previous chapter for 
determining whether particular issues should be subject to multilateral trade 
rules. It then explores the rationale for an agreement on trade facilitation in light 
of these same criteria, and discusses possible ways in which any such agreement 
could be responsive to the needs and concerns of developing countries. 
The Singapore issues left out of the Doha Round
Trade and competition, trade and investment, and transparency in government 
procurement have rightly been left off the negotiating agenda for the Doha 
Round. None appears to meet all three of the tests set out in chapter 8: are they 
related to trade and market access? are they in line with broader development 
priorities? and what is the speciﬁc value of a proposed WTO agreement?
In terms of the ﬁrst criterion, all three issues are in some way related to 
market access—investment most directly, competition and transparency in 
government procurement more indirectly.1 However, in terms of the second 
criterion, many of these issues would not seem to be development priorities. 
In the case of competition law, for example, many of the poorest developing 
countries do not have such laws; most developing countries that have them 
have not had them for long, have often not been enforcing them, and generally 
need to develop much more experience to determine what works and what does 
not. Finally, it is not clear for any of these issues that a WTO agreement would 
contribute signiﬁcant value added to existing international initiatives in terms 
of overcoming domestic or international collective action problems.2 
Trade and competition
It is hard to see what beneﬁts a WTO-based initiative on competition policy 
could bring. All but a handful of the poorest developing countries’ economies 
are small. A sound trade policy based on moderate and as uniform as possible 
tariffs, on the absence of nontariff barriers, and on a liberal investment policy 
is likely to ensure the highest possible level of competition in their domestic 
markets. That small markets do not necessarily attract enough competitors is 
a problem that competition policy cannot handle. While a multilateral ban 
on export cartels would be beneﬁcial, it was not at all clear that OECD coun-
tries would have been willing to put this on the table or what price would be 
demanded. This is an issue where unilateral action could be taken if there was 
a serious interest in promoting development—the same is true with respect to 
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other pro-developing country proposals that had been identiﬁed in some of 
the proposals that were put forward in the Working Group: such as introduc-
ing competition law criteria in the enforcement of antidumping actions, or 
explicitly taking into consideration the effects of anticompetitive behavior by 
national ﬁrms operating on developing country markets. 
Trade and investment
A multilateral agreement on investment is unlikely to increase protection of 
investor rights beyond what is already provided for in the more than 2,000 
existing bilateral investment treaties, and countries are already undertaking 
massive unilateral and plurilateral liberalization of investment (UNCTAD 
2003f). Nor is action at the WTO likely to add much to existing international 
initiatives to curb improper public or corporate practices. Where a multilateral 
agreement could be useful is in addressing “beggar thy neighbor” policies to 
attract investment, in particular competitive subsidizing. However, available 
evidence about the capacity to discipline such subsidies suggests that the WTO 
is unlikely to succeed where governments have generally failed.
Transparency in government procurement
There are clearly potential domestic governance beneﬁts from increasing 
transparency in government procurement, though they depend crucially on 
whether the reforms are backed by senior political leadership in the context of 
broader governance reforms. Would a trade agreement help?3 Given the dif-
ﬁculties in pulling off unilateral domestic procurement reform in developing 
countries, a trade agreement might galvanize political constituencies behind 
domestic reform in return for some other beneﬁts—such as improved market 
access abroad. However, putting transparency provisions at the core of such an 
international agreement is unlikely to stimulate much support from domes-
tic exporters who are mainly interested in market access (Evenett 2003). The 
developmental impact, therefore, of WTO discussions on only transparency in 
government procurement is likely to be limited.
Trade facilitation
The current conditions of trade facilitation in the world suggest strong handi-
caps for developing countries—particularly for the poorest ones, and even for 
those located in the most dynamic regions of the world, such as the Asian-
Paciﬁc countries (Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki 2003). For instance, customs 
clearance for sea cargo takes an average of 2.1 days in developed countries and 
4.8 in East Asia and the Paciﬁc. But traders in Latin America and the Carib-
bean must wait up to 9 days, and those in Africa and South Asia, 10 days 
(World Bank 2003a). 
Port charges, delays, and freight costs are signiﬁcant constraints to export-
ing, and the availability of adequate transport and logistics infrastructure and 
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management greatly affects market delivery of products. The “list of deten-
tions” published by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration reveals that the 
main reason for detentions from Africa was that most food exports from the 
region were rotten (Jha 2002). Availability of sound logistics also inﬂuences 
investment decisions. With intraﬁrm trade now accounting for 33 percent of 
total world trade, companies’ choice of location is heavily inﬂuenced by the 
ease and cost of import and export (World Bank 2004). 
What is the rationale for disciplines on trade facilitation?
Trade facilitation is directly related to trade gains from market access (the ﬁrst 
of the three tests), and it brings a range of other development gains that make 
it a more general development priority (the second test). The list of handicaps 
above implies that gains to be expected from allowing customs and ﬁrms to 
operate in a more competitive framework—a mix of improving customs pro-
cedures and related services—are large. Initial estimates of such gains suggest 
magnitudes equivalent to those brought by tariff liberalization, though they 
vary depending on the deﬁnition of trade facilitation used (that is, the extent 
to which it includes broader factors such as transport costs) (box 9.1). More-
over, such gains are likely to be larger for small and medium enterprises, which 
tend to suffer most from current poor trade facilitation—hence they tend to 
be larger for the poorest developing countries, which tend to have the worst 
Box 9.1
Gains from trade 
facilitation 
Source: Wilson 2003; 
Wilson, Mann, and 
Otsuki 2003; Australian 
Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and 
Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation 
2001; Walkenhorst and 
Yasui 2003; Hummels 
2001; WTO 2000b; 
Staples 1998; Guasch 
and Spiller 1999.
• The cost of moving goods across international borders is now as important as tariffs 
in determining the cost of landed goods.
• Enhanced capacity in global trade facilitation would increase world trade by roughly 
$377 billion, or 9.7 percent. About $107 billion (2.8 percent) of the total gain would 
come from improvements in port efﬁciency and about $33 billion (0.8 percent) from 
those in the customs environment. The largest gains would come from an improve-
ment in service sector infrastructure and e-business usage ($154 billion or 4 percent). 
Gains from the exporter’s improvements in trade facilitation would dominate those 
from the importer’s improvements.
• Improving speciﬁc aspects of trade facilitation can already bring large beneﬁts. If 
developing countries were able to shave off an average of one day in the time spent 
handling all of their trade, the savings would amount to some $240 billion annually. 
Documentary red tape in customs procedures can increase the cost of imports sub-
stantially—under one estimate, by up to 7–10 percent of the value of world trade. 
Inefﬁcient regulation of port operations can give rise to implicit tariffs of 5–15 percent 
in exports in Latin America. Each day saved in shipping time, in part due to faster cus-
toms clearance, is worth a 0.5 percent reduction in the ad valorem tariff. Within APEC, 
moving to electronic documentation for trade could yield cost savings of some 1.5–15 
percent of the landed cost of an imported item. The introduction of electronic data 
interchange (EDI) systems in Chilean customs led to savings of more than $1 million a 
month for a system cost of $5 million. Duty shortfalls traced to irregular customs have 
been estimated as up to 50 percent, harming those poorest developing countries for 
which tariff revenue is an important source of public ﬁnances.
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current trade facilitation practices and a larger share of small and medium 
enterprises. New security demands underline the interest of all WTO Mem-
bers in upgrading the world’s trading machinery.
As a result, many developing countries recognize that improved trade facili-
tation is in their own interests and are already taking steps to make the neces-
sary improvements (though progress is slow, often due to resource constraints).
But does trade facilitation satisfy the third test? That is, what is the ratio-
nale for a WTO agreement on trade facilitation? And under what circum-
stances would such an agreement serve development?
Developing countries have raised a number of concerns about negotiat-
ing trade facilitation in the WTO (World Bank 2004). First, they fear being 
required to take on obligations that are expensive, difﬁcult to administer, and 
require investment in infrastructure beyond their capacities. These fears are not 
unjustiﬁed: costs of customs reforms are high, and reform cannot be achieved 
overnight. Second, in the face of these costs, there is concern that adequate 
technical assistance may not be forthcoming. Again, experience with other 
WTO agreements (notably TRIPS) suggests that these fears are not unjusti-
ﬁed. Third, there is the fundamental question of whether binding WTO rules 
are the appropriate way to promote what is essentially institutional develop-
ment in poor countries. Building institutions and infrastructure requires sus-
tained effort and investment over a long period; WTO agreements are argued 
to be a blunt instrument for ensuring such efforts.
The 2004 DWP text on trade facilitation provides little guidance on 
what could be a WTO agreement on trade facilitation, and it leaves some 
key questions open. WTO Members agreed “by explicit consensus” to launch 
negotiations on trade facilitation, but they did so “without prejudice to the 
format of the ﬁnal result of the negotiations and would allow consideration of 
various forms of outcomes.” The negotiating mandate recognizes the imple-
mentation challenges faced by developing countries and provides for SDT 
and enhanced assistance and capacity building (box 9.2). The scope of the 
negotiations is also clearly limited. While trade facilitation can encompass 
the whole raft of domestic policies, institutions, and infrastructure associ-
ated with the movement of goods across borders, the scope of WTO negotia-
tions on trade facilitation is narrower, focusing on three GATT Articles that 
directly concern aspects of trade facilitation: transit of goods, fees charged for 
customs clearance, and transparency in applicable legislation and administra-
tive requirements. 
There are three main arguments in favor of a WTO agreement on trade 
facilitation. First, the existence of an agreement galvanizes political will to 
ensure that reforms are actually undertaken within a meaningful time frame. 
But this gives rise to concerns that it will divert spending from other, greater 
development priorities. While investment in trade facilitation will be compen-
sated over the longer term by increased exports, in the short term there may be 
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greater immediate priorities (clean water, HIV/AIDS programs, and the like) 
in a context of very limited government spending.
This is where the second rationale for a WTO agreement comes in. The 
main beneﬁt of a WTO agreement in trade facilitation would lie in providing 
a mechanism for channeling international assistance into meeting these costs. 
There is a strong case for international assistance. In addition to the fact that 
it allows developing country government spending to focus on core develop-
ment issues such as health and education, trade facilitation is also a global 
public good; all countries beneﬁt from improvements in others’ trade manage-
ment capacities. Gains may increase when improvements are concurrent. Con-
versely, all countries are affected by weak links in others’ export and import 
capability; in the new security environment, such weak links can be a major 
source of vulnerability. There is also a strong argument that international assis-
tance for developing countries should focus not simply on meeting basic needs 
and providing social infrastructure, but on building the production and trade 
capabilities that can in turn generate growth (UNCTAD 2004b). The real 
value added of a WTO agreement on trade facilitation would thus depend on 
how effective it is in providing a mechanism to attract additional resources—
from both developed and, to a lesser extent, developing countries—for trade 
facilitation.
The third argument is that the trade facilitation agenda spans matters that 
revolve around the traditional domain of GATT/WTO negotiations: cross-
Box 9.2
The 2004 Doha 
Work Programme 
mandate on trade 
facilitation
Source: WTO 2004d.
Aim. Negotiations shall aim to clarify and improve relevant aspects of GATT Articles V (Free-
dom of Transit), VIII (Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation), 
and X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations) with a view to further expedit-
ing the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. A further 
aim is effective cooperation on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues. 
Special and differential treatment. The negotiations should take “fully into account the 
principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least developed coun-
tries” and this should “extend beyond the granting of traditional transition periods for 
implementing commitments.” The timing and extent of commitments shall be related to 
implementation capacity and countries. LDCs will be required only to undertake commit-
ments “to the extent consistent with their individual development, ﬁnancial and trade 
needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities.” 
Technical assistance. The negotiations also aim to enhance technical assistance and 
support for capacity building, and developed countries are to provide assistance for both 
the negotiation and implementation of commitments. In the “limited cases” where infra-
structure is required, developed countries will make every effort to ensure that support 
and assistance directly related to the nature and scope of the commitments is provided—
although such commitments are not open-ended. Where assistance is not provided, 
implementation is not expected. The effectiveness of assistance will be subject to review. 
A collaborative effort on assistance is foreseen, involving the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WCO, 
and World Bank.
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border negative (monetary) spillovers. An example is the conditions that are 
imposed on transit trade, something that is of great importance for landlocked 
countries. Another example concerns the negative impacts of trade costs for 
express carriers, which may impede them from offering their services, or may 
greatly reduce the extent of their potential market in speciﬁc countries.
Options for a trade facilitation agreement
A WTO agreement on trade facilitation cannot be business as usual. It should 
not impose heavy obligations on developing countries and make light promises 
of assistance. A new approach is needed so that the agreement provides some-
thing in the trading interests of all countries, but in a way that ensures that the 
entirety of the implementation burdens do not fall on the countries least able 
to afford them. How might this be achieved?
Should it apply to all WTO Members? The 2004 DWP text does not refer to a 
trade facilitation agreement but to disciplines on trade facilitation. The absence 
of a reference to an agreement is argued by some to mean that the disciplines 
need not apply to all Members. However, others note that the language refer-
ring to clariﬁcation of GATT Articles V, VIII, and X, along with the reference 
to the negotiations having been decided by “explicit consensus,” make it clear 
that the negotiations are part of the single undertaking of the Doha Agenda. 
They also note that the reference to the extent and timing of entering into 
commitments by developing and Least Developed Countries being related to 
their implementation capacities implies that all will be subject to the rules. 
However, the words “entering into” commitments also imply a possible GATS-
like structure where countries only undertake market-opening commitments 
when they are ready to do so. This could imply that trade facilitation disci-
plines could be signed onto on an à la carte basis.
These options do not provide for differential commitments, however—
although it is possible that the timing for implementation of certain provisions 
could be so long as to be indeﬁnite. There are several reasons for this. First, 
improvements in trade facilitation are in a country’s own interests, so if there 
are grounds for a WTO agreement at all, it is as a mechanism for helping 
countries to achieve those gains, not for excusing them from doing so. Sec-
ond, if a WTO agreement is to prove a meaningful instrument for marshaling 
resources, the “public good” argument must be stressed—and this argument 
leaves more limited scope for some countries never to have to contribute to its 
provision. Third, a WTO agreement should not include provisions that any 
of its Members can never implement. If the provisions are so demanding or 
resource intensive they arguably have no place in a WTO agreement. Either 
certain provisions are truly necessary to promote trade facilitation, in which 
case it is in everyone’s interests that they be implemented at some point, or they 
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are not, in which case there is no need for them to be in a WTO agreement, 
given that Members are always free to exceed their obligations if they wish.
This argument is analogous to the consideration given to a possible pluri-
lateral agreement. Under a plurilateral approach, all countries are involved in 
the negotiations, but can choose whether to join the agreement or not. How-
ever, plurilateral agreements pose several problems. Once the agreement is in 
place, countries gradually come under pressure to join (acceding countries in 
particular), especially if the agreement aspires to covering a certain percent-
age of world trade. Plurilateral agreements also run the risk of discriminating 
against nonparties. Some developing countries have also expressed concerns 
that a plurilateral approach on the Singapore issues could set a precedent for 
similar approaches on environment or labor standards. These problems are 
likely also to arise in the context of a trade facilitation agreement where not all 
provisions applied to all Members.
Types of obligations. A trade facilitation agreement is likely to work best where 
the commitments to be undertaken take the form of general principles and 
are not overly prescriptive on the precise means to achieve them. Most WTO 
agreements specify general objectives without being too speciﬁc as to how 
countries achieve them or the technological means they use to do so. Where 
they have ventured into more speciﬁc and prescriptive disciplines—such as 
the precise periods speciﬁed for patent protection under TRIPS—they have 
been open to charges of “one size ﬁts all” and have experienced consider-
able problems with implementation. Further, in the trade facilitation case, 
the Kyoto Convention of the World Customs Organization (WCO) already 
provides detailed instruction for national authorities on the improvement of 
customs procedures.4
Given that most OECD countries have the required trade facilitation 
frameworks largely in place, the implementation burden of any new disciplines 
would fall on developing countries. In view of this asymmetry, and the fact 
that some developing countries face real resource constraints in implementing 
trade facilitation reforms, the agreement should match these country obliga-
tions on trade facilitation disciplines with developed country obligations to 
provide the necessary assistance. That is, binding commitments by developed 
countries on the provision of adequate technical and ﬁnancial assistance to 
developing countries facing implementation difﬁculties should be negotiated 
as part of any new trade facilitation agreement.
Such assistance could be provided bilaterally or could tap into the consid-
erable assistance in this area under way or planned through international or 
regional organizations. For example, given that a number of developing coun-
tries are currently taking out loans from the World Bank for trade facilitation 
or related infrastructure, one option in terms of provision of assistance could 
be for developed countries to fund the provision of interest-free or otherwise 
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subsidized loans to developing countries for trade facilitation infrastructure. 
The World Bank at Cancùn also launched a major new initiative on trade 
facilitation, including a review of the Bank’s project portfolio in ports, cus-
toms, and other trade-related infrastructure. Additionally, considerable assis-
tance with customs reform is provided by the IMF and the WCO. Bilateral 
donors including the EU, U.S., and Japan are already funding projects tied to 
strengthening the WTO system, security upgrades, and related trade facilita-
tion infrastructure (World Bank 2004). WTO Members could fund country-
speciﬁc projects under these and other existing programs. 
Five options. The ﬁve options presented below aim to take into account these 
aspects. They range from a traditional WTO agreement with SDT to a GATS-
type approach providing greater ﬂexibility for countries to choose the timing 
of their commitments. They are all based on the assumption of general disci-
plines and parallel commitments by developing and developed countries on 
substantive obligations and the provision of necessary assistance to implement 
them respectively. 
Option 1. The “GATS commitments” model
Countries would sign onto individual disciplines related to trade facilitation as 
they were ready to implement them. They would not undertake commitments 
until they felt comfortable that they could implement them, or had already 
implemented them. Developed countries would be under a general obligation 
to provide the necessary assistance to help developing countries reach the point 
where they could agree to be bound by certain disciplines. 
This approach provides a high degree of ﬂexibility to countries to prioritize 
implementation costs against other priorities for development spending.
This option has two main drawbacks. First, it is unlikely to provide any 
great impetus for the improvement of trade facilitation procedures in develop-
ing countries. This is a disadvantage for those countries, as many costs are 
incurred because of lack of trade facilitation infrastructure and procedures—
costs that must be weighed against the costs of implementation. Second, there 
is likely to be parity between the nature of developing country commitments 
on trade facilitation and the nature of developed country commitments to 
provide adequate technical and ﬁnancial assistance. Open-ended time frames 
for developing countries to undertake commitments are unlikely to result in 
greatly increased assistance from developed countries.
Option 2. The “unilateral GATS precommitments” model
A particular technique used in the GATS—precommitments—would form 
the basis of the agreement. Under the GATS a country can commit itself to 
implementing a particular obligation for a speciﬁc service from a certain date 
in the future. Under this option, developing countries would autonomously 
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indicate, for each discipline in the agreement, the future date by which they 
would implement it. 
This approach provides for some certainty and an end date by which obli-
gations will deﬁnitely be implemented, but still allows individual WTO Mem-
bers the freedom to select those dates according to their existing capacities, 
development spending priorities, and the relative resource-intensiveness of dif-
ferent obligations. 
This option has three main drawbacks. Some countries may opt for end 
dates that are so far into the future as to render the agreement meaningless—
and such commitments are also unlikely to attract meaningful technical and 
ﬁnancial assistance. It may also leave those obligations that would confer the 
most beneﬁt in terms of improvements in trade facilitation to be last. Coun-
tries may also have difﬁculty in predicting realistic dates for implementation 
of parts of the agreement.
Option 3. The “negotiated GATS precommitments” model
Instead of being determined unilaterally, precommitments could be reached 
through a process of request-offer negotiations (as they are in the GATS). This 
same process would be used to negotiate parallel commitments by developed 
countries for the provision of adequate assistance to facilitate implementation 
by the given date. 
There are several beneﬁts to this approach. First, it allows for differentiation 
among developing countries based on their capacity to implement, without the 
need for creating new categories among them. This is particularly useful as a 
priori categories may be based on criteria that do not reﬂect their actual capac-
ity to implement a trade facilitation agreement. For example, despite being at 
comparable levels of GDP, countries may have quite different problems and 
capacities—some will be landlocked; others might face difﬁcult geographi-
cal conditions (natural disasters, remoteness). Equally, given the heavy role of 
governments in providing many of the necessary services for trade facilitation 
(such as customs inspection), governance issues and the political circumstances 
may have a particular inﬂuence on ability to implement. The request-offer pro-
cess would allow for these individual circumstances to be taken into account in 
agreeing deadlines for particular provisions. 
Under this option, the poorest countries may choose to use an additional 
possibility, that is, to negotiate as a group to maximize their resources and nego-
tiating power. A regional, coordinated approach may make sense for countries 
whose own progress on trade facilitation is partially dependent on that of their 
neighbors—as is the case for landlocked countries. A group approach may 
also facilitate the creation of regional technical assistance schemes. The group 
approach would not preclude individual countries from establishing their own 
implementation deadlines, however. 
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Negotiations may also result in a more sensible differentiation between 
developing countries in the sense that major traders are more likely to be sub-
ject to greater pressure for early compliance than poorer countries. Equally, the 
fastest reformers among developing countries can set the pace and encourage 
others to speed up the reform process. A major beneﬁt is that countries are 
more likely to respect deadlines that they have developed and agreed to in 
negotiations, rather than dates they may feel have been arbitrarily established. 
The second beneﬁt of this approach is that, by subjecting the provision of 
assistance to the negotiation of bound commitments, it forces greater coordina-
tion among developed country donors. Given that countries will be negotiat-
ing implementation dates simultaneously with commitments for the assistance 
to help make implementation by that date feasible, it will be in the interests 
of major donors to coordinate among themselves to determine how the cost of 
assistance will be distributed and who will take the lead in providing assistance 
to individual countries. In practice, countries tend to devote more assistance to 
those closer or more important to them—this model would likely reﬂect that 
reality, with major donors taking primary responsibility for providing assis-
tance to their traditional recipients. Arrangements among donors would need 
to be made to ensure that all countries were covered. While there is a potential 
free-rider problem, developed countries are likely to place sufﬁcient pressure on 
each other to ensure that all pay their share of assistance. 
In addition, within governments, this system could assist in better coor-
dination between trade and aid ministries, as aid ofﬁcials would be involved 
in the negotiations from the start. Instead of the trade agreement being signed 
and the aid agencies later being approached for help in implementation—with-
out any sense of ownership on their part—under this process, they would be 
involved throughout the process in negotiating their own commitments. This 
need not involve—or solely involve—visits to Geneva; negotiations could 
also take place in the capital of the developing country concerned through 
local embassies and specialist delegations. This would foster a more integrated 
approach to such trade-related assistance in bilateral aid programs and greatly 
increase the chances of adequate follow through. 
This option has three main drawbacks. First, the potential downside of 
negotiating commitments to provide technical assistance is the risk that it 
could undermine efforts to take a more demand-driven locally owned approach 
to the provision of assistance. Much would depend on the extent to which 
the relevant authorities were involved in the negotiations and in the level of 
speciﬁcity used in the identiﬁcation of assistance. While the risks might be 
lower were an envelope of assistance to be agreed, there is still the question 
of whether ear-marking an envelope of funds for this speciﬁc purpose would 
cut across efforts to move toward greater budget, not program, aid (designed 
to promote the ability of individual countries to set their own priorities). Sec-
ond, any assistance negotiated under this scheme would simply displace exist-
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ing bilateral assistance. It could be argued, however, that the transparency 
of this arrangement and the scope for concerns to be raised in negotiations 
(and traded off against implementation deadlines) would go some way toward 
helping to ensure that trade facilitation assistance was genuinely additional 
to existing assistance. A third drawback is that this process may be relatively 
time-consuming and resource-intensive.
Option 4. The standard GATT agreement model, including enhanced SDT
A fourth option would be for the agreement on trade facilitation to consist of 
a set of obligations that would be implemented immediately by OECD coun-
tries, with developing countries given an extended period of time to implement 
the agreement—say, 5 years. The poorest developing countries would be given 
10 years.
Developed country commitments to provide adequate technical and ﬁnan-
cial assistance would be applied over the same time frames, and failure to pro-
vide assistance could be raised by developing countries as a defence in any 
dispute settlement case regarding the agreement. 
One or two reviews of each implementing member would be held during 
the implementation period. Reviews would cover both the developing country 
in question’s progress in implementing the agreement and the adequacy, qual-
ity, and effectiveness of the assistance provided by developed country members. 
Expert advice would be given by the WCO, World Bank, UNCTAD, and any 
regional organization involved in the provision of assistance (such as APEC). 
The reviews would be seen as an opportunity to identify problems with imple-
mentation and gaps in the provision of assistance. That is, the process would 
be strictly disconnected from any dispute settlement action.
Attendance at implementation reviews by appropriate capital-based experts 
from each country under review could be facilitated by the creation of a fund 
administered by the WTO Secretariat to which all developed country mem-
bers would contribute as part of their assistance obligations. Developing coun-
try members could then request assistance from the fund. Participation by 
other developing countries in the review process would be encouraged as they 
might be able to offer useful perspectives from their own experience. Schedul-
ing reviews should, to the extent possible, aim to facilitate opportunities for 
networking by developing countries facing similar issues.
In addition, the following SDT provisions would apply:
• A “Peace Clause” (that is, a moratorium on dispute settlement) would 
exist for a further, say, ﬁve years after the end of the implementation 
period. During this period, WTO Members would be free to consult 
about matters related to implementation, but no dispute settlement 
processes could be brought. For the poorest developing countries, the 
moratorium would apply for another, say, 10 years.
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• Developing countries would also have the possibility to seek an exten-
sion of time to implement the agreement. These extensions would be 
subject to negotiation with the Trade Facilitation Committee, but 
would be subject to a requirement that requests receive sympathetic 
consideration. (A similar provision exists in the Customs Valuation 
Agreement.) Consideration of requests would also take into account the 
assessment of assistance received in the previous reviews. Negotiated 
extensions would include review provisions—again of both implemen-
tation and assistance received—and they would draw on expert advice 
from the WCO plus any other organization substantially involved in the 
provision of assistance to the country concerned (similar to the advice of 
the IMF used with regard to exercise of the exceptions related to balance 
of payments concerns). The Peace Clause would continue in effect for 
the additional implementation period, and would expire as normal ﬁve 
years after the original implementation date or two years after the end 
of the new agreed date for implementation, whichever is the longer. A 
variation on this model would make the extension provision available 
only with regard to the most complex or resource-intensive provisions of 
the agreement, rather than the whole agreement. 
This option provides for a clear timetable for implementation of the agree-
ment and thus provides incentives for both developing and developed countries 
to take their obligations seriously. It also affords some ﬂexibility for developing 
countries in implementation, through the possibility of negotiating extensions 
and the Peace Clause—giving the poorest countries an incentive to implement, 
while shielding them from dispute settlement action. And it combines the best 
elements of technocratic assessment of actual capacity, including by drawing 
on external expertise, and the use of the WTO as a mechanism for countries 
to coordinate, negotiate, and agree among themselves on a reasonable overall 
package. 
Its main drawback is that developing countries are still required to imple-
ment the agreement by a set date and thus it could still be argued to distort 
development spending priorities. The monitoring and review process is also 
somewhat resource-intensive. 
Option 5. The “GATS precommitment” model, with review
This proposal would combine the GATS precommitment models with the 
review mechanism outlined above. The dates for the reviews would also be 
negotiated as part of the request-offer process. The possibility of extension 
would exist as for Option 4, to be negotiated for each provision for which 
the implementing country was seeking an extension. The Peace Clause would 
apply for an additional one year after each implementation date for the relevant 
provision for developing countries. For the poorest developing countries this 
period could be, for example, ﬁve years.
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This option combines the strongest elements of all the systems outlined 
above. Implementation deadlines could be customized in negotiations with 
individual countries and are thus more likely to be feasible and respected. 
Technical and ﬁnancial assistance packages could be likewise negotiated and 
customized, with the greater involvement of aid ministries at an early stage, 
which should result in greater ownership and follow through. The regular 
review and monitoring process would allow for problems to be identiﬁed and 
addressed in a timely fashion, with input from expert organizations and other 
developing countries with similar experiences, and the possibility of negotiated 
extensions would exist to deal with unforeseen difﬁculties or where the time 
and assistance required had been underestimated. Lastly, the Peace Clause 
would provide some ﬁnal breathing space for countries experiencing ﬁnal 
implementation problems.
The main drawback is that it makes the agreement longer to negotiate, 
the implementation less even, and the monitoring and review process more 
complicated.
Should dispute settlement apply?
The 2004 DWP text is silent on the issue of whether trade facilitation disci-
plines should be subject to dispute settlement.
The key issue is the extent to which commitments by developing coun-
tries to implement trade facilitation and those by developed countries to pro-
vide the necessary assistance would be parallel from the point of view of dis-
pute settlement. Developing countries could bring a case against a developed 
country for failure to provide the promised assistance; however, this may 
not always be a good use of their scarce dispute settlement resources. That 
said, in the case of a pattern of nondelivery by a donor country, the lodging 
of a complaint by a group of developing countries could be feasible. This 
situation is not inconceivable—for instance where a donor country’s politi-
cal processes had tied up the necessary funds (perhaps due to linkages to 
unrelated issues in parliamentary bodies), the lodging of a WTO complaint 
might be a useful boost to those domestic agencies trying to push the fund-
ing through.
Most of the time, however, developed country commitments on assistance 
will be used as a form of counter-claim in any disputes on developing country 
nonimplementation brought by developed countries. The effect could be to 
make developed countries think twice about bringing disputes, given that they 
would be required to prove that the full extent of their promised assistance had 
been provided. In this way, the onus of proof is also reversed—in arguing that 
a developing country had not complied with the agreement, the developed 
country would have ﬁrst to prove that all its promised assistance had been 
provided in a timely manner.
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This is a powerful incentive for developed countries to implement their assis-
tance obligations. Developed countries wish to see trade facilitation improve-
ments in developing countries, and the effect of this system is to strengthen 
the link between that implementation, the ability to enforce it through dispute 
settlement, and their own role in providing assistance. 
Conclusion
The options proposed above are designed to play to the strengths of the WTO 
as a forum for the negotiated exchange of “concessions,” while making this 
process more balanced and responsive to the needs of developing countries by 
ensuring that the provision of assistance is subject to the same negotiating and 
dispute frameworks as developing country implementation obligations.5 
On balance, Option 5 would seem to be the most promising approach. Out 
of the proposals above, it comes closest to providing a framework to effectively 
channel increased international resources into the promotion of trade facilita-
tion, while minimizing to the extent possible the disproportionate burden on 
developing countries. 
The options outlined above apply to trade facilitation, but they could be 
adapted to ﬁt other types of WTO agreements related to rules with implemen-
tation costs. This possibility is discussed in chapter 11 on special and differen-
tial treatment.
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The TRIPS Agreement
In debates about the scope of WTO rules, no area has generated more con-
troversy than the TRIPS Agreement. For some, the protection of intellec-
tual property rights (IPRs) has no place in the trading system; others view 
their inclusion as in principle legitimate, but believe the TRIPS Agreement 
to be seriously ﬂawed; still others view it as perfectly legitimate. This chapter 
explores whether developing countries have an interest in IPR protection in the 
WTO and whether the existing agreement affords them sufﬁcient ﬂexibility 
with reference to two issues that dominate the TRIPS negotiating agenda: 
access to medicines, and geographical indications (GIs). 
Access to essential medicines came close to derailing the Doha negotia-
tions, ﬁrst during the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, then in subsequent 
negotiations leading up to the 2003 Cancún Ministerial. A belated solution 
was only reached less than two weeks before the Cancún Ministerial, when the 
U.S. ﬁnally dropped its reservation to the text previously agreed by all other 
WTO Members nine months earlier. However, by that stage, serious damage 
had already been done by months of often acrimonious negotiations and a very 
public, equally acrimonious, debate between the pharmaceutical industry and 
a number of high-proﬁle NGOs. At issue was both the nature and legitimacy 
of intellectual property rights protection for medicines and whether the trad-
ing system should be used to enforce those rights.
GIs are the main current TRIPS issue on the negotiating agenda. These 
negotiations are likely to attract less public attention—though some products, 
such as tobacco or traditional knowledge or designs, could become the center 
of attention from some NGOs—but they are also shaping up to create deep 
divisions among the WTO membership. Unlike access to medicines, however, 
these divisions do not split along developed-developing country lines. In par-
ticular, and somewhat ironically, the positions of most WTO Members—from 
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the U.S. or the EU to India or Egypt—on GIs are the complete opposite of 
their position on the drug issue: the U.S. is the hardliner on drugs against 
India, but India, along with the EU, is among the hardliners on the GIs issue. 
This ﬂuidity of interests and positions may be seen as reﬂecting the inher-
ently second-best feature of the TRIPS Agreement in a world of multiple dis-
tortions. Drugs and GIs require countries to ﬁnd a balance between the inter-
ests of inventors-producers and the needs of the public for access to products, 
information, and services—and there is no reason that this balance should be 
the same for each TRIPS topic in every country.
This ﬂuidity also suggests that some developing countries might have 
growing interests in IPR protection in the WTO. Despite the fact that econo-
mists would have preferred that the complicated TRIPS issues would be dealt 
with in a more pragmatic way and outside the WTO, an increasing number of 
WTO Members appear to have some interests in the TRIPS Agreement. These 
interests may be actual (GIs) or potential in areas not covered, or insufﬁciently 
covered, by the agreement to date. For instance, developing countries are well 
endowed with traditional knowledge and genetic resources for which they are 
seeking increased protection under the agreement (chapter 12). 
There is perhaps more agreement on the extent to which the TRIPS Agree-
ment provides sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for developing countries. As a basic matter, 
there is wide agreement that the time and resources required to implement 
the Agreement were greatly underestimated and that implementation has (and 
will, if nothing is done) put a considerable strain on many developing coun-
tries. Assistance from developed countries, and the additional implementation 
periods permitted developing countries, have not been commensurate with the 
size of the task. 
Additionally, in some cases, the substance of the Agreement provides 
insufﬁcient ﬂexibility, imposing a “one size ﬁts all” model of IPR protection on 
countries at widely differing levels of development and requiring protection of 
the full range of IPRs despite varying interests and priorities. In other cases, 
the problem may be not so much that the Agreement has no in-built ﬂexibil-
ity. Rather, it is that some WTO Members are not permitting others to take 
advantage of the existing ﬂexibility. For instance, while the agreement provides 
for differing implementation periods, countries acceding to the WTO may 
not even have access to these normal ﬂexibilities. Additionally, certain WTO 
Members—the U.S. on drugs, the EU on GIs—are trying to impose strict 
(and thus unacceptable for a vast majority of the rest of the world) limits on 
the existing TRIPS ﬂexibility.
Both these issues—the potential areas of developing country interest and 
the question of how much ﬂexibility the agreement provides and whether 
countries are actually able to use it—are discussed below with reference to 
access to medicines and GIs. It is important to remember during the following 
discussions that, in the absence of any new decision, the full effect of TRIPs 
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will be felt only after 2005 by the developing countries, and after 2016 by the 
poorest countries.
At the outset, it is useful to revisit some of the reasons why the TRIPS Agree-
ment was introduced into the WTO. In the middle of the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations, support for freer trade in developed countries was fading. The U.S. 
coalitions for investment, and later for services—the engines of the negotiations 
during the ﬁrst years—had disappeared or were in disarray. By contrast, oppo-
nents of a Uruguay Round deal in the U.S. and EU farm and clothing sectors 
were strong. The support of IPR-intensive sectors (drugs, software) became essen-
tial to move the negotiations forward. The Uruguay Round became a “TRIPS 
for textiles (and agriculture)” deal in which the developing countries agreed to 
extend protection for IPRs in exchange for liberalization of trade in textiles and 
clothing (and agriculture) (Panagariya 1999).1 However, relatively little has been 
achieved on textiles liberalization to date (chapter 5), and farm barriers were left 
almost intact by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (chapter 3).
TRIPS and access to medicines
The signatories of the TRIPS Agreement were aware that extension of IPRs 
to all WTO Members would have the effect of increasing the price of essen-
tial medicines—and other IPR-based products—in developing countries, and 
reducing the ability of many developing countries to access new technologies.2 
For this reason, they included certain provisions intended to lessen some of the 
most severe potential negative consequences by balancing the interests of IPR-
holders with those of the society at large. As will be discussed further below, 
the extent of some of these ﬂexibility provisions was the focus of the negotia-
tions at Doha and during the following year (box 10.1).3
Between the signing of the Uruguay Agreement (1994) and the 2001 
Doha Ministerial, the spread of HIV/AIDS reached pandemic proportions. 
But research into detection and treatment yielded a cocktail of drugs that 
could reduce the viral load almost to zero. A disease that had been a death 
sentence two decades previously could now be treated, affording its victims 
a near normal life. However, the new drugs are subject to patent protection, 
with a typical treatment costing $12,000 a year per person in developed coun-
tries—a sum far out of reach for most AIDS victims in the developing world. 
This situation prompted a discussion of possible interpretations of the TRIPS 
provisions on patents that would enable consumers in developing countries, 
particularly in the poorest ones, to have access to essential drugs under patent 
protection. This discussion was only partly about legal interpretations of the 
TRIPS provisions—most legal experts already agreed that these ﬂexibilities 
exist—and the Doha Declaration itself adds little in legal terms. What was 
really at stake was the ability of countries to actually make use of the TRIPS 
ﬂexibilities, in light of political pressures not to do so. A clear political message 
of the legitimacy of such use was needed to help in countering this pressure. 
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Initially, the solution was to rely on existing provisions under the TRIPS 
Agreement—hence at the Doha Ministerial, the WTO Members afﬁrmed 
the use of TRIPS Article 31, which permits the use of compulsory licensing, 
including in the event of a national health emergency. However, these existing 
rules contained an important gap: under TRIPS Article 31(f), drugs produced 
under compulsory licenses must be intended primarily for domestic use. In other 
Box 10.1
Key concepts 
and provisions 
for TRIPS and 
medicines
 
Source: Lehmann 2002.
A patent is a property right granted by a state to the inventor of a novel (not previously 
disclosed anywhere in the world, or only in the national territory, according to domestic 
law), non-obvious, and useful invention. The purpose of a patent is to provide incentives 
for creation and investment by granting a limited-term exclusive property right over the 
invention.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members are obliged to extend patent protection 
without discrimination as to ﬁeld of technology (TRIPS Article 27). Patents have to be 
made available for both processes and products. The term of patent protection is to be 20 
years from the date of ﬁling. WTO Members have discretion to adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health, but they should be consistent with the provisions of the Agree-
ment (TRIPS Article 8). 
Developing countries have until 2005 to implement patent protection for pharmaceu-
ticals. At the Doha Ministerial it was decided that LDCs would not be obligated to imple-
ment, apply, or enforce the TRIPS obligations on patents or undisclosed information before 
2016. However, the exclusive marketing rights provision in TRIPS speciﬁes that new drugs 
invented between 1996 and 2005 will qualify for patent protection when they come onto 
the market after 2005. Indeed, some of those drugs are already on the market, beneﬁting 
from protection in countries that have already implemented their patent obligations.
Governments can authorize the use of a patented invention by someone other than the 
right-holder by issuing a compulsory license (TRIPS Article 31). However, they must ﬁrst 
make efforts to obtain authorization from the right-holder on reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions. This requirement can be waived in a national emergency. Products pro-
duced under a compulsory license should be predominantly for the domestic market of the 
member authorizing the use, and the right-holder is to be paid adequate remuneration. 
WTO Members can provide limited exceptions to patent rights provided that these do 
not unreasonably conﬂict with the normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreason-
ably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legiti-
mate interests of third parties (TRIPS Article 30). For example, a WTO panel has ruled 
that drugs producers can develop and submit for regulatory approval a generic product 
before the patent life of the original product has expired (the “Bolar” or “early working” 
exception, see below).
Exhaustion of intellectual property rights refers to whether countries permit products 
legitimately marketed under a patent right in other countries to be sold in their market 
without prior permission of the domestic IPR-holder. National exhaustion, as opposed 
to international exhaustion, means that patented drugs initially marketed outside the 
territory cannot be resold without the domestic patentee’s consent within the domestic 
market. TRIPS leaves all members free to take their own approach (TRIPS Article 6). 
(The exhaustion issue raises important questions from a domestic competition policy 
perspective, given that what is really at stake is arguably exclusive distribution rights in 
a particular market.)
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words, countries with little or no drug production capacity—mostly the poorest 
countries—still would have difﬁculty gaining access to the necessary quantity of 
essential drugs once they were covered by patent protection after 2005 (although 
it should be mentioned that most of the drugs on WHO’s list of essential drugs 
are off-patent). The Doha Ministerial thus directed the TRIPS Council to make 
recommendations concerning access for these countries by the end of 2002.
Interpreting the TRIPS patent regime on essential drugs
In 2002 the TRIPS Council undertook the challenge of ﬁnding some means 
to provide access to AIDS drugs and other pharmaceuticals for countries lack-
ing manufacturing capacities without undermining the value of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the patent system in stimulating and rewarding innovation.4 
There were essentially three general approaches that could be taken to the 
issue—leaving aside the option of building sufﬁcient domestic manufacturing 
capacity in the poorest countries to enable them to take advantage of the exist-
ing compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.5
Expanding the exceptions provision. One proposal was for an authoritative 
interpretation of TRIPS Article 30. This solution was based on the fact that 
Article 30 does not enumerate the subject matter scope of exceptions, thus 
leaving the freedom to provide an exception to patent rights for the purpose of 
exporting essential medicines to countries with insufﬁcient drug production 
capacity. TRIPS Article 30 already provides for limited exceptions to patent 
rights (see box 10.1), which have been interpreted to mean, for example, that 
persons other than the patent holder can undertake testing and seek regulatory 
approval for their generic drug prior to expiration of the patent.6 This was the 
main proposal favored by developing countries.
However, the U.S. noted, among other arguments, that the proposed inter-
pretation of Article 30 would violate the Article 30 requirement that exceptions 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent holders (U.S. 
Department of State 2002). It suggested two variants on this proposal: either 
a waiver on the obligations of TRIPS Article 31(f) or a moratorium on dispute 
settlement on the same provision. Neither of these proposals found favor with 
developing countries, which preferred the greater legal certainty conferred by 
an authoritative interpretation of the agreement. A waiver is normally time 
limited, subject to periodic renewal and negotiation of conditions. Likewise, a 
moratorium on dispute settlement would also normally be time limited. Cru-
cially, instead of conferring cover by means of an agreed exception, a mora-
torium would also have still left members exporting drugs produced under 
compulsory license technically in breach of the agreement. 
Relying on exhaustion and differential pricing. Another, earlier approach pro-
moted by developing countries before the Doha Ministerial was to facilitate 
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deeper price discounting in developing countries, that is, by boosting incen-
tives for patent-holders to price-discriminate across markets (after the Ministe-
rial, they mostly favored the Article 30 solution above).7 This approach relied 
on the existing ﬂexibility under the TRIPS Agreement for each country to 
establish the terms under which property rights are exhausted in its own terri-
tory (see box 10.1). For instance, the U.S. has adopted the principle of national 
exhaustion: patented drugs initially marketed outside the U.S. cannot be resold 
on the U.S. market without the express permission of the patent holder. The 
EU has adopted the principle of regional exhaustion covering all EU member 
states. National (or regional) exhaustion facilitates market separation, hence 
price discrimination across national markets, since patent holders have a proﬁt-
incentive to charge a proﬁt-maximizing price in each market.
There are problems with this approach, however, all related to the lack 
of incentives for drug companies to serve the markets of the poorest coun-
tries in the ﬁrst place. First, given the very limited ability to pay for essen-
tial medicines in the poorest countries, the proﬁt-maximizing price may not 
even constitute a tiny mark-up over marginal cost. Even priced at marginal 
cost, essential medicines may be prohibitively expensive for many developing 
country consumers. Second, drug companies feared that deep price-discount-
ing in developing countries would undermine their ability to charge a proﬁt-
maximizing price in developed country markets. They argued that public 
health agencies in developed countries that purchase large volumes of essen-
tial medicines would press their suppliers to offer discounts similar to those 
offered to developing countries. This fear would seem unwarranted, however; 
generic equivalents of drugs patented in the Western world were available for 
years in places such as India at a fraction of the price charged in the developed 
countries, without these price differences leading to a collapse of prices in the 
rich world. That said, from the point of view of the companies, the sorts of 
complications created by price discrimination between industrial and devel-
oping country markets may override the negligible proﬁt opportunities avail-
able on sales to developing country markets. Third, during a severe health 
emergency, drug companies may prefer, in terms of their image, to present 
price discounting as a donation motivated by humanitarian concern for the 
very poor and very sick, rather than proﬁt-maximizing price discrimination 
(donations are not a perfect substitute in any case, in view of problems with 
their scope and sustainability).
Using compulsory licensing for other than the domestic market. The third pro-
posed solution referred to a permanent amendment of the requirement under 
Article 31(f) that production under a compulsory license be predominantly for 
the domestic market, to allow some countries to supply drugs to other coun-
tries without manufacturing capacity at lower cost. Again, this solution opened 
the possibility that some of these drugs might ﬁnd their way into developed 
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countries’ markets—although it should be noted this problem would have also 
existed in the case of an Article 30 solution.
The U.S. sought to limit the scope of diseases, medicines, and beneﬁciaries 
to be covered because they were concerned about an agreement being abused 
for “industrial policy objectives.” There was a long debate about whether the 
discussions during the Doha Ministerial had focused on the few always-named 
diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and “other epidemics”) as argued by the 
U.S. and a few other countries, or whether they referred to a broader set of 
diseases (“public health concerns”) as argued by the developing countries. 
The interim solution
On August 30, 2003, the U.S. joined the consensus, enabling the adoption of 
a waiver to TRIPS Article 31(f). Under the waiver, patented drugs may, on cer-
tain conditions, be produced by a compulsory licensee exclusively for export into 
countries that lack domestic drug manufacturing capacities. U.S. agreement to the 
deal was secured by the Chair’s reading a written statement to the effect that the 
ﬂexibility being granted to developing countries was to protect public health and 
not to pursue industrial and commercial policy objectives through compulsory 
licensing. The statement also referred to 11 countries that had voluntarily agreed 
to opt out of using the agreement except in situations of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use.8 
Additionally, in the text of the decision itself, a number of developed countries 
indicated that they would not use the system as importing members.9 
Under the deal, all LDCs are entitled to import drugs from other mem-
bers under compulsory license; other importing members must notify the 
WTO of their intention to use the system, although no approval is required. 
Some developed countries (such as Canada, Norway, and those of the EU) are 
also currently in the process of implementing changes to their laws to enable 
their domestic generic industry to export to developing countries. Developing 
countries that still enjoy the TRIPS transitional provisions will need to issue 
a compulsory license to export drugs under the system after 2005, when they 
must fully implement patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Both importing 
and exporting members are obliged to provide information on their use of the 
system for transparency purposes. 
Compulsory licenses issued by the exporting member must be limited to 
the amount necessary to meet the needs of the importing member, with the 
entirety of production exported to that country. In addition, there are several 
measures designed to prevent products leaking into the markets of other coun-
tries, including:
• Products produced under the license are to be clearly identiﬁed through 
speciﬁc labeling or marking. Suppliers should use special packaging or 
special coloring/shaping of the products, to the extent feasible and with-
out a signiﬁcant impact on price.
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• Importing members must take reasonable measures within their means 
to prevent re-exportation of the products (technical and ﬁnancial coop-
eration should be available on request).
• All members must ensure the availability of effective legal means to pre-
vent the importation into, and sale in, their territories of these products. 
While this deal originally took the form of an interim waiver from the 
existing rules on compulsory licensing under TRIPS, the TRIPS Council 
was instructed to initiate work on an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to 
replace the waiver, with a view to its adoption by the end of June 2004. This is 
still ongoing, but progress is difﬁcult. In particular, controversy has arisen over 
the status of the Chair’s statement made at the time the U.S. accepted the deal: 
the U.S. argues that it should form part of the amendment, but most others are 
refusing on the grounds that the amendment should be based on the agreed 
legal text only. A further disagreement has emerged about whether the legal 
solution takes the form of a footnote to the text (the U.S. preferred option) or a 
new paragraph in Article 31. The latter is favored by developing countries as it 
affords greater legal clarity and certainty. Members have now agreed to extend 
the deadline for approving an amendment to March 2005. 
The solution has attracted criticism from a number of NGOs on the basis 
that it still fails to provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for developing countries. While 
some of this criticism is based on the premise that pharmaceuticals should be 
excluded from patent protection altogether, others criticize particular aspects 
of the scheme—for example, the notiﬁcation requirements before using the 
system are argued to be too burdensome and in need of revisiting. The great-
est concerns, however, have been expressed about additional conditions being 
placed on compulsory licenses in the context of preferential free trade agree-
ments (FTAs). The U.S. in particular has included a range of TRIPS-plus 
provisions in its recent FTAs, which, inter alia, place additional limitations on 
the use of compulsory licenses and extend the effective term of protection for 
pharmaceutical products (chapter 13). 
Alternative approaches
Just as countries (such as Brazil, Canada, and the U.S.) 10 have in the past used 
the threat of issuing a compulsory license to negotiate reduced prices from 
pharmaceutical patent-holders, this solution might also give patent-holders 
stronger incentives to supply the poorest countries in health crises at a price 
at (or even below) marginal cost. A regime capable of preventing re-export of 
deeply discounted products from the poorest countries to the rest of the world 
may also increase the willingness of drug ﬁrms to price-discriminate across 
markets. The simplest, most natural regime may be national exhaustion, that 
is, a complete ban of parallel imports from poor to rich countries. A more 
complicated approach would be to allow developed countries to impose an 
appropriate tariff against drug re-exports (Brown and Norman 2003). The 
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bans or the tariffs could be a powerful instrument—in terms of both imple-
mentation and economic beneﬁt. They could potentially be used as the basis 
for arguing for reduced terms of patent protection, as drug ﬁrms would have 
the opportunity to make proﬁts on both developed and developing markets. 
Lastly, assistance organizations could also exercise additional controls when 
distributing drugs, in order to minimize the emergence of gray markets in 
essential drugs. 
In any event, these solutions will be insufﬁcient if not combined with 
aid (subsidized purchases of essential medicines) because even generic drugs 
offered at marginal cost remain prohibitively expensive in the poorest coun-
tries. For example, a generic package of HIV/AIDS drugs currently costs about 
$200 annually. While considerably below the $12,000 charged in developed 
countries, such a sum is a substantial share of the GDP per capita in the poor-
est countries severely affected by the AIDS epidemic. Moreover, this gap is 
not covered by insurance; health insurance coverage in most developing coun-
tries is conﬁned to a small share of the population, the people with higher 
incomes.
From an economic perspective, the best approach to intellectual property 
in the drug industry would be to subsidize research and development and to 
grant no patent rights (or to grant patent rights and subsidize production up to 
the point where the patent-holder maximizes proﬁts by setting price equal to 
marginal cost). However, this approach seems out of reach for a long time. 
In fact, the international extension of intellectual property rights, as it 
applies to drugs, may progressively become (as the effect of TRIPS-induced 
patent protection will be felt mainly in the future) welfare-reducing from a 
world perspective and particularly from a developing country point of view. 
This is because most developing countries have virtually no ability to con-
tribute meaningfully to the costs of developing major drugs, and there is little 
worldwide gain in terms of new product development funded by developing 
country purchases.11 By contrast, the cost of drug protection to developing 
countries may increase because the monopolies created by the extension of 
patent protection may progressively cut many developing countries off from 
essential medicines. In sum, no innovation gain may ultimately compensate 
the monopoly-related loss brought about by extending patent protection to 
the developing countries. A related and important point is that the research 
priorities of pharmaceutical companies are based on rich-country demands. 
They thus concern lifestyle drugs and diseases that do not represent the heavi-
est health burden in poor countries—raising the crucial issue of the alternative 
policy mechanisms that could promote research and development speciﬁc to 
poor country needs. 
Ideally, dealing with health crises would have been achieved by not includ-
ing medicines, essential or otherwise, in the TRIPS Agreement, and by encour-
aging countries to use their domestic regulatory process to enforce property 
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rights. Then the use of drugs in the developing countries would have risen 
from almost zero to a point where price equals marginal cost, while, in the 
developed countries, the prices paid by consumers and the incentive to inno-
vate would not have been disturbed. 
The agreement reached on the interpretation of TRIPS Article 31 is an 
approximation of this solution. How good an approximation remains to be seen. 
In this context, it should not be forgotten that developing countries could have 
unilaterally suspended the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement as it pertains 
to essential medicines. They would have run the risks of the U.S. and EU retali-
ating and withdrawing concessions of equal value. The blow to the multilateral 
trade regime would have been enormous—for all WTO Members.
Interpreting the TRIPS regime on geographical indications
Geographical indications (GIs) are place names (or words associated with a 
place) used to identify the origin and quality, reputation or other characteris-
tics of products. GIs have a long history of controversial negotiations, dating 
back from the ﬁrst (and failed) effort to include the word “origin” in the 1958 
Lisbon Conference for the Revision of the Paris Convention. Similarly, their 
inclusion in the TRIPS Agreement was so difﬁcult that the only way to avoid 
blocking the TRIPS negotiations was to agree to further talks—hence the 
mandate that appears on the list of negotiating issues in the Doha talks. GIs 
are the only TRIPS issue mentioned in the July 2004 Doha Work Programme 
framework as part of the continuation of the ongoing consultative process on 
implementation and as an issue of interest, but not agreed, in agriculture.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, GIs must identify goods with “a given qual-
ity, reputation or other characteristic essentially attributable to its geographical 
origin.” GIs move thus beyond the usual concept of “appellation of origin” in 
two important ways. They may identify a particular geographical area through 
words and pictorial symbols, not necessarily through the place name itself. 
They refer not only to quality, but to a much broader concept of reputation or 
characteristic that can cover, for instance, local innovativeness (craft goods) 
rather than physical characteristics emanating from climate or soil quality—
as long as this reputation or characteristic is tied to a unique geographical 
origin.
The TRIPS Agreement creates two layers of GIs protection: a basic one for 
products other than wines and spirits, and a higher one for wines and spirits.12 
In the latter case, it requires WTO Members to prevent the use of GIs identify-
ing wines and spirits that do not originate in the place indicated, even where 
the true place of origin is indicated or the GI is used in translation or accom-
panied by such expressions as “kind,” “imitation,” or the like. It also mandates 
negotiations concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notiﬁca-
tion and registration of GIs for wines and spirits eligible for protection in those 
Members choosing to participate in the registration system.
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This two-layered GIs structure has generated international and domestic 
tensions—not surprisingly because exclusive rights emanating from GI-based 
production may enhance export prospects and raise value added (monopoly 
rents) for those regions that can establish distinctiveness of this kind. Interna-
tional tensions have been visible since the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Confer-
ence, which had to address the question of extending the GIs higher protection 
for wines and spirits to other products. This was based around a provision in 
the Agreement (TRIPS Article 24.1) mandating further negotiations on higher 
protection for individual GIs (not related to wines and spirits). The meaning 
of this provision was the subject of much debate, with some members arguing 
that the reference to higher protection for individual GIs did not provide a 
mandate to negotiate extension of such protection to an entire new category 
of products. 
In 1998 the EU mixed the two mandates, by proposing a register not lim-
ited to wines and spirits (opening the door to products such as cheese, choco-
lates, beer, and embroidery designs). This register was conceived as a complex 
process of registration and challenges, and as a source of substantive obligations 
for all WTO Members as they would be required to protect all GIs in the reg-
ister (which is thus not a mere database). In particular, registration itself would 
create the presumption of eligibility, thereby restricting the scope for ﬂexibility 
on the part of members. Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, and 
the U.S. (joined later by Argentina and Mexico, among others) argued that the 
EU proposal interfered with the WTO Members’ right to choose appropriate 
national implementation methods (Members are required only to provide “the 
legal means” to protect GIs) and that it raised unreasonable administrative bur-
dens. These countries proposed a voluntary register without legal effect, but 
which participating Members would agree to refer to when making decisions 
regarding national protection of particular GIs.
These international tensions are also mirrored in domestic tensions. For 
instance, the EU negotiators worked hard to broaden the scope of the register 
to products beyond wines and spirits (foodstuffs, tobacco products, artisan 
goods, goods based on collective knowledge, and even services) with the aim 
of trying to get support from more countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Egypt, India, Mauritius, Pakistan, Slovenia, and Sri Lanka). But these efforts 
are attracting increasing criticism from the EU wine and spirits sector, which 
fears that the disciplines they would like to get for their own products will be 
diluted.
These tensions make GIs quite different from drugs because it is by no 
means an issue pitting developed against developing or poorest countries. 
Instead, it is largely one in which some exporters see potential beneﬁts for their 
producers by claiming distinctive place-based qualities and thus exclusive rights 
to certain terms, arrayed against other exporters, who perceive that their com-
mercial interests lie in being able to continue to use those same commercially 
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valuable terms—which they consider to be generic, or common, names for 
certain types of products—to market their products.
That the disagreements remain wide implies that cross-issue negotiations 
may be required to achieve consensus. In particular, it is often said that the 
EU and other participants preferring a strong system will need to offer other 
concessions, especially in agriculture. However, this tradeoff is a potentially 
dangerous one—market access granted for agricultural products could be 
undermined where foreign producers are not permitted to use commercially 
valuable product descriptors. 
Economic perspectives on geographical indications
Geographical indications share many features of trademarks, another form 
of IPR.13 Both aim at guaranteeing the ultimate origin of a product (Landes 
and Posner 1987). By permitting ﬁrms to attach their reputation for quality 
to particular symbols or expressions, trademarks offer a solution to the fact 
that information is costly to acquire and asymmetrically distributed between 
consumers and producers. In the absence of trademarks, consumers would 
have higher search costs for ﬁnding quality of the desired level and, if they 
are risk-averse in the presence of uncertain information, would consume less. 
Hence selling under trademarks gives ﬁrms an incentive to sustain quality, 
but it also provides incentives to seek out proﬁt-maximizing market segments 
(such as consumers of high-fashion goods at low volumes versus consumers 
of low-quality products at high volumes). The result is extensive product 
and quality differentiation. This is reinforced by the fact trademarks induce 
new ﬁrms with distinctive products to enter markets, providing the founda-
tion for interbrand competition among ﬁrms in similar but differentiated 
products—all key processes for market deepening and growth in developing 
countries.14
As GIs bear all the above characteristics, with potentially stronger, more direct 
information content on quality or reputation, they may be expected to have some 
pro-competitive and pro-development features, and to provide global consumers 
lower search costs, greater choice, and a deeper continuum of quality.
However, there are important differences between GIs and trademarks. 
Primarily, a trademark attaches to a ﬁrm regardless of its location, whereas a 
GI designates a particular area, within which many ﬁrms may have rights to its 
use. In this context, a number of complications arise.
Even though a product may come from a region that has a particular repu-
tation, the product of speciﬁc ﬁrms may still be differentiated by quality (and 
therefore require supplemental trademark protection). Some wines from Bor-
deaux are surely better than others, and their relative price premia reﬂect both 
the geographical designation and their individual reputations. In this context, 
GIs are hardly sufﬁcient to encourage competition among member ﬁrms in 
quality. Rather the ﬁrms might be expected to migrate toward some average or 
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least-cost quality, meaning that GIs may not carry with them automatic pres-
sures among ﬁrms to sustain quality.15
There is also no necessary restriction on entry of ﬁrms into the area cov-
ered by a GI, implying that popular ones may become congested in a “com-
mons” overuse of the joint property right. Under an arbitrary initial allocation 
of a ﬁxed bundle of rights, participants may be expected to achieve maximum 
rents from the location and improve incentives for maintaining quality. How-
ever, this raises at least two difﬁcult—and costly—issues. First, many regions 
can be expected, prior to the adoption of GIs, to have both ﬁrms that are 
solidly within some notion of its boundaries and ﬁrms that are on its margins. 
Determination of whether the latter ﬁrms should be awarded GI use is liable 
to be costly and litigious, as experience has suggested in the case of Australian 
wine regions.
Second, and related, the very deﬁnition of how broad a region a GI should 
cover is difﬁcult. Consider the use of a GI to register and protect traditional 
clothing designs. It is likely that many villages or provinces within a develop-
ing country have skilled artisans making such clothing. It might be sensible, 
therefore, to register a broad territory (even the country) as a GI in order to 
economize on registration and marketing costs. However, the broader the ter-
ritory, the more difﬁcult the coordination problem, and the greater the incen-
tives to cheat on quality.
Put differently, while GIs solve one market failure (information asymme-
try) they give rise to another (coordination difﬁculties). Producer associations 
may be capable of managing this difﬁculty, but they may equally act in an 
exclusive and monopolistic fashion, reducing the net gains (and their diffu-
sion) to small ﬁrms and potential entrants. At the not-so-unlikely extreme, 
authorities may need to be involved in the deﬁnition of speciﬁc geographical 
areas and GIs. 
As a result, the ﬁxed costs of organizing and sustaining a system of GIs 
are far higher than in the case of trademarks. Little surprise, then, that while 
there are hundreds of thousands of registered trademarks in the world, there 
are fewer than 1,000 registered GIs (Fink, Smarzynska, and Spatareanu 2003; 
Escudero 2001). In this regard, small regions in poor developing economies 
may not be able to marshal the resources needed for an effective use of geo-
graphical indications on a global scale. Technical and ﬁnancial assistance, both 
for identifying appropriate market niches and for establishing the right forms 
of registration and marketing, may be central in this area of TRIPS.
GIs and the developing countries
A number of developing countries have indicated interest in expanded protec-
tion for GIs on products other than wines and spirits. For some, GIs are seen as 
a useful way to differentiate their agricultural products and beneﬁt from niche 
markets (Sichuan pepper, Madagascar vanilla). For basic agricultural products, 
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this may be the best—or often only—way to negotiate higher prices. For oth-
ers, GIs are seen as an important mechanism for deﬁning and protecting the 
commercial fruits of certain forms of traditional or collective knowledge. 
Undeniably there is a link here, for GIs may be scaled to incorporate all local 
users of knowledge regarding the exploitation of natural resources or design 
traditions. Indeed, GIs are the only form of TRIPS that provides this kind of 
collective right, albeit based on production location rather than underlying 
knowledge. They also have the beneﬁt of being not limited in time, as opposed 
to copyright or patents. Thus there is scope for combining these two concepts 
in order to reduce poverty. However, the coordination costs noted above for 
GIs are of much higher magnitude in the area of traditional knowledge, and 
it is not clear whether these costs would be offsetting or cumulative (Luthria 
and Maskus 2003).
In sum, this analysis suggests that determining whether particular coun-
tries or regions would beneﬁt from a rigorous multilateral and extended system 
of registration of GIs is not at all straightforward, all the more because existing 
GIs regulations are notoriously arcane and difﬁcult to implement in a costless 
way (Rangnekar 2002).
However, it is possible at this stage to set out some useful guideposts for 
thinking about this question. First, GIs are clearly most applicable to agricul-
tural goods and foodstuffs. Their application to designs, services, and tradi-
tional knowledge are less concrete. Second, the establishment of GIs on their 
own is likely to be insufﬁcient to provide signiﬁcant incentives for building 
markets and exports. Complementary technical and ﬁnancial assistance may 
be required. More centrally, other forms of TRIPS (trademarks, trade secrets, 
design protection) and competition regulation are required complements. 
Third, careful consideration needs to be paid to the tradeoffs between econo-
mies of scale (large area GIs) and problems of coordination. Fourth, because 
most conceivable GIs would implicate ﬁrms that are already producing with 
some access (perhaps remote) to the associated region or knowledge, institut-
ing a system of GIs will generate signiﬁcant redistribution of opportunities and 
wealth across actors—a key difﬁculty inhibiting these newcomers in the GI 
ﬁeld, the developing countries to beneﬁt from GIs.
Some additional factors should be borne in mind in the context of the 
TRIPS negotiations on GIs. Terms are normally required to have a history 
of domestic protection before being eligible for recognition by others as a GI. 
For some developing countries with no history of IPR protection, establishing 
that their terms warrant recognition as GIs on a TRIPS register may thus not 
be a straightforward prospect. Equally, developing countries should weigh the 
relative beneﬁts of international protection through a register for their own 
GIs against the costs of having to ensure protection at the national level for the 
large number of GIs likely to be claimed by the EU and others. These costs are 
both administrative (and unlikely to be a development priority) and actual—as 
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producers and exporters incur costs, and risks of lost market share, in ﬁnding 
different terms to describe their products. 
The proposed register would arguably severely limit the existing ﬂexibility 
under TRIPS for countries to determine at the national level, taking account 
of local conditions (whether a domestic consumer is likely to be misled as to 
the origin or nature of the products by the use of a certain term), whether any 
particular term qualiﬁes as a GI in their market. That is, while TRIPS cur-
rently provides for the protection of GIs, it does not stipulate a priori that any 
given term actually qualiﬁes as a GI—that is left to each member to determine. 
The effect of a register would be that certain terms would be considered to 
be automatically protected as GIs in all countries, with exceptions only for 
countries that speciﬁcally objected. Given the likely volume of registrations, 
developing countries could ﬁnd themselves having to protect a large number of 
terms simply because they were not able to lodge objections in time.
In light of these uncertainties it is surprising that so many developing 
countries are advocating for a multilateral registration system with strong legal 
effect. For most nations, especially the poorest ones, it is probably advisable 
at this point to maintain as much ﬂexibility as possible. This would mean not 
linking themselves to the extensive registration system, and taking advantage 
of the limitations on GIs set out in TRIPS.
However, as with the U.S. and pharmaceuticals, this process is already 
happening in the context of bilateral or regional agreements pursued by the 
EU—as illustrated by the bilateral wine agreement with Australia or the GI 
element in the free trade agreements with Chile and South Africa. The EU is 
also pursuing higher protection for other terms that it deems to be “traditional 
expressions” in the context of these and other preferential agreements.
Conclusion
Should IPRs have been included in the WTO? From an economic point of 
view, probably not, because IPRs require a very delicate balance of market 
forces and public action—a balance unlikely to be the same for countries with 
wide differences in terms of income and technology, all the more because obli-
gations of the TRIPS Agreement also tend to be “one size ﬁts all,” taking no 
account of levels of development and varying interests and priorities. 
That said, the TRIPS Agreement would appear to be here to stay. And 
it is not without areas of actual or potential interest for developing countries 
(although the balance of costs and beneﬁts will vary among developing coun-
tries and according to the issue), nor is it without some ﬂexibility in its provi-
sions. However, the ﬂexibility provided for implementation of TRIPS seems 
yet insufﬁcient on paper, and even more so in practice, and the assistance pro-
vided is clearly inadequate. Just as for access to medicines, there is a clear case 
for revisiting more of the rules to determine their impact on developing coun-
tries and whether any additional ﬂexibility is required. This issue is discussed 
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further in the following chapter on special and differential treatment. In other 
cases, the Agreement provides for ﬂexibility, but certain WTO Members—the 
U.S. on drugs, the EU on GIs—are trying to narrow unacceptably the scope of 
that ﬂexibility. Developing countries should resist this trend—that it is taking 
place in the context of preferential free trade agreements (chapter 13) should 
give countries pause to reﬂect on the value of those agreements versus multi-
lateral rules.
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Special and differential treatment
Previous chapters have focused on the issue of what, from a development per-
spective, should be the subject of trade rules and have considered the sort of 
trade rules on those issues that make sense from a development perspective with 
regard to speciﬁc—and controversial—issues on the Doha Agenda: TRIPS and 
the Singapore issues. But the debate over what sort of trade rules make sense 
from a development perspective applies across the entirety of WTO agreements, 
and is at the heart of the debate over special and differential treatment (SDT).
Broadly speaking, SDT has three main dimensions. First, exemptions 
from speciﬁc WTO rules, implying either greater freedom to use restrictive 
trade policies that are otherwise subject to WTO disciplines, or exemptions 
from rules requiring the adoption of common regulatory or administrative 
disciplines. Second, making promises to provide technical and ﬁnancial assis-
tance to help developing countries implement multilateral rules binding, and 
thus enforceable. Third, expansion in development aid to address supply-side 
constraints that restricted the ability of ﬁrms to take advantage of improved 
market access.
The SDT agenda thus encompasses both the issue of the appropriateness 
of the rules themselves for developing countries and the need for developed 
countries to ensure provision of adequate assistance to implement those rules. 
While developed countries have tended to focus on the latter issue, many 
developing countries have also argued that the rules are unbalanced. There is a 
strong perception that the rules have been imposed on them through the Sin-
gle Undertaking (the fact that WTO Members had to sign all the Agreements 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round, with the exception of the Agreement 
on Government Procurement) without their having been given the opportu-
nity to participate meaningfully in their design. Many also argue that they did 
not understand fully what they were signing.
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Discussions in the WTO have been plagued by both procedural and sub-
stantive disagreements. A fundamental problem is the absence of serious analy-
sis underpinning the SDT debate. Proposals rarely, if ever, offer a robust ratio-
nale in terms of developmental signiﬁcance or a justiﬁcation for what is being 
sought. The assumption behind many of the proposals seems to be that devel-
opment will be best served by the lowest possible level of policy commitments 
in the WTO. That is, if obligations can be diluted or ways found of ensuring 
they do not apply, this is beneﬁcial for development. Aside from the problem 
already highlighted—that in the contractual environment of trade negotia-
tions, the price of exemption has too often been loss of bargaining power—a 
case can be made that exemption may not confer development beneﬁts. 
This chapter considers whether different treatment is justiﬁed on develop-
ment grounds—ﬁrst, in the context of rules on traditional trade policy instru-
ments and second, on those with a regulatory dimension. It also offers some 
thoughts on moving forward on SDT in the WTO. 
Is there a development case for different treatment on 
“traditional” trade policy instruments?
For agreements and disciplines that pertain to the bread and butter of the 
WTO—traditional trade policies such as tariffs, quotas, and export subsidies 
that can be implemented readily—a good case can be made that developing 
countries should abide by the same core trade policy disciplines that apply to 
developed countries. The case for using traditional trade policy instruments to 
achieve economic development objectives is weak, and some of the exemptions 
found in the GATT for “more favorable” treatment of developing countries are 
not actually beneﬁcial (box 11.1).
Infant industry protection
Some developing countries have asked for additional ﬂexibility to use GATT 
Articles XVIII:a and XVIII:c to raise tariffs or impose quotas to afford protec-
tion to infant industries. 
However, infant industry protection has a poor record of encouraging the 
growth of competitive sectors and kick-starting broader industrial develop-
ment. It is more likely to create vested interests that seek to prolong protec-
tion, imposing costs on the domestic economy and prolonging misallocation of 
resources. Such protection also puts the government in the position of “picking 
winners,” requiring that it be prepared to set—and stick to—a clear timetable 
for reduction of protection and to allow ﬁrms that cannot become viable within 
that time period to fail. For this to work, a strong framework of accountable, 
stable, and sufﬁciently expert institutions must be in place, a particular chal-
lenge for many of the poorest developing countries. 
Using trade policy to promote industrial development is also an outdated 
and self-defeating strategy in a world of tradable services, increased foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) ﬂows, and global production chains (Hoekman, 
Michalopoulos, and Winters 2003). Openness to trade and FDI allows devel-
oping countries to improve the productivity of domestic ﬁrms, increase the 
efﬁciency of domestic resource allocation, and reap the positive externalities 
associated with learning through the diffusion and absorption of technology 
(see box 11.1). Protection, by contrast, is more likely simply to retard techno-
logical development and inhibit growth. 
Box 11.1
Major provisions 
allowing greater 
freedom to 
use traditional 
trade policies
 
Source: Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001.
Infant industry protection
GATT Articles XVIII:A and XVIII:C allow for removal of tariff concessions or use of quotas if 
they are necessary to establish an industry in a developing country. Compensation must 
be offered to countries that would be negatively affected. 
Balance of payments protection
Article XVIII:b allows for trade measures to be imposed to safeguard the balance of pay-
ments. In contrast to Articles XVIII:A and XVIII:C, surveillance and approval procedures 
are less burdensome, and there is no need to offer compensation to affected countries. 
As a result, since 1967 no country has invoked the infant industry provisions of the GATT, 
but numerous countries have made use of Article XVIII:b. Most developing countries had 
no need to invoke GATT articles to protect their industries, as their tariffs generally were 
not bound or were bound at high levels. However, GATT Article XVIII:b was needed to 
use quotas, as these are generally prohibited by the GATT. In the Uruguay Round, Article 
XVIII:b was revised, and surveillance procedures were tightened. WTO Members must 
now publicly announce time schedules for the removal of restrictive import measures 
taken for balance of payments purposes and in principle use price-based measures 
(tariffs).
Subsidies
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) attempts to dis-
tinguish between subsidies—deﬁned as ﬁnancial contributions by government—that can 
be justiﬁed on market failure or noneconomic grounds and those that distort the incentive 
to trade in a major way. Nonspeciﬁc subsidies—deﬁned as those where access is gen-
eral or eligibility is automatic on the basis of clearly spelled-out, objective criteria—are 
nonactionable; that is, they are permitted and cannot be countervailed. Subsidies that 
are contingent on export performance or on the use of domestic over imported goods are 
prohibited (except for a group of poor countries—see below). Measures that in principle 
are permitted but create “serious prejudice”—deﬁned to exist if the total ad valorem 
subsidization of a product exceeds 5 percent, if subsidies are used to cover operating 
losses of a ﬁrm or industry, or if debt relief is granted for government-held liabilities—can 
be countervailed or give rise to dispute settlement. The same may be possible if it can be 
shown that a subsidy has had a negative effect on a partner’s exports. 
LDCs and countries with GNP per capita below $1,000 are exempt from the prohibition 
on export subsidies. The prohibition on subsidies contingent on the use of domestic goods 
(local content) does not apply to developing countries for a period of ﬁve years (eight years 
for LDCs). Developing countries that have become competitive in a product—deﬁned as 
having a global market share of 3.25 percent—must phase out any export subsidies over 
a two-year period. 
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From an economic viewpoint, the drafters of the GATT were therefore 
justiﬁed in placing relatively stringent conditions on the use of trade policy for 
industrial development purposes, and in particular, on being most restrictive 
on the use of quantitative restrictions and local content requirements. More-
over, in cases where import competition proves too ﬁerce, the WTO allows 
for safeguards—“emergency” and transitory protection. The conditions that 
the WTO imposes on the use of safeguards are useful because they help to 
enhance certainty and ensure that there is a good case for intervention.
Subsidies
Subsidy-type policies will generally be less distorting (more efﬁcient) than 
trade policy in offsetting an externality or pursuing a noneconomic objective. 
WTO rules do not constrain the ability of governments to address market 
failures through subsidies or taxes. Interventions that are horizontal (general), 
not sector-speciﬁc or industry-speciﬁc, are deemed nonactionable under WTO 
rules. Consumption subsidies that do not affect the prices of tradable goods 
in a signiﬁcant way are not covered by WTO rules. Thus, for example, food 
subsidies, household energy subsidies, and health and education programs are 
not vulnerable to WTO action. Similarly, factor-use subsidies—for example, 
to the wages of workers taken directly off the unemployment register—are not 
covered unless they are conﬁgured so as to make them de facto subsidies to 
speciﬁc sectors. Overall, therefore, the sorts of subsidies of most use in ﬁghting 
poverty and offsetting market failures are not constrained by WTO disciplines 
(McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera 2001).1
In other cases the ﬂexibility in WTO rules regarding subsidies can impose 
difﬁcult choices on governments. For instance, the poorest countries (with a 
per capita income below $1,000) are exempt from export subsidy disciplines—
that is, for more than 70 WTO Members, export subsidy disciplines do not 
bite. This ﬂexibility is somewhat paradoxical—the poorest countries are given 
freedom to use instruments that they can ill afford and that raise domestic 
prices and adversely affect domestic consumers. (Unless the subsidized goods 
are produced in signiﬁcant amounts by the poor, such subsidies are likely to 
worsen poverty.) However, governments may be attracted to export subsidies 
as a means to overcome the threshold barriers to engaging in an activity or to 
developing new lines of business—and these barriers are likely to be many in 
the case of the poorest countries. (Once a product line has become successful 
enough to lead to exports that exceed the market share threshold set out in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, serious consideration 
would need to be given to eliminating the subsidy in any event). In sum, WTO 
rules on export subsidies leave to the governments of the poorest countries the 
very difﬁcult task of assessing whether the possible gains from such subsidies 
outweigh their costs for the domestic economy and for the poor. Such assess-
ments require stable and competent institutions and governance structures 
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(particularly given that sectoral producer interests can be adept at portraying 
themselves as the national interest).
The WTO prohibition on export subsidies is also a means of avoiding 
subsidy competition between governments. Such competition not only may 
lead to the transfer of rents to companies that can play governments off against 
each other, but would almost certainly harm the poorest countries, which can-
not afford to play this game. Experience with export subsidies in agriculture 
all too clearly demonstrates the harm done to the poorest countries by such 
subsidies—as well as their diversion of domestic resources toward powerful 
vested interests. Indeed, the challenge in the Doha Round is to tighten the 
rules to prevent the use of such subsidies by those who can afford them—as 
best illustrated by developed countries in agriculture—not to extend the right 
to use them to other WTO Members. Developing countries do not beneﬁt 
from greater freedom to use such bad and inefﬁcient policies.
Given that a substantial dose of ﬂexibility exists in the system (safeguards, 
general subsidies to address market failures), committing to abide by the 
same procedural rules on the use of traditional trade polices that pertain to 
developed countries makes good sense, as it will both beneﬁt consumers and 
enhance welfare in developing countries. 
Is there a development case for different treatment on 
regulatory-type rules?
But what of WTO rules that relate to regulatory disciplines and require invest-
ments of resources to establish (or strengthen) implementing institutions? 
These are fundamentally different from the traditional trade policy instru-
ments above. The ability to implement and beneﬁt from WTO disciplines 
on regulatory matters varies from country to country, depending on size and 
income and on factors such as institutional capacity and available human 
resources. There may also be uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of par-
ticular policy instruments for individual countries, given differences in capac-
ity and domestic priorities. 
Disciplines on regulatory matters thus pose quite different cost-beneﬁt 
calculations for developing countries. This heightens the need for stringent 
application of the threshold tests of whether the issue should be included in the 
trading system at all.
First, where the implementation costs of an existing or envisaged agreement are 
very high and the tests—particularly of whether an agreement is serving domestic 
trade interests and development objectives—are not satisﬁed, the question is not 
so much one of how to manage difﬁculties in implementing rules through SDT, 
but whether the rules themselves belong in the trading system—as best illustrated 
by the Singapore issues left off by the Doha Round (see chapter 9).
Second, there are a number of existing agreements where the market access 
test is met but the test of alignment with broader development priorities is 
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not—that is, where the rules are market-access related but the development 
beneﬁts are only a longer term priority. For such agreements, there is a case for 
ﬂexibility in terms of their application. Flexibility must be proportionate: the 
more long-term the development beneﬁt, the more extensive the ﬂexibility. Just 
as the implementation costs differ among countries, so too does the alignment 
with development priorities—for more advanced developing countries the 
development beneﬁts may be more likely to be realized in the short to medium 
term. There is also arguably a greater case for ﬂexibility where the impact on 
others of nonimplementation will not be great, or not great in comparison with 
the size of the implementation effort required. Of course, this consideration is 
also related to the third test about the value of WTO agreements in contexts 
where the value of reform is raised if others reform as well, or in the achieve-
ment of global public goods (see chapter 8).
These considerations are particularly relevant in the case of the poorest 
countries with limited participation in international trade. For example, the 
poorest developing countries could be given considerably greater ﬂexibility 
in terms of their obligation to implement the Customs Valuation Agreement. 
Implementation for these countries could be on a best endeavors basis for an 
extended period, in recognition of the fact that this agreement is likely to take 
a disproportionate share of government resources to implement and is really 
only a longer term priority. However, implementation costs may be lower 
and the agreement more in line with overall development priorities for more 
advanced developing countries and thus more limited ﬂexibility may be appro-
priate (Mattoo and Subramanian 2004).
Third, implementation of a number of other agreements may be resource-
intensive, and there are differences of view among countries about the devel-
opment beneﬁts of the agreement. For example, in the case of TRIPS there 
are differences of view about the scope for developing countries to gain from 
the agreement, as well as the extent to which they might be harmed by it (see 
chapter 10).
Where implementation is costly but development beneﬁts are greater, 
agreements for those countries could be pursued along the lines of the model 
proposed for trade facilitation (see chapter 9). Under that model, countries 
could negotiate implementation dates individually (per GATS precommit-
ments), and as a package with developed country commitments to provide 
adequate technical and ﬁnancial assistance. Different dates could be agreed for 
different provisions—a useful ﬂexibility in areas such as TRIPS where coun-
tries’ priorities may vary considerably across the agreement For example, for 
some developing countries, pharmaceutical patent protection may not be a pri-
ority, but for those with geographical indications or software industries, other 
intellectual property rights may be more so. Technical reviews would assist in 
ensuring that assessments on effectiveness of assistance and capacity to imple-
ment were based, to the extent possible, on sound analysis, and a peace clause 
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would provide further ﬂexibility with regard to the timing of the application 
of dispute settlement. Negotiated commitments on assistance by donors could 
ensure more assistance, better follow through, and improved coordination.
From a WTO systemic perspective, such resource-intensiveness, for both 
developed and developing countries, is not necessarily a bad thing. First, it 
serves as a natural brake on the number of new issues and agreements that can 
be pursued under the trading system at any given time. This should help keep 
the development of multilateral trade agreements more in step with the politi-
cal and ﬁnancial commitment of developed countries and with the political 
and technical capacity of developing countries to implement them.
Second, for the justiﬁable WTO agreements (those where the trade and 
development tests are met) resource-intensiveness is an opportunity to make 
these WTO agreements an effective lever to marshal the required level of inter-
national assistance. The WTO agreements on standards (Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Measures, or SPS, and Technical Barriers to Trade, or TBT), for 
instance, are very burdensome to implement. However, they serve the trade 
interests of developing countries in helping to safeguard their market access 
interests (see chapter 6) and are not counter to their overall development inter-
ests (higher standards are also desirable at the national level of the developing 
countries). It could be argued that while there are gains in terms of raising 
domestic standards, meeting OECD-level standards might not be such a high 
development priority. However, the inability to meet these standards has ongo-
ing costs in terms of lost trade opportunities and the loss of a potential means 
of generating growth—and of generating resources for achieving other devel-
opment priorities. 
If the real answer is greatly increased assistance, how can WTO agree-
ments help achieve this? Both the TBT and SPS agreements are interesting 
illustrations because they include different kinds of obligations on developed 
countries to provide assistance (box 11.2). The TBT obligations are relatively 
strong—members “shall” provide assistance—although the proviso “on mutu-
ally agreed terms and conditions” means that it is not a blank check. However, 
it is worth noting that no developing country has made a request for assistance 
under these provisions (Rotherham 2003).2 The SPS obligations are weaker in 
some respects—members are to “consider” technical assistance where develop-
ing countries face substantial investments in fulﬁlling their standards—but 
have likewise a poor record of meaningful implementation. 
What can be done to strengthen these provisions?3 One approach would be 
to make the provision of assistance to the poorest developing countries manda-
tory. For example, contributions to an SPS assistance fund by trading partners 
could be calculated on the basis of a percentage of the value of overall imports 
in relevant products. These contributions could be set at a certain level per 
year, or triggered when a developed country introduces an SPS measure signiﬁ-
cantly affecting the import of particular goods from a developing country. 
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Under the trigger approach, affected developing countries could petition 
speciﬁc assistance through the SPS Committee. This might permit both some 
multilateral scrutiny of the request and the possibility that other members 
might contribute to the necessary assistance. The trigger approach might also 
encourage more targeted assistance on the part of donors and limit the scope 
(to the extent possible) for them simply to shift funds from existing develop-
ment projects. A tighter nexus between negotiating assistance and standards 
might have a useful chilling effect, discouraging the adoption of unnecessarily 
high standards that pose additional implementation burdens on developing 
countries. 
Negotiations for extensions of time to implement should also be provided, 
for all suppliers to the market, not just major suppliers (smaller suppliers are 
more likely to have difﬁcultly in implementing new standards). A model such 
as that proposed for trade facilitation could be considered to draw on expert 
advice and negotiate appropriate assistance at the same time. Assistance could 
be delivered on a bilateral basis, or through international organizations, per-
haps using the recently created International Standards and Trade Develop-
ment Facility.4 A review process similar to that proposed for trade facilitation 
could also be used—or regular reports from both donors and recipients on the 
efﬁcacy of assistance could simply form part of the SPS Committee agenda. 
This type of concrete assistance is likely to be more valuable over the longer 
Box 11.2
Current assistance 
obligations under 
the agreements 
on Technical 
Barriers to Trade 
and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Measures
Under the SPS Agreement, members agreed to facilitate the provision of technical assis-
tance to developing countries through bilateral or relevant international agreements. This 
includes assistance in processing technologies, research, and infrastructure, advice, 
credits, donations, and grants for the purpose of seeking technical expertise, training, 
and equipment, and the establishment of national regulatory bodies so that countries can 
adjust to and comply with SPS measures in their export markets. Where developing coun-
tries face substantial investments in fulﬁlling the SPS standards of an importing member, 
that member is to consider technical assistance to the extent which would permit the 
developing country members to maintain and expand their market access opportunities 
for the products involved. 
Likewise, under the TBT Agreement, members shall, on request, grant developing 
countries technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions regarding the 
preparation of technical regulations; the establishment of national standards bodies and 
participation of these bodies in international standardizing bodies; the establishment of 
regulatory bodies or bodies for the assessment of conformity with technical regulations; 
information on how to implement technical regulations; the establishment of bodies for 
the assessment of conformity with standards adopted within the territory of the request-
ing member; the steps that should be taken by the producers if they wish to have access 
to systems for conformity assessment operated by governmental or nongovernmental 
bodies within the territory of the importing member; and the establishment of the institu-
tions and legal framework to enable them to fulﬁll obligations of membership or participa-
tion in regional or international systems for conformity assessment.
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term, is more likely to result in tangible increases of agricultural exports from 
the poorest developing countries than preference regimes, and would represent 
a better use of donor resources. 
Moving forward on special and differential treatment
SDT for the rules cannot be considered in a monolithic fashion. Not all rules 
are the same, and their cost-beneﬁt analysis for developing countries varies 
considerably. The key question is what development purpose exemption would 
serve, since exemption from the rules is not synonymous with encouraging 
the development of efﬁcient policies. Instead, the answer is to make the rules 
in such a way that development concerns and constraints, as well as capacities 
to undertake obligations, are factored in. And when the rules require actual 
investments of resources, the guiding principle for answering the two key 
questions—what SDT to grant and to whom—should be a cost-beneﬁt analy-
sis taking into account the relationship of the issue to trade, the extent of its 
alignment with broader development priorities, the costs of implementation, 
and the relative costs to others of nonimplementation. 
In the case of rules on “traditional” trade policies, there does not seem to be 
a strong case for exempting developing countries from WTO rules. Additional 
freedom to use inefﬁcient policies promises few development gains—and they 
may cause additional damage to other developing countries (such as subsidy 
wars). Indeed, rather than seeking greater ﬂexibility to use these policies, the 
aim of the negotiations should be to remove the SDT that gives rich countries 
such ﬂexibility—for export subsidies in agriculture and quotas in textiles and 
clothing.
In the case of WTO rules on domestic regulations, implementation costs 
can be high, and—more important—a positive cost-beneﬁt balance cannot be 
taken for granted. Where the implementation costs are high and the trade and 
development tests are not satisﬁed, there is a strong case that the issue should 
not be subject to rules in the WTO. In other cases, assessments of the relative 
costs and beneﬁts of WTO rules will vary among issues, and careful calcula-
tions are needed on an agreement by agreement country basis. 
Where the costs are high, the trade test is met, and development ben-
eﬁts are present—but only a longer term priority—and the impact on oth-
ers marginal, there is a strong case for extensive ﬂexibility. But this ﬂexibility 
should have some end-point, however distant. If an agreement is such that 
some WTO Members will never be able to implement it, or it will never be a 
development priority at any level of development, then it should not be part of 
WTO rules—it could be pursued in other international fora (chapter 8). 
In other cases, where the development beneﬁts are greater or more imme-
diate, a model that calibrated commitments with assistance and gave greater 
ﬂexibility to countries to determine appropriate implementation periods might 
be useful. Where implementation costs are high but the WTO rules promise 
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real and short-term beneﬁts in terms of the trade and development interests of 
developing countries, full implementation may be desirable but not affordable. 
In these cases, concrete technical and ﬁnancial assistance is required to ensure 
that developing countries can beneﬁt from the rules, and agreements must 
be made more effective in generating the required assistance—for instance, 
through mandatory commitments subject to review and linked to implemen-
tation requirements of developing countries (and to dispute settlement—see 
chapter 9). However, making mandatory assistance work is not without 
challenges—for example, to ensure that such assistance is truly additional and 
well coordinated (Mattoo and Subramanian 2004). 
Implementation costs, trade and development beneﬁts, and impacts of 
nonimplementation on others are all variables that will also vary depending on 
the level of development of the country. The important consideration is that 
assessments of relative costs and beneﬁts be based on sound analysis and not 
mere political bargaining. Effective SDT will require a pragmatic approach 
rather than abstract discussion. In the absence of concrete considerations, it 
can be too easy to slide from one dangerous extreme—“one size ﬁts all”—to 
another—“one size doesn’t ﬁt any, ever.”
Introduction of more concrete and usable SDT into the multilateral trad-
ing system will be no easy task. There is considerable debate over the approach 
to be used.5 The choice of which type of approach is “best” requires consid-
erable thought and discussion. What matters most at this point is ﬁrst, that 
WTO Members recognize that capacities and priorities differ hugely across the 
membership, and second, that this discussion is based, to the greatest extent 
possible, on robust analysis rather than political bargaining. More information 
and analysis on the costs and beneﬁts of alternative rules for all countries, and 
on the distribution of these costs and beneﬁts within countries, are essential 
(see chapter 12). 
In the context of this report, and in particular for market access (part 1 
and box 11.3) we have used the concept of “poorest countries” as a way to 
address the needs of those developing countries that do not qualify as LDCs 
but are nonetheless low (or very low) income and suffer from a range of serious 
development challenges. Clearly, there are a wide range of factors that could be 
taken into account in thinking about which countries might fall under such a 
heading (see appendix 4), and other approaches may be equally feasible. 
Whatever the approach taken, a balance will need to be found between 
targeting SDT more closely to the actual implementation needs of speciﬁc 
countries and avoiding overly substantial transaction costs and uncertainty. 
Moreover, in determining SDT eligibility, nonnegotiability once a deal has 
been reached is of great importance. A crucial contribution of the WTO to 
world welfare is the promotion of transparency and predictability. These are 
essential for producers and users of internationally traded goods, for investors, 
and ultimately for consumers. With this in mind, WTO Members will need to 
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be careful to avoid having SDT merely traded as a “concession” in the negotia-
tion of agreements. 
Efforts to make SDT more effective will also require strengthening the 
mechanisms for regular monitoring of SDT implementation. This should 
extend to the provision of information on national trade-related priorities by 
developing countries eligible for SDT, the funding and investment require-
ments these priorities involve, and the extent to which international and bilat-
eral donors have provided assistance. Some of the proposals above already 
Box 11.3
Special and 
differential 
treatment for 
market access
The key message from part 1 on market access is that there is a case for SDT for develop-
ing countries to allow them to undertake less market opening in goods, services, and agri-
culture. There is no doubt that the primary responsibility for delivering on market access 
for development in the Doha Round rests with the developed countries, which—being both 
primary beneﬁciaries of the current system and better able to manage adjustment—now 
bear a special responsibility to remove their egregious support and trade barriers in agri-
culture, their high tariffs and quotas in nonagricultural products, and their barriers to trade 
in labor-intensive services.
However, while lesser obligations for developing countries make sense, zero obliga-
tions do not. No obligations equals not only no ability to effectively prosecute negotiating 
interests across the agenda, it also means no ability to use the trading system to pro-
mote domestic reform and increase national welfare. The emphasis is on an approach 
that requires developing countries to participate in liberalization in a way that is both 
commensurate with their current level of development and likely to serve their long-term 
development interests.
It is not in developing countries’ interests to remain completely outside of the recipro-
cal bargain that underpins the trading system. Developing countries have real export inter-
ests in agriculture, nonagricultural market access, and services to pursue for which they 
will need to make some—although not equal—concessions in return. Most important, 
middle-income developing countries are now far too important as markets for each other 
and for the poorest developing countries to leave their own barriers in place, particularly 
when those barriers actually harm the domestic economy.
What is expected from developing countries in terms of market access varies depending 
on their level of development and capacity to bear adjustment costs. Hence the greatest 
degree of ﬂexibility is granted to the poorest developing countries, given the very serious 
constraints on their ability to adjust (for example, to reform the tax system to provide alter-
native sources of revenue as tariffs decline), to devise and provide complementary policies 
and safety nets, and to establish sound regulatory frameworks to underpin liberalization. 
Equally, the implications for what should be done can also vary by sector. The chapters 
on agriculture, services, and nonagricultural trade all propose concrete ways forward for 
both developing and the poorest developing countries in this regard. 
Finally, preferential market access is not a viable solution for addressing development 
needs in the context of market access. While the beneﬁts have been, with few exceptions, 
relatively modest, the costs have been high—in terms of trade diversion from other devel-
oping countries, inappropriate specialization, and lost opportunities for domestic reform. 
Preferences can also prevent developing countries from forming alliances to combat the 
protectionism in OECD markets that causes real harm to their development interests. 
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include such mechanisms, including as part of mandatory developed country 
obligations. Equally, whatever approach is eventually adopted on SDT in the 
WTO, enforcement will be important. One question that arises then concerns 
the ability of low-income countries to defend their rights in the WTO. This is 
of course also a more general dimension of participation by developing coun-
tries in the system and is dealt with in chapter 14.
Any reform of SDT will also need to be underpinned by greatly increased 
international assistance—not simply to implement agreements, but also to 
help developing countries combat the many structural disadvantages they face 
in global trade. How to increase this assistance, and the priorities for its use, 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
Box 11.4
Key points on 
special and 
differential 
treatment
SDT for the rules cannot be considered in a monolithic fashion. Not all rules are the same, 
and their cost-beneﬁt balance for developing countries varies considerably.
For rules on traditional trade policies (tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and so on), exemp-
tion is unlikely to encourage the development of efﬁcient policies. Additional freedom to 
use bad policies promises few development gains, and risks harming other developing 
countries (through subsidy wars). 
For rules on domestic regulations requiring actual investment of resources, a cost-
beneﬁt analysis should guide the answer to the two key questions: what SDT to grant and 
to whom? This analysis would take into account several factors: the extent to which the 
rules are related to trade (market access); the extent to which they are in line with broader 
development priorities; the costs of implementation; and the relative costs to others of 
nonimplementation. Assessments of costs and beneﬁts will vary by issue and also accord-
ing to the level of development of the country concerned. The important consideration is 
that assessments be based on sound analysis and not mere political bargaining.
• Where the costs are high and the trade and development beneﬁts minimal, there is 
a strong case that the issue should not be subject to rules in the WTO. 
• Where the costs are high, the trade test is met, development beneﬁts are present 
but only a longer term priority, and the impact on others is marginal, there is a 
strong case for extensive—but not eternal—ﬂexibility. 
• Where the development beneﬁts are greater or more immediate, a model that cali-
brates commitments with assistance and gives greater ﬂexibility to countries to 
determine appropriate implementation periods might be useful. 
• Where implementation costs are high, but WTO rules promise real and short-term 
beneﬁts in terms of the trade and development interests of developing countries, 
full implementation may be desirable, but not affordable. In these cases concrete 
technical and ﬁnancial assistance is required to ensure that developing countries 
can beneﬁt from the rules, and agreements must be made more effective in gener-
ating the required assistance—for instance, through mandatory commitments sub-
ject to review and linked to implementation requirements of developing countries.
3 Other systemic issues
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Coherence
For trade to contribute to poverty reduction, several elements need to work 
together in synergy: better national development strategies that integrate trade 
as a key component; increased and effective international ﬁnancial and tech-
nical assistance for developing production and trade capacities; and a more 
enabling international trade environment. Improvements in the international 
trade regime will have an impact on poverty only if countries have sound poli-
cies and receive the necessary assistance to build the productive capacity to 
take advantage of new opportunities (UNCTAD and ICTSD 2004). The pre-
vious chapters have discussed the ways in which the international trade regime 
could be more supportive of developing countries; this chapter focuses on the 
other two elements: national strategies and international technical and ﬁnan-
cial assistance. 
Against this backdrop, a “coherent” approach in the context of trade and 
the Millennium Development Goals has three interlinked dimensions. First, 
at the national level, coherence means the adoption of sound complementary 
policies by national governments where necessary to manage liberalization, as 
well as ensuring that trade policymaking is appropriately informed by expertise 
across a range of policy areas. It means integrating trade policy into national 
development plans and ensuring that trade policy is subject to public debate 
including all relevant stakeholders. Second, at the international level, coher-
ence calls for a signiﬁcant ramping-up of “aid for trade” by the development 
community and for a clear and realistic view on the WTO’s role in technical 
assistance. Third, coherence means a mutually supportive relationship between 
trade and other policies at the national and international levels with a view to 
achieving the Goals. Clearly, while the three are all linked, policy coherence 
at the national level is the key to creating the conditions for the effectiveness 
of all other actions. 
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Policy coherence at the national level
Trade liberalization can require a range of complementary policies to ensure 
that gains for the economy and society as a whole are realized and the needs 
of the most vulnerable groups addressed. While liberalization results in over-
all gains in terms of economic growth and wealth creation, it does not by 
itself address the ultimate distribution of those gains. The immediate effects 
of trade liberalization can also vary among different groups—those in import-
competing sectors may suffer adjustment costs in the face of increased compe-
tition, while those in export sectors may experience gains from new opportuni-
ties. Governments need to make choices about whether and how adjustment 
assistance may be offered to those who suffer losses, and how the gains from 
growth may be distributed—or redistributed—within a society. Such choices 
can be crucial in determining the outcomes of trade liberalization for particu-
lar groups and for the economy as a whole.
Complementary policies for the poor
One of the most important complementary policies for the poor is an efﬁcient 
social safety net. Trade liberalization will have some impact upon those poor 
households that may be incapable of sustaining even short periods with adverse 
adjustment costs because they do not have the savings. The policy choices broadly 
deﬁned are: general social safety nets, safety nets targeted to those who are harmed 
by the trade reform, and selective limitation of the reforms or intervention in mar-
kets for the purpose of limiting the impact of market reforms on the poor.
In terms of the third option, a fundamental problem in using government 
interventions to limit market reforms ostensibly for the beneﬁt of the poor is that 
these interventions are subject to political lobbying. The poor typically lack politi-
cal power, so that political intervention in market processes will typically result in 
outcomes that are even worse for the poor. Indeed, a variety of efforts are under 
way in many countries to replace parastatals and similar bodies with more efﬁ-
cient private sector entities.1 In the poorest developing countries, such alternatives 
may not be a viable option, however. Complementary actions may be called for, 
such as improving and reducing the cost of education to poor households.
Regarding the second option, specialized safety nets linked to trade reform 
have a spotty history. In practice it is difﬁcult to distinguish workers who are 
harmed due to trade reform from those who are harmed due to normal turn-
over or displacement in an economy. Fundamentally, it is morally difﬁcult 
to justify safety-net programs to poor people who are harmed due to trade 
reform, and to deny assistance to other poor people who suffer equivalent 
harm from ﬂuctuations such as technological displacement or price changes 
due to domestic demand shifts. Consequently, it is best to employ general, 
countrywide safety nets to deal with problems linked to trade reform, rather 
than to establish special safety net programs for trade related problems. As the 
main need for the poor during a difﬁcult transition period is likely to be food, 
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one approach is a time-limited food subsidy and distribution program. Given 
that targeting of food subsidies is difﬁcult, an untargeted subsidy on “inferior” 
goods may be a better approach.
This leaves the ﬁrst option: provision of a general social safety net. Direct 
income support tends to be the most efﬁcient type of social safety net, provided 
it can be administratively arranged. A problem is that it is very hard to identify 
who actually needs the money and even harder to get it to all those who need 
it. One approach is to provide a money payment to all households initially, 
subsequently narrow this to middle and low-income families, and ﬁnally give 
it only to low-income families. Because distinguishing the poor from the non-
poor may be difﬁcult, workfare programs may be more generally applicable, 
and have been proven effective under various circumstances, as individuals can 
self-identify for these programs.
Some poor countries may not be able to afford a full-ﬂedged safety net. This 
implies that development aid has an important role to play in supporting the 
operation of such safety nets, as is discussed further below. In terms of the design 
of trade policy reform, it also strengthens the need for up-front analysis of where 
the poor are located in terms of production (income) and consumption, assess-
ing which groups may be seriously detrimentally affected, and determining what 
types of complementary reforms would best offset these potential losses. 
Identifying the national interest
Research efforts at the national level should aim to ensure that trade policy 
decisions, including WTO negotiating positions, are based on sound analysis 
of the costs and beneﬁts of different options for the domestic economy. This 
assessment has become all the more important in the context of WTO rules 
subject to binding dispute settlement, and all the more complex as trade rules 
move further into domestic regulatory areas. Evaluating and understanding 
the implications of alternative rules is not straightforward, especially when it 
comes to the regulatory, “behind the border” policies—such as food safety or 
product standards, labeling requirements, and regulations for all the services 
sectors, from ﬁnancial markets to auditing services, to conditions for building 
new large retail shops—that are increasingly the subject of multilateral discus-
sions. Too often deliberations in the WTO are not informed by economic 
analysis or a good understanding of the costs and beneﬁts of speciﬁc proposals 
or rules, or how these costs and beneﬁts are distributed across or within coun-
tries. This is another form of policy coherence, namely coherence between 
analysis of what makes sense in terms of trade policy reform for development 
and negotiating positions and dynamics in Geneva.
The role of domestic institutions is crucial because trade policy raises 
domestic issues, and vice-versa. In some countries, domestic universities or 
independent think tanks conduct much of the needed research and policy 
analysis. In other countries, government agencies undertake this analysis. For 
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instance, the Australian Productivity Commission conducts public inquiries 
and research into a broad range of economic and social issues, including trade 
and industry assistance. Recent reviews have focused on, for example, assistance 
to the automotive and textile industries, as well as barriers to trade in services 
in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. The role of the Productivity Commission has been 
instrumental in turning Australia from a protectionist country in the 1960s to 
a free-trade-minded country today. 
Well informed domestic debates are particularly critical for a number of 
the poorest developing countries, where assessing the impact of existing or 
possible policy choices in the context of negotiations remains a major chal-
lenge. International organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and others in the development community can do much to assess the costs and 
beneﬁts for individual countries of various liberalization scenarios. Interna-
tional organizations—such as UNCTAD, the World Bank, and OECD—and 
local and international NGOs ﬁll part of the gap, but their supply falls short 
of demand, in particular for country-speciﬁc analyses. Moreover, they do not 
address the crucial (and in all countries difﬁcult) problem of the extent to 
which these debates effectively feed into the policymaking process. The best 
way forward is likely to involve leveraging the expertise of international organi-
zations and international NGOs to help countries develop such research capac-
ity at the national level. Strengthening and expanding existing linkages and 
networks between international organizations and local NGOs and researchers 
could be an important starting point. 
More generally, greater efforts should be made to support developing 
countries at the national level in efforts to involve a wider range of national 
stakeholders in the debate about trade policy and assessment of different 
policy options. This is essential to ensure that assessments of policy options 
are grounded in local realities and that realistic and sustainable positions that 
reﬂect the views of a range of constituents are adopted.
In addition to greater involvement of local NGOs, business in develop-
ing countries could usefully be assisted to become better organized and better 
able to promote their interests in national policy debates. Business groups are 
vital in identifying offensive interests—governments may not always be aware 
of which companies are exporting what and to which markets, or indeed of 
the types of problems being encountered (such as on standards). Equally, the 
small and medium-size enterprises that account for the bulk of businesses in 
developing countries may beneﬁt particularly from the certainties provided by 
international trade rules. Increasing the capacity of business to communicate 
export interests to governments is also critical to balancing the (generally more 
organized) voice of the protectionist lobbies. 
Finally, better efforts are also needed at the national level to explain the 
gains from trade and trade rules. The survival of the WTO depends on the 
willingness of the Members to undertake necessary reform at the national 
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level. The case for reform and the role of the rules-based multilateral trading 
system in supporting that has to be explained and defended at the national 
level. Increasing the proﬁle and informed debate about trade issues in the 
media will be a critical element in building support for policy positions and 
reforms at home.
Achieving whole-of-government positions
Complex trade agreements intersecting with a wide range of domestic regula-
tory issues also place new demands on coordination within government at the 
national level. Trade negotiations are no longer the exclusive domain of trade 
ministries; at some point almost all government agencies will be called on to 
feed into the assessment of policy options, the development of “whole of govern-
ment” negotiating positions, or the design of appropriate complementary poli-
cies. Most important, responsibility for actually implementing commitments is 
likely to fall to government agencies beyond those responsible for trade. 
But coordination is no easy task. Many government agencies have limited 
knowledge of—or often interest in—trade agreements or negotiations, even 
where their own areas of responsibility might be involved. Overburdened and 
underresourced agencies with heavy domestic responsibilities may legitimately 
view trade negotiations as a lower priority. A survey of countries’ preparations 
for the GATS negotiations revealed that, while many countries had some sort 
of mechanism for intragovernmental coordination in place, attracting inter-
est from other agencies was often a major challenge. Even where agencies 
were engaged, considerable time, effort, and resources needed to be devoted 
to explaining the issues and providing information about the trading system. 
Developing countries with limited administrative resources faced particular 
obstacles in pursuing and servicing the coordination process (OECD 2003d). 
Further, where other agencies are motivated to be engaged in the negotiations, 
this can be due to regulatory capture (where the agency’s strong links with the 
domestic industry for which it has regulatory responsibility lead it to view their 
interests as being the national interest).
Lack of policy coherence poses real risks in terms of inappropriate WTO 
commitments, or failure to implement those commitments. By contrast, the 
gains from sound policy coordination are large, and include:
• Early involvement by relevant agencies assists in government under-
standing of the various policy options and maximizes the knowledge 
of both the current situation and alternative approaches taken by other 
countries. Similarly, involving regulatory agencies in the negotiations 
helps them to establish their own international networks, fostering dia-
logue and encouraging the development of regulatory cooperation to 
address cross-border issues.
• Experience suggests that ministries with responsibility for particular 
sectors or issues are less resistant to the development of trade rules if 
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they are involved in the discussions and negotiations from an early 
stage.
• Involvement of other agencies also assists with the implementation of 
WTO commitments by ensuring that liberalization is underpinned by 
necessary and appropriate regulation; and by generating both awareness 
of the potential impacts and prior planning of programs and strategies 
to manage those impacts.
• Coordination can also assist in the identiﬁcation of areas where trade 
liberalization can contribute to other national policy goals. For exam-
ple, improving access to higher education might be achieved by allow-
ing foreign universities to establish in the country; access to health care 
might be served by promoting health tourism and using the proceeds to 
cross-subsidize the national system; or, more generally, importation of 
food might lower the costs of basic items for poor consumers. 
• Coordination can also help to identify and promote policy “win-wins.” 
A number of these have been identiﬁed in trade and environment—for 
instance, trade disciplines on environmentally harmful subsidies (in 
agriculture or energy services) or through trade in environmental goods 
and services. 
• Coordination is also important for avoiding contradictory policy, such 
as pursuing curbs on greenhouse gases while subsidizing the extraction 
of coal.
Policy coherence at the international level
International policy coherence refers not simply to the provision of interna-
tional assistance to help countries participate in the trading system and to 
integrate into the world economy. It also refers to the need for such assistance 
to be better coordinated among key donors and international organizations.
This international level is not unrelated to coordination at the national 
level. One reason for the post-Uruguay Round difﬁculties with implementa-
tion is that commitments by OECD countries to provide assistance were made 
without the involvement of their aid agencies (who actually have responsibil-
ity for disbursing funds). Equally, to the extent that aid is demand-driven, 
developing countries must also nominate trade-related assistance as a priority 
for bilateral aid programs. Donors have indicated that, while they planned to 
put more emphasis on trade in their bilateral country programs, the outcome 
would depend on the priorities of the partner country (WTO/OECD 2003). 
Current aid for trade
In recent times, and in response to the Doha Agenda, most donors have 
increased both the quantity and value of their Trade-Related Technical Assis-
tance and Capacity Building (TRTA/CB) (WTO/OECD 2003) (box 12.1). 
Given this increase, donor coordination is all the more important, and some 
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initiatives have been taken. The WTO and OECD secretariats have combined 
to create a Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity-Building Data Base 
(TCBDB), which aims to help the development and trade policy communities 
to achieve higher degrees of coordination and coherence, avoid duplication, 
share information, and monitor the implementation of commitments in the 
Doha Agenda. The TCBDB enables donors to view the multiplicity of pro-
grams (national and regional) already available and to identify gaps. 
Another important initiative has been the Integrated Framework for 
Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF). A partnership between the 
International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, WTO, UNDP, World Bank, and 
IMF, it aims to take a coordinated approach to identifying and prioritizing 
trade-related assistance needs in LDCs, as well as projects for donor funding. 
It also aims to mainstream trade into national poverty reduction and devel-
opment strategies. The IF is now on a more stable footing, having had a few 
false starts, but more effort is still required to achieve the kind of cooperation 
between donors and organizations that the IF was supposed to engender. Turf 
protection and other priorities of international organizations have been an 
Box 12.1
Trade-related 
technical 
assistance and 
capacity building
a. Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, EC, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, the United 
States, plus 16 internation-
al organizations including 
APEC, FAO, IMF, ITC, OECD, 
UNCTAD, UNDP, UNIDO, 
WTO, and World Bank.
b. Trade policy and regula-
tions: effective participation 
in negotiations, analysis, 
and implementation of mul-
tilateral trade agreements; 
trade policy mainstreaming 
and technical standards; 
trade facilitation, including 
tariff structures and cus-
toms regimes; support to 
regional trade agreements 
and human resources 
development in trade. Trade 
development: business 
development and activities 
aimed at improving the 
business climate; access 
to trade ﬁnance; and trade 
promotion in the productive 
sectors, including at the 
institutional and enterprise 
level. All aid to infrastruc-
ture is deemed to assist 
international trading.
Source: WTO/OECD 2003.
The Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity-Building Data Base, launched in November 
2002, contains information from 39 bilateral donors and multilateral agenciesa on three 
categories of assistance: trade policy and regulations (participation in the trading sys-
tem), trade development (business climate and trade promotion), and infrastructure.b
On average, some 3,500 trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building activ-
ities were committed in 2001 and 2002, almost equally distributed in number between 
trade policy ($719 million) and trade development ($1,408 million). Some 1,900 activities 
were committed for infrastructure ($8,144 million—not all directed at trade).
Most commitments under trade policy went to trade facilitation (mostly Africa), regional 
trade agreements (mostly Asia), technical standards (mostly regional), and aid to inte-
grate trade into development plans (mostly Asia). For activities related to WTO negotia-
tions, most assistance went to competition and environment. Under trade development, 
most were business support services, trade ﬁnance activities, and trade promotion and 
market development.
Since 2001, 177 developing countries have received some assistance in trade policy 
and 163 in trade development, with the number of activities per recipient ranging from 1 
to 260. Five countries (China, Indonesia, Thailand, Uganda, and Viet Nam) received more 
than 150 activities. Africa received more than one-third of total infrastructure activities 
and 31 percent of trade development but only 21 percent of trade policy and regulations. 
Asia received one-third of trade policy activities but only a quarter of trade development 
and infrastructure.
Commitments to trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities 
constitute 4.8 percent of total aid, on a par with population programs and more than basic 
education or basic health. Multilateral programs remained the main channel for such 
activities, but some large donors also run substantial bilateral programs. 
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issue, as has a lack of willingness of major donors to act through the IF and 
not their own channels. 
Finally, there is also considerable scope to deepen the treatment of trade 
and trade-related policies in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
prepared by developing country authorities, with input from the IMF and 
World Bank, as well as donors and NGOs, which set out policy and donor 
priorities for many of the poorest developing countries. Links could also be 
made between the domestic PRSPs and, where available, the studies conducted 
for the IF.
The role of the WTO
Whereas the GATT was essentially conceived as a contract between the par-
ties, with an interim secretariat to support it, the WTO is an organization with 
148 Members. This change of status has given rise to many new and conﬂict-
ing expectations. 
On one hand, the WTO is strongly member-driven. The WTO as such 
does little—as evidenced by the relatively small size of the organization (500 
employees, compared with 2,000 for the OECD). The media and others often 
use expressions such as “the WTO requires,” but this is completely mislead-
ing. WTO obligations are owed not to the organization, but to the Members, 
and the organization undertakes no independent monitoring of its Members’ 
implementation of their obligations. That is, commitments are owed to other 
WTO Members, and only other Members can claim that those commitments 
are not being met and initiate a dispute. Even notiﬁcation obligations are owed 
to other Members—speciﬁcally, to the bodies (such as the Council for Trade in 
Services) that those Members constitute. In other words, the WTO is merely 
the channel.
On the other hand, the new status of the organization, and the greater 
reach of its rules, bring new factors into play. Unlike much of the GATT, 
WTO obligations apply to all developing countries and those obligations were 
(and are increasingly) linked in negotiations to the provision of assistance 
for their implementation. The perception thus became that “WTO obliga-
tions” should be accompanied by “WTO assistance” with implementation. As 
became rapidly apparent—from TRIPS to customs valuation—this is a task 
that the organization is ill-equipped to undertake. The WTO’s role on techni-
cal assistance will continue to evolve, but the following principles might serve 
as useful “rules of thumb”: 
• Focus on what the WTO Secretariat can and cannot do. The main form of 
assistance that the WTO Secretariat can provide is to explain the legal 
requirements of WTO agreements. Even for this limited task, demand 
greatly outstrips the capacity of the Secretariat to deliver. There is a need 
to increase resources to some extent (as already took place pursuant to 
the Doha Agenda) but also to outsource more—using local consultants 
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can both be cheaper and have a useful ﬂow-on effect in helping to estab-
lish local networks. The challenge is to maintain quality control. 
• Manage expectations about what assistance the WTO can provide. This 
is not assistance to trade—the WTO does not fund the development 
of new ports or roads—nor even all the assistance that is required to 
meet the obligations of agreements (the WTO does not fund the cre-
ation of national SPS standards bodies). It is limited to explaining what 
the agreements require and providing advice on the range of ways in 
which Members might be consistent with their commitments. Other 
organizations and forums exist to provide countries with advice about 
development policy, organizations that come accompanied by funding 
to implement those policies.
• Improve cooperation and coherence with other organizations. The WTO 
needs to share with others the burden of helping countries identify 
options for reform and draw on those with greater experience on the 
practical solutions—such as WIPO on intellectual property, and the 
WCO on customs reform and trade facilitation. This should be part of 
an ongoing loop—input from these organizations should also inform 
Members’ deliberations of what obligations they should negotiate in the 
ﬁrst place, as well as how to implement them.
Looking ahead
While trade policies create market access opportunities for developing coun-
tries, increased aid must be forthcoming if developing countries are to be able 
to beneﬁt from these opportunities. A major constraint limiting export growth 
in many small and low-income countries is a lack of supply capacity and a 
high-cost business environment. Firms in these low-income countries may also 
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deal with regulatory requirements such as health and safety 
standards that apply in export markets. Development assistance can play an 
important role in helping to build the institutional and trade capacity needed to 
beneﬁt from increased trade and better access to markets. As noted above, this 
assistance must go beyond the implementation of trade agreement rules nar-
rowly deﬁned and focus on supply capacity more broadly, as well as addressing 
adjustment costs associated with reforms (including with others’ reforms, as in 
the case of those countries that will experience losses from preference erosion). 
More aid for trade. Clearly, signiﬁcantly stepped-up funding is required. 
Donors should create an international “aid for trade fund” to assist developing 
countries to beneﬁt from and undertake trade reforms. The size of the fund 
should reﬂect the scale and importance of the task at hand. 
Mobilizing such funding should be feasible as the aggregate (global) gains 
from trade are much greater than the aggregate losses associated with restruc-
turing. The problem is that in practice the compensation (transfers) that is 
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called for often does not occur domestically, and barely occurs at all interna-
tionally, as reﬂected in low ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) levels—
$69 billion in 2003—relative to the estimates of the net income gains asso-
ciated with past multilateral rounds (in the $200–$500 billion range), the 
magnitude of total support to farmers in OECD countries (currently some 
$350 billion), or the potential gains from further global liberalization (upward 
of $500 billion, especially if services trade is included).2 
There are various ways in which such redistribution could be realized 
(Hoekman 2004). For instance, it could be through a small consumption tax 
on the goods whose prices will be falling as a result of the implementation of 
negotiated multilateral liberalization commitments. However, administrative 
convenience and collection costs considerations might make a small uniform 
levy on imports whose tariffs are being cut more feasible. To give a sense of 
the orders of magnitude involved, a 0.25 percent levy on imports of OECD 
countries would be equivalent to more than $12 billion (total OECD imports 
are some $5 trillion). However, as much of trade into OECD countries is duty 
free, and it is not desirable to re-impose duties on such trade, any such levy 
should be restricted to currently dutiable imports where tariffs are subject to 
reduction commitments. An option here would be to agree to allocate a cer-
tain share of currently collected revenue to low-income countries. As tariffs 
are gradually lowered following a Doha Round negotiated outcome, the total 
revenue available would automatically decline over time, which is appropriate 
given that the motivation is to facilitate adjustment. 
Indeed, it is important that there be general acceptance that any such 
levy not be an additional tax, but be explicitly based on the recognition that 
any process of multilateral liberalization will create losers as well as winners. 
Despite the well known case for and potential feasibility of compensating los-
ers, in practice this often does not occur. A small reduction in the price gains/
beneﬁts that will accrue to consumers as a result of liberalization is one practi-
cal means of redistributing some of the gains from trade reform to those who 
gain less or may lose.
A key challenge will be to ensure that these additional funds are used most 
effectively, including within the existing structures and mechanisms for “aid for 
trade.” There are a variety of potential channels where this additional funding 
could usefully be absorbed—notably the Integrated Framework—and ensur-
ing coordination and cooperation with existing initiatives will be an impor-
tant task for the trade and development communities. A priority task could be 
the identiﬁcation of new and existing channels through which this additional 
funding could most efﬁciently be made available for relevant, targeted projects 
in developing countries. 
In terms of the types of activities to which such increased international 
assistance could be devoted, four main areas can be identiﬁed: assistance for 
trade policymaking and participation in negotiations; for implementation of 
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WTO agreements; to manage the costs of adjustment; and to participate in 
trade itself. Under each of these headings, some work is already under way (see 
box 12.1), although amounts remain small compared with what is needed, and 
there is considerable scope to scale up activities.
A few additional words of caution are required, however. First, care must be 
taken to ensure that additional assistance to participate in WTO negotiations 
does not reﬂect OECD priorities more than those of developing countries—as, 
for instance, has been the case with the focus on competition and environ-
ment, and the scarcity of assistance to help developing countries address anti-
dumping complaints. Second, in regulatory areas, vigilance is necessary in the 
face of the risk that OECD assistance may be used to create regulatory “spheres 
of inﬂuence”—that is, OECD countries might seek to propagate their own 
regulatory systems in developing countries (however inappropriate they may 
be for the country concerned). While this may be legitimately motivated by 
the belief that their approach is the best, it can also be used to create a critical 
mass of countries that share their approach for the purpose of new rule-making 
negotiations in the WTO. Third, additional assistance should aim at maxi-
mizing the beneﬁts for, and building genuine local capacity in, developing 
countries—goals that cannot be achieved where aid is conditional on the use 
of inputs from the donor (so-called “tied aid”).
Finally, additional assistance will also be most effective where developing 
countries also create supportive conditions for trade and investment as part of 
their national development strategies (UNCTAD 2003c). Trade liberalization 
requires international negotiations and international assistance, but its beneﬁts 
and challenges remain fundamentally a question of domestic economic and 
policy reform. 
Aid to assist trade policymaking at the national level and participation in WTO 
negotiations. As noted above, international organizations can play an important 
role in assisting countries in identifying their interests in negotiations and in 
assessing the impact of various policy choices, in particular in relation to the 
poor. This analysis can be speciﬁc to the negotiations—as in the assessments 
of different tariff reduction formulas (see chapter 3), or more generally related 
to liberalization, with or without WTO commitments (such as efﬁcient regula-
tory policy for energy liberalization). Much analysis is, and should be, devoted 
to seeking insights for the current negotiations from assessments of the impact, 
including that on the most vulnerable groups, of Uruguay Round agreements. 
This can be important both in overcoming short-term resistance to change and 
in learning from past mistakes. As noted above, however, international organi-
zations are a complement to domestic research capacity, not a substitute; their 
efforts should ultimately aim at developing local capacity for analysis.
Exchanges among countries on their experiences with liberalization and 
policy reform are also valuable, either bilaterally or regionally (for example, 
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APEC combines research projects with intergovernmental dialogue on ser-
vices and regulatory reform). International organizations can also serve as a 
forum for the exchange of views, with the additional beneﬁt of subjecting their 
research to the “reality check” of policymaker input.
Finally, programs run by international organizations, NGOs, or bilateral 
donors can help developing country trade negotiators to participate in WTO 
negotiations. These courses, of which the best known is the WTO Trade Pol-
icy Training Course, normally cover the speciﬁcs of individual agreements, as 
well as insights into the negotiating process.
Aid to assist with implementation of WTO agreements. This has been the focus of 
much international assistance, and rightly so. Initially this assistance focused 
on explaining the legal provisions and requirements of the new agreements. 
However, what was required to implement WTO agreements went well 
beyond this. The new agreements required not only new laws, but new institu-
tions, with trained staff and enforcement capacity. The involvement of other 
international organizations with expertise—and resources—has proved criti-
cal (such as WIPO on intellectual property and the WCO on rules of origin 
and customs valuation). But WTO Members greatly underestimated what 
would be required to implement the new agreements, and more time and far 
more resources than anticipated are required. Some additional key areas for 
assistance include institutions, infrastructure, and human resources for Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
(the Standards and Trade Development Facility is a positive development—see 
chapter 6); and assistance to develop and implement regulatory frameworks in 
services (chapter 4).
Aid to manage adjustment from liberalization. This report has highlighted 
many areas where international assistance—often ﬁnancial assistance—will 
be required to help countries operate the complementary policies needed for 
successful trade liberalization. These include assistance to operate social safety 
nets (chapter 12); assistance with the funding for universal service mechanisms 
targeting poor consumers in liberalized services markets (chapter 4); assistance 
with reform of the tax system to help compensate governments for loss of tariff 
revenue (chapter 5); assistance with land reform, education of farmers, and 
research and technology in agriculture (chapter 3); and compensation mecha-
nisms to address concerns about preference erosion—given that estimates to 
date indicate that the amounts involved may not be enormous, this should be 
feasible (chapter 7). 
The IMF’s Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM), approved by the IMF 
Board in April 2004, is designed to help mitigate adjustment costs of liberaliza-
tion for developing countries. It is intended to address not only preference ero-
sion but also developing country concerns that multilateral trade liberalization 
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might temporarily affect their balance of payments. That is, the TIM will also 
cover cases such as balance of payments shortfalls as a result of ATC quota inte-
gration and the possible impact on net food-importing developing countries of 
higher foods import prices. The TIM is not a new facility but operates through 
existing IMF facilities. A further suggestion is for compensation by developed 
countries for loss of agricultural preferences to be covered by the Green Box 
(chapter 3). Addressing this issue would do much to ease the concerns of the 
recipient countries and remove an important roadblock in the negotiations. 
The magnitude of adjustment shocks and the associated costs are of course 
a function of the magnitude of the underlying policy changes. Insofar as a 
developing country does little to open its own markets, and the Doha Round 
outcome is not very ambitious, by deﬁnition there will be little in the way of 
adjustment costs—or potential net gains for that matter. However, even an 
ambitious Doha Round may have only limited beneﬁts for many of the poorest 
countries without assistance to better integrate them into the world economy 
(see below).
Aid to participate in trade. Finally, increased assistance is required to address 
the supply-side constraints on poor countries, affecting their ability to take 
advantage of new market access opportunities. Such assistance could include, 
for example, support for measures to improve the investment climate and raise 
productivity in agriculture. In many cases, assistance may also be required 
to tackle transaction costs and institutional weaknesses obstructing trade and 
develop the necessary infrastructure (as in relation to transportation of goods 
for export). Here, liberalization may increase capacity (as in telecommunica-
tions and ﬁnancial services—chapter 4), though assistance may still be needed 
in creating a sound regulatory environment to underpin this liberalization. 
Finally, assistance may be necessary to improve the performance of institutions 
for trade (such as customs reform—chapter 9).
Additional assistance will be necessary to help developing country export-
ers meet health or other technical standards in key export markets. This should 
include assistance to increase developing country participation in relevant 
international standard-setting bodies, to ensure that international standards 
take account of their interests and to promote the development of standards in 
their products (chapter 6).
Other policy coherence for development
While beyond the immediate scope of this study, a critical area for attention is 
the relationship between trade, debt, and ﬁnance and how the level of exter-
nal debt affects developing countries’ participation in international trade. The 
creation of a WTO Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance is an impor-
tant step in encouraging greater coherence between the WTO and the Bret-
ton Woods institutions. Developed countries need to take greater account of 
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the full range of policies and circumstances affecting the ability of developing 
countries to participate in world trade, particularly in assessing the actual or 
potential impacts of WTO obligations.
More generally, in the globalized economy, ever more domestic policies 
have international effects. Consideration of the potential impact of domestic 
policies on developing countries must become an automatic part of the policy-
making process in developed countries. From the impact of domestic stan-
dards for goods and services on the potential trade opportunities of developing 
countries, to the impact of agricultural, ﬁnancial, and aid policies, if developed 
countries are serious about their commitment to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015, a more comprehensive approach to ensuring the 
consistency of the whole range of their domestic policies with this objective 
will need to be taken. 
Policy coherence in practice: trade and environment 
Coherence between trade and environment policy has been on the interna-
tional agenda for some years.3 The ﬁrst “trade and” issue to be included in the 
WTO, the trade and environment work program has aimed at identifying the 
synergies and areas of potential tension between these two key national policies 
aimed at international problems and with international ramiﬁcations. Consid-
erable work has been undertaken by a wide range of international organiza-
tions, NGOs, and researchers to identify the linkages and synergies between 
trade and environment policies, including the scope for “win-win-win” out-
comes (for environment, development, and trade) from the removal of environ-
mentally harmful—and trade-distorting—subsidies in agriculture, ﬁsheries, 
and energy (box 12.2). In agriculture, for instance, trade-distorting domestic 
support policies encourage environmentally harmful agricultural practices, 
such as intensive farming, including high use of fertilizers and pesticides. The 
result is resource degradation and environmental stress. Furthermore, trade-
distorting support, including export subsidies, can have negative environmen-
tal effects in third countries, particularly developing countries.
The relationship between WTO rules and trade obligations in multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements. A key aspect of policy coherence with regard to trade 
and environment is also on the negotiating agenda of the Doha Round. The 
Doha Agenda mandates negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on 
the relationship between existing WTO rules and speciﬁc trade obligations in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (the other major issues man-
dated for negotiations—environmental services and goods—are dealt with in 
chapters 4 and 5, respectively). At issue is whether WTO rules and speciﬁc 
trade obligations under MEAs are always compatible and, if not, which takes 
precedence. Some careful limits are placed on the negotiations, however. They 
shall not “prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to 
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the MEA in question,” nor “add or diminish the rights and obligations” of 
any WTO Member under existing WTO agreements, in particular the SPS 
Agreement. That is, the negotiations do not include discussion of the situation 
where there is a conﬂict between WTO Members when one is not a party to 
the MEA in question, the more likely source of possible tensions. 
There are currently approximately 200 multilateral environmental agree-
ments in operation, of which only 20 contain speciﬁc trade provisions. These 
include, for example, the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone 
layer, which applies restrictions on the production, consumption, and export of 
aerosols containing chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs); the Basel Convention, which 
controls trade or transportation of hazardous waste across international bor-
ders; and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. To 
date, no measure affecting trade taken under an environmental agreement has 
been challenged in the GATT-WTO system.
Given the cautious pace of discussions in the WTO to date (where much 
time has been devoted to coming to a common understanding on the scope 
of the mandate), and the fact that this issue has rightly not been a priority 
for developing country resources in the Doha Round, it would be premature 
to advocate any particular outcome as being in the interests of all developing 
Box 12.2
Win-win-win 
scenarios? Fishery 
subsidies
The current WTO negotiations on ﬁsheries subsidies could set an important precedent 
in an area where trade and conservation objectives intersect (see box 1.6). Subsidies 
to marine capture ﬁsheries, which have been estimated to be at least $15 billion a year 
worldwide, are believed by a number of countries to be contributing to overcapacity and 
overﬁshing, putting enormous strain on ﬁshing stocks already threatened by the destruc-
tion of coastal habitats and the pollution of the seas. Developing country exporters of 
ﬁsheries products compete not only against the highly subsidized ﬂeets of developed 
countries—some subsidies also support distant-water ﬁshing by developed country ﬂeets 
in the exclusive economic zones of developing countries, which may stunt the develop-
ment of their own ﬁshing ﬂeets and exports.
Not all the money spent by governments in support of their ﬁshing industries is harm-
ful. Indeed, a not insigniﬁcant proportion of it is used to fund research, monitoring, and 
enforcement—activities that are vital for ensuring the effective management of a vital 
natural food resource. The focus of the current negotiations, therefore, is on crafting 
effective disciplines that will prohibit or discourage subsidies that are capacity-enhancing 
or effort-enhancing, while allowing space for governments to spend money on protecting 
their ﬁshery resources and encouraging structural adjustment, such as through decom-
missioning vessels and retraining displaced workers.
How to provide developing countries with special and differential treatment remains 
one of the thornier issues. Some developing countries would like to maintain or even 
increase employment in their ﬁshing industries, especially in the small-scale and artisanal 
segments, and feel that subsidies are necessary to accomplish that goal. Other develop-
ing countries, speaking from experience, warn that subsidizing the expansion of ﬁshing 
capacity risks overshooting the target of maximum sustainable yield. It is apparently a risk 
that some countries would nonetheless prefer having the option to take.
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countries. Two general points could be made, however. First, improved coor-
dination between trade and environment ofﬁcials at the national level is the 
key to a more mutually supportive trade and environment relationship and 
is the best way to limit the potential for future problems. But this is not eas-
ily achieved: divisions within governments on several trade and environment 
issues appear to be as great as between governments. But trade and environ-
ment is an area that demands true policy coherence and whole-of-government 
positions, rather than replays of battles between different ministries and inter-
est groups at the international level and among international organizations. 
Second, developing countries have an interest in ensuring that trade mea-
sures are seen as part of a package of measures in MEAs and not taken out of 
context. Trade measures play a certain role in such a package and contribute 
as such to the overall effectiveness and efﬁciency of the package. Developing 
countries have a key interest in supportive measures—such as ﬁnancial and 
technical assistance, training, transfer of technology, and so on—that gener-
ally contribute to reducing adjustment costs in developing countries to meet 
MEA objectives. Developing countries also have an interest in ensuring that 
trade measures do not pursue one-size-ﬁts-all approaches, but are customized 
to the speciﬁc situation in different country groups. Finally, developing coun-
tries need to emphasize the interrelationship between ﬂexibility in MEA trade 
measures and the size and effectiveness of supportive measures. In short, the 
more rigid a trade measure in a MEA, the higher the need for supportive mea-
sures and their ﬂexibility in application for developing countries. 
The Doha Agenda also mandates work programs to explore the effect of 
environmental measures on market access (see chapter 6), TRIPS, and envi-
ronmental labeling, with recommendations to be made to the WTO Ministe-
rial Conference on future action, including the desirability of negotiations. 
TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Discussions on TRIPS have 
focused on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (CBD), including the protection of traditional 
knowledge. Developing countries have a particular interest in the CBD, as the 
vast majority of global biodiversity and traditional knowledge lies within their 
territories. They also wish to make full use of these resources for their long-
term sustainable development. 
Article 16(5) of the CBD recognizes that patents and other intellectual 
property rights may have an inﬂuence on the CBD implementation and 
requests parties to cooperate in this regard to ensure that such rights are sup-
portive of and do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention. The 
TRIPS Agreement makes no mention of the CBD or its principles.
The type of knowledge protected under the TRIPS Agreement (patents, 
trademarks, copyright, and so on) is predominantly held in developed countries. 
Some 95 percent of patents are in developed countries, and a large proportion 
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of the 5 percent in developing countries is held by developed country compa-
nies. Developing countries are, on the other hand, well endowed with tradi-
tional knowledge. The nature of this knowledge—for example, it is often held 
collectively, passed down orally from generation to generation—makes much 
if not most of it difﬁcult to protect using the conventional IPR instruments 
required by the TRIPS Agreement. Thus there exists an imbalance, whereby 
the knowledge predominant in developed countries is protected, whereas that 
predominant in developing countries is not.
Moreover, there are concerns that the genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge of developing countries are often used commercially and patented in 
developed countries with little or no beneﬁt to the owners of genetic resources 
(the sovereign states, as per the CBD) or traditional knowledge, and without 
their prior informed consent. With the TRIPS Agreement being implemented 
by more WTO Members, there are concerns that this situation will only be 
exacerbated, to the detriment of developing countries and the holders of tradi-
tional knowledge.
To this end, developing countries have sought to amend the TRIPS Agree-
ment so that applications for patents relating to biological materials or to tra-
ditional knowledge shall provide, as a condition to acquiring patent rights: 
disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource and 
of the traditional knowledge used in the invention; evidence of prior informed 
consent through approval of authorities under the relevant national regimes; 
and evidence of fair and equitable beneﬁt sharing under the national regime of 
the country of origin. This would provide a legally binding defensive protec-
tion against “bad patents” based on misappropriation of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, and facilitate beneﬁt sharing. But it would not prevent 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge being inappropriately acquired, used 
commercially, but just not patented. There is therefore also a need for positive 
protection, such as national sui generis systems for the protection of traditional 
knowledge, traditional knowledge registries, and databases. There have also 
been many calls from the developing world for an international framework, 
which would recognize protection of traditional knowledge at the national and 
regional levels.
Ecolabeling. Ecolabeling could represent a potentially attractive way to provide 
consumers with information about the environmental impact of purchased 
products, as well as provide producers in developing countries with market 
access, and possibly a price premium, for products that are environmentally 
friendly (as products from organic agriculture or certiﬁed sustainably man-
aged forests). While there is still no evidence of changes in trade ﬂows arising 
from ecolabeling programs, there are a number of concerns (noted in chapter 
6) related to the costs of compliance and compliance assessment; the appro-
priateness and comparability of the information provided to consumers; and 
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the potential use of ecolabels based on a life-cycle approach, which would 
take account of non-product-related process and production methods (see also 
chapter 5 with regard to environmental goods). Particular attention needs 
to be paid to this issue, because mandatory ecolabels based on non-product-
related process and production methods could undermine what is perceived to 
be a competitive advantage of developing countries. In addition, this approach 
may open the backdoor for consideration of the precautionary measures that 
go beyond the current approach in the SPS Agreement, which require that 
precautionary measures be: temporary and subject to review in the light of new 
scientiﬁc evidence; based on scientiﬁc evidence; and subject to a risk assess-
ment (Article 5). 
Ecolabeling is currently being discussed in the WTO, but the debate has 
not progressed much. Given that the majority of ecolabeling schemes are vol-
untary, and that there is no obligation to notify voluntary labeling schemes to 
the WTO, progress on this issue may be beneﬁcial to developing countries, 
because as long as ecolabels remain outside the scope of WTO agreements 
they can lead to inappropriate discrimination (see chapter 6). At a minimum, 
developing countries should demand greater transparency in the establishment 
and application of such schemes.
Box 12.3
Did we say policy 
coherence?
• Total aid from OECD countries amounts to around $69 billion a year, but total OECD 
spending on agricultural subsidies is $300 billion a year. In 2001 net ﬂows of ODA to 
LDCs would have been doubled if 14 percent of the 2001 value of the ﬁscal support 
for OECD producers had been redirected in aid to LDCs (UNCTAD 2004b). 
• Aid programs encourage crop diversiﬁcation in developing countries, but preference 
programs encourage specialization.
• Aid includes assistance to help countries upgrade their production capacity and 
increase their value added, but tariff escalation discourages further processing. 
• Trade preferences are granted to help developing countries to integrate into the global 
trading system, but they create incentives for them to oppose further liberalization of 
global trade.
• Developed countries promote intra-developing country trade, but the rules of origin in 
their own preferential agreements with developing countries discourage it by prevent-
ing sourcing of inputs from other developing countries on a global basis or by requiring 
use of developed country fabric.
• Developed countries have long promoted the idea that developing countries have 
export interests in services, as well as the possibilities of making use of informa-
tion and communication technology for development. But some have responded to 
increased outsourcing to developing countries (a services export).
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Free trade agreements
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements poses major challenges both 
for the multilateral trading system and for trade. It has led to the creation 
of a tangled web of differential treatment, adding complexity and uncer-
tainty to trade, and to the development of different trade rules under different 
agreements—rules that may not be in the interests of developing countries. 
Virtually all WTO Members are party to one or more free trade agree-
ments (FTAs). More than 170 FTAs are currently in force; an additional 70 are 
estimated to be operational though not yet notiﬁed to the WTO. The WTO 
estimates that, by the end of 2005, if FTAs reportedly planned or already 
under negotiation are concluded, the total number of FTAs in force might well 
approach 300. Developing countries are involved in 149 agreements (76 noti-
ﬁed to the WTO, 34 concluded but not notiﬁed, and 39 under negotiation), of 
which 76 are intra-developing country agreements (27 notiﬁed to the WTO, 
26 concluded but not notiﬁed, and 23 under negotiation) (Schott 2003).
Do free trade agreements confer beneﬁts?
Notwithstanding their popularity, FTAs are often tools of geopolitics (or 
domestic public relations and marketing) rather than economics. They have a 
mixed record in terms of the extent of real liberalization achieved, particularly 
in sensitive sectors and once the impact of sometimes restrictive rules of origin 
are taken into account. Developing countries negotiating FTAs often have lim-
ited bargaining power and, unlike in the multilateral setting, have limited abil-
ity to form coalitions to take on more powerful trading partners—Cancún is 
a timely reminder of the importance of coalitions in defending and promoting 
developing country interests. Some developing countries may ﬁnd themselves 
excluded from FTAs altogether, as they offer limited economic or geopolitical 
beneﬁts to trading partners.
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Even where parties to the FTA beneﬁt in terms of signiﬁcant market access 
gains, it is often at the expense of nonparties to the agreement—that is, there is 
trade diversion from other efﬁcient suppliers, many of which may also be develop-
ing countries. There are also costs to the countries in the FTA: under trade diver-
sion, the importing country ends up paying more for imports, with money that 
was initially going to the government as tariff revenue now accruing to producers 
in the partner countries. Part of this extra cost is a simple transfer from the taxpay-
ers in the importing partner to producers in the exporting partner, but because 
the real cost of imports has risen (the partner is less efﬁcient than “outside” pro-
ducers), real resources are also wasted by trade diversion. When all the commodi-
ties covered by the FTA are considered together, if trade diversion predominates, 
the FTA can reduce the welfare of some or all of the member countries. 
Further, from a political economy point of view, FTAs that are trade divert-
ing are likely to encounter less resistance from domestic industry than those that 
are trade creating. The reason is simple. Trade creation occurs when domestic 
production is replaced by cheaper imports from partner countries. While ben-
eﬁcial for the economy as a whole, it damages domestic producers, which will 
oppose the agreement or request exceptions. On the other hand, trade diversion 
means that imports from the rest of the world are replaced by imports from the 
partner country, and this is less damaging for the domestic industry. 
Additionally, FTAs do not address some of the biggest problems in world 
trade, notably agricultural subsidies. In the case of agriculture, FTAs can be 
especially damaging—either agriculture is excluded entirely from the agree-
ment, signiﬁcantly reducing the value of such agreements to countries for 
which this is a key export interest, or only the market access dimension is cov-
ered. This creates the iniquitous situation where some parties to FTAs progres-
sively open their markets to the agricultural produce of other parties, but with-
out means of addressing in parallel the enormous subsidies on those products. 
Such agreements can serve less to liberalize trade than to legitimize dumping 
(as happened to Mexico under NAFTA and as threatens to happen to other 
FTA partners in the absence of signiﬁcant progress on agricultural subsidies at 
the multilateral level). 
Where FTAs go beyond the multilateral system, this is not necessarily good 
news. In FTAs, developing countries are more likely to be confronted with pro-
visions on nontrade issues that they have combined with others to resist at the 
multilateral level—such as those related to adherence to labor standards. More 
recently, concerns have arisen that FTAs negotiated by the U.S. have the effect 
of extending patent protection for pharmaceuticals beyond that required by 
the TRIPS Agreement, perhaps undermining countries’ ability to make use of 
compulsory licensing provisions to ensure access to medicines (box 13.1). 
Regardless of the nature of the FTA, there are also dangers in terms of 
the costs—including opportunity costs—they impose. Multiple FTAs with 
differing rules of origin impose high transaction costs, particularly on small 
251Chapter 13 Free trade agreements
traders. For small countries with limited trade negotiating capacity, FTAs can 
also divert scarce resources from the pursuit of multilateral liberalization. While 
some argue that FTAs stimulate global trade negotiations, much of the evidence 
shows that advances in multilateral trade negotiations have led—not followed 
—the formation of trade blocs.1 Equally, the perception that trade blocs make 
global liberalization easier to achieve because they reduce the number of nego-
tiating parties is open to question because blocs may ﬁnd it just as difﬁcult to 
achieve internal agreement, while their size can make it easier for them to resist 
global pressures to liberalize (as in the case of EU agriculture). Even where such 
agreements may lead to multilateral liberalization, this also involves costs—in 
encouraging temporary trade diversion, FTAs encourage the temporary growth 
of some industries, and the adjustment costs of entry and exit can be particu-
larly high for developing countries (Stiglitz and Charlton 2004). 
Intra-developing country free trade agreements
However, given the importance of trade among developing countries—by some 
estimates, 40 percent of all developing country trade (Stiglitz and Charlton 
2004)—are there beneﬁts to intra-developing country FTAs? Some argue that 
where domestic ﬁrms have weak technological and productive capacities and the 
global economic context is characterized by systemic biases and asymmetries, 
Box 13.1
Examples of 
TRIPS-plus 
provisions in free 
trade agreements
Source: Oxfam 
International 2003, 
2004b; Vivas-Eugui 
2003; Drahos 2004.
Extension of patent protection beyond the 20 years required under TRIPS: Patent terms 
should be extended to compensate patent holders for any unreasonable delays in the 
granting of the patent or unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the 
marketing approval process. There are no such requirements under TRIPS, so the effec-
tive period of protection under TRIPS is usually less than 20 years.
Limits on parallel imports: The patent holder is permitted to restrict the possibility of paral-
lel imports in the market. TRIPS is silent on parallel importation. 
Test data protection: Test data of patent owners must be protected for at least 5 years for 
pharmaceutical products (10 years for agricultural chemicals) from the date of approval 
of the patent, delaying the marketing approval of generic drugs. Should this requirement 
continue to apply even where a compulsory license has been issued, it would effectively 
prevent the use of such licenses, since the delay and costs would be too great. TRIPS 
requires only protection of such data against “unfair commercial use.”
Compulsory licensing: The grounds on which compulsory licenses can be issued are more 
restrictive than in TRIPS, or requirements for compensation to the right holder may be 
higher than required by TRIPS.
Marketing approval and the life of the patent: The patent owner must be notiﬁed of the 
request for marketing approval and of the identity of the applicant; patent holders are 
claimed to use frivolous lawsuits to unnecessarily delay marketing approval for generics. 
TRIPS permits generic producers to seek regulatory approval during the life of the patent 
with no conditions. 
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regional arrangements may well provide the most supportive environment in which 
to pursue national development strategies (UNCTAD 2002). These studies note 
that FTAs among developing countries (such as AFTA and Mercosur) tend to 
be less restrictive to nonmembers than those between developed and developing 
countries—in the latter case, developing country members tend to gain consider-
able advantage over other developing countries in access to developed country 
markets (Mexico under NAFTA), though this advantage can be eroded when 
new FTAs are signed by the developed country in question (as best illustrated by 
the “pyramid of preferences” that the EU tried to create during the 1970s). This 
can alter the distribution of market shares among developing countries, and the 
outcome is not always favorable to the poorer countries (UNCTAD 2002).
One could also argue that FTAs could solve inherited political problems. 
For instance, countries in Africa that have inherited inappropriate borders might 
not be readily able to negotiate them away, but they may be able to render them 
less important by negotiating the free movement of goods, services, and people. 
Single markets of this nature might be more attractive to foreign investors and 
could facilitate the creation of cost-saving regional regulatory frameworks and 
institutions. However, the question remains whether these offsetting beneﬁts 
could counterbalance the above problems of trade diversion.
However, others have cast doubt on the gains from intra-developing country 
FTAs. They argue that an intra-developing country FTA among small econo-
mies that provides preferential access to its member states but keeps its external 
trade policy with respect to the rest of the world unchanged is likely to lower 
welfare for the bloc as a whole (Panagariya 1997; Schiff and Winters 2002, 
2003). The argument is that, as it is likely that members of intra-developing 
country FTAs will continue to import from excluded countries, prices cannot 
fall for homogeneous goods because domestic prices continue to be equal to 
world prices plus the tariff on imports from the rest of the world. And since 
prices are unchanged, output, consumption, and imports are unchanged as 
well. Since total imports do not increase, there can be no trade creation. How-
ever, imports from other member countries increase at the expense of cheaper 
imports from excluded countries—and this trade diversion lowers the welfare 
of the bloc as a whole (Schiff and Winters 2003). 
Additionally, the less developed members are likely to lose more. More devel-
oped members usually have a trade surplus with the less developed members, and 
trade diversion from the rest of the world to the partner country results in a trans-
fer of tariff revenues from the poorer to the more developed countries, equivalent 
to a worsening of the terms of trade for the poorer member countries. Losses may 
also result from agglomeration effects, whereby industry tends to leave the smaller 
and poorer members and agglomerate in the more developed ones once trade 
barriers between them are removed. The best way to ensure that intra-developing 
country FTAs are beneﬁcial is thus for member countries to liberalize their trade 
regimes with respect to the rest of the world (Schiff and Winters 2003).
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The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding
While getting the rules right is important, so is enforcement. The crux of this 
issue is the ability of developing countries to use WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms in instances where they perceive that partners have not been abid-
ing by the terms of an agreement. Suggestions have been made by observers that 
there may be a potential bias against developing countries in the dispute settle-
ment system due to their resource constraints and lack of retaliatory power. A 
number of proposals to address such possible biases are discussed below. 
Who uses the system?
During 1995–2002, 305 bilateral disputes were brought to the WTO, entail-
ing more than 1,800 “grievances”—speciﬁc allegations of violation of a WTO 
provision. Developing countries brought 124 of the 305 disputes, or about one-
third (appendix 8). Most of these countries were middle-income economies; 
low-income countries (with a per capita income below $800) were plaintiffs 
in only 18 cases and respondents only 21 times—and much of this reﬂected 
the activities of India. That said, many of those developing countries using 
the system have done so successfully, including against much larger and bet-
ter resourced trading partners (Ecuador and the EU, and Costa Rica and the 
U.S. are two such instances). In sum, while some developing countries have 
been relatively active users of the system, with some success, LDCs did not 
participate at all, never acting as a complainant or respondent. Well over half 
the WTO membership does not participate in WTO dispute settlement.
Developing countries accounted for about one-third of complaints under 
both the GATT and the WTO. However, the share of cases against develop-
ing countries rose from 8 percent to 37 percent, suggesting that the shift to the 
WTO—with the associated expansion of disciplines on developing countries—
has given rise to a signiﬁcant increase in the probability of confronting dispute 
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settlement. However, the evidence for “bias” is not particularly strong once 
one controls for the fact that disputes should be correlated with the number 
of incompatible measures a country’s exporters encounter and the volume of 
trade. It is nonetheless striking that many developing countries have not par-
ticipated in WTO dispute settlement. 
Why has developing country participation been limited?
In part this simply reﬂects the manifold challenges that arise at various levels. 
A ﬁrst necessary condition to defending rights through the WTO is informa-
tion that a WTO provision may have been violated by a partner government. 
A second is to convince the government to bring the case forward—enterprises 
do not have access to the WTO (that is, they have no legal standing). A third 
is that the expected payoff to bringing a case is positive. This will depend in 
part on the remedy that is available and the likelihood that the trading partner 
will implement the proposed remedy, which in turn depends on an implicit 
cost-beneﬁt analysis that will be a function of facing (and imposing) retaliation 
in the case of noncompliance. That the incentives to participate revolve around 
expected net payoffs has, for good (and bad) reasons, involved large OECD 
countries—in particular the EU and the U.S.—more rapidly in dispute settle-
ment than the other WTO Members.
The problem of asymmetric enforcement ability
There are “asymmetric” incentives for countries to deviate from the WTO, as 
the ultimate threat that can be made against a Member that does not comply 
with a panel recommendation is retaliation. Small countries cannot credibly 
threaten this because raising import barriers will have little impact on the tar-
get market while being costly in welfare terms. Thus, pressure to comply with 
panel rulings is largely moral in nature. In practice, the system has worked 
rather well, in that recourse to retaliation has rarely been required to enforce 
multilateral dispute settlement decisions. This reﬂects the repeated nature of 
WTO interactions and the resulting value that governments attach to main-
taining a good reputation. Nonetheless, asymmetry in enforcement ability can 
affect incentives to use the system. The classic recommendation to address 
this asymmetry problem is to change the rules so that nonimplementation of 
panel recommendations would be punished by withdrawal of market access 
commitments by all WTO Members. Suggestions to this effect have always 
been resisted.
A basic problem with retaliation is that it involves raising barriers to trade, 
which is generally detrimental to the interests of the country that does so, and 
to world welfare more generally. The power of retaliation may also be cap-
tured by protectionist interests in an importing country. A superior approach 
would be to strengthen compensation provisions. Developing countries have 
proposed, for example, that WTO panels should be authorized to recommend 
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payment of ﬁnancial compensation in cases where a developing country loses 
its trade in a product as a result of actions by a developed country that are 
inconsistent with WTO norms. Such suggestions have a long history. Mexico 
recently suggested allowing countries that have won a dispute but where imple-
mentation has not occurred to auction off the resulting retaliation rights.
While compensation or ﬁnes would be less distorting than trade sanctions, 
they may not be very effective in inducing compliance, as the costs would 
be dispersed over all taxpayers. Other options should therefore be considered, 
including stronger surveillance mechanisms and greater opportunities for 
interested parties to bring cases in national forums. Whatever is done, it is 
important to halt the emerging trend toward escalating retaliation and the use 
of trade sanctions.
Compensation may be worth revisiting, however, as a possible solution 
to cases where it is clear that a Member will not (has no intention to) com-
ply with an adverse ruling. At present there are a couple of instances where 
large Members have chosen to absorb the cost of retaliation on an ongoing 
basis rather than to bring the nonconforming measure into compliance with 
their obligations. This has been the case, and other cases are likely to arise in 
the future, when the noncompliant Member assesses that the political cost of 
implementation is too high.
This situation is undesirable for several reasons. First, retaliation harms 
all WTO Members and global welfare, and instituting protection is not a 
long-term solution (the whole idea of retaliation is to force prompt compli-
ance). In situations of prolonged noncompliance, the WTO dispute settlement 
system begins to serve the function of legitimizing trade wars, rather than 
opening markets. This point is particularly resented by sectors that, while not 
involved in the original complaint, bear the cost of retaliation (companies in 
these sectors often legitimately argue that it is not they that are refusing to 
comply). Second, prolonged noncompliance undermines the credibility of the 
system, the delicate balance that keeps all Members agreeing to play by the 
rules because they need others to do so. Given that prolonged noncompliance 
is generally an option only for larger Members whose economies can bear the 
cost of retaliation, it also adds to perceptions that the system is biased against 
smaller players. Third, noncompliance creates incentives for the noncompliant 
party to bring other difﬁcult and contentious disputes into the system, rather 
than address them through negotiation, in order to create bargaining chips, in 
the hope that noncompliance by the other party will eventually “cancel out” 
its own.
All these do considerable harm to the trading system. However, it can be 
argued that equal—or greater—harm could be done were the noncompliant 
party to comply with a ruling that was politically or socially unacceptable to most 
of the populace. This could undermine public support for the trading system in a 
more fundamental and, in the longer term, more deeply damaging way.
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In this situation, it may be better to accept that the noncompliant party 
has no intention of complying in the foreseeable future and to make a vir-
tue of necessity. That is, after a period (say, two years) of bearing retaliation, 
the noncomplying Member would be automatically (unless WTO Members 
agree by consensus to waive the requirement) required to offer compensation 
to other Members in the form of additional market opening in other areas, to 
the equivalent value of the retaliation.
While the noncomplying Member would be able to choose the areas in 
which it offered the compensatory market access, it could be obliged to give 
serious consideration to the requests of the original parties (and perhaps third 
parties) to the dispute. Such compensation would in no way imply that the 
original Member was now in compliance: the compensatory market access 
would stay in place for as long as the noncomplying measure remained in force. 
If the value of the access increased over time, this would obviously alter the 
cost-beneﬁt analysis of the noncompliant party and may encourage ultimate 
compliance in the longer term. 
It could be argued that this undermines the rules-based system, by essen-
tially allowing Members to buy their way out of their obligations. This is a 
valid criticism. However, it must be pointed out that it is attempting to deal 
with something that is already happening; as noted above, it attempts to sal-
vage something positive for the system from the reality on the ground.
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Main conclusions and 
recommendations
Main conclusions
Trade openness can be a powerful driver of economic growth, which is indis-
pensable to reduce poverty and foster development. Trade, however, is not a 
silver bullet for achieving development. There is no way around the other insti-
tutional, macroeconomic, and microeconomic conditions that, along with well 
designed social policies, must also be met to attain development. Yet it is very 
likely that if developed countries opened their markets signiﬁcantly more to 
developing countries and developing countries also became more open, pov-
erty would fall faster worldwide, including in most of the poorest countries, 
provided the needed complementary policies were in place.
Achieving more open and fair markets for the promotion of development 
is the mission of the multilateral trading system. This system has evolved pro-
gressively since the end of the Second World War and has delivered impressive 
results for many countries, particularly those now fully industrialized. 
Throughout most of its existence, however, the trading system has mainly 
served the interests of developed countries. Sometimes by their own decision 
and other times by explicit exclusion dictated by richer countries, developing 
countries have not been inﬂuential in the design of the multilateral trading 
system. Moreover, most of the existing multilateral rules, through respective 
rounds, emulated to a great extent the policies, the practices, and most impor-
tant, the laws and regulations of a few developed countries.
The system is thus unbalanced against the interests of developing coun-
tries. Balancing the system will give developing countries greater economic 
growth potential, a major stake in developing multilateral trade rules and dis-
ciplines and in pursuing trade liberalization, and a more effective capacity to 
expand trade and defeat poverty.
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That goal was the raison d’être of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
Round of trade negotiations launched in November 2001, at least according 
to the rhetoric.
But this sense of purpose was short-lived. With key deadlines missed and 
progress practically nil on every issue contained in the DDA, the WTO Min-
isterial of September 2003 collapsed amid acrimony. There is no single reason 
to explain this; however the failure of the U.S., the EU, and Japan to lead by 
example is a major one. 
WTO Members have since made a courageous effort to revive the Doha 
Round, but a lot more will be required. The 2004 Doha Work Programme 
framework, while necessary to prevent the collapse of the Round, is far from 
sufﬁcient to sustain it. 
The real work remains to be done, and a sense of urgency is required if the 
Doha Round is to be completed by the end of 2006 or very early 2007 at the 
latest. If this narrow window of opportunity is missed, it is hard to see how 
the round can be completed in time to contribute to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015. 
All WTO Members must identify the core priorities of a real development 
round and make concrete political and ﬁnancial commitment to achieving 
them. What must be done in the Doha Round and beyond? 
Agriculture—the biggest and costliest aberration
The biggest and most costly aberration of the trading system is to be found in 
agriculture. Farm producers in rich countries receive support in excess of $250 
billion, thanks to which their farmgate prices are almost one-third higher than 
world prices. Consumers in those countries pay for that protection through 
higher taxes and higher food prices. It’s their choice, but it must be stressed 
that by doing so they also impose a heavy burden on other agricultural pro-
ducers, particularly in developing countries. Agricultural protection in both 
developed and developing countries is most assuredly a cause of poverty in 
poor countries. 
That rich countries should lead farm liberalization is beyond question. 
They should deliver substantial liberalization under all three pillars of the 
agricultural negotiations. They should shift their farm policies to income 
support—helping the poor and small farmers in rich countries adjust to more 
open farm markets. Export subsidies should be totally and deﬁnitively elimi-
nated, as agreed in the DDA framework of August 2004. This will send a 
powerful signal to developing countries, which will follow suit with their own 
deeper market opening without the danger of trade and competition being 
greatly distorted by export subsidies. Negotiations on farm trade liberalization 
should also broaden their focus beyond elimination of export subsidies to stress 
reductions in tariffs—themselves a powerful discipline on export subsidies—
and reduction in domestic support. Market access negotiations must address 
259Chapter 15 Main conclusions and recommendations
both the unacceptably high tariffs, which remain in agriculture, and tariff 
escalation, which continues to frustrate developing country efforts to move up 
the value chain.
The growth of the poorest countries depends crucially on a more dynamic 
farm sector—coming from increased domestic production for import substitu-
tion and/or exports. The fragility of these countries, however, suggests that, as 
a result of the Doha Round, they should reduce only their bound tariffs—since 
most of their applied tariffs are moderate—and also their applied tariff peaks, 
which cost their poor consumers dearly without bringing public revenue. Addi-
tional complications for the few poor countries that may be hurt by this mod-
est liberalization could be dealt with by a substantial increase in international 
aid—to provide the necessary means for a new wave of Green Revolutions and 
to ensure adequate food security.
Nonagricultural market access—developing countries should also 
liberalize
Although not as severe as in farm products, trade barriers in nonagricultural 
products continue to be signiﬁcant and particularly detrimental to develop-
ing countries. For example, developing countries’ exports to developed coun-
tries face tariffs that are, on average, four times higher than those faced by 
the exports of other developed countries. Developing countries’ exports suf-
fer from tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and quotas imposed by rich countries 
on goods of great export potential. While over the last few decades develop-
ing countries have undertaken an unprecedented level of trade liberalization, 
both on an autonomous basis and in the context of multilateral and regional 
negotiations, they still suffer, of course, from their own protection, which not 
only reduces their competitiveness in world markets but also cancels enormous 
opportunities of increased trade among themselves. 
While developed countries bear a special responsibility to liberalize in this 
Round, developing countries should also do so—in their own interests and 
because they are important markets for each other and for the poorest coun-
tries. While this would still be less than full reciprocity, the poorest countries 
should nonetheless bind their tariffs at uniform and moderate rates in their 
own development interests. Adjustment costs should be economically and 
socially sustainable in developing countries, for example, by phasing in tariff 
reductions and providing international technical and ﬁnancial assistance. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) man-
dated the progressive phasing out of quotas by January 1, 2005. But phase-outs 
were heavily backloaded, with more than 50 percent of quotas—covering the 
most commercially valuable products—left to be removed on the ﬁnal deadline 
of January 1 2005. This backloading robbed developing countries of one of the 
major gains expected from the Uruguay Round and gave rise to legitimate 
doubts about the willingness of the major importers to honor the agreement. It 
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also undermined any chance of gradual and orderly adjustment in the sector; 
the abrupt removal of the remaining quotas on January 1, 2005, may create 
adjustment problems for importers and exporters alike, and is likely to unleash 
powerful protectionist forces. These must be effectively contained—for exam-
ple, by restraining the proliferation of contingency protection measures. The 
correct answer lies not in pursuing protectionism by other means, but in pro-
viding adjustment support to the poorest countries and small suppliers highly 
dependent on this sector through trade and development measures. 
This has led some to call for an extension of quotas, but this would be a 
mistake. “Temporary” textile and clothing protection has been around for 40 
years; continued protection is likely only to prolong and further distort the 
adjustment process. Addicts always promise that they will quit tomorrow—the 
difﬁcult process of adjustment must be started now. Given the role that devel-
oped countries have played in creating the scale (if not the fact) of the adjust-
ment challenge, they must now be prepared to contribute to its costs. Assis-
tance could help developing countries move into niche markets or up the value 
chain and strengthen their networks of suppliers and clients to meet just-in-
time production deadlines. Removal of trade barriers and domestic distortions 
by developing countries themselves would also help increase competitiveness. 
Tariff preferences may ease adjustment for some countries in the short term, 
though restrictive rules of origin will need to be addressed. More helpful and 
less distortionary temporary breathing space could be provided by all devel-
oped countries extending duty-free and quota-free access to all products from 
the poorest developing countries no later than January 1, 2006.
Services—a major source of gains for developing countries
Liberalization of trade in services, especially of mode 4 (the temporary move-
ment of people to supply services), has been recognized as a major source of 
gains for developing countries, capable of bringing more beneﬁts to them than 
perhaps any other part of the Doha Round. Services liberalization promises 
real development gains—in terms of the efﬁciency and growth potential of the 
economy as a whole, the export of goods and other services, and access to basic 
services to improve the lives of the poor. Done right, services negotiations offer 
developing countries an opportunity to act in their own economic interest and 
get paid for it. 
But services gains are not automatic, and producing an outcome that sup-
ports development can be a challenge, given the need for regulation to address 
complex issues of market structure, market failures, and noneconomic objec-
tives. Ensuring that services liberalization results in competition and increases 
access to services by the poor are key regulatory challenges—and will require 
increased assistance and regulatory creativity. But with appropriate care to the 
nature, pace, and sequencing of reform, adjustment—including that related to 
increased imports of labor-intensive services—can be managed. 
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A serious “Development Round” must make progress on mode 4. Develop-
ing countries should seek to expand access for groups of interest to them (such 
as contractual service suppliers, and intracorporate transferees) and improve 
the transparency and usability of existing access. Bilateral or plurilateral agree-
ments could also be considered as an interim step. These cover a broader range 
of workers than mode 4 and provide scope to develop trust and complementary 
policies (such as on brain drain, remittance transfer, return, and recognition). 
Over time, recruitment of workers under these schemes could be opened on 
a most favored nation (MFN) basis to any country that can implement the 
requirements. Agreements would be notiﬁed to the WTO, and WTO Mem-
bers would have the opportunity to indicate their interest in joining or nego-
tiating similar agreements. An MFN waiver would likely be necessary. While 
a potentially useful interim step, bilateral or regional agreements are no sub-
stitute over the longer term for bound multilateral commitments under the 
WTO. WTO commitments remain the best and most effective way to deliver 
gains to developing countries, and commercially meaningful market access 
commitments on mode 4 are essential to fulﬁll the development dimension of 
the services, and Doha, negotiations.
Keeping markets open—avoiding new barriers, added costs, and 
uncertainties
Hard-won gains in market access in agricultural and nonagricultural products 
are increasingly eroded by other policies that recreate trade barriers and/or cre-
ate transaction costs and uncertainty. 
Antidumping is used disproportionately against the exports of developing 
countries, with a severe chilling effect on their actual and potential trade—
though some developing countries are now also becoming major users of 
antidumping measures. The Doha Round could help in several ways. The de 
minimis threshold below which developing country exports are immune from 
antidumping could be raised—currently, as soon as imports from developing 
countries emerge from being insigniﬁcant, they can be restricted by high anti-
dumping barriers. Additionally, national antidumping laws could be required 
to treat all affected domestic interests—import-competing industries, consum-
ers, and users—equally. 
Many developing countries are being denied effective market access by their 
inability to meet ever more—and ever higher—OECD standards or market-
entry conditions. Exemptions are unlikely to help, serving only to brand devel-
oping country exports as inferior or unsafe, and providing no incentive to raise 
national standards for the beneﬁt of domestic consumers. Where standards are 
imposed by private buyers, there is even less scope for—or point in—seeking 
exemptions. Two things are essential if developing countries are not to be left 
behind: assistance to make effective use of the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) disciplines to ensure 
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that standards are not abused for protectionist purposes; and signiﬁcant assis-
tance to construct the institutional frameworks and infrastructure required to 
meet legitimate standards. Further, developing countries must be assisted to 
become more substantively involved in standard-setting processes and those 
standard-setting activities themselves need to be oriented toward issues of 
greater interest to developing countries. 
Preferences—liberalization on a most favored nation basis and 
appropriate compensation are a better way
Rich countries have used preferences to divide developing countries and pro-
mote their narrower regional, sectoral, and political objectives, often estab-
lishing complicated regulations that exclude exports from otherwise eligible 
countries. The poorest countries have often received limited beneﬁts from 
preference schemes, because preferences do nothing to address their multiple 
supply-side constraints. Beneﬁts are also often at the expense of other devel-
oping countries, and are smaller than would be the case with either direct 
transfers or multilateral liberalization. But the price of preferences is con-
tinuing protection in rich countries. MFN liberalization—plus appropriate 
compensation for countries that may suffer adjustment problems—is likely 
to be a better path.
While preference erosion is generally less than often thought, some countries 
may confront possible large losses and will require concrete assistance. Given 
the history of preference programs, developed countries as a group should pay. 
They should replace preferences with equivalent development assistance, which 
could be used by the recipient governments to fund adjustment costs. Opera-
tionalizing this deal should be an explicit part of the Doha Round. Any such 
assistance should be seen as part of a broader effort that is needed to help poor 
countries build and strengthen their ability to use trade beneﬁcially. However, 
speciﬁcally in the context of a Doha deal, there is a need to accompany global 
commitments to implement far-reaching trade reforms on an MFN basis with 
a temporary program to transfer additional resources to developing countries, 
especially those that will experience preference erosion losses.
Free trade agreements—limited beneﬁts, high costs
Likewise, free trade agreements have a mixed record in achieving real liberal-
ization, especially on the hardest nuts (such as agricultural subsidies or sensi-
tive products). Beneﬁts may be limited (or achieved at the expense of oth-
ers) but costs can be high. Unlike at the WTO where developing countries 
can form effective coalitions, in free trade agreements (FTAs) they are at a 
disadvantage in resisting the inclusion of nontrade issues or erosion of their 
WTO rights (such as TRIPS+ on patents, especially pharmaceutical patents, 
and other WTO+ provisions). Multiple FTAs with differing rules of origin 
impose high transaction costs, particularly on small traders, and divert the 
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limited negotiating resources of poor countries from the pursuit of multilateral 
liberalization. 
Singapore issues—trade facilitation promises gains but cannot be 
business as usual
Three out of the four so-called Singapore issues (competition, investment, 
transparency in government procurement) have rightly been left off the Doha 
Round. None meets the essential tests of whether rules on regulatory issues 
should be included in the WTO: Are they trade related? Are they in line with 
broader development priorities? And what is the speciﬁc value of a WTO 
agreement? These issues are not priorities for poor countries and could divert 
scarce resources from other issues with higher development payoffs. Even 
where there are development beneﬁts, they may not be best pursued through a 
WTO agreement. 
Trade facilitation promises trade and development gains, but a WTO agree-
ment cannot be business as usual. It should not impose heavy obligations on 
developing countries and make light promises of assistance. The main value of 
a WTO agreement on trade facilitation would be as a mechanism for attract-
ing and channeling international assistance. From a development perspective, 
the best model is one where implementation deadlines could be customized in 
negotiations with individual countries (along the lines of GATS precommit-
ments), with technical and ﬁnancial assistance negotiated and customized as 
part of a package. A review process, involving expert organizations and other 
developing countries with similar experiences, could identify problems early, 
and negotiated extensions would be possible. Flexibility on dispute settlement 
could be provided by a Peace Clause.
Trade-related intellectual property rights—could be revisited
Should intellectual property rights have been included in the WTO? From 
an economic point of view, probably not, because they require a very delicate 
balance of market forces and public action—a balance unlikely to be the same 
for all countries. TRIPS obligations also tend to be “one size ﬁts all,” taking 
no account of levels of development and varying interests and priorities. While 
the agreement tries to mitigate this to some extent by providing for differing 
implementation periods, countries acceding to the WTO may not even have 
access to these normal ﬂexibilities. 
That said, the TRIPS Agreement is not without areas of actual or potential 
interest for developing countries (although the balance of costs and beneﬁts 
will vary among developing countries and according to the issue), nor is it 
without some ﬂexibility in its provisions. However, the ﬂexibility provided for 
implementation of TRIPS seems yet insufﬁcient on paper, and even more so 
in practice, and the assistance provided is clearly inadequate. There is a clear 
case for revisiting more of the rules to determine their impact on developing 
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countries and any additional ﬂexibility required. In other cases, the agreement 
provides for ﬂexibility, but certain WTO Members—the U.S. on drugs, the 
EU on geographical indications—are trying to narrow unacceptably the scope 
of that ﬂexibility.
Special and differential treatment—making it more effective and 
operational
While it is clear that developing countries beneﬁt from freer trade, it is equally 
clear that their capacity to do so is different from that of developed countries. 
Developing countries generally have a more limited ability to take advantage of 
new opportunities and to bear adjustment costs. Special and differential treat-
ment makes sense and should be made more effective and operational. 
There is no compelling case for exemption for rules on traditional trade 
policies. Additional freedom to use bad policies promises few development 
gains and risks harming other developing countries (such as subsidy wars). For 
rules on domestic regulations requiring actual investment of resources, a cost-
beneﬁt analysis based on four factors should guide what special and differential 
treatment to grant and to whom: the extent to which the rules are related to 
trade (market access), the extent to which they are in line with broader devel-
opment priorities, the costs of implementation, and the relative costs to others 
of nonimplementation. Assessments of costs and beneﬁts will vary by issue and 
the level of development of the country concerned. 
Where the costs are high and the trade and development beneﬁts mini-
mal, the issue should not be included in the WTO. Where the costs are high 
and development beneﬁts only a longer term priority, there is a strong case for 
extensive—but not eternal—ﬂexibility. Where development beneﬁts are greater 
or more immediate, a model that calibrates commitments with assistance and 
gives greater ﬂexibility to countries to determine appropriate implementation 
periods is warranted. Where WTO rules promise real and short-term trade and 
development beneﬁts, concrete technical and ﬁnancial assistance should be 
ensured—say, through mandatory commitments subject to review and linked 
to the implementation requirements of developing countries.
Coherence—adopting sound complementary policies and ramping up 
aid for trade
If trade liberalization is to contribute to economic growth, expanded trade, 
and poverty reduction, it must be coordinated with other policies at both the 
national and international levels. At the national level, policy coherence means 
the adoption of sound complementary policies by national governments to 
manage liberalization, as well as ensuring that trade policymaking is appropri-
ately informed by expertise across a range of policy areas. At the international 
level, coherence calls for a signiﬁcant ramping up of “aid for trade” by the devel-
opment community (to negotiate, assess, and implement WTO agreements 
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and to design and implement adjustment policies) and for a clear and realistic 
view of the WTO’s role in technical assistance. This assistance for increasingly 
deeper capacity building must be additional to, and not at the expense of, 
development aid. Trade liberalization requires international negotiations and 
international assistance, but its beneﬁts and challenges remain fundamentally 
a question of domestic economic and policy reform. 
Main recommendations
A real development round is achievable but will require some enlightened, 
albeit self-interested, leadership on the part of the major players in both devel-
oped and developing countries. Providing this leadership is not within the 
realm of trade negotiators’ capacities. Political leadership must be generated 
at a higher level, perhaps not even at the ministerial level but at the head of 
government level as part of a coherent policy approach—economic, political, 
and social—to meeting the development challenge. 
The year 2005 offers a rare opportunity to harness the broader momentum 
of the “2000 plus 5” high-level review of the Millennium Summit to seek a 
major political consensus among the heads of government of a group of 20 or 
so countries on the Doha Development Round and other crucial topics for 
achieving the Goals.
Heads of state can agree on the major strategic criteria to shape the mul-
tilateral trading system for the future. This grand vision would keep the eyes 
of negotiators preparing for the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, in Hong 
Kong (China) in December 2005, on the prize of a real development round 
and the contribution it could make to achieving the Goals. 
In this context it is recommended that leaders agree on the following ideals 
for the future path of the trading system: 
• In a conveniently distant long term (2025) the multilateral trading sys-
tem must deliver the total removal of barriers to all merchandise trade, a 
substantial and extensive liberalization of trade in services, and the uni-
versal enforcement of the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimina-
tion in a way that supports attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals. This target is ambitious but not impossible, with political will 
and appropriate support for adjustment. And there is a base to build on; 
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies have already 
committed to free trade by 2010 for developed Members and 2020 for 
developing Members. 
• The most useful WTO would be one focused solely on trade and 
relieved of other global economic governance tasks, which could be bet-
ter accomplished by other international instruments or entities.
Consistent with these criteria, more medium-term targets could be adopted. 
Greatly increased international technical and ﬁnancial support for reform and 
adjustment by developing countries will be needed to ensure the achievement 
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of those targets; in the absence of such assistance, more ﬂexibility would be 
required. But given the potential beneﬁts, it is in all countries’ interests for 
substantial assistance to be forthcoming to underpin the following targets:
• By 2015, no bound farm tariff should exceed 5 percent for OECD coun-
tries, 10 percent for developing countries, and 15 percent for the poorest 
countries. All nontariff barriers, including tariff-rate quotas, should be 
removed by 2010.
• As soon as possible and no later than 2010, all export subsidies should 
be abolished, with comparable disciplines on similar instruments.
• Domestic support (such as price support, direct production subsidies) 
must be made both less trade-distorting (decoupled from production) 
and subject to an overall, signiﬁcantly lower limit. All countries should 
decouple all support payments to farmers by 2010 and cap all domestic 
support measures at 10 percent of the value of agricultural production 
(on a by-product basis) by 2010 and at 5 percent by 2015. The Green 
Box (of minimally trade-distorting subsidies) should be maintained for 
the poorest countries—with clariﬁcations or marginal additions such 
as support for diversiﬁcation, transportation subsidies for farm prod-
ucts, consumption subsidies for domestic food aid, public assistance for 
establishing farm cooperatives, or institutions for promoting marketing 
and quality control.
• Developed countries should bind all tariffs on nonagricultural mer-
chandise at zero by 2015, the target date for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. A mid-term target could be for no tariff higher 
than 5 percent by 2010. Ideally, developing countries should all be at 
zero tariffs by 2025. As soon as possible, these countries should bind all 
their tariffs in coherence with their applied rates. The poorest countries 
should also aim to bind all tariffs at a uniform and moderate rate.
• Duty-free and quota-free access for all exports from the poorest countries 
should be extended by all developed countries no later than January 1, 
2006. 
• The liberalization of mode 4 of the GATS (temporary movement of 
labor to provide services) should be adopted as a high-priority item on 
the international agenda, considering its potential beneﬁts for both 
developing and developed countries as well as the need to manage in 
a more orderly fashion the mounting migration pressures in the world. 
Developing countries’ liberalization to foreign direct investment must 
be matched by developed countries’ liberalization to foreign labor. 
• The traditional approach to special and differential treatment must be 
revised away from the present, and for the most part counterproductive, 
system of exemptions from obligations and complex webs of discrimina-
tory preferences. A trading system limited only to agreements that are in 
the trade and development interests of all Members to implement under 
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the framework of binding multilateral trade rules should be accompa-
nied by special and differential treatment that affords appropriately 
long and ﬂexible conditions to adjust to trade liberalization and real and 
substantial aid for trade. Poor countries must be supported in generat-
ing the sources of revenue needed to compensate for losses incurred as 
a result of lowering import duties, in building the human and physical 
infrastructure they need to beneﬁt from increased market opportuni-
ties, and in adjusting to erosions of existing trade preferences stemming 
from multilateral negotiations. 
• A temporary “aid for trade fund” commensurate with the size of the 
task, or signiﬁcantly ramped-up contributions through such existing 
channels as the Integrated Framework, is needed to support countries 
in addressing adjustment costs associated with the implementation of a 
Doha reform agenda. Such funding must be additional to current aid 
ﬂows (and could be ﬁnanced out of the tariff revenue that is presently 
collected by OECD and higher income developing countries on imports 
that will be subject to Doha reduction commitments). A priority task 
for the development and trade communities could be the identiﬁcation 
of new and existing channels through which this additional funding 
could most efﬁciently be made available for relevant, targeted projects 
in developing countries.
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Countries on the UN ofﬁcial 
list of LDCs that are WTO 
Members or observers
Angola Malawi
Bangladesh Maldives
Benin Mali
Bhutan* Mauritania
Burkina Faso Mozambique
Burundi Myanmar
Cambodia* Nepal
Cape Verde* Niger
Central African Republic Rwanda
Chad Samoa*
Congo, Dem. Rep. São Tomé and Principe*
Djibouti Senegal
Equatorial Guinea* Sierra Leone
Ethiopia* Solomon Islands
Gambia Sudan*
Guinea Tanzania
Guinea-Bissau Togo
Haiti Uganda
Lao PDR* Vanuatu*
Lesotho Yemen*
Madagascar Zambia
* WTO observer.
LDCs that are not WTO Members or observers are Afghanistan, Comoros, 
Eritrea, Kiribati, Liberia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu.
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 2
G-90 countries (ACP, LDC, or 
African Union) that are WTO 
Members or observers
Country Afﬁliations Country Afﬁliations
Algeria* AU Lao PDR* LDC
Angola ACP, AU, LDC Lesotho ACP, AU, LDC 
Antigua and Barbuda ACP Madagascar ACP, AU, LDC
Bahamas* ACP Malawi ACP, AU, LDC
Bangladesh LDC Maldives LDC
Barbados ACP Mali ACP, AU, LDC
Belize ACP Mauritania ACP, AU, LDC
Benin ACP, AU, LDC Mauritius ACP, AU
Bhutan* LDC Mozambique ACP, AU, LDC
Botswana ACP, AU Myanmar LDC
Burkina Faso ACP, AU, LDC Namibia ACP, AU
Burundi ACP, AU, LDC Nepal* LDC
Cambodia* LDC Niger ACP, AU, LDC
Cameroon ACP, AU Papua New Guinea ACP
Cape Verde* ACP, AU, LDC Rwanda AU, LDC
Central African Republic ACP, AU, LDC Samoa* ACP, LDC
Chad ACP, AU, LDC São Tomé and Principe* ACP, AU, LDC
Congo ACP, AU Senegal ACP, AU, LDC
Côte d’Ivoire ACP, AU Seychelles* ACP, AU
Congo, Dem. Rep. ACP, AU, LDC Sierra Leone ACP, AU, LDC
Djibouti ACP, AU, LDC Solomon Islands ACP, LDC
Dominica ACP St Kitts and Nevis ACP
Dominican Republic ACP St Lucia ACP
Equatorial Guinea* ACP, AU, LDC St Vincent and the Grenadines ACP
Ethiopia* ACP, AU, LDC Sudan* ACP, AU, LDC
Fiji ACP Suriname ACP
273G-90 countries (ACP, LDC, or African Union) that are WTO Members or observers
Country Afﬁliations Country Afﬁliations
Gabon ACP, AU Swaziland ACP, AU
The Gambia ACP, AU, LDC Tanzania ACP, AU, LDC
Ghana ACP, AU Togo ACP, AU, LDC
Grenada ACP Tonga* ACP
Guinea ACP, LDC Trinidad and Tobago ACP
Guinea Bissau ACP, AU, LDC Tunisia AU
Guyana ACP Uganda ACP, AU, LDC
Haiti ACP, LDC Vanuatu* ACP, LDC
Jamaica ACP Yemen* LDC
Kenya ACP, AU Zambia ACP, AU, LDC
Zimbabwe ACP, AU
* WTO observer.
Note: Egypt (AU), South Africa (ACP, AU), and Nigeria (ACP, AU) are not included on this list since they 
were members of the G-20 at Cancún. Other ACP countries that are not WTO Members or observers are 
Comoros, Cook Islands, Eritrea, Kiribati, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Somalia, and Tuvalu. Other African Union countries that are not WTO Members or observers 
are Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Libya, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Somalia.
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OECD members
Austria Korea, Rep.
Australia Luxembourg
Belgium Mexico
Canada Netherlands
Czech Republic New Zealand
Denmark Norway
Finland Poland
France Portugal
Germany Slovak Republic
Greece Spain
Hungary Sweden
Iceland Switzerland
Ireland Turkey
Italy United Kingdom
Japan United States
Note: Observers vary according to OECD bodies. Observers to the Trade Committee include Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong (China), and Singapore. All OECD members are WTO Members.
This report uses the term “poorest developing countries” to indicate develop-
ing countries that, while not on the UN List of LDCs, still face a wide range of 
serious development challenges. This appendix does not attempt to deﬁne this 
group in any comprehensive way, but offers some initial thoughts on some of 
the factors and indicators that might be useful in identifying a group of poorest 
developing countries. 
One basic indicator is gross national income (GNI) per capita, as already 
used in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to 
deﬁne the poorest countries as those with a GNI per capita of less than $1,000. 
There is also the World Bank list (table A4.1) of low-income and lower middle-
income countries (these are countries with GNI per capita of $735 or less and 
$736–$2,935, respectively). Criticisms have been made, however, of GNI per 
capita as a sufﬁcient means of differentiating countries.
A ﬁrst issue from a trade point of view is that the threshold of $1,000 
GNI per capita includes some countries that are relatively dynamic economies 
and signiﬁcant exporters. Proposals have thus been made to supplement the 
income-based indicator with a measure of trade performance, such as the share 
of manufactured products in total exports (Oyejide 2002). 
Another issue is that the GNI per capita includes very large countries. A 
possibility would thus be to supplement it with the condition that the total 
GNI of a poorest country should not be larger than 2 percent of the total GNI 
of all donor countries (Messerlin 2003). This formula would address the par-
ticular problem of countries such as India and China, which have very large 
numbers of poor people, but which have also experienced high growth rates in 
the last decades and have achieved considerable reductions in the number of 
people living in extreme poverty.1 Further, these countries have much larger 
levels of negotiating capital and domestic reform capacity than many poorest 
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countries. There is also a political economy problem; their inclusion in the 
group of poorest developing countries to which the most extensive special and 
differential treatment would be granted may reduce the willingness of other 
countries—mostly developed, but perhaps also some developing—to extend 
more meaningful special and differential treatment.
Another criticism is that some countries, while having a certain level 
of GDP per capita, are particularly vulnerable to shocks. These tend to be 
mini-states, or small island states at particular risk of natural disasters, often 
geographically remote and highly dependent on a narrow range of products. 
Considerable work has been done by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the 
World Bank (2000) to identify these small and poor economies—work that 
could usefully serve as a guide to discussions in the WTO. While a work pro-
gram on small economies has been launched as part of the Doha agenda, the 
self-selected group of small economies goes beyond the scope envisioned by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank and is perhaps too broad to 
be useful.
Finally, purely economic measurements may not be a reliable indicator 
of countries’ actual levels of development and regulatory capacities. A more 
sophisticated approach would be to create a composite index capturing the eco-
nomic and institutional factors that WTO Members would be ready to con-
sider as relevant for deﬁning the poorest countries. For the sake of illustration, 
table A4.2 provides the UNDP human development index (HDI), a composite 
index that measures a country’s average achievements in a range of aspects of 
development: longevity, knowledge, and standard of living. Longevity is mea-
sured by life expectancy at birth (drawn mainly from UN Population Division 
data); knowledge, by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined 
primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (based on UNESCO 
data); and standard of living, by GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power 
parity with the U.S. dollar (drawn from World Bank data). 
For the sake of information, table A4.3 provides a potential list of the 
WTO Members and observers (as of December 2003) that would meet one of 
the criteria mentioned above, along with some additional indicators: GNI per 
capita of less than $1,000; GNI less than 2 percent of total donor GNI; trade 
performance; population; farm exports exposure; food security situation; and 
HDI ranking. 
277The “poorest developing countries”—some relevant factors
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Table A4.2
GDP per capita and 
Human Development 
Indicators, 2004
GDP per capita 
(purchasing power 
parity in 2002 dollars)
a. Neither WTO Member 
nor observer.
b. For purposes of calculating 
HDI, a value of $40,000 
(PPP) was used.
c. Data may refer to another 
year than that speciﬁed.
d. Estimate based on regression.
e. Preliminary World 
Bank estimate, subject 
to further revision.
f. No reliable GDP data are 
available. A rough estimate 
of GDP was used to build 
the corresponding HDI.
Source: UNDP 2004a. 
HDI rank Country
GDP per capita (PPP)  
2002 
High human development
1 Norway 36,600
2 Sweden 26,050
3 Australia 28,260
4 Canada 29,480
5 Netherlands 29,100
6 Belgium 27,570
7 Iceland 29,750
8 United States 35,750
9 Japan 26,940
10 Ireland 36,360
11 Switzerland 30,010
12 United Kingdom 26,150
13 Finland 26,190
14 Austria 29,220
15 Luxembourg 61,190b
16 France 26,920
17 Denmark 30,940
18 New Zealand 21,740
19 Germany 27,100
20 Spain 21,460
21 Italy 26,430
22 Israel 19,530
23 Hong Kong (China) 26,910
24 Greece 18,720
25 Singapore 24,040
Medium human development
26 Portugal 18,280
27 Slovenia 18,540
28 Korea, Rep. 16,950
29 Barbados 15,290
30 Cyprus 18,360c
31 Malta 17,640
32 Czech Republic 15,780
33 Brunei Darussalam 19,210c
34 Argentina 10,880
35 Seychelles 18,232d, e
36 Estonia 12,260
37 Poland 10,560
38 Hungary 13,400
39 St Kitts and Nevis 12,420
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HDI rank Country
GDP per capita (PPP)  
2002 
Medium human development
40 Bahrain 17,170
41 Lithuania 10,320
42 Slovakia 12,840
43 Chile 9,820
44 Kuwait 16,240d
45 Costa Rica 8,840d
46 Uruguay 7,830
47 Qatar 19,844c
48 Croatia 10,240
49 United Arab Emirates 22,420c, d
50 Latvia 9,210
51 Bahamas 17,280c
52 Cuba 5,259c 
53 Mexico 8,970
54 Trinidad and Tobago 9,430
55 Antigua and Barbuda 10,920
56 Bulgaria 7,130
57 Russian Federation 8,230
58 Libya 7,570
59 Malaysia 9,120
60 FYR Macedonia 6,470
61 Panama 6 170
62 Belarus 5,520
63 Tonga 6,850d
64 Mauritius 10,810
65 Albania 4,830
66 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5,970 
67 Suriname 6,590d, e
68 Venezuela 5,380
69 Romania 6,560
70 Ukraine 4,870
71 Saint Lucia 5,300
72 Brazil 7,770
73 Colombia 6,370d
74 Oman 13,340
75 Samoa (Western) 5,600d
76 Thailand 7,010
77 Saudi Arabia 12,650d
78 Kazakhstan 5,870
79 Jamaica 3,980
(continued on next page)
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Table A4.2
GDP per capita and 
Human Development 
Indicators, 2004
(continued)
HDI rank Country
GDP per capita (PPP)  
2002 
Medium human development
80 Lebanon 4,360
81 Fiji 5,440
82 Armenia 3,120
83 Philippines 4,170
84 Maldives 4,798c, d, e
85 Peru 5,010
86 Turkmenistan 4,300c
87 St Vincent and the Grenadines 5,460
88 Turkey 6,390
89 Paraguay 4,610d
90 Jordan 4,220
91 Azerbaijan 3,210
92 Tunisia 6,760
93 Grenada 7,280
94 China 4,580
95 Dominica 5,640
96 Sri Lanka 3,570
97 Georgia 2,260
98 Dominican Republic 6,640d
99 Belize 6,080
100 Ecuador 3,580
101 Iran 6,690
102 Occupied Palestinan Territories f
103 El Salvador 4,890d
104 Guyana 4,260d
105 Cape Verde 5,000d
106 Syria 3,620
107 Uzbekistan 1,670
108 Algeria 5,760d
109 Equatorial Guinea 30,130c, d
110 Kyrgyzstan 1,620
111 Indonesia 3,230
112 Viet Nam 2,300
113 Moldova 1,470
114 Bolivia 2,460
115 Honduras 2,600d
116 Tajikistan 980
117 Mongolia 1,710
118 Nicaragua 2,470d
119 South Africa 10,070d
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HDI rank Country
GDP per capita (PPP)  
2002 
Medium human development
120 Egypt 3,810
121 Guatemala 4,080d
122 Gabon 6,590
123 São Tomé and Principe 1,317c 
124 Solomon Islands 1,590d
125 Morocco 3,810
126 Namibia 6,210d
127 India 2,670d
128 Botswana 8,170
129 Vanuatu 2,890d
130 Cambodia 2,060d
131 Ghana 2,130d
132 Myanmar 1 027
133 Papua New Guinea 2,270d
134 Bhutan 1,969c 
135 Lao PDR 1,720
136 Comoros 1,690d
137 Swaziland 4,550
138 Bangladesh 1,700
139 Sudan 1,820d
140 Nepal 1,370
141 Cameroon 2,000
Low human development
142 Pakistan 1,940
143 Togo 1,480d
144 Congo 980
145 Lesotho 2,420d
146 Uganda 1,390d
147 Zimbabwe 2,400c
148 Kenya 1,020
149 Yemen 870
150 Madagascar 740
151 Nigeria 860
152 Mauritania 2,220
153 Haiti 1,610
154 Djibouti 1,990
155 Gambia 1,690
156 Eritrea 890
157 Senegal 1,580
158 Timor-Leste f
(continued on next page)
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Table A4.2
GDP per capita and 
Human Development 
Indicators, 2004
(continued)
HDI rank Country
GDP per capita (PPP)  
2002 
Low human development
159 Rwanda 1,270
160 Guinea 2,100
161 Benin 1,070
162 Tanzania 580
163 Côte d’Ivoire 1,520
164 Zambia 840
165 Malawi 580
166 Angola 2,130
167 Chad 1,020
168 Congo, Dem. Rep. 650
169 Central African Republic 1,170
170 Ethiopia 780
171 Mozambique 1,050
172 Guinea-Bissau 710
173 Burundi 630
174 Mali 930
175 Burkina Faso 1,100
176 Niger 800
177 Sierra Leone 520
Developing countries 4,054
Least Developed Countries 1,307
Arab States 5,069
East Asia and the Paciﬁc 4,768
Latin America and the Caribbean 7,223
South Asia 2,658
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,790
Central and Eastern Europe and CIS 7,192
OECD 24,904
High-income OECD 29,000
High human development 24,806
Medium human development 4,269
Low human development 1,184
High income 28,741
Middle income 5,908
Low income 2,149
World 7,804
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 5
A brief explanation of the structure 
and operation of the GATS
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) applies to all services 
supplied on a commercial basis.1 It excludes most air transport services as well 
as services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority (deﬁned as ser-
vices supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or 
more service suppliers). 
The agreement includes both rules and a framework for countries to make 
commitments to open particular service sectors to foreign suppliers. These 
market-opening commitments are referred to as “speciﬁc commitments” and 
set out the service sectors in which foreign suppliers will be permitted and the 
conditions under which they will be permitted to supply services.
Accordingly, the GATS is divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part of the GATS 
consists of general obligations, as well as some obligations that apply only where 
commitments for particular sectors are made. An example of a general obliga-
tion is the most favored nation or MFN requirement, which requires WTO 
Members to treat all other WTO Members as well as they treat their most 
favored nation. That is, treatment offered to one country must be extended to 
all other Members. 
Some transparency requirements are also general obligations, such as the 
requirement to publish or otherwise make publicly available at the national level 
all relevant measures of general application that pertain to the agreement. Other 
transparency requirements apply only where a commitment has been made, such 
as the requirement to notify other WTO Members through the WTO Council 
for Trade in Services of any new or changed laws that signiﬁcantly affect trade 
in services covered by a commitment.2 Another example of these types of obliga-
tions is the requirement that, in sectors where speciﬁc commitments are under-
taken, measures of a general application affecting trade in services be adminis-
tered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner (Article VI.1). 
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The second part of the GATS sets out the framework under which coun-
tries decide which service sectors they want to allow foreign suppliers to enter, 
and under what conditions. The commitments made under this framework are 
referred to as “speciﬁc commitments.” The commitments undertaken by each 
WTO Member are contained in individual schedules of commitments, which 
are annexed to the GATS.
For the purposes of making commitments, a list of 12 service sectors and 
around 160 subsectors was developed. The Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation 
List (MTN.GNS.W/120, known as “W/120”) includes cross-references to the 
Provisional United Nations Central Product Classiﬁcation (Provisional CPC). 
While its use was not obligatory, many WTO Members used W/120 in mak-
ing their GATS-speciﬁc commitments.
What are modes of supply?
As a further tool for making market-opening commitments, the GATS also 
sets out four possible modes, or ways, in which services can be traded between 
WTO Members. Mode 1 (cross-border supply) is where the service crosses the 
border (a Malaysian architect faxes a plan to a client in Thailand). Mode 2 
(consumption abroad) is where the service is consumed in the territory of the 
service supplier (a Thai tourist goes to Malaysia for a holiday). Mode 3 (com-
mercial presence) is where the service supplier establishes a commercial presence 
in another WTO Member to provide the service (a Malaysian architecture ﬁrm 
opens a branch in Thailand). Mode 4 (presence of natural persons) is where an 
individual service supplier moves temporarily to another WTO Member for 
the purposes of supplying a service (a Malaysian architect visits Thailand for 
six months to supervise construction of the building she designed). 
Who is covered by mode 4?
Generally, mode 4 is seen as covering: 
• Business visitors.
• Contractual service suppliers, either individuals or employees of foreign 
companies who have obtained a contract to supply services to clients in 
the host country.
• Intracorporate transferees: persons employed abroad by foreign compa-
nies established in the host country. 
There is a difference of view among WTO Members about whether mode 4 
covers foreign employees of domestic companies, as opposed to persons pro-
viding services to those companies on a contract basis. The wording of the 
agreement seems to cover only foreign employees of foreign ﬁrms established 
in another Member, and some WTO Members argue that foreigners working 
for host-country companies would fall under GATS mode 4 if they worked 
on a contractual basis as independent suppliers for a locally owned ﬁrm, but 
would not necessarily seem to be covered if they were employees of that ﬁrm. 
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However, other Members argue that employees of domestic ﬁrms are included 
and note that a number of GATS commitments actually refer to short-term 
employment (these commitments also form an integral part of the GATS). 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that some WTO Members 
deem almost all types of foreign temporary workers to be employees for the 
purposes of bringing them under domestic labor law (with implications for 
their wages, conditions, and social protection). 
Mode 4 covers only temporary movement. While temporary is not deﬁned 
under the GATS, permanent migration is explicitly excluded. In practice, most 
WTO Members’ commitments under mode 4 range from up to 3 months (as 
for business visitors) to up to 5 years (as for intracorporate transferees, gener-
ally limited to 2–5 years). 
Mode 4 also applies only to service suppliers. However, it is not always easy 
to know what constitutes the supply of a service. For example, should fruit 
pickers be viewed as temporary agricultural laborers (outside the scope of mode 
4) or as suppliers of fruit-picking services? Equally, tasks performed on a fee 
or contract basis, without ownership of the inputs or outputs, are sometimes 
deemed to be services, even when they would appear to be technically manu-
facturing in nature. For example, a factory that receives a roll of fabric and a 
contract to sew 300 shirts is a supplier of tailoring services, whereas a factory 
that owns the cloth and produces 300 shirts, which it then sells under its own 
mark, is a textile manufacturer. In a world where production chains are being 
broken down into a series of outsourced activities, there is some debate over 
the extent to which activities previously classiﬁed as manufacturing can now 
be broken down into, and classiﬁed as, services. 
Technically, mode 4 includes service suppliers at all skill levels, but in prac-
tice WTO Members’ commitments have been generally limited to the higher 
skilled—managers, executives, specialists—though these terms are generally 
not further deﬁned. 
While there is no single, clear deﬁnition of mode 4, a useful approach 
might be to consider both duration and purpose of stay. That is, mode 4 service 
suppliers:
• Gain entry for a speciﬁc purpose (to fulﬁll a service contract as self-
employed or an employee of a service supplier). 
• Are normally conﬁned to one sector (as opposed to workers who enter 
under general migration or asylum programs who can move between 
sectors).
• Are temporary (they are neither migrating on a permanent basis nor 
seeking entry to the labor market). 
How does the GATS operate? 
The GATS covers the rules and framework for making a commitment to open 
particular services to foreign suppliers.
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What is a commitment?
GATS commitments are guaranteed minimum treatment offered to other 
WTO Members; countries are always free to offer better treatment if they 
wish, but they cannot offer worse. Commitments are binding—that is, they 
cannot be changed without paying compensation to other Members (this takes 
the form of a commitment for access in another area of equal value to the one 
being changed or withdrawn). Commitments are also on an MFN basis—that 
is, the access offered is open to suppliers from all other WTO Members.
Commitments can be made for each sector or subsector and, within this, for 
each mode of supply. For example, under “legal services,” commitments can be 
made for “foreign legal consultants,” with some access granted under mode 3 and 
mode 4, but not mode 1. Alternatively, commitments can be made “horizontally,” 
covering a single mode of supply across all sectors listed in the schedule. Hori-
zontal commitments apply to all sectors listed in the schedule unless otherwise 
clearly speciﬁed at the sectoral level (for example, a Member’s schedule speciﬁes 
that its horizontal mode 4 commitment does not apply to legal services).3 
What are market access and national treatment?
For each service sector or subsector, and for each mode of supply within that, 
countries make commitments to the level of “market access” and “national 
treatment” they will offer. Read together, market access and national treatment 
commitments inform a foreign supplier about the access they will have to the 
Table A5.1
Summary of 
mode 4 coverage
Included Excluded Differences of view exist
Temporary movement 
(temporary is undeﬁned)
Permanent migration 
(residence, citizenship, or 
employment on a permanent 
basis)
Related to the supply of 
services
Persons working in nonservice 
sectors, such as agriculture or 
manufacturing
Scope of activities included 
in “services incidental to 
agriculture” (such as temporary 
agricultural workers or suppliers 
of fruit-picking services) 
or “services incidental to 
manufacturing”
All skill levels (but in practice 
commitments to date are 
limited to the highly skilled)
Foreign employees of foreign 
companies established in the 
host country
Domestic (nationals of the 
host country) employees of 
foreign companies established 
in the host country
Foreign employees of domestic 
companies
Business visitors, 
intracorporate transferees, 
contractual service suppliers 
(self-employed or as employee 
of a foreign service supplier) 
Persons seeking to enter the 
employment market
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WTO Member’s market and any special conditions that will apply to them as 
foreigners. In making commitments, a WTO Member has three main choices:
• A commitment to provide full market access or national treatment for a 
particular mode—that is, to maintain no restrictions—indicated in the 
schedule by “none.”
• No commitment to provide anything on national treatment and/or 
market access for a particular mode, indicated by “unbound” (no bound 
commitment undertaken).
• Partial commitments for market access or national treatment, with the 
remaining restrictions listed in the schedule.
There are six types of restrictions on access to their markets for a given 
service that WTO Members need to list in their commitment if they want to 
use them. These restrictions can apply to both nationals and foreigners or only 
to foreigners. These market access restrictions are: 
• Restrictions on the number of service suppliers, including in the form of 
monopolies or exclusive service suppliers.
• Restrictions on the total value of service transactions or assets.
• Restrictions on the total number of service operations or the total quan-
tity of service output.
• Restrictions on the total number of natural persons that may be employed 
in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ.
• Restrictions on or requirements for certain types of legal entity or joint 
venture for the supply of a service.
• Limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum 
percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual 
or aggregate foreign investment.
National treatment means that foreign services and service suppliers are 
granted treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like national services 
and service suppliers. This can mean formally identical or formally different 
treatment—the key requirement is that it does not modify the conditions of 
competition in favor of services or service suppliers who are nationals instead 
of foreigners. National treatment can also cover both de jure and de facto dis-
crimination—that is, even if a measure applies to foreigners and nationals it 
may still be discriminatory if its effect is to discriminate against foreign suppli-
ers. However, national treatment does not require a Member to compensate for 
any inherent competitive disadvantage that results from the foreign character 
of the relevant service or service suppliers. 
A key consideration in national treatment is whether the services or service 
suppliers are “like.” The GATS, like other WTO agreements, does not deﬁne 
“like,” and panels under the WTO dispute settlement system have tended to 
approach the issue of “likeness” on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, 
inter alia, consumer perceptions of the degree to which a particular good is 
like, and its substitutability. 
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WTO Members are free to make no commitment on national treatment 
or to provide partial national treatment if they list the measures they maintain 
that discriminate in favor of nationals in their schedule. Unlike market access, 
there is no speciﬁc list of the types of measures that have to be scheduled; Mem-
bers must judge whether a measure breaches national treatment and therefore 
should be scheduled. A measure may not be considered discriminatory if it 
is genuinely open to both nationals and foreigners to fulﬁll it. For example, 
a requirement for a degree of proﬁciency in a certain language need not be 
discriminatory if it is genuinely possible for foreigners to be able to learn the 
language and achieve the required level of proﬁciency. Examples of the types of 
measures that would need to be listed in the schedule as limitations on national 
treatment include eligibility for subsidies reserved to nationals and the ability 
to lease or own land reserved to nationals. 
What are the options in making commitments?
Contrary to perception, the GATS does not force privatization of any services. 
Whether to allow private—or foreign—provision of services remains a purely 
national decision. The GATS comes into play only once countries have decided to 
permit foreign private supply in their market and is concerned only with the treat-
ment of foreign providers. The GATS also does not impede countries’ ability to 
regulate the supply of services within their territories. GATS commitments cover 
only market access and measures that discriminate in favor of nationals. Coun-
tries retain ﬂexibility to introduce any new regulatory measures that apply equally 
to foreigners and nationals, if these are transparent and on an MFN basis.
In making commitments, WTO Members have a number of choices: 
• They can exclude an entire sector (health services) or parts of a sector 
(everything other than general nursing) from their commitments. WTO 
Members are free to deﬁne the sector as they wish—they can refer to a 
list developed for the GATS negotiations (the Services Sectoral Classiﬁ-
cation List), or to the United Nations Central Product Classiﬁcation to 
which this GATS list refers, or they can use their own deﬁnitions. 
• They can exclude some modes of supply. For example, a WTO Member 
may decide to permit its nationals to study abroad (mode 2) but not 
permit foreign universities to establish in its territory (mode 3). 
• They can place limits on the “market access” they offer (for example, 
they can limit the number and type of foreign computer professionals 
and the activities in which they can engage).
• They can discriminate against foreign providers in favor of nationals 
(say, by placing additional conditions or requirements on foreign com-
puter professionals, or restricting some activities or beneﬁts to national 
computer professionals). 
• They can discriminate among foreign suppliers (that is, they can give 
better treatment to suppliers from some countries) if they have an 
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MFN exemption for the relevant service. WTO Members had a one-off 
opportunity to claim exemptions from MFN at the time they joined the 
GATS.4 Members that are party to regional trade agreements can also 
discriminate in favor of other members of those agreements.
• They can commit to providing less access than they currently actually 
provide (for example, a member may commit in the GATS to allow-
ing 40,000 foreign professionals to provide services temporarily each 
year, but may in practice under its national law allow 100,000 foreign 
professionals to enter). Because a commitment is a binding guarantee of 
minimum treatment, WTO Members often commit to less than they 
currently offer to leave themselves room to maneuver (say, to change 
the national law to drop the number from 100,000 to 50,000). Many 
current GATS commitments represent signiﬁcantly less openness than 
actually exists in the member concerned.
• They can commit to liberalize at a chosen future date to give themselves 
time to ensure that the necessary regulatory frameworks are in place (for 
example, they can commit to allowing foreign lawyers to work in their 
territory, but only from 2010). These are known as precommitments.
• Developing countries have added ﬂexibility to liberalize fewer sectors 
and to attach conditions to access offered. And other members should 
facilitate their participation in trade, including liberalizing modes and 
sectors of interest to them, and should establish special contact points to 
provide information to developing country service suppliers. 
The GATS negotiating process
The GATS negotiating process includes general negotiating proposals by 
WTO Members and request-offer negotiations.
Phase one: general negotiating proposals
In the ﬁrst phase of the negotiations—roughly between their commencement 
on January 1, 2000, and the WTO Ministerial in Doha in 2002—a number 
of members tabled general proposals outlining their interests in the services 
negotiations. More than 120 proposals were tabled in all, and are available 
online at www.wto.org. 
Phase two: requests and offers
Requests. Under request-offer negotiations, each WTO Member submits 
requests to its trading partners. These requests can be made to other mem-
bers individually or to groups of members. While some countries tailor their 
requests to speciﬁc trading partners, others have submitted nearly identical 
general requests to a number of countries. Requests can take the form of: 
• A request for the trading partner to make commitments in a new sector 
(a sector not already included in its schedule). 
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• A request to remove an existing restriction or to reduce its level of restric-
tiveness (for example, if a member has a foreign equity limitation of 49 
percent in a given sector, another WTO Member may request that limit 
to be removed altogether—that 100 percent equity be allowed—or that 
it be raised to 75 percent).
• A request to remove an existing MFN exemption.
• A request to make an additional commitment in its schedule covering 
particular regulatory practices aimed at making sure that liberalization 
is effective. For example, additional commitments were used in the 
negotiations on telecommunications for countries to commit to provid-
ing an independent regulator for the sector. 
Requests are communicated directly between the WTO Members con-
cerned, not through the WTO Secretariat, so there is no central collection point 
for requests. It is thus not possible to know the exact number of requests or to have 
an overview of their content. Some WTO Members have made their requests—or 
summaries of their requests—public, but others have chosen not to. It is the deci-
sion of individual WTO Members whether to make their initial requests public. 
Offers. In the next stage, WTO Members submit offers in response to all the 
requests they have received. Members usually prepare a single offer in response to 
all requests received. They may choose not to offer anything in response to some 
requests, or not to satisfy all points in some requests, and they are free to do so. 
The choice of what to offer is a decision of each WTO Member. Some members 
have already indicated that they will not be making requests or offers on particu-
lar sectors (notably, health and education) in the current round of negotiations.
For the sake of clarity, WTO Members have submitted their initial offers in 
the form of a revision to their existing schedule of commitments, with changes 
indicated in strike-out and bold. 
While requests are addressed bilaterally to negotiating partners, offers are 
traditionally circulated multilaterally (to all WTO Members). This is because, 
under the MFN rule, access offered to one WTO Member is automatically 
offered to all WTO Members. Given this, the offer is shown to all WTO 
Members, and even Members that did not initially make any requests can 
consult and negotiate with a Member that has submitted an offer. Equally, 
some Members may choose not to submit their own requests, judging that 
their interests are covered by others’ requests and knowing that whatever those 
other Members manage to negotiate in terms of access will automatically be 
extended to them under the MFN rule. 
The submission of offers can also trigger further requests, including by 
countries that had not yet submitted requests, and then the process continues 
and becomes a succession of requests and offers. As with most types of negotia-
tions, initial requests can be ambitious and initial offers more minimal, with a 
compromise emerging in the process of negotiation.
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The unﬁnished rules agenda 
under the GATS
The GATS is an unﬁnished agreement, with key areas left outstanding at the 
end of the Uruguay Round. These mainly concern general disciplines, or rules, 
covering four areas: a possible emergency safeguard (Article X); government 
procurement (Article XIII); possible disciplines on trade-distorting subsidies 
(Article XV); and possible disciplines on certain types of domestic regulation 
(Article VI.4). These negotiations are all due to be concluded prior to the con-
clusion of the negotiations on speciﬁc commitments.
Emergency safeguard negotiations (Article X)
A safeguard is a mechanism that allows WTO Members to temporarily sus-
pend their commitments in the event of unforeseen and negative consequences 
for domestic suppliers. While such mechanisms exist for goods trade, there is 
currently no safeguard for services. GATS Article X mandates negotiations on 
the question of an emergency safeguard. Negotiations have been under way 
since 1996, but the original deadline has been extended several times. 
Progress in the negotiations has been slow because of differences of view 
among WTO Members on the desirability of a safeguard and because of tech-
nical and conceptual difﬁculties in developing a safeguard for services. The 
nature and coverage of any safeguard mechanism is still to be determined. A 
number of developing countries have indicated that the quality of their offers 
will be inﬂuenced by whether or not any commitments they ultimately under-
take would have access to an emergency safeguard. 
Government procurement (Article XIII)
Government procurement is deﬁned in the GATS as “the procurement by gov-
ernmental agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes and not 
with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services 
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for commercial sale.” It is not subject to MFN (WTO Members are not bound 
to treat all other WTO Members equally), and commitments on market access 
and national treatment in a sector do not cover government procurement. 
GATS Article XIII mandates negotiations on government procurement in 
services within two years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement (within 
two years of January 1, 1995). However, to date there has been relatively limited 
interest in these negotiations for a number of reasons, including the greater pri-
ority placed by a number of WTO Members on concluding the safeguard nego-
tiations and the parallel efforts to develop a multilateral agreement on transpar-
ency in government procurement applying to both goods and services. 
Subsidies (Article XV)
There are currently no speciﬁc disciplines on subsidies under the GATS 
(although discriminatory subsidies should be scheduled as limitations on 
national treatment where speciﬁc commitments are made), and understanding 
of the issue is still at an early stage. This is reﬂected in the language of Article 
XV, which states that members recognize that, in certain circumstances, sub-
sidies may have distortive effects on trade in services. Article XV mandates 
members to enter negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multi-
lateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive effects of subsidies. 
Article XV does not condemn subsidies. Indeed, it notes that the nego-
tiations shall recognize the role of subsidies in relation to the development 
programs of developing counties and take into account the needs of members, 
particularly developing countries, for ﬂexibility in this area.
Article XV also mandates that members shall exchange information con-
cerning all subsidies related to trade in services that they provide to their 
domestic service suppliers. In 1996 a questionnaire asked WTO Members to 
identify any subsidies they thought were relevant. However, the survey has had 
relatively few responses, in part because members have experienced difﬁculty 
in identifying what might constitute a subsidy, and a subsidy with trade-distor-
tive effects, in services. 
Certain types of domestic regulation (Article VI.4)
Article VI.4 mandates the development of any necessary disciplines to ensure 
that nondiscriminatory measures (which are not restrictions on market access) 
relating to qualiﬁcation requirements and procedures, technical standards, and 
licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in ser-
vices. That is, these measures should be:
• Based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and 
ability to supply the service.
• Not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.
• In the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply of a service.
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These disciplines do not exist yet. Progress on Article VI.4 has been very 
slow and there are different views among WTO Members on the sort of dis-
ciplines that should be developed. Some Members argue that any disciplines 
should focus on increasing transparency and that any “necessity test” is itself 
not necessary. These Members have expressed concern that a necessity test 
could allow other WTO Members to “second-guess” the decisions of national 
regulators. However, others argue that other WTO Members should be free 
to challenge requirements they feel are unnecessarily trade-restrictive and 
be able to suggest other—equally effective and reasonably available but less 
trade-restrictive—ways of achieving the same objective.
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Summary of preference 
margins by country for 
agricultural products, 2003
Country
Harmonized 
System  
chapter
Preference 
margin (%) Product descriptions
Australia 05 5 Products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
speciﬁed or included
07 5 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
08 5 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons
11 5 Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; 
insulin; wheat gluten
12 5 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder
13 5 Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products 
not elsewhere speciﬁed or included
17 5 Sugars and sugar confectionery
19 5 Preparations of cereals, ﬂour, starch, or milk; 
pastry cooks’ products
20 5 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other 
parts of plants
22 5 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
Canada 02 11 Meat and edible meat offal
04 11 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; 
edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
speciﬁed or included
06 12.5–16 Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots, and the 
like; cut ﬂowers and ornamental foliage
07 11–19.6 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
08 12.5 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons
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Country
Harmonized 
System  
chapter
Preference 
margin (%) Product descriptions
Canada 
(continued)
15 11 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal 
or vegetable waxes
16 12.5 Preparations of meat
17 12.5 Sugars and sugar confectionery
19 14.5 Preparations of cereals, ﬂour, starch, or milk; 
pastry cooks’ products
20 11.5–17 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other 
parts of plants
21 12.5 Miscellaneous edible preparations
22 16 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
24 12.5–13 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
European Union 20 24–40 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other 
parts of plants
22 32 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
24 26–74.9 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco. Substitutes
United States 04 19–25.0 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; 
edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
speciﬁed or included
07 20–24.3 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
08 28–29.8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons
15 18–19.1 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal 
or vegetable waxes
17 18.3 Sugars and sugar confectionery
20 22.4–29.8 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other 
parts of plants
21 20–30.6 Miscellaneous edible preparations
22 35 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
24 18.1–46.9 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
Source: WTO 2003a.
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WTO disputes with developing 
country complainants
WTO 
dispute 
number Disputes title Year Complainant Respondent
1 1 Prohibition of imports of polyethylene 
and polypropylene
1995 Singapore Malaysia
2 2 Standards for reformulated and 
conventional gasoline
1995 Venezuela U.S.
3 4 Standards for reformulated and 
conventional gasoline
1995 Brazil U.S.
4 12 Trade description of scallops 1995 Peru EC
5 14 Trade description of scallops 1995 Chile EC
6 16 Importation, sale, and distribution of 
bananas
1995 Guatemala EC
7 16 Importation, sale, and distribution of 
bananas
1995 Honduras EC
8 16 Importation, sale, and distribution of 
bananas
1995 Mexico EC
9 17 Import duties on rice 1995 Thailand EC
10 19 Import regime for automobiles 1995 India Poland
11 22 Measures affecting desiccated 
coconut
1995 Philippines Brazil
12 23 Antidumping investigation concerning 
certain oil country tubular goods
1996 Mexico Venezuela
13 24 Quantitative restrictions on Costa 
Rican underwear
1996 Costa Rica U.S.
14 25 Implementation of Uruguay Round 
commitments concerning rice
1996 Uruguay EC
15 27 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas
1996 Ecuador EC
16 27 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas
1996 Guatemala EC
17 27 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas
1996 Honduras EC
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WTO 
dispute 
number Disputes title Year Complainant Respondent
18 27 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas
1996 Mexico EC
19 29 Restrictions on imports of textile and 
clothing products
1996 Hong Kong 
(China)
Turkey
20 30 Measures affected desiccated 
coconut and coconut milk powder
1996 Sri Lanka Brazil
21 32 Measures affecting imports of 
women’s and girls’ wool coats
1996 India U.S.
22 33 Measures affecting imports of woven 
wool shirts and blouses
1996 India U.S.
23 34 Restrictions on imports of textile and 
clothing products
1996 India Turkey
24 35 Export subsidies in respect of 
agricultural products
1996 Argentina Hungary
25 35 Export subsidies in respect of 
agricultural products
1996 Thailand Hungary
26 47 Restrictions on imports of textile and 
clothing products
1996 Thailand Turkey
27 49 Antidumping investigation on fresh 
and chilled tomatoes from Mexico
1996 Mexico U.S.
28 58 Import prohibition of shrimp and 
shrimp products
1996 India U.S.
29 58 Import prohibition of shrimp and 
shrimp products
1996 Malaysia U.S.
30 58 Import prohibition of shrimp and 
shrimp products
1996 Pakistan U.S.
31 58 Import prohibition of shrimp and 
shrimp products
1996 Thailand U.S.
32 60 Antidumping investigation on imports 
of portland cement from Mexico
1996 Mexico Guatemala
33 61 Import prohibition of certain shrimp 
and shrimp products
1996 Philippines U.S.
34 69 Measures affecting importation of 
certain poultry products
1997 Brazil EC
35 70 Measures affecting the export of 
civilian aircraft 
1997 Brazil Canada
36 71 Measures affecting the export of 
civilian aircraft 
1997 Brazil Canada
37 78 Safeguard measure against imports 
of broom and corn brooms
1997 Colombia U.S.
38 89 Imposition of antidumping duties on 
imports of color television receivers 
from the Republic of Korea
1997 Korea, Rep. U.S.
39 96 Quantitative restrictions on imports 
of agricultural textile and industrial 
products
1997 EC India
40 97 Countervailing duty investigation of 
imports of salmon from Chile
1997 Chile U.S.
41 99 Antidumping duty on dynamic random 
access memory semiconductors 
(DRAMS of one megabyte or above) 
originating from the Republic of Korea
1997 Korea, Rep. U.S.
304 Appendix 8
WTO 
dispute 
number Disputes title Year Complainant Respondent
42 105 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas
1997 Panama EC
43 111 Tariff rate quota for imports of 
groundnuts
1998 Argentina U.S.
44 112 Countervailing duty investigation 
against imports of buses from Brazil
1998 Brazil Peru
45 122 Antidumping duties on angles, 
shapes, and sections of iron or 
nonalloy steel and H-beams
1998 Poland Thailand
46 123 Safeguard measures on imports of 
footwear
1998 Indonesia Argentina
47 134 Measures affecting import duties 
on rice
1998 India EC
48 140 Antidumping measures on imports of 
unbleached cotton fabrics from India
1998 India EC
49 141 Antidumping measures on imports of 
cotton-type bed-linen from India
1998 India EC
50 143 Measure affecting import duty on 
wheat from Hungary
1998 Hungary Slovak Rep.
51 148 Measure affecting import duty on 
wheat from Hungary
1998 Hungary Czech Rep.
52 154 Measures affecting differential and 
favorable treatment of coffee
1998 Brazil EC
53 156 Deﬁnitive antidumping measure 
regarding grey Portland cement from 
Mexico
1999 Mexico Guatemala
54 158 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas (II)
1999 Guatemala EC
55 158 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas (II)
1999 Mexico EC
56 158 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas (II)
1999 Panama EC
57 158 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas (II)
1999 Honduras EC
58 158 Regime for the importation, sale, and 
distribution of bananas (II)
1999 Ecuador EC
59 159 Safeguard measure on imports of 
steel products
1999 Czech Rep. Hungary
60 168 Antidumping duties on import of 
certain pharmaceutical products 
from India
1999 India South Africa
61 179 Antidumping measures on stainless 
steel plate in coils and stainless 
steel sheet and strip from the 
Republic of Korea
1999 Korea, Rep. U.S.
62 181 Safeguard measure on imports 
of plain polyester ﬁlaments from 
Thailand
1999 Thailand Colombia
63 182 Provisional antidumping measure on 
cement from Mexico
1999 Mexico Ecuador
64 185 Antidumping measures on pasta from 
Costa Rica
1999 Costa Rica Trinidad and 
Tobago
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65 187 Provisional antidumping measure on 
imports of macaroni and spaghetti 
from Costa Rica
2000 Costa Rica Trinidad and 
Tobago
66 188 Measures affecting imports from 
Honduras and Colombia
2000 Colombia Nicaragua
67 190 Transitional safeguard measures 
on certain imports of woven fabrics 
of cotton and cotton mixtures 
originating in Brazil
2000 Brazil Argentina
68 191 Deﬁnitive antidumping measure on 
cement from Mexico
2000 Mexico Ecuador
69 192 Transitional safeguard measure on 
combed cotton yarn from Pakistan
2000 Pakistan U.S.
70 201 Measures affecting imports from 
Honduras and Colombia
2000 Honduras Nicaragua
71 202 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of circular welded carbon 
quality pipe from the Republic of 
Korea
2000 Korea, Rep. U.S.
72 205 Import prohibition on canned tuna 
with soybean oil
2000 Thailand Egypt
73 206 Antidumping and countervailing 
measures on steel plate from India
2000 India U.S.
74 207 Price band system and safeguard 
measures relating to certain 
agricultural products
2000 Argentina Chile
75 208 Antidumping duty on steel and iron 
pipe ﬁttings
2000 Brazil Turkey
76 209 Measures affecting soluble coffee 2000 Brazil EC
77 211 Deﬁnitive antidumping measures on 
rebar from Turkey
2000 Turkey Egypt
78 215 Antidumping measures regarding 
polypropylene resins from the 
Republic of Korea
2000 Korea, Rep. Philippines
79 216 Provisional antidumping measure on 
electric transformers
2001 Brazil Mexico
80 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Brazil U.S.
81 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Chile U.S.
82 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 India U.S.
83 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Indonesia U.S.
84 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Korea, Rep. U.S.
85 217 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Thailand U.S.
86 218 Countervailing duties on certain 
carbon steel products from Brazil
2001 Brazil U.S.
87 219 Antidumping duties on malleable cast 
iron tube or pipe ﬁttings from Brazil
2001 Brazil EC
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88 220 Price band system and safeguard 
measures relating to certain 
agricultural products
2001 Guatemala Chile
89 222 Export credits and loan guarantees 
for regional aircraft
2001 Brazil Canada
90 224 U.S. Patents Code 2001 Brazil U.S.
91 226 Provisional safeguard measure on 
mixed edible oils
2001 Argentina Chile
92 227 Taxes on cigarettes 2001 Chile Peru
93 228 Safeguard measures on sugar 2001 Colombia Chile
94 229 Antidumping duties on jute bags from 
India
2001 India Brazil
95 230 Safeguard measures and 
modiﬁcation of schedules for sugar
2001 Colombia Chile
96 231 Trade description of sardines 2001 Peru EC
97 232 Measures affecting the import of 
matches
2001 Chile Mexico
98 233 Measures affecting the import of 
pharmaceutical products
2001 India Argentina
99 234 Continued Dumping andSubsidy 
Offset Act of 2000
2001 Mexico U.S.
100 235 Safeguard measure on imports of 
sugar
2001 Poland Slovak Rep.
101 237 Certain import procedures for fresh 
fruit
2001 Ecuador Turkey
102 238 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of preserved peaches
2001 Chile Argentina
103 239 Certain measures regarding 
antidumping methodology
2001 Brazil U.S.
104 240 Import prohibition on wheat and 
wheat ﬂour
2001 Hungary Romania
105 241 Deﬁnitive antidumping duties on 
poultry from Brazil
2001 Brazil Argentina
106 242 Generalized System of Preferences 2001 Thailand EC
107 243 Rules of origin for textiles and 
apparel products
2002 India U.S.
108 246 Conditions for granting tariff 
preferences to developing countries
2002 India EC
109 250 Equalizing excise tax imposed by 
Florida on processed orange and 
grapefruit products
2002 Brazil U.S.
110 251 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products
2002 Korea, Rep. U.S.
111 252 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products
2002 China U.S.
112 255 Tax treatment on certain imported 
products
2002 Chile Peru
113 256 Import ban on pet food from Hungary 2002 Hungary Turkey
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114 259 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products
2002 Brazil U.S.
115 261 Tax treatment on certain products 2002 Chile Uruguay
116 263 Measures affecting imports of wine 2002 Argentina EC
117 266 Export subsidies on sugar 2002 Brazil EC
118 267 Subsidies on upland cotton 2002 Brazil U.S.
119 268 Sunset review of antidumping 
measures on oil country tubular 
goods from Argentina
2002 Argentina U.S.
120 269 Customs classiﬁcation of frozen 
boneless chicken
2002 Brazil EC
121 270 Certain measures affecting the 
importation of fresh fruit and 
vegetables
2002 Philippines Australia
122 271 Certain measures affecting the 
importation of fresh pineapple
2002 Philippines Australia
123 272 Provisional antidumping duties on 
vegetable oils from Argentina
2002 Argentina Peru
124 274 Deﬁnitive safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products
2002 Taiwan (China) U.S.
Source: Horn and Mavroidis 2003.
Chapter 1
1. For a good overview, see Anderson (2004).
2. This estimate is based on the following assumptions: developed country agricul-
tural tariffs of no more than 10 percent and a target average of 5 percent; with tariffs on 
manufactures to no more than 5 percent and a target average of 1 percent; developing 
country ceiling of 15 percent and a target average of 10 percent for agriculture, with a ceil-
ing of 10 percent and a target average of 5 percent for manufacturing; complete elimination 
of export subsidies, speciﬁc tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and antidumping penalties.
3. The concept of nonreciprocity was ﬁrst established in Part IV of the GATT in 
1964, exempting developing country contracting parties from making reciprocal tariff 
concessions.
4. Both the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the GATS mandated the 
start of further market access negotiations by January 1, 2000. 
5. “Modalities” refers to the approach, or methodology, to be followed in negotiations 
on expanded market access and subsidy reductions. Commonly, WTO Members have used 
formulas, where, for example, they agree to reduce subsidies on x percent of products by 
y percent, and to cut tariffs on b percent of products by c percent.
6. For a useful overview of the proposals and discussions at the Cancún Ministerial, 
see UNCTAD (2003e).
7. The G-20 comprised Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. El Salvador left the group dur-
ing the Cancún Ministerial, while Indonesia and Nigeria joined. Egypt and Kenya were 
not formal members but supported the G-20’s position. Some countries later left the 
grouping—Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru—while Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe have joined. 
8. Members of the Cairns Group are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, 
the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
9. The G-33 comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
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Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
10. Under these arrangements, products from these countries enter developed coun-
try markets at tariffs lower than those applying to all other WTO Members, including 
many other developing countries. The higher the initial protection (tariff ) in the developed 
country market for a particular product, the greater the practical value of the preference 
(see chapter 7).
11. A list of members of these groupings that are members or observers of the WTO 
is in appendix 2. 
12. See WTO (2004d). See also UNCTAD (2004d) and the report of the United Nations 
Secretary-General to the 59th General Assembly on trade and development. The account in 
this section draws upon ICTSD Bridges July–August 2004. Details of the outcomes on indi-
vidual issues are discussed in the body of the report and are not repeated at length here.
13. Trade promotion authority (TPA)—or “fast track”—confers upon the U.S. presi-
dent the authority to negotiate international trade agreements and submit them to Con-
gress under a procedural understanding that the agreements will be voted up or down, 
without amendment and within a certain time frame. TPA provides countries negotiat-
ing agreements with the U.S. with certainty that their carefully negotiated outcomes will 
not be renegotiated in the U.S. Congress, potentially undermining the balance reached. 
The current TPA, granted in August 2002, is due to expire on June 1, 2005, unless it is 
extended until June 1, 2007. An extension will be granted unless either the House of Rep-
resentatives or the Senate adopts an “extension disapproval resolution.”
Chapter 3
1. In fact, decoupling was not completely new. The pre-2003 CAP regime already had 
a decoupling component in cereals in the (admittedly limited) sense that area-based subsi-
dies were not crop-speciﬁc so that farmers could change the production mix between the 
various kinds of cereals with no consequences in terms of subsidies. This was not the case 
for the head-based subsidies (speciﬁc to beef, cows, suckling cows, sheep, and so on) but 
these subsidies were constrained by ceilings on the number entitled to receive subsidies.
2. There is a tiny decline (less than 1 percent) of the current intervention price in cere-
als due to a change in a procedural rule (a 50 percent cut in monthly increments).
3. Only one major livestock (beef) may face a less insigniﬁcant price change (6 per-
cent) if all the EU 15 member states use the full possibility of decoupling (minimal decou-
pling would bring only a roughly 1 percent price change) (FAPRI 2003; OECD 2004b).
4. No other new measure of importance has been taken for the other dairy products. 
The price of another key dairy product (skimmed milk powder) will be reduced by 15 per-
cent as agreed in the so-called “Agenda 2000.” The target price for milk will be abolished, 
but milk quotas will be maintained until the 2014–15, and increased by 0.5 percent in 
2006, 2007, and 2008, as agreed in Agenda 2000.
5. These OECD estimates of the impact of the 2003 reform do not change much 
when one compares maximum and minimum decoupling.
6. Under this agreement, global trade in clothing was subject to quotas negotiated 
between countries. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing gradually 
phases out this system of quotas by January 1, 2005. See chapter 5.
7. Compared with the pre-2003 CAP, the 2003 reform is projected to have a substan-
tial positive welfare impact on the new members, but a (very modest) negative impact on 
the welfare of the rest of world (Jensen and Frandsen 2003).
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8. A further issue, liberalization and food safety, is discussed in chapter 6, which 
looks at the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures from the perspective of 
developing countries.
9. The relatively high average level of food security (4.6) for net-food-importing 
developing countries suggests that the list reﬂects the negotiating skills of some countries 
more than the reality. This experience suggests that WTO negotiators should refrain from 
generating subgroups of loosely deﬁned countries during negotiations.
10. Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, the 
Republic of Korea, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
11. Under the UAA special safeguard, additional duties can be triggered automati-
cally if import volumes rise above a certain level, or if prices fall below a certain level, and 
the importing country does not need to show that import increases have seriously injured 
its producers.
12. The EU and the U.S. may indeed try to make a good deal for themselves by trad-
ing concessions on these subsidies now (which are losing importance because of increasing 
world prices in any case) for valuable concessions in other topics.
13. Consumption subsidies are already available under the WTO, but providing them 
through producer subsidies for goods that are barely traded is generally not permitted 
because developing countries registered no farm subsidies during the Uruguay Round and 
are bound by a commitment not to increase subsidies above historical levels. The deliv-
ery of such subsidies through producers may be desirable for reasons of administrative 
simplicity.
Chapter 4
1. The WTO Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List (MTN.GNS/W120—known as 
“W/120”) used for the GATS negotiations identiﬁes 12 main service sectors and more than 
160 subsectors: business services (including a range of professional services), construc-
tion services, communication services (including telecommunications and audiovisual ser-
vices), distribution services, education, environmental services, ﬁnancial services, health 
and social services, personal and recreational services, and tourism and transport services 
(including air, maritime, rail, and road).
2. These ﬁgures are derived from the balance of payments, which covers transac-
tions between residents and nonresidents and thus excludes important services ﬂows under 
GATS commercial presence and, to some extent, mode 4. Balance of payments categories 
for services also differ from, and are less detailed than, the GATS sectoral classiﬁcations.
3. An explanation of the structure and operation of the GATS and GATS negotia-
tions is in appendix 5.
4. Under the GATS, WTO Members can choose which service sectors to open and 
under what conditions. Commitments are guaranteed minimum treatment—a WTO 
Member who has made a commitment for a given service is free to offer better treatment 
at any time, but it cannot offer worse. Commitments need not reﬂect the level and type 
of access currently provided—a WTO Member may commit to less liberal access to have 
room to maneuver. (See appendix 5.)
5. While this is a general pattern, in certain sectors (such as cross-border trade in 
ﬁnancial services audiovisual services) developing or least developed countries have under-
taken more liberal commitments than developed countries (World Bank 2002).
6. As noted in the introduction, in contrast to the GATT, nondiscrimination is not 
an absolute obligation under the GATS. WTO Members had a one-off opportunity to list 
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exemptions from MFN at the time they joined the agreement. They can also limit national 
treatment (appendix 5).
7. The EU (extra-EU trade) is the number one services exporter and accounts for 27.1 
percent of the global market. The U.S. is second, with 21.5 percent, and Japan third, at 5.3 
percent. Other developed countries in the top 10 are Canada (number 6 at 3.1 percent) and 
Switzerland (number 7 at 2.4 percent). 
8. There is currently no consensus among WTO Members on whether services deliv-
ered over electronic networks are covered by GATS mode 1 (cross-border trade) or mode 
2 (consumption abroad). Given that mode 2 commitments tend to be more liberal than 
mode 1, the distinction is not without signiﬁcance. 
9. While mode 4 is limited to temporary movement by persons supplying services, 
remittance ﬁgures include money sent home from workers in manufacturing and agricul-
ture and by permanent migrants. Further, remittance ﬁgures do not include money sent 
by persons who have been abroad for less than one year, while these people can fall under 
mode 4. Remittance ﬁgures may thus both underestimate and overestimate mode 4 trade. 
No breakdown between mode 4 and other remittances is currently possible from existing 
data.
10. Mode 4 often cuts across several existing visa categories, and relevant numbers 
are hidden within larger aggregates. Deﬁnitions of relevant categories in visa schemes vary 
between countries. 
11. Data collection is limited to a few countries. In 2000–01, 5,967 non-EU nurses 
were admitted to the U.K. Nursing and Midwifery Council. Leading sources were the 
Philippines (3,396) and South Africa (1,086) (UKCC 2002). In the U.S., 3.9 percent of 
registered nurses were trained abroad, with the major sources being the Philippines (43 per-
cent), Canada (16.1 percent), the United Kingdom (7.8 percent), and India (9.6 percent). 
In 2001, 13,536 Philippine nurses left for foreign jobs (OECD 2002d). 
12. Germany’s Green Card program aimed to recruit 20,000 non-EU ICT specialists, 
with a university degree in an ICT-related ﬁeld for a promised annual salary of €51,000, 
on ﬁve-year permits. In January 2003, 60,000 applications had been received and 13,600 
cards issued. The program ended in July 2003. ICT professionals have now been removed 
from the UK Shortage Occupation List, which allows for accelerated recruitment of for-
eign workers (OECD 2004a).
13. Temporary programs for seasonal workers, primarily in agriculture, have expanded 
considerably. In the UK, seasonal workers in agriculture numbered 25,000 in 2003; in 
Germany the ﬁgure was 278,000, and in Switzerland 55,000 (2001 ﬁgure). However, in 
the U.S., the numbers of seasonal agricultural workers (H2A visas) fell in 2001 (OECD 
2004a). 
14. This section draws upon McKinsey Global Institute (2003); “India’s plan to 
beat the off-shoring backlash,” Financial Times, 27 January 2004; Mattoo and Wunsch 
(2004). 
15. These balance-of-payments ﬁgures for business services do not capture the full 
value of trade in outsourced services and should be treated as an approximation.
16. Privatization here refers to the entry of private sector ﬁnance—which may be 
domestic or foreign—while liberalization refers to the entry of foreign providers. In many 
developing countries the processes are simultaneous, as foreigners may be the largest avail-
able source of private capital. 
17. Some important work is already under way. In addition to discussions of assess-
ment of trade in services held as part of the negotiations at the WTO, a number of interna-
tional organization are also beginning systematic research into developing country experi-
ence with services liberalization. See, in particular, UNCTAD 2004a. 
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18. In 26 American and Asian economies, telecommunications markets with compe-
tition were the only ones that consistently increased employment levels, while two-thirds 
of the countries with monopolies saw considerable declines in their telecommunications 
workforce (Petrazzini and Lovelock 1996). Competition can also increase employment in 
the incumbent—the Indian incumbent operator expanded its workforce over 1996–2000 
as competition forced it to improve its marketing strategy, expand its network, and open 
thousands of public call ofﬁces all over India (World Bank 2002). 
19. In the long run, increased returns to acquiring skills may encourage greater educa-
tion and training, including through government provision (Winters 2003). 
20. For example, it is estimated that about half of those admitted under the tempo-
rary high-skilled worker program remain in the U.S. as permanent residents (Lowell 2001). 
However, only a relatively small proportion of UK work permit holders seem to settle 
permanently—in 1998, 3,160 work permit holders settled, yet approximately 70,000–
80,000 work permits are approved each year (United Kingdom Home Ofﬁce 2001).
21. These sorts of provisions are included in the agreements between Ecuador and 
Spain and the Canadian Commonwealth, Caribbean, and Mexican Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Programme.
22. A proposed scheme between the Dutch and Polish ministers of health aims to 
prepare Polish nurses to be employed within the Dutch healthcare system for a maximum 
period of two years and to facilitate their return and reintegration into the Polish system 
after their return (OECD, IOM, World Bank 2004).
23. See WTO document S/CSS/W/12, dated 24 November 2000. 
24. The GATS already requires establishment of enquiry points at the national level. 
However, these are single points for all services and, for that reason, have not been very 
effective in providing timely and speciﬁc information.
25. This is a form of the negative-list approach—where all services are deemed to be 
liberalized unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise—which is increasingly used for services in 
RTAs. By contrast, the GATS uses a positive-list approach, where only those sectors explic-
itly included in the commitments are liberalized and no commitments are undertaken for 
sectors not included.
26. Equally, some OECD countries are not seeking commitments from Least Devel-
oped Countries in the current round, while others have simply made a general request that 
they consider market opening in a range of sectors.
27. It must be acknowledged that the absence of GATS commitments may affect the 
ability of the poorest developing countries to attract FDI, by reducing the certainty for 
foreign investors that government policy will not be subject to rapid change. However, this 
is likely to be only one factor in investment decisions in the poorest developing countries.
28. For example, the U.S., Korea, and Estonia specify that their commitments on 
sewerage services are limited to services purchased by private industry, while the EU has 
listed a general carve-out for public utilities. 
29. Under these arrangements a private supplier builds and operates the facilities, 
which are then transferred back to the government after a deﬁned period.
30. This uses three broad categories according to the kind of economic activity 
undertaken: pollution management group; cleaner technologies and products group; and 
resources management group (OECD 2001c).
31. This proposes two categories: environmental infrastructure services—such as 
water supply, wastewater treatment, and solid waste management; and noninfrastructure, 
commercial environmental services—such as air and water pollution control, including 
river restoration and remediation and clean-up of soil. The latter also includes services that 
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are necessary as direct inputs, such as consulting, design and engineering, construction 
and installation, analysis and monitoring, and certiﬁcation services (UNCTAD 2003a).
Chapter 5
1. WTO Members bind—that is, they commit to providing—tariffs at a certain level 
(such as 20 percent) for products identiﬁed using the Harmonized System of tariff lines, 
which classiﬁes products at a range of levels of detail. A tariff binding means that a Mem-
ber cannot raise the tariff above that level without paying compensation to affected trading 
partners. WTO Members often give themselves room to maneuver by committing to a 
bound rate (say, 20 percent) higher than the rate actually applied (say, 10 percent). Bind-
ings can also be phased in, with reductions occurring over a number of years in order to 
reach the ﬁnal bound level by a ﬁxed date. 
2. Note that these are all MFN tariffs; some middle-income and poorest developing 
countries may have reduced their tariffs further in the context of preferential trade agree-
ments. However, such access is obviously not available to all other WTO Members, includ-
ing all other developing countries.
3. These tariffs are zero for LDCs in the EU, U.S., and Canada; however, developing 
countries pay the MFN tariff. 
4. Tariffs on cocoa exports have been eliminated for LDCs under the EU’s Every-
thing But Arms initiative, but this does not apply to large exporters such as Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNCTAD 2003c).
5. Other developed countries, such as Australia, had unilaterally renounced the use 
of textile quotas. 
6. Under the ATC, products are referred to as being “integrated,” that is, they are 
brought under GATT rules, under which quotas are prohibited. 
7. While this table includes agricultural exports, almost three-quarters of total LDC 
exports are accounted for by fuels, apparel, precious stones, and ﬁsh and ﬁsh products 
(WTO 2003a). 
8. Whalley (2002) notes that tariffs, applying only to trade ﬂows (the difference 
between domestic production and consumption), are narrowly based, compared with taxes 
applied to production or consumption taxes. Further, the distortions created by trade taxes 
render them inferior to other ﬁscal policy instruments. 
9. Again, it is important to distinguish among markets for textiles—which include 
ﬁbers, fabrics, and clothing. Developing countries are important exporters of natural ﬁbers, 
but much textile production is capital-intensive and located in developed countries. While 
high-end clothing can be capital-intensive and congregate in clusters in developed coun-
tries (Emilia Romagna in Italy), the bulk of clothing remains labor-intensive and located 
in developed countries.
10. Other winners could be developing country exporters of natural ﬁbers (Pakistan, 
South Africa) as demand expands. Agricultural subsidy reform could increase their gains 
(OECD forthcoming).
11. The vertical specialization index reveals the extent of international production 
networks in the industry by measuring the share of foreign value added in exports.
12. Calls for additional protection need to be seen in light of the fact that several 
developed countries still numbered among the dominant textiles and clothing exporters in 
2002 (Kyvik Nordås 2004). 
13. It should be noted that the Dominican Republic and El Salvador receive prefer-
ential access into the U.S. market under CAFTA, as does Mauritius into the EU under the 
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Cotonou Agreement. Pakistan receives preferential access into the EU related to efforts in 
combating drug trafﬁcking.
14. This agreement was concluded subsequent to the round at the Singapore Ministe-
rial Conference in 1996. There are currently 61 parties to the agreement, accounting for 
more than 95 percent of world trade in information technology products.
Chapter 6
1. Of the transition economies, Poland has been the major initiator (11 cases), fol-
lowed by the Czech Republic (3 cases), with Slovenia and Bulgaria initiating 1 case each.
2. It should be noted that “voluntary” export restraints are banned under WTO 
rules.
3. The International Accreditation Forum (IAF), the International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC), and the ISO Committee on Conformity Assessment 
(ISO CASCO) are heading up a comprehensive initiative to develop international guide-
lines and standards to provide a foundation for communicating procedural requirements 
and for demonstrating competence. The IAF and ILAC are also developing mutual recog-
nition agreements.
4. The examples in the box are drawn from more detailed OECD case stud-
ies on the impact of environmental standards on market access that are available at 
http://webdomino1.oecd.org/comnet/ech/tradeandenv.nsf. Useful UNCTAD case studies 
are available at http://r0.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/openF1.htm. 
5. The problem is not simply entry into developed country markets. Poor information 
and lack of transparency as to standards and testing also hinder trade between developing 
countries.
6. Though government regulations relating to both product and process attributes 
are covered by the SPS and TBT Agreements, some countries have argued that where the 
process attributes are unrelated to the product attributes (that is, some aspect of the pro-
duction process that has no impact on the composition of the ﬁnal product) their coverage 
would imply a major intrusion by trade rules into domestic regulatory territory. 
7. Some developing countries have proposed that a standard only be recognized as 
“international” under the SPS Agreement if a minimum percentage of countries have par-
ticipated in its development and it has been adopted by consensus. Some commentators 
have queried whether this would ultimately be in these countries’ interests, given that 
this additional stringency is likely to result in fewer international standards and thus a 
proliferation of the differing national standards—which the SPS Agreement was partially 
designed to address (Jensen 2002). 
8. Of the 18 SPS dispute settlement cases, only 4 involve developing countries: 2 as a 
defendant (EC-India import restrictions 2002–07, U.S.-Mexico restrictions on live swine); 
1 as a complainant (India-EC import duties on rice); and 1 as both parties (Thailand-
Egypt restrictions on canned tuna).
9. Proposals to increase the effectiveness of the provisions in the TBT and SPS Agree-
ments requiring increased assistance are discussed in chapter 11.
10. This section draws upon Josling (2003), World Bank (2003a), DFID (2002), and 
Rotherham (2003).
Chapter 7
1. India recently brought a dispute against an EU preference scheme arguing that, 
while the Enabling Clause permitted discrimination between developed and developing 
countries for the purposes of providing preferential access to the latter, it did not permit 
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discrimination among developing countries. The EU countered that the Enabling Clause 
was an exception to MFN and therefore nondiscrimination obligations did not apply. 
The Panel agreed with India (WTO 2003e). However, the Appellate Body found that the 
Enabling Clause is an exception to MFN, and that differentiation is not discrimination to 
the extent that it is assessed according to an objective standard (see WTO 2004e).
2. In this way preferences also differ from preferential free trade agreements (FTAs) 
where market access is offered among signatories on a reciprocal basis. Further, FTAs must 
cover “substantially all trade,” while preferences can be limited in their product coverage. 
FTAs are discussed further in chapter 13. However, as discussed below, the foregoing does 
not imply there is no “conditionality.” In practice preference schemes have often been con-
ditional on “performance standards” by the beneﬁciary countries.
3. AGOA also seems to have served as a catalyst for the general expansion of other, 
dutiable textile and apparel exports from Africa (Garay and Cornejo 2002). 
4. Cumulation allows inputs from speciﬁed countries to be treated as coming from 
the preference-receiving countries (inputs from other countries in a given grouping can be 
used without changing the origin of the product). 
5. Preferences under the Cotonou (ACP) conventions are an exception, because that 
is a formal treaty that constrains unilateral actions.
6. Chapter 3 on agriculture notes that the value of preferences can be less than assumed, 
as developing countries gaining preferential access to the protected market ﬁnd themselves 
trying to compete against heavily subsidised domestic producers in a glutted market.
7. For recent proposals for an adjustment facility tied to the implementation of a Doha 
Round set of reforms, see Commonwealth Secretariat (2004), Hoekman (2004), Page and 
Kleen (2004), and Winters (2004a).
8. These include, for example, increased funding for multilateral risk insurance agen-
cies to partially cover noncommercial risk in LDCs; standard noncommercial risk insurance 
policies for LDCs; pooling the capacity of noncommercial risk insurers from developed 
countries in speciﬁc public-private partnerships in developing countries; project-related 
subsidies to cover noncommercial risks (Mistry and Olesen 2003).
9. See Rodriguez-Clare (2004), Hoekman and Javorcik (2004), and Hoekman, 
Maskus, and Saggi (2004) for more discussion.
Chapter 8
1. There have been a number of analyses and suggestions developed in the literature 
on criteria to be used to determine inclusion of subjects on the WTO agenda. Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2004) argue that issues should be included on the agenda of a development round 
only if they score highly on three criteria: the relevance of the issue to trade ﬂows; its devel-
opment friendliness; and the existence of a rationale for collective action. See Finger (2002), 
Maskus (2002), and Bagwell and Staiger (2003) for additional argument and suggestions.
Chapter 9
1. For example, national enforcement (or nonenforcement) of antitrust laws could 
impede effective market entry (contestability of the market) by foreign suppliers. That 
is, private business practices (abuse of dominance) might nullify the expected beneﬁts 
of negotiated trade liberalization commitments. However, market access concerns were 
largely abandoned in the course of the WTO discussions—see Hoekman and Saggi (2004) 
for a fuller discussion.
2. All of the excluded Singapore issues have been the subject of analyses that use 
these criteria. See World Bank (2003a) on investment; Evenett (2003) on transparency in 
Notes316
government procurement; Hoekman and Saggi (2004) on competition policy; and Maskus 
(2000), Winters (2003), and Stiglitz and Carleton (2004) on all three. 
3. The existing plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement covers both mar-
ket access and transparency. The transparency provisions mainly emphasize publication 
of tenders and notiﬁcation of regulations to the WTO; ex post norms are relatively weak. 
This agreement currently has 26 members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, EU, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liech-
tenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. China, Iceland, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Panama, and Taiwan (China) are negotiating accession, in some cases as 
part of WTO accession, but the current membership is limited to high-income countries.
4. The WCO’s International Convention on the Simpliﬁcation and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures—the Kyoto Convention—comprises a set of principles and 31 annexes 
that lay out standards and best practices for customs procedures and related arrangements. 
5. “Concessions” are something of a misnomer, as what is being exchanged are things 
that it is in a country’s own interest to do in any event.
Chapter 10
1. On the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, see UNCTAD and ITCSD 
(2003). 
2. While TRIPS essentially codiﬁed a number of preexisting treaties of the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), there are important differences between the WIPO 
Paris Convention on Industrial Property and TRIPS. Unlike TRIPS, the WIPO treaty allows 
countries considerable discretion to exempt a range of subject matter from patent protection, 
and many countries had excluded inventions relating to public health. The Paris Convention 
also affords governments greater ﬂexibility in requiring the compulsory license of patents. 
Not all countries were signatories to the Paris Convention (Lehman 2002).
3. For a more detailed analysis of these provisions, see UNCTAD-ICTSD (2003). 
4. This section draws on Brown (2003).
5. This option is not wholly unrealistic, however. The Indian drugmaker Cipla is cur-
rently exploring the possibility of investing in Bangladesh, precisely to take advantage of 
Bangladesh being an LDC and not subject to the 2005 deadline.
6. See Dispute between European Communities and its Member States and Canada: 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DSB114/R, dated 17 March 2000.
7. The Doha Declaration referred to a very precise problem—the “difﬁculty in mak-
ing effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.” 
8. These are Hong Kong (China); Israel; Kuwait; Macao (China); Mexico; Qatar; the 
Republic of Korea; Singapore; Taiwan (China); Turkey; and United Arab Emirates. 
9. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.
10. For a detailed analysis of the Canadian and U.S. practice of compulsory licensing, 
see Reichman and Hasenzahl (2002a, 2002b) and UNCTAD-ICTSD (2003).
11. There is a clear market failure for drugs in developing countries. The hope that 
IPR protection would provide a ﬁnancial incentive to drug ﬁrms to invest in drugs for 
tropical diseases has not materialized; during the last decade, research and development for 
developing country diseases has declined rather than increased. In 1975–99 only 1 percent 
of 1,191 new drugs approved for marketing were speciﬁcally indicated for a tropical disease. 
Poor countries do not constitute a market capable of inducing patent-driven investment 
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(Lehman 2002). The global market for pharmaceuticals was estimated at $406 billion in 
2002, with the U.S., EU, and Japan accounting for 80 percent of this market and the rest 
of the world combined for only 20 percent (IMS Health 2001). 
12. Escudero (2001) points out that wines have even stronger protection than spirits 
through protection against homonymous indications (TRIPS Article 23.3).
13. This section draws extensively on Maskus (2003).
14. See Maskus (2000) for evidence in Lebanon and Maskus, Dougherty, and Mertha 
(1998) for China.
15. Put in more technical terms, ﬁrms availing themselves of a GI may have incentives 
to cheat on its reputation individually, with a joint “prisoner’s dilemma” outcome of eroded 
quality over time. The evident solution to this free-riding is a coordinated strategy within 
producer coalitions or associations that provides implicit or explicit punishments to defec-
tors. Such associations may themselves be exclusionary, of course.
Chapter 11
1. The ability to provide such subsidies is of course constrained by lack of resources 
within countries. The need for assistance to help developing countries manage adjustment 
is discussed in chapter 12. 
2. It should be noted, however, that Nepal, in its protocol of accession to the WTO, 
secured a commitment from Japan to provide technical assistance on the implementation 
of the TBT Agreement. WTO Members also committed to provide Nepal with technical 
assistance for the implementation of the SPS, TRIPS, and Customs Valuation Agreements. 
3. The absence of requests for assistance under the existing TBT provisions should be 
analyzed and better understood in this regard. One reason is likely to be that governments 
know there are very few if any resources available and therefore approach bilateral donors 
directly.
4. http://www.standardsfacility.org/.
5. See, for example, Stevens (2002, 2003), Prowse (2002), Wang and Winters (1999), 
Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and Winters (2003), Hoekman (2004), Messerlin (2003), 
Mattoo and Subramanian (2004), and Page and Kleen (2004).
Chapter 12
1. For example, the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management seeks 
to establish market-based price insurance schemes that would reduce the price risk that 
farmers (especially the poor) have to shoulder in exporting cash crops. 
2. See Anderson (2004) for a review of the estimates in the literature.
3. This section draws on Jha (2003).
Chapter 13
1. Many countries have reformed their trade well before they joined FTAs: Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey are salient examples (Foroutan 1998). Many African FTA 
members, and some in Latin America, have not reformed. And plenty of countries have 
reformed without joining FTAs: Chile (in the 1970s and 1980s), the Republic of Korea, 
Indonesia, and China (Schiff and Winters 2003).
Appendix 4
1. China’s average real GDP growth between 1991 and 2000 is estimated at 10.1 
percent, India’s at 5.5 percent (World Bank 2003).
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Appendix 5
1. This appendix draws on Nielson and Taglioni (2003) and Nielson (forthcoming). 
Material on the request-offer negotiations is adapted from the WTO website.
2. The Council for Trade in Services includes representatives of all WTO Members. 
It normally meets around four times a year. The WTO Secretariat serves as the Secretariat 
to the Council and its subsidiary bodies: the Working Party on Domestic Regulation; the 
Committee on Financial Services; the Working Party on GATS Rules; and the Committee 
on Speciﬁc Commitments. 
3. A WTO Member’s mode 4 commitments relate to the acceptance of foreign service 
suppliers into its territory, not the sending of its own nationals abroad as service suppliers. 
Similarly, mode 2 commitments relate to the movement of its own nationals abroad to 
consume services, not the acceptance of foreign consumers into its territory.
4. There are currently about 425 MFN exemptions notiﬁed by WTO Members, 
around half reﬂecting bilateral or plurilateral agreements among WTO Members.
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